Plotinus on *Eudaimonia*

A Commentary on Ennead *I. 4*

Translation and Commentary
by
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to the memory of
Gerard Watson

Preface

This book began life as a Ph.D. thesis written between 1988 and 1992 under the supervision of the late Professor Gerard Watson. It was submitted in 1992 to the Department of Ancient Classics at St Patrick's College, Maynooth; now NUI Maynooth. When I began the thesis there were few full-length commentaries on individual treatises of the *Enneads* available in English, and much of what had been written on Plotinus in English did not concern itself directly with his ethical theory. It seemed to me that a commentary on treatise 46, ΠΕΡΙ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΣ, was a project worth attempting. The result is the first full-length English commentary on ΠΕΡΙ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΣ.

The current work has been thoroughly updated since its completion as a thesis in 1992, and I hope that it has lost, to some degree at least, its Ph.D. appearance. I have been able to take on board more recent commentaries by Paul Kalligas (1994) and Alessandro Linguiti (2000), as well as the work of Alexandrine Schniewind on the Plotinian *Spoudaios* (2003), and on Plotinus' ethical theory (2005). The book, however, undoubtedly still shows its great debt to the translations of both Stephen MacKenna and A. Hilary Armstrong, my first guides through the writings of Plotinus. I have, of course, many other debts to acknowledge. Principally I am indebted to the late Professor Gerard Watson, without whose encouragement and support the Ph.D. would never have been begun, nor indeed, finished. Little did I know what I was getting into when I began my study, and many times, like W. B. Yeats before me, I wanted to 'mock Plotinus' thought and cry in Plato's teeth'. Throughout my times of crisis Professor Watson's direction was kind and astute, and his support constant. To his memory the book is fondly dedicated.

I am grateful to many other people for their help in the writing of this book. Principally I thank George Huxley who read the manuscript through in its entirety and improved it enormously. I am also indebted to the following individuals who read sections of the text and saved me from a number of errors. I list them in no particular order: John Dillon, Gerard O'Daly, John Cleary, Gillian Clark, and

Stephen Clark. I thank also the following at Oxford University Press: Hilary O'Shea, Dorothy McCarthy, Enid Barker, Kathleen McLaughlin, and especially the anonymous readers at Oxford University Press whose feedback helped me to improve the book by making me rethink certain ideas that had been long settled in my mind. The book has benefited greatly from the copy-editing skills of Tom Chandler. I am also grateful to my colleagues, and former colleagues, at NUI Maynooth, especially Isabel Torrance, for their help. I must also thank my family and friends for their support, and especially my wife, Linda Hogan, who will be as happy that this book is finished as I am.

K.McG.

Maynooth,
2005

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Abbreviations

ANRW	*Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* (1972–)
B/R	Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. C. Rowe comm. S. Broadie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
B/T	R. Harder, *Plotinus Schriften* (contd. by Beutler and Theiler) (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1956–71). Throughout the commentary I refer to Beutler and Theiler, except where they indicate that the comment belongs to Harder; then I refer simply to Harder.
Comm. Not.	Plutarch, *Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions*, ed. and trans. H. Cherniss (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press and Heinemann, 1976).
Disc.	Epictetus, *Discourses*, ed. and trans. W. A. Oldfather, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press and Heinemann, 1925–8).
DL	Diogenes Laertius
EE	Aristotle, *Ethica Eudemia*, ed. R. R. Walzer and J. M. Mingay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
EN	Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, ed. I. Bywater (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894).
H/S^1	*Plotini Opera*, *editio maior*, ed. P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer, 3 vols. (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1951–73).
H/S^2	*Plotini Opera*, *editio minor*, ed. P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer, 3 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964–82).
L/S	*The Hellenistic Philosophers*, ed., trans., and comm. A. A. Long and D. Sedley, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
Lexicon Plot.	*Lexicon Plotinianum*, ed. J. H. Sleeman and G. Pollet (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980).
R-E	A. Paully, G. Wissowa, and W. Kroll, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (1893–).
SVF	J. von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* (Leipzig: 1905–24, vol. iv indices by M. Adler, Leipzig: 1924).

Tusc. Disp.	Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, ed. and trans. J. E. King (rev. edn. Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press and Heinemann, 1945).
VP	*Vita Plotini*

Introduction

PLOTINUS AND *ENNEAD* I. 4 [46]

The general story of Plotinus' life does not need to be retold here in any great detail. It can be found in Porphyry's *Life of Plotinus* in volume one of Hilary Armstrong's translation of the *Enneads* published in the Loeb series.[1] Plotinus was born in Lycopolis (modern Assuit), in AD 204.[2] He began to study philosophy at the age of 27, settling down in Alexandria under the tutorship of Ammonius Saccas (*VP* 3 . 7). In 242 when he was 39, he enlisted in the army of the emperor Gordian III for the expedition to the East. When Gordian was murdered in Mesopotamia in 244, Plotinus barely escaped with his life. He made his way to Antioch before finally settling in Rome at the age of 40. He set up a school there and began teaching. At first he wrote nothing,[3] but in 254 he began to write down the material that came up in discussion in the school. By the time Porphyry, his biographer, arrived in 262–3, Plotinus had completed twenty-one treatises. Plotinus wrote another twenty-four treatises during the six years that Porphyry was with him in Rome, so that by 267–8 he had completed forty-five treatises. Porphyry then left for Sicily, and while he was away Plotinus wrote the final nine treatises of the collection that has come down to us as the *Enneads*. At the time of writing the last nine treatises, Plotinus was in very poor health. He left Rome for Campania where he died in 270 (see *VP* 4–6).

[1] See also the translation of Porphyry's *Life* by S. MacKenna, 4th edn. (published with *Plotinus: The* Enneads) by Faber and Faber (1969), revised for Penguin by J. Dillon (1991): and, more recently, M. Edwards, *Neoplatonic Saints: The Lives of Plotinus and Proclus by their Students* (2000), 1–53, which has a translation of the text with full notes. In general one might consult also L. Brisson, *et al.*, *Porphyre, La Vie de Plotin*, i and ii (1982, 1992).

[2] See the Appendix on the chronology of Porphyry's *Life* in Edwards, *Neoplatonic Saints*, 117–19.

[3] See M. D. Grmek, 'Les Maladies et la Mort de Plotin', in Brisson *et al.*, *Porphyre, La Vie de Plotin*, ii. 335–53.

Ennead I. 4 [46] *Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας*, is the forty-sixth treatise as listed in Porphyry's chronological ordering of Plotinus' writings. It was sent to Porphyry in Sicily in 268–9, in the first year of the reign of the emperor Claudius II, at a very late stage in Plotinus' life (*VP* 6. 1–5). The treatise, indeed, bears all the marks of having been written at a time when he was ill and awaiting death.[4] One feels the weight of his illness throughout the treatise. Certainly, in comparison to the treatises of the middle period, *Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας* is dry, and repetitive in places, lacking the style and intensity of those earlier writings. Porphyry himself concedes that in the last nine treatises Plotinus' waning powers are noticeable (*VP* 6. 34–7).

PLOTINUS AND HIS PREDECESSORS

Plotinus' place in the philosophical tradition is already well documented.[5] There is no doubt that Plotinus was well versed in the writings of his predecessors. We know that he had commentaries read out in his seminars of middle Platonists like Severus, Gaius, and Atticus, and also of Pythagoreans such as Cronius and Numenius. Commentaries on Aristotle by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Aspasius, Adrastus, and others, were also used as starting points for discussion (*VP* 14. 11–14).[6] Porphyry informs us that the *Enneads* are, in fact, full of concealed Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines (*VP* 14. 4–5). Plotinus was obviously familiar with Aristotle's own writings and, as this commentary makes clear, he was very familiar with the writings of Epictetus. Indeed, when taking account of Stoic arguments, it seems often that Plotinus is responding directly to Epictetus' *Discourses*.[7]

[4] See D. O'Brien, 'Plotin et le voeu de silence' in Brisson *et al.*, *Porphyre, La Vie de Plotin*, ii. 419–59.

[5] See P. Henry, 'The Place of Plotinus in the History of Thought', pp. xxxv–lxx in MacKenna, *Plotinus* (1969), repr. also in Dillon (1991).

[6] For a comprehensive account of Plotinus' school, see M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, 'L'arrière-plan scolaire de la *Vie de Plotin*', in Brisson *et al.*, *La Vie de Plotin*, i. 231–80.

[7] Plotinus' familiarity with the writings of Epictetus has already been noted by A. Graeser, *Plotinus and the Stoics*, (1972), 82.

A philosophical school frequently omitted in discussions concerning Plotinus and his predecessors is that of Epicureanism. Epicureanism in the third century AD, however, was not as dead as is generally supposed. Although Plotinus does not take their arguments as seriously as those of Aristotle or the Stoics, he does think Epicureanism sufficiently important to criticize it.[8]

ENNEAD I. 4 [46]

Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας is concerned with a topic that, more and more, began to occupy Plotinus in his final years in which his health continued to deteriorate. In this treatise he explains how one must live the life of the higher soul in *Nous* while paying as little attention as possible to the needs of the combination of body and soul. The treatise is written from the vantage point of the man who has achieved excellence, the *spoudaios*, who has become self-conscious on the hypostatic level of *Nous*, where he enjoys fullest life. Consequently in chapter 1 Plotinus criticizes his predecessors for not linking *eudaimonia* directly to fullest life, the life of *Nous*. Their attempts to link *eudaimonia* to proper function, he insists, present the possibility of extending *eudaimonia* to the lower living things, such as plants and non-rational animals. In chapter 2 Plotinus accepts that the Stoics are on the right track when they see rationality as an important asset in the acquisition of *eudaimonia*, but since reason for them is tied to a sensory reality, they have no satisfactory explanation, in his view, for asserting its importance in relation to the good for man.

Chapters 3 and 4 establish that the highest good for man is founded on his ability to live at the level of *Nous*. This involves much more than the mere presence of rationality; it involves a metaphysical ascent to one's higher soul, which remains always on the hypostatic level of *Nous*. Chapters 3 and 4 explain that in *Nous* one finds the totality of life, that is, perfect life, which lacks nothing, and that it is in possession of this perfect life that man is *eudaimōn*.

[8] In ch. 2 of this treatise, Plotinus, it seems to me, is alluding to Epicurus.

Chapters 5 through to 8 then explain how the *eudaimōn* is not subject to vicissitudes that assail the combination of the body and lower soul. Peripatetic objections that the *eudaimonia* of the *spoudaios* can be disrupted through changes of fortune with regard to the body and soul combination, are refuted on the ground that the *spoudaios* lives on an ontological level above that on which the body and soul combination operates. The Stoics, in their turn, are criticized for their claim that the sage is invulnerable to bad fortune while at the same time confining him to the same ontological level as that on which bad fortune operates. The ability of the *spoudaios* to remain *eudaimōn* in the face of disturbances in the temporal world, whether this involved specific ailments with regard to his own body, or disturbances in general, became a common topic in Plotinus' later writings. The two treatises that follow *Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας* chronologically, 46 and 47, *On Providence* I and II, and Plotinus' final short treatise, number 54, *On the first Good*, are concerned, in particular, to make clear that while the temporal world is full of apparent evils and man seems at the mercy of random chance, nothing bad can happen to the *spoudaios* who has achieved excellence and lives the noetic life.

Chapters 9 and 10, perhaps the most complex chapters in the treatise, explore in more detail how consciousness at the level of the higher soul alone constitutes *eudaimonia* for man. We are told there that the activity of the higher soul in *Nous* continues regardless of whether or not any image of it presents itself to the faculty of imagination which in turns creates a *phantasma* and thus makes itself available to the combination of the body and lower soul. Plotinus is concerned to show that consciousness of this higher self, on the level of the combination, is irrelevant to the *eudaimonia* of the *spoudaios*. Indeed, as the examples in the later part of chapter 10 show, consciousness of this higher activity may even enfeeble it. The activity of our higher soul is in fact most pure when it is not spilt out into the faculty of imagination.

The remaining chapters make clear that the body attached to the *spoudaios* does indeed belong to him and that he has a certain responsibility towards it, but he is other than it, and is free to abandon it when he can no longer make any progress in it. It is understandable that *Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας* concludes by presenting a view concerning the legitimacy of suicide that is slightly at odds with what

Plotinus has to say about suicide in earlier treatises. It seems clear from this late treatise that Plotinus' deteriorating physical condition persuaded him to allow more freedom to the putative suicide than he had heretofore.

PLOTINUS THE *SPOUDAIOS*?

Porphyry's *Life* presents, among other things, an account of Plotinus' behaviour in his normal everyday activity. Plotinus in the *Life* is portrayed as an ordinary man surrounded by friends, ranging from the emperor Gallienus and his wife Salonina, to the women in whose house he lived. According to Porphyry he ran a sort of orphanage (*VP* 9. 6). He looked after the property of other people, when it was entrusted to him, and took care that he was accurate in such matters (*VP* 9. 13). He was clearly a worldly man who interacted with people in a normal manner. Porphyry also says that he was gentle, and at the disposal of all who had any sort of acquaintance with him (*VP* 9. 19).

However there seems to be a certain contradiction in this portrait of Plotinus when set against the *spoudaios* and his requirements for living life in *Nous* as outlined in *Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας*. The ambiguity here has been noted by a number of scholars.[9] A number of attempts have been made to reconcile this apparent contradiction.[10] Smith[11] has argued that the lower ethical life of the *spoudaios* in the temporal world will be informed by his higher life in *Nous*, and thus he will be

[9] See J. M. Rist, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality*, (1967) 163; P. Plass, 'Plotinus' Ethical Theory', (1982), 253; R. Ferwerda, 'Pity in the Life and Thought of Plotinus', (1984), 58; L. Westra, *Plotinus and Freedom*, (1989), 127; J. Bussanich, 'The Invulnerability of Goodness: The Ethical and Psychological Theory of Plotinus', (1990), 182; J. Dillon, 'An Ethic for the Late Antique Sage', (1996), 320; A. Smith, 'The Significance of Practical Ethics for Plotinus' (1999), 228–230; K. McGroarty, 'The Ethics of Plotinus' (2001), 28–33; and most recently A. Schniewind, *L'Éthique du Sage chez Plotin: le Paradigme du Spoudaios*, (2003), 13–28, who looks at the history of the scholarship concerning this particular problem.

[10] See Rist, *Road to Reality*, 163–4, and A. Schniewind, *L'Éthique du Sage chez Plotin*, 171–97.

[11] Smith, 'Significance of Practical Ethics', 235.

guided in his ethical activity. It may indeed be the case that the *spoudaios* engages with his fellow men because his ethical activity is guided by principles from *Nous*,[12] but Plotinus does not tell us this in *Ennead* I. 4 [46] where one might expect him to do so. Indeed he does not tell us this specifically anywhere in the *Enneads*. At no point are we instructed to be the compassionate man that Plotinus obviously was; in fact, in places the philosophy of the *Enneads* suggests the opposite to compassion: 'If some boys, who have kept their bodies in good training, but are inferior in soul to their bodily condition because of lack of education, win a wrestle with others who are trained neither in body or soul and grab their food and their dainty clothes, would the affair be anything but a joke?' (*Ennead* III. 2 [47] 8. 16–21). Therefore it is not clear to me how Plotinus the philosopher can be easily reconciled with Plotinus the man, as he appears in Porphyry's *Life*. The problem is this: the imperative of the *Enneads* is that we must try to bring back the god in us to the divine in the All (*VP* 2. 26). This would, one imagines, demand a somewhat reclusive lifestyle for the sage. This does not seem to be the lifestyle that emerges from Porphyry's biography. If we are to regard Plotinus as a *spoudaios*, it may be that we have to accept that he did not always preach what he practised.[13]

[12] The *spoudaios* can certainly operate on two different levels. There is no doubt that this is what is suggested by Porphyry when he tells us: 'even if he was talking to someone, engaged in continuous conversation, he kept to his train of thought. He could take his necessary part in the conversation to the full, and at the same time keep his mind fixed without a break on what he was considering. When the person he had been talking to was gone he did not go over what he had written . . . he went straight on with whatever came next. In this way he was present at once to himself and others, and he never relaxed his self turned attention except in sleep' (*VP* 8. 13–22).

[13] See the references to other scholars who support this viewpoint in McGroarty, 'The Ethics of Plotinus', 28–33.

TEXT AND TRANSLATIONS

The Greek text used is from volume 1 of the *editio minor* of P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer with the corrections in the *addenda ad textum* in volume 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964–82). The few *addenda* in volume 3 are given in this footnote and are reflected in the text, translation, and discussed in the commentary.[14] The commentary is essentially philosophical. The few changes that I have suggested are listed in this footnote[15] and explained in the commentary. The translation of *Ennead* I. 4 [46] *Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας* is my own. All other translations from the *Enneads* are by A. H. Armstrong from the seven-volume Loeb edition (Cambridge, 1966–89), adapted where indicated. When I refer to Armstrong, B/T, Bréhier, Bouillet, Cilento, Harder, Igal, Kalligas, Kirchhoff, Linguiti, Llorens, MacKenna, Müller, or Volkmann, I am referring to their translations or/and comments on *Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας*. Full details are available in the bibliography. Translations of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* are by S. Broadie and C. Rowe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); of Aristotle's *Eudemian Ethics* are by H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press and Heinemann, 1952); of Epictetus' *Discourses* are by W. A. Oldfather (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press and Heinemann, 1925–8); of Marcus Aurelius' *Meditations* are by A. S. L. Farquharson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944); of Plato's dialogues are by E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). In the case of all the above translations I have indicated where they have been adapted. Other translations are acknowledged, and if unacknowledged, then they are my own.

[14] 2.9 *προσλαμβάνειν*, *εἰ* 2.9–10 [*ἢ καταστάσει*] 2.11 *αἰσθήσει*; 3.25 *τὸ εὖ*, 8.3–4 *ἔσται* < *καὶ* > *ἐν τῷ ἀλγεῖν*, *ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτοῦ* [*καὶ ἐν τῷ*] *ἔνδον φέγγος οἷον* 8.12 [*οὔτε ἀλγεινὰ*] 12.11 *περὶ τὸν* [*σπουδαῖον*].

[15] Ch. 8. 12: Remove the square brackets from *οὔτε ἀλγεινὰ*. Ch. 8. 13: Read *ἂν* for *γὰρ*. Chapter 10. 3: Read *δεῖ* not *δοκεῖ*. Chapter 13. 8: Supply comma after *ἡδὺ*. Chapter 16. 5: Supply comma after *διδοὺς*.

A NOTE ON TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION

My translation of *Ennead* I. 4 is quite literal throughout. In attempting to present what Plotinus actually says, I have sacrificed style for accuracy. Throughout I have transliterated *eudaimonia* and *Nous*, since there is no single English equivalent that captures the meaning of these terms. Neither happiness, nor well-being accurately reflect what is meant by *eudaimonia*, which is achieved when one becomes conscious in one's higher soul at the level of *Nous*. For the same reason I have retained *Nous* in place of the traditional translation 'Intellect'. In my translation of I. 4 I have retained *spoudaios* for the wise man or sage. Finally, in chapter 10, I have transliterated *phantasmata* for the products of imagination. A translation such as 'mind-pictures' does not suffice, since the products of imagination include what one cannot rightfully describe as mind-pictures. Throughout I capitalize 'Good' when it is clear that Plotinus is referring to the transcendental One; I use the lower case 'good' when I think Plotinus is referring only to the good for man or the good for other living things.

Sigla

H	Scriba in scribendo
H^{s}	Scriba in scribendo supra lineam
H^{mg}	Scriba in scribendo in margine
$H^{\gamma\rho}$	Scriba in scribendo praemisso γρ(άφεται)
$H^{\gamma\rho s}$	Scriba in scribendo supra lineam praemisso γρ(άφεται)
$H^{\gamma\rho mg}$	Scriba in scribendo in margine praemisso γρ(άφεται)
H^{ec}	Ipse probabiliter scriba a correctione
H^{ac}	Ante correctionem
H^{pc}	Post correctionem
H^{1}	Reuisor non certo distinctus a scriba
H^{2}	Reuisor certo distinctus a scriba
H^{3}	Reuisor ab H, H^{1}, H^{2} distinctus
H^{1-2}	H^{1} uel H^{2}
καὶ^{1}	καὶ prima uice in contextu
μ^{2}	Littera μ secunda uice in uocabulo de quo agitur
w	Consensus codicum eiusdem classis qui in apparatus testium afferuntur
Enn.	Enneadum archetypus
Vita	Vitae Plotini archetypus
Pinax	Index omnium titulorum primae Enneadi praemissus
Summ.	Summarium, id est index titulorum cuique Enneadi praemissus
γρ.	γράφεται
ἴσ.	ἴσως
[σῶμα]	Interpolatio delenda
< ψυχὴ >	Additio
νέκυες	Quae ad uerbum citat Plotinus, diductis litteris scripsimus
†	Locus nondum sanatus
=	Fons ex quo Plotinus quamquam liberius citans tamen dubium non est quin hauriat
cf.	Locus ad quem alludere uidetur

Codices

FAMILIA W

A	Laurentianus 87. 3
F	Parisinus Gr. 1816
	Marcianus Gr. 241
E	Parisinus Gr. 1976

FAMILIA X

B	Laurentianus 85. 15
R	Vaticanus Reginensis Gr. 97
J	Parisinus Gr. 2082

FAMILIA Y

U	Vaticanus Vrbinas Gr. 62
	Cizensis 63
S	Berolinensis Gr. 375
C	Monacensis Gr. 449
M	Marcianus Gr. 240

FAMILIA Z

Q	Marcianus Gr. 242
L	Ambrosianus Gr. 667

FAMILIA D

D Marcianus Gr. 209

Omnes editores	Consensus septem priorum editorum qui sunt Perna, Creuzer, Kirchhoff, Müller, Volkmann, Bréhier, Faggin.
H/S[1]	*Plotini opera,* ed. P. Henry et H.-R. Schwyzer, editio maior, tomus I, 1951.

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TEXT AND TRANSLATION

I 4 (46)
ΠΕΡΙ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΣ

1. *Τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τιθέμενοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ἆρα τούτων μεταδώσομεν; εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ᾗ πεφύκασιν ἀνεμποδίστως διεξάγειν, κἀκεῖνα τί κωλύει ἐν εὐζωΐᾳ λέγειν εἶναι; καὶ γὰρ εἴτε ἐν εὐπαθείᾳ τὴν εὐζωΐαν τις θήσεται, εἴτε ἐν ἔργῳ οἰκείῳ τελειουμένῳ, κατ' ἄμφω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὑπάρξει. καὶ γὰρ εὐπαθεῖν ἐνδέχοιτο ἂν καὶ ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἔργῳ εἶναι· οἷον καὶ τὰ μουσικὰ τῶν ζῴων ὅσα τοῖς τε ἄλλοις εὐπαθεῖ καὶ δὴ καὶ ᾄδοντα ᾗ πέφυκε καὶ ταύτῃ αἱρετὴν αὐτοῖς τὴν ζωὴν ἔχει. καὶ τοίνυν καὶ εἰ τέλος τι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τιθέμεθα, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔσχατον τῆς ἐν φύσει ὀρέξεως, καὶ ταύτῃ ἂν αὐτοῖς μεταδοίημεν τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν εἰς ἔσχατον ἀφικνουμένων, εἰς ὃ ἐλθοῦσιν ἵσταται ἡ ἐν αὐτοῖς φύσις πᾶσαν ζωὴν αὐτοῖς διεξελθοῦσα καὶ πληρώσασα ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος. εἰ δέ τις δυσχεραίνει τὸ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας καταφέρειν εἰς τὰ ζῷα τὰ ἄλλα—οὕτω γὰρ ἂν καὶ τοῖς ἀτιμοτάτοις αὐτῶν μεταδώσειν· μεταδώσειν δὲ καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς ζῶσι καὶ αὐτοῖς καὶ ζωὴν ἐξελιττομένην εἰς τέλος ἔχουσι—πρῶτον μὲν ἄτοπος*

Enn. = w(= AE) x(= BRJ) y(= USC) Q

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1. 1–5 cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic. A* 8. $1098^{b}21$ et *Stoic. Vet. Fr.* iii, n. 17   3 cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic. H* 14. $1153^{b}11$ 6 cf. ibid. *B* 5. $1106^{a}23$–24 et *K* 7. $1177^{a}16$–17   10 cf. ibid. *K* 6. $1176^{a}31$ 11–12 cf. *Stoic. Vet. Fr.* iii, n. 3   17 cf. Sext. Empir. *Adu. Math.* xi. 97

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1. 1 *τὸ*[2] om. *Vita* 6. 6   3 *ᾗ*: *ἢ* R   4 *ἐν* $A^{pc}B^{pc}J^{pc}$(*ἐν* in ras.)yQ^{pc}: *εἰ ἐν* A^{ac}(*εἰ* eras.)EB^{ac}(*εἰ* cancell.)RJ^{ac}Q(*εἰ* exp.)   5 *γὰρ* om. y   6 *τελειουμένω* y: *τελουμένω* wxQ   10 *ἔχειν* y   14 *αὐτοῖς*[2]: *αὐτῆς* Kirchhoff

Ennead I. 4 [46]
Peri Eudaimonias

1. In saying that living well and *eudaimonia* are in the same thing, will we also be giving [a share] of them to the other living things? For if they are able to live out a life natural to them without impediment, what stops us saying that they too are [in possession of] a good life? For whether one sets the good life in good experience or in the completion of one's appropriate function, in both cases it will be available to the other living things too. For it would be possible to undergo both good experiences and to function in accordance with one's nature; like musical animals who undergo good experiences in other ways, and, moreover, sing as is in their nature and in this way have the life preferable to them. And then, also, if we suppose *eudaimonia* to be in a particular end, which is the final point of desire in [some thing's] nature; here also we must grant to them [the possibility of] *eudaimonia* when they arrive at this final point; when they reach it, the nature in them comes to a stop, having gone through a complete life-cycle and having fulfilled it from beginning to end. But if someone is disgusted at bringing down *eudaimonia* to the other living things—for thus one would have to allow it to the least valued of them; one would have to allow it to plants, for they too live and have a life which unfurls to an end—first,

διὰ τί εἶναι οὐ δόξει μὴ ζῆν εὖ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα λέγων, ὅτι μὴ πολλοῦ ἄξια αὐτῷ δοκεῖ εἶναι; τοῖς δὲ φυτοῖς οὐκ ἀναγκάζοιτο ἂν διδόναι ὃ τοῖς ἅπασι ζῴοις δίδωσιν, ὅτι μὴ αἴσθησις πάρεστιν αὐτοῖς. εἴη δ᾽ ἄν τις ἴσως καὶ ὁ διδοὺς τοῖς φυτοῖς, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ζῆν· ζωὴ δὲ ἡ μὲν εὖ ἂν εἴη, ἡ δὲ τοὐναντίον· οἷον ἔστι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φυτῶν εὐπαθεῖν καὶ μή, καρπὸν αὖ φέρειν καὶ μὴ φέρειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡδονὴ τὸ τέλος καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὸ εὖ ζῆν, ἄτοπος ὁ ἀφαιρούμενος τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τὸ εὖ ζῆν· καὶ εἰ ἀταραξία δὲ εἴη, ὡσαύτως· καὶ εἰ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν δὲ λέγοιτο τὸ εὖ ζῆν εἶναι.

2. Τοῖς μέντοι φυτοῖς διὰ τὸ μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐ διδόντες κινδυνεύσουσιν οὐδὲ τοῖς ζῴοις ἤδη ἅπασι διδόναι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο λέγουσι, τὸ τὸ πάθος μὴ λανθάνειν, δεῖ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ πάθος πρὸ τοῦ μὴ λανθάνειν, οἷον τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν, κἂν λανθάνῃ, καὶ οἰκεῖον εἶναι, κἂν μήπω γινώσκῃ ὅτι οἰκεῖον καὶ ὅτι ἡδύ· δεῖ γὰρ ἡδὺ εἶναι. ὥστε ἀγαθοῦ τούτου ὄντος καὶ παρόντος ἤδη ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ εὖ τὸ ἔχον. ὥστε τί δεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν προσλαμβάνειν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα οὐκέτι τῷ γινομένῳ πάθει [ἢ καταστάσει] τὸ ἀγαθὸν διδόασιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ γνώσει καὶ αἰσθήσει; ἀλλ᾽ οὕτω γε τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτὴν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐροῦσι καὶ ἐνέργειαν ζωῆς αἰσθητικῆς· ὥστε καὶ ὁτουοῦν ἀντιλαμβανομένοις. εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν λέγουσιν, οἷον αἰσθήσεως τοιούτου, πῶς ἑκατέρου ἀδιαφόρου ὄντος

1. 21–24 cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* *A* 6. 1097b33–1098a2 26 cf. Aristipp. apud Diog. Laert. 2. 88 28 cf. Epicurus, *Epist.* iii = Diog. Laert. x. 128 29 cf. *Stoic. Vet. Fr.* i, n. 183 **2.** 1 cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* *K* 9. 1178b28 3–4 cf. Plat. *Phileb.* 33 d 8–9

1. 23 *ὁ* om. Q 25 *τῶν* y: om. wxQ 25–26 *καὶ μή* Exy: *καὶ* A: *καὶ μή, καὶ* Kirchhoff 29 *ζῆν δὲ* transp. Q **2.** 2 *κινδυνεύσουσιν* ERJU: *κινδυνεύουσιν* ABSCQ 3 *τὸ τὸ πάθος* wRJQ: *τὸ πάθος* B[ac](alterum *τὸ* B[1s])y 9 *οὐκέτι* Theiler: *οὐκ ἐν* wBJyQ: *ἐν* R

why will he not seem absurd in saying that the other living things do not live well, because he doesn't think them to be worth much? One would not be forced to give to plants that which one gives to all [the other] living things, because sense-perception is not present in them. But perhaps there might be someone who would allow [the possibility of *eudaimonia*] to plants, since indeed they have life. For the life could be good or the opposite; for instance, plants can undergo good experiences or not, they can bear fruit or not. If, then, pleasure is the end and living well is in it, he who deprives the other living things of living well is absurd; and if tranquillity is [the end sought] the same thing applies; and if someone should say that living well is the life according to nature.

2. So those who do not allow [*eudaimonia*] to plants because they lack sense-perception are, as a consequence, in danger of denying it to all living things. For if they mean this by sense-perception, to be aware of an affection, the affection itself must be good prior to one's awareness of it, as for example to be in a natural state, even if one is not aware [that it is a natural state] and to be in one's own appropriate state, even if one does not know that it is one's appropriate state, and that it is pleasant, for it [will] necessarily be pleasant. Just as this good exists and is present, the one who has it already has the good. So why is it necessary to involve sense-perception? Unless they no longer ascribe the good to the affection, but to knowledge and sense-perception of it? But in that case they will be saying that the good is the sense-perception itself and the activity of the life of sense-perception; so [the good will belong] also to whatever can lay hold of it [through sense-perception]. But if they say that the good results from [a combination] of both, that is, the perception by the senses [of an object] of a particular kind, how, when each of the

τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι λέγουσιν; εἰ δὲ ἀγαθὸν μὲν τὸ πάθος, καὶ τὴν τοιάνδε κατάστασιν τὸ εὖ ζῆν, ὅταν γνῷ τις τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ παρόν, ἐρωτητέον αὐτούς, εἰ γνοὺς τὸ παρὸν δὴ τοῦτο ὅτι πάρεστιν εὖ ζῇ, ἢ δεῖ γνῶναι οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἡδύ, ἀλλ' ὅτι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν. ἀλλ' εἰ ὅτι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐκ αἰσθήσεως τοῦτο ἔργον ἤδη, ἀλλ' ἑτέρας μείζονος ἢ κατ' αἴσθησιν δυνάμεως. οὐ τοίνυν τοῖς ἡδομένοις τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὑπάρξει, ἀλλὰ τῷ γινώσκειν δυναμένῳ, ὅτι ἡδονὴ τὸ ἀγαθόν. αἴτιον δὴ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν οὐχ ἡδονὴ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τὸ κρίνειν δυνάμενον, ὅτι ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν. καὶ τὸ μὲν κρῖνον βέλτιον ἢ κατὰ πάθος· λόγος γὰρ ἢ νοῦς· ἡδονὴ δὲ πάθος· οὐδαμοῦ δὲ κρεῖττον ἄλογον λόγου. πῶς ἂν οὖν ὁ λόγος αὑτὸν ἀφεὶς ἄλλο θήσεται ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ γένει κείμενον κρεῖττον εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐοίκασιν, ὅσοι τε τοῖς φυτοῖς οὐ διδόασι καὶ ὅσοι αἰσθήσει τοιᾷδε τὸ εὖ, λανθάνειν ἑαυτοὺς μεῖζόν τι τὸ εὖ ζῆν ζητοῦντες καὶ ἐν τρανοτέρᾳ ζωῇ τὸ ἄμεινον τιθέντες. καὶ ὅσοι δὲ ἐν λογικῇ ζωῇ εἶναι λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁπλῶς ζωῇ, οὐδὲ εἰ αἰσθητικὴ εἴη, καλῶς μὲν ἴσως ἂν λέγοιεν. διὰ τί δὲ οὕτω καὶ περὶ τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον μόνον τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τίθενται, ἐρωτᾶν αὐτοὺς προσήκει. ἆρά γε τὸ λογικὸν προσλαμβάνεται, ὅτι εὐμήχανον μᾶλλον ὁ λόγος καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀνιχνεύειν καὶ περιποιεῖν τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν δύναται, ἢ κἂν μὴ δυνατὸς ᾖ ἀνιχνεύειν μηδὲ τυγχάνειν; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν διὰ τὸ ἀνευρίσκειν μᾶλλον δύνασθαι, ἔσται καὶ τοῖς μὴ λόγον ἔχουσιν, εἰ ἄνευ λόγου φύσει τυγχάνοιεν τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν· καὶ ὑπουργὸς ἂν ὁ λόγος καὶ οὐ δι' αὑτὸν αἱρετὸς γίγνοιτο οὐδ' αὖ ἡ τελείωσις αὐτοῦ, ἥν

2. 32 cf. *Stoic. Vet. Fr.* iii, n. 687 = Diog. Laert. vii. 130 42–43 cf. Aristot. *Phys.* *H* 3. 247ᵃ2

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2. 24 ⟨τὸ⟩ ἀγαθόν Bréhier 26 κρείττονα Q 27 αὐτὸν *se* 35–36 προσλαμβάνεται A^{ac}EBR(εR^{2s})JyQ: προσλαμβάνετε A^{pc}(ε^{2} in ras.) R^{pc} 37 κἂν : οὐκ ἂν y 38 τυγχάνει Q.

components is neutral, can they say that the combination is good? [15] But if the affection is good and living well is the particular condition when someone knows that the good is present to him, one must ask them, if he lives well because he knows that this is present or is it necessary not only to know that this is pleasant but that this is [also] the good. And if [he must know that] this is the good, this then is not the function of sense-perception but of another power [20] greater than sense-perception. Then living well will not belong to those who feel pleasure, but to the one able to grasp that pleasure is the good. The cause of living well then will not be pleasure, but the ability to judge that pleasure is good. [25] For [the ability] to judge is superior to [experiencing] an affection; for it is reason or intellect; whereas pleasure is [merely an] affection, and that which doesn't have reason is in no way superior to reason. How could reason, neglecting itself, declare something else, lying in a subordinate genus, to be better than itself? For they seem, those who do not allow [*eudaimonia*] to plants and those who set the good in some kind of sense-perception, to be seeking, [30] unbeknown to themselves, living well in something greater, and to be placing the better in a clearer life. And those who say that [*eudaimonia*] is to be found in a rational life, and not simply in life, not even if it were life with sense-perception, are perhaps speaking sensibly. But it is fitting to ask them why they place *eudaimonia* in only the rational living being. [35] Does one introduce the rational because reason is more resourceful and is able to track easily and acquire the primary things according to nature, or [would you introduce reason] even if it was unable to track or discover the primary things according to nature? But if you [introduce reason] because it is better able to discover [the primary things according to nature]; *eudaimonia* will be [possible] also for those who do not have reason, [40] if without reason they can locate the primary things according to nature; and reason would become a servant, not chosen for itself, nor, in turn, the perfection of it, which we call excellence. But if you say that [reason]

φαμεν ἀρετὴν εἶναι. εἰ δὲ φήσετε μὴ διὰ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν πρῶτα ἔχειν τὸ τίμιον, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν ἀσπαστὸν εἶναι, λεκτέον τί τε ἄλλο ἔργον αὐτοῦ καὶ τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ καὶ τί τέλειον αὐτὸν ποιεῖ. ποιεῖν γὰρ δεῖ αὐτὸν τέλειον οὐ τὴν θεωρίαν τὴν περὶ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο τι τὸ τέλειον αὐτῷ εἶναι καὶ φύσιν ἄλλην εἶναι αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸν τούτων τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν μηδὲ ἐξ ὧν τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν μηδ' ὅλως τούτου τοῦ γένους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ κρείττονα τούτων ἁπάντων· ἢ πῶς τὸ τίμιον αὐτῷ οὐκ οἶμαι ἕξειν αὐτοὺς λέγειν. ἀλλ' οὗτοι μέν, ἕως ἂν κρείττονα εὕρωσι φύσιν τῶν περὶ ἃ νῦν ἵστανται, ἐατέοι ἐνταυθοῖ εἶναι, οὗπερ μένειν ἐθέλουσιν, ἀπόρως ἔχοντες ὅπῃ τὸ εὖ ζῆν, οἷς δυνατόν ἐστι τούτων.

3. *Ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τί ποτε τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπολαμβάνομεν εἶναι. τιθέμενοι δὴ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐν ζωῇ, εἰ μὲν συνώνυμον τὸ ζῆν ἐποιούμεθα, πᾶσι μὲν ἂν τοῖς ζῶσιν ἀπέδομεν δεκτικοῖς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι, εὖ δὲ ζῆν ἐνεργείᾳ ἐκεῖνα, οἷς παρῆν ἕν τι καὶ ταὐτόν, οὗ ἐπεφύκει δεκτικὰ πάντα τὰ ζῷα εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν τῷ μὲν λογικῷ ἔδομεν δύνασθαι τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ ἀλόγῳ οὐκέτι· ζωὴ γὰρ ἦν τὸ κοινόν, ὃ δεκτικὸν τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔμελλεν εἶναι, εἴπερ ἐν ζωῇ τινι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπῆρχεν. ὅθεν, οἶμαι, καὶ οἱ ἐν λογικῇ ζωῇ λέγοντες τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν γίνεσθαι οὐκ ἐν τῇ κοινῇ ζωῇ τιθέντες ἠγνόησαν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν οὐδὲ ζωὴν ὑποτιθέμενοι. ποιότητα δὲ τὴν λογικὴν δύναμιν, περὶ ἣν ἡ εὐδαιμονία συνίσταται, ἀναγκάζοιντο ἂν λέγειν. ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς λογική ἐστι ζωή· περὶ γὰρ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο ἡ εὐδαιμονία συνίσταται· ὥστε*

2. 48 *αὐτῷ*^{1} A^{ac}(prob.)y: *αὐτῶν* EBRJ(*ῶ* J^{s})Q: *αὐτὸν* A^{pc}(*ὸν* in ras. A^{2-3}) *αὐτῷ*^{2} xyQ: *αὐτῶν* A(*ὸν* comp. A^{2-3s})E **3.** 1 *λέγωμεν* wCQ: *λέγομεν* xUS^{ac}(*ο* in *ω* mut.) 2 *δὴ* wU: *δὲ* B^{ac} (prob., *η* in alia litt. B^{2})RJ: *δὲ δὴ* SC 4 *ζῶσιν*: *ζώοις* x *δεκτικῆς* wC 5 *ἐνέργειαν* Q 6 *τὰ* om. Q 12 *ἐπιτιθέμενοι* Q

has value not on account of [its finding] the primary things according to nature, but that it is to be embraced on its own merit, you must say what other function it has, and what its nature is, and what makes it perfect. For the study of these [primary things according to nature] is not necessary to make [reason] perfect, but its perfection is something else, and it has another nature and it itself is not [one] of the primary things according to nature, nor is it of the things from which the primary natural things emerge, nor in general is it of this genus of beings, but rather it is superior to all these things; otherwise I do not see how it is possible for them to explain its value. But these people, until they discover a superior nature than that where they now come to a stop, let them remain there, where they choose to remain, at a loss [to explain] in what way, those who are capable of [discovering] these things [primary natural needs], live well.

3. Let us say, starting from the beginning, what it is that we suppose *eudaimonia* to be. Setting *eudaimonia* in life, if we made 'life' mean the same thing in every case, we would then have given to all living things [the capacity] to receive *eudaimonia*, and [would have acknowledged] that those live well in actuality, to whom was present one and the same thing, [something] which by nature all living things [were capable of] receiving. And we did not give the possibility of [*eudaimonia*] to the rational but no longer to the irrational; for life was common to both, and [both, by virtue] of being capable of receiving it, were intended to be able to achieve *eudaimonia*, if *eudaimonia* existed in a life. On this account, I think that, those who say that *eudaimonia* is to be found in a rational life, not having placed it in life which is common to all, did not recognize that [they were] not placing *eudaimonia* in life at all. They would have to say that the rational power is a quality [of life] on which *eudaimonia* is constructed. But their hypothesis is [that *eudaimonia* is founded on] rational life [not rationality]; *eudaimonia* is constructed on this [life] in its totality, that is, on another species

περὶ ἄλλο εἶδος ζωῆς. λέγω δὲ οὐχ ὡς ἀντιδιῃρημένον τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμεν πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον εἶναι. πολλαχῶς τοίνυν τῆς ζωῆς λεγομένης καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἐχούσης κατὰ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ δεύτερα καὶ ἐφεξῆς καὶ ὁμωνύμως τοῦ ζῆν λεγομένου ἄλλως μὲν τοῦ φυτοῦ, ἄλλως δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ τρανότητι καὶ ἀμυδρότητι τὴν διαφορὰν ἐχόντων, ἀνάλογον δηλονότι καὶ τὸ εὖ. καὶ εἰ εἴδωλον ἄλλο ἄλλου, δηλονότι καὶ τὸ εὖ ὡς εἴδωλον αὖ τοῦ εὖ. εἰ δὲ ὅτῳ ἄγαν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν—τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ὃ μηδενὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἐλλείπει—τὸ εὖ, μόνῳ ἂν τῷ ἄγαν ζῶντι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχοι· τούτῳ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, εἴπερ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὸ ἄριστον τὸ ὄντως ἐν ζωῇ καὶ ἡ τέλειος ζωή· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ ἐπακτὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχοι, οὐδ' ἄλλο τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀλλαχόθεν γενόμενον παρέξει αὐτὸ ἐν ἀγαθῷ εἶναι. τί γὰρ τῇ τελείᾳ ζωῇ ἂν προσγένοιτο εἰς τὸ ἀρίστῃ εἶναι; εἰ δέ τις τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν ἐρεῖ, οἰκεῖος μὲν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν, οὐ μὴν τὸ αἴτιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐνυπάρχον ζητοῦμεν. ὅτι δ' ἡ τελεία ζωὴ καὶ ἡ ἀληθινὴ καὶ ὄντως ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ νοερᾷ φύσει, καὶ ὅτι αἱ ἄλλαι ἀτελεῖς καὶ ἰνδάλματα ζωῆς καὶ οὐ τελείως οὐδὲ καθαρῶς καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον ζωαὶ ἢ τοὐναντίον, πολλάκις μὲν εἴρηται· καὶ νῦν δὲ λελέχθω συντόμως ὡς, ἕως ἂν πάντα τὰ ζῶντα ἐκ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς ᾖ, μὴ ἐπίσης δὲ τὰ ἄλλα ζῇ, ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν πρώτην ζωὴν καὶ τὴν τελειοτάτην εἶναι.

3. 16–17 cf. Aristot. *Categ.* 13. $14^{b}33$ 37 εἴρηται cf. VI. 6. 18; VI. 7. 15

3. 16 ἀντιειρημένον y 24 αὖ τοῦ scripsimus: αὐτοῦ US (αὖ τοῦ S^{1-2s}) C: τοῦ wxQ 25 τοῦ : τὸ Q ἐπιλείπει Q 26 τοῦτο Heintz 28 καὶ ἡ τέλειος ζωή wx: καὶ ἡ τέλειος ὄντως ζωή Q: om. y 29–30 *neque aliud 'substratum' aliunde adueniens efficiet id* (scil. 24 ὅτῳ et 26 τούτῳ) *esse in bono* 31 ἀρίστῃ scripsimus: ἀρίστη *Enn.* 33 δ' ἡ SCQ: δὴ wxU 36 ζωαὶ: ζῷα Q 39 ζῇ: ζῆν y 40 τελειότητα w

of life. I do not mean this as a logical distinction [within a genus], but as when we [Platonists] say [something] is prior and [something else] posterior. Now 'life' is spoken about in various ways, differentiated in terms of first and second and so on in order, and 'living' is used homonymously, in one way of plant life, and in another way of irrational life, differentiated according to clarity and dimness, and so clearly this analogy may be applied to the Good. And if one thing is an image of another, clearly its good is the image of another good. And if the good belongs to whatever has a superabundance of life—this is whatever is in no way lacking in life—only to whatever lives superabundantly would *eudaimonia* belong; for to this the best [will belong], if that which is really the best in life is in real beings and is the perfect life. For in this way the good would not exist [in something] from outside, nor would the basis [of its goodness] coming from somewhere else, cause it to be in a good state. For what could be added to the perfect life to make it the best life? If someone will say 'the nature of the Good', that would be appropriate to our account, but we are seeking that in which it exists, not the cause. Often it has been said that the perfect life and the true life and the real life is in that noetic nature, and that the other [lives] are imperfect and are [only] reflections of life, existing imperfectly and impurely, and no more lives than their opposite. And now let us summarize: as long as all living things derive from a single origin, but other things do not live equally [with it], of necessity the origin is the first and the most perfect life.

4. *Εἰ μὲν οὖν τὴν τελείαν ζωὴν ἔχειν οἷός τε ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ταύτην ἔχων τὴν ζωὴν εὐδαίμων. εἰ δὲ μή, ἐν θεοῖς ἄν τις τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν θεῖτο, εἰ ἐν ἐκείνοις μόνοις ἡ τοιαύτη ζωή. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν φαμὲν εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τοῦτο, σκεπτέον πῶς ἐστι τοῦτο. λέγω δὲ ὧδε· ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τελείαν ζωὴν ἄνθρωπος οὐ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν μόνον ἔχων, ἀλλὰ καὶ λογισμὸν καὶ νοῦν ἀληθινόν, δῆλον καὶ ἐξ ἄλλων. ἀλλ' ἆρά γε ὡς ἄλλος ὢν ἄλλο τοῦτο ἔχει; ἢ οὐδ' ἔστιν ὅλως ἄνθρωπος μὴ οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἢ δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ ἔχων, ὃν δὴ καί φαμεν εὐδαίμονα εἶναι. ἀλλ' ὡς μέρος αὐτοῦ τοῦτο φήσομεν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ εἶδος τῆς ζωῆς τὸ τέλειον εἶναι; ἢ τὸν μὲν ἄλλον ἄνθρωπον μέρος τι τοῦτο ἔχειν δυνάμει ἔχοντα, τὸν δὲ εὐδαίμονα ἤδη, ὃς δὴ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστὶ τοῦτο καὶ μεταβέβηκε πρὸς τὸ αὐτό, εἶναι τοῦτο· περικεῖσθαι δ' αὐτῷ τὰ ἄλλα ἤδη, ἃ δὴ οὐδὲ μέρη αὐτοῦ ἄν τις θεῖτο οὐκ ἐθέλοντι περικείμενα· ἦν δ' ἂν αὐτοῦ κατὰ βούλησιν συνηρτημένα. τούτῳ τοίνυν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν; ἢ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὅπερ ἔχει· τὸ δὲ ἐπέκεινα αἴτιον τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἄλλως ἀγαθόν, αὐτῷ παρὸν ἄλλως. μαρτύριον δὲ τοῦ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἄλλο ζητεῖν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα. τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ ζητήσειε; τῶν μὲν γὰρ χειρόνων οὐδέν, τῷ δὲ ἀρίστῳ σύνεστιν. αὐτάρκης οὖν ὁ βίος τῷ οὕτως ζωὴν ἔχοντι· καὶ σπουδαῖος, ᾗ αὐτάρκης εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ εἰς κτῆσιν ἀγαθοῦ· οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν ὃ μὴ ἔχει. ἀλλ' ὃ ζητεῖ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ζητεῖ, καὶ οὐχ αὐτῷ, ἀλλά τινι τῶν αὐτοῦ. σώματι γὰρ προσηρτημένῳ ζητεῖ· κἂν ζῶντι δὲ σώματι, τὰ αὐτοῦ ζῶντι τούτῳ, οὐχ ἃ τοιούτου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐστί.*

4. 26 cf. Plat. *Alcib.* 131 a 2

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4. 4 *ἐν* om. Q   16 *δὴ* om. y   19 ⟨*τῷ*⟩ *ὅπερ* Kirchhoff   20 *τοῦ τοῦτο* Müller: *τούτου τὸ* wxy: *τούτου* Q (*τὸ* Q^{s})   23 *καὶ* Harder: *κἂν* *Enn.*   24 *σπουδαῖος* scil. *ὁ ἄνθρωπος* Harder^{1} recte, aliter Beutler–Theiler   *ᾗ* scripsit Harder: *ἡ* *Enn.*

4. If, then, a human being is able to have the perfect life, a man who has this life is *eudaimōn*. If not, one would have to set *eudaimonia* among the gods, [if] such a life [belongs] to them alone. Yet since we say that this *eudaimonia* exists also among human beings, we must consider how this is so. I mean this: it is clear from other considerations that man has perfect life through having not only sense-perception, but also reasoning, and true noetic [activity]. But does he have this as something other than himself? No, he is not really a man if he does not have this either potentially or in actuality, which we say constitutes *eudaimonia*. But will we say that he has this species of life, this perfect life, in him as a part of him? The other man who has this as a part, has it [*eudaimonia*] potentially, but the man who is now in [possession of] *eudaimonia*, who is this in actuality, has passed into it, and is this. The other things now [merely] clothe him; one would say that they are not part of him because he does not want them to surround him. They would be his if they were connected to him through an act of will. What then is the good for this man? He himself [is the good] for himself by virtue of what he has. The transcendent cause [the Good] is [the cause] of the good in him and is in another way good, present to him in another way. There is evidence for this in that the one who has [the good] in this way does not seek to be anything else. For what indeed would he look for? Nothing from the worse things, and the best is in him. Therefore the one who has life in this way is self-sufficient, and [he is] the *spoudaios* who is self-sufficient in regard to *eudaimonia* and possession of the good; for there is no good which he does not have. And what he seeks, he seeks as a necessity, not for himself, but for some one of the things belonging to him. He seeks it for the body connected to him; and even if [this is] a living body, [the needs] of this living being are not [the needs] of such a man.

καὶ γινώσκει ταῦτα καὶ δίδωσιν ἃ δίδωσιν οὐδὲν τῆς αὐτοῦ παραιρούμενος ζωῆς. οὐδ᾽ ἐν τύχαις τοίνυν ἐναντίαις ἐλαττώσεται εἰς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν· μένει γὰρ καὶ ὧς ἡ τοιαύτη ζωή· ἀποθνῃσκόντων τε οἰκείων καὶ φίλων οἶδε τὸν θάνατον ὅ τι ἐστίν, ἴσασι δὲ καὶ οἱ πάσχοντες σπουδαῖοι ὄντες. οἰκεῖοι δὲ καὶ προσήκοντες τοῦτο πάσχοντες κἂν λυπῶσιν, οὐκ αὐτόν, τὸ δ᾽ ἐν αὐτῷ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, οὗ τὰς λύπας οὐ δέξεται.

5. *Ἀλγηδόνες δὲ τί καὶ νόσοι καὶ τὰ ὅλως κωλύοντα ἐνεργεῖν; εἰ δὲ δὴ μηδ᾽ ἑαυτῷ παρακολουθοῖ; γένοιτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐκ φαρμάκων καί τινων νόσων. πῶς δὴ ἐν τούτοις ἅπασι τὸ ζῆν εὖ καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἂν ἔχοι; πενίας γὰρ καὶ ἀδοξίας ἐατέον. καίτοι καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἄν τις ἀποβλέψας ἐπιστήσειε καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολυθρυλλήτους αὖ μάλιστα Πριαμικὰς τύχας· ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ φέροι καὶ ῥᾳδίως φέροι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ βουλητά γε ἦν αὐτῷ· δεῖ δὲ βουλητὸν τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον εἶναι· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν σπουδαῖον ψυχὴν τοιάνδε, μὴ συναριθμεῖσθαι δ᾽ αὐτοῦ τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὴν σώματος φύσιν. ἑτοίμως γὰρ τοῦτο φαῖεν ἂν λαμβάνειν, ἕως ἂν αἱ τοῦ σώματος πείσεις πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀναφέρωνται καὶ αὖ καὶ αἱ αἱρέσεις καὶ φυγαὶ διὰ τοῦτο γίγνωνται αὐτῷ. ἡδονῆς δὲ συναριθμουμένης τῷ εὐδαίμονι βίῳ, πῶς ἂν λυπηρὸν διὰ τύχας καὶ ὀδύνας ἔχων εὐδαίμων εἴη, ὅτῳ ταῦτα σπουδαίῳ ὄντι γίγνοιτο; ἀλλὰ θεοῖς μὲν ἡ τοιαύτη διάθεσις εὐδαίμων καὶ αὐτάρκης, ἀνθρώποις δὲ προσθήκην τοῦ χείρονος λαβοῦσι περὶ ὅλον χρὴ τὸ γενόμενον τὸ εὔδαιμον ζητεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ μέρος, ὃ ἐκ θατέρου κακῶς ἔχοντος ἀναγκάζοιτο ἂν καὶ θάτερον*

5. 7 cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic. A* 10. $1100^{a}8$ et 11. $1101^{a}8$ 8–9 cf. Alex. Aphrod. *De an.*, Suppl. Aristot. ii. 1. p. 159. 18 9–11 cf. Ps.-Archytas *apud* Stob. *Anth.* iii. 1. 112, p. 61. 20–62. 2

5. 1 *δὲ τί* scripsit Harder (*quidnam* Ficinus): *δ᾽ ἔτι Enn.* *ὅλως* : *ἄλλως* A(*ὅλως* A^{1s})E 2 *δὴ* om. Q *γὰρ* om. y

He recognizes what these [needs] are and gives what he gives taking nothing from his own life. Not even in adverse fortunes will his *eudaimonia* be diminished; for, even so, such a life remains [with him]; when relations and friends die, he understands what death is, as also do those who suffer [if] they are *spoudaioi*. And even if the suffering of his relations brings grief, it doesn't distress him, but that in him, which is separate from *Nous*, since he [the *spoudaios*] will not admit pains of this sort.

5. But what about pains and illness, and in general that which impedes activity? And if he is not conscious to himself? This could happen because of drugs and some illnesses. How, then, in all these circumstances could one have the good life and *eudaimonia*? One might discount poverty and disgrace. However someone might insist on considering these things too and especially the much talked about fortunes of Priam; for even if one could bear these things and bear them lightly, even so, one would not want them; and the *eudaimōn* life must be something one wants; since this *spoudaios* is not a soul of such a kind without adding to his substance the nature of body. They might say (i.e. the Peripatetics) that they readily accept this, as long as the affections of the body are associated with him, and again, the choices and refusals come to be in him through this [i.e. the body]. But when pleasure is counted as part of the *eudaimōn* life, how would someone be *eudaimōn* having grief and pains through [mis]fortune, [even if] the one to whom these things happen is a *spoudaios*? For such a state of *eudaimonia* and self-sufficiency belongs to the gods, but in human beings, since they have received the addition of a worse part, one must look for the *eudaimōn* in the total of what has come to be, and not just in a part; a [worse] part, which doing badly would force the better part on the

τὸ κρεῖττον ἐμποδίζεσθαι πρὸς τὰ αὑτοῦ, ὅτι μὴ καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου καλῶς ἔχει. ἢ ἀπορρήξαντα δεῖ σῶμα ἢ καὶ αἴσθησιν τὴν σώματος οὕτω τὸ αὔταρκες ζητεῖν πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔχειν.

6. *Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μὲν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐν τῷ μὴ ἀλγεῖν μηδὲ νοσεῖν μηδὲ δυστυχεῖν μηδὲ συμφοραῖς μεγάλαις περιπίπτειν ἐδίδου ὁ λόγος, οὐκ ἦν τῶν ἐναντίων παρόντων εἶναι ὁντινοῦν εὐδαίμονα· εἰ δ᾿ ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κτήσει τοῦτό ἐστι κείμενον, τί δεῖ παρέντας τοῦτο καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντας κρίνειν τὸν εὐδαίμονα τὰ ἄλλα ζητεῖν, ἃ μὴ ἐν τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἠρίθμηται; εἰ μὲν γὰρ συμφόρησις ἦν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλ᾿ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τούτων λεγομένων, ἐχρῆν καὶ ταῦτα παρεῖναι ζητεῖν· εἰ δὲ τὸ τέλος ἕν τι εἶναι ἀλλ᾿ οὐ πολλὰ δεῖ—οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οὐ τέλος, ἀλλὰ τέλη ἂν ζητοῖ—ἐκεῖνο χρὴ λαμβάνειν μόνον, ὃ ἔσχατόν τέ ἐστι καὶ τιμιώτατον καὶ ὃ ἡ ψυχὴ ζητεῖ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐγκολπίσασθαι. ἡ δὲ ζήτησις αὕτη καὶ ἡ βούλησις οὐχὶ τὸ μὴ ἐν τούτῳ εἶναι· ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ αὐτῇ φύσει, ἀλλὰ παρόντα μόνον φεύγει ὁ λογισμὸς ἀποικονομούμενος ἢ καὶ προσλαμβάνων ζητεῖ· αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ ἔφεσις πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον αὐτῆς, οὗ ἐγγενομένου ἀποπεπλήρωται καὶ ἔστη, καὶ οὗτος ὁ βουλητὸς ὄντως βίος. τῶν δ᾿ ἀναγκαίων τι παρεῖναι οὐ βούλησις ἂν εἴη, εἰ κυρίως τὴν βούλησιν ὑπολαμβάνοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ καταχρώμενος ἄν τις λέγοι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταῦτα παρεῖναι ἀξιοῦμεν. ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κακὰ ἐκκλίνομεν, καὶ οὐ δήπου βουλητὸν τὸ τῆς ἐκκλίσεως τῆς τοιαύτης· μᾶλλον γὰρ βουλητὸν τὸ μηδὲ δεηθῆναι τῆς ἐκκλίσεως τῆς τοιαύτης. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτά, ὅταν παρῇ· οἷον ὑγίεια καὶ ἀνωδυνία. τί γὰρ τούτων ἐπαγωγόν ἐστι; καταφρονεῖται γοῦν ὑγίεια παροῦσα*

6. 19–25 cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* *Γ* 4. $1111^{b}26$–28

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5. 21 *τὸ κρεῖττον* del. Müller **6.8** *καί*^{2} om. y 14 *τὸ*: *τοῦ* Müller *ἐν τούτῳ* (*in hoc mundo*): *ἐν τούτοις* Harder 15 *αὐτῇ* scil. *ψυχῇ ἐστιν* 23–24 *μᾶλλον—τοιαύτης* om. y

[better] side to be impeded in its activities, because the things of the [worse] side are not doing well. Or it is necessary to cut away the body, and even perception of the body, and thus to seek to have self-sufficiency with regard to *eudaimonia*.

6. But if our account taught that *eudaimonia* [depended on] not being in pain or ill or unfortunate or falling into great disasters, *eudaimonia* would not be [possible], whenever any of these contraries were present. But if this [*eudaimonia*] lies in possession of the true good, why is it necessary to put it aside, and looking towards it, to seek other things by which to judge *eudaimonia*, [other things] which do not count towards *eudaimonia*? For if it was a collection of goods and necessities, or what are not even necessities, but even so are called goods, it would be necessary to seek to have these things present also. But if it is necessary for the end to be a single thing and not many—for thus one would be seeking not an end, but ends—it is necessary to grasp that alone, that which is the end point and the most valued [thing], and that which the soul seeks to grasp to itself. This search and this willing are certainly not aimed at being in this [state]; for these things [necessities] are not in it [the soul] by nature but only present [incidentally]; the reasoning faculty seeks either to flee, trying to get rid of them, or it seeks to grasp them. This longing [of the soul] is towards the better part of itself, and when this comes to be, it is filled up and at rest, and this goal of the will is truly life. The presence of any of the necessities would not be a matter of will, if one uses the [term] will properly, and not misuse it one might say, whenever we think it right that [these necessities] be present also. Since indeed, in general, we avoid evils, but of course such avoidance is not the goal of the will; for rather the goal of the will is to not have been in need of such avoidance. And these things themselves provide evidence for this, whenever they are present, for example, health and freedom from pain. For what

καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀλγεῖν. ἃ δὲ παρόντα μὲν οὐδὲν ἐπαγωγὸν ἔχει οὐδὲ προστίθησί τι πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἀπόντα δὲ διὰ τὴν τῶν λυπούντων παρουσίαν ζητεῖ⟨ται⟩, εὔλογον ἀναγκαῖα, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀγαθὰ φάσκειν εἶναι. οὐδὲ συναριθμητέα τοίνυν τῷ τέλει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπόντων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων παρόντων ἀκέραιον τὸ τέλος τηρητέον.

7. Διὰ τί οὖν ὁ εὐδαιμονῶν ταῦτα ἐθέλει παρεῖναι καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἀπωθεῖται; ἢ φήσομεν οὐχ ὅτι πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν εἰσφέρεταί τινα μοῖραν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸ εἶναι· τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία τούτων ἢ πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἢ ὅτι ἐνοχλεῖ τῷ τέλει παρόντα, οὐχ ὡς ἀφαιρούμενα αὐτό, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ὁ ἔχων τὸ ἄριστον αὐτὸ μόνον βούλεται ἔχειν, οὐκ ἄλλο τι μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ὃ ὅταν παρῇ, οὐκ ἀφῄρηται μὲν ἐκεῖνο, ἔστι δ᾽ ὅμως κἀκείνου ὄντος. ὅλως δὲ οὐκ, εἴ τι ὁ εὐδαίμων μὴ ἐθέλοι, παρείη δὲ τοῦτο, ἤδη παραιρεῖταί τι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· ἢ οὕτω γε καθ᾽ ἑκάστην τὴν ἡμέραν μεταπίπτοι ἂν καὶ ἐκπίπτοι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· οἷον εἰ καὶ παῖδα ἀποβάλλοι ἢ καὶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν κτημάτων. καὶ μυρία ἂν εἴη ἃ οὐ κατὰ γνώμην ἐκβάντα οὐδέν τι παρακινεῖ τοῦ παρόντος τέλους αὐτῷ. ἀλλὰ τὰ μεγάλα, φασί, καὶ οὐ τὰ τυχόντα. τί δ᾽ ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μέγα, ὥστ᾽ ἂν μὴ καταφρονηθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀναβεβηκότος πρὸς τὸ ἀνωτέρω ἁπάντων τούτων καὶ οὐδενὸς ἔτι τῶν κάτω ἐξηρτημένου; διὰ τί γὰρ τὰς μὲν εὐτυχίας, ἡλικαιοῦν ἐὰν ὦσιν, οὐ μεγάλας ἡγεῖται, οἷον βασιλείας καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἐθνῶν ἀρχάς, οὐδὲ οἰκίσεις καὶ κτίσεις πόλεων, οὐδ᾽ εἰ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ γίγνοιντο, ἐκπτώσεις δὲ

6. 29 τῶν y: τῶν ἐναντίων (prob. glossa ex 32)wxQ ζητεῖται Kirchhoff: ζητεῖ *Enn.* 7.8 οὐκ εἴ τι : οὐκέτι y 9 ἤδη om. Q 11 παῖδα *scruum* ἀποβάλλοι RJy: ἀποβάλοι wBQ 14 φησί JQ 18 ἐὰν *Enn.*: ἂν Kirchhoff, sed cf. II. 2. 1. 48 19 οἰκίσεις A: οἰκήσεις (*administrationes*) ExyQ 20 κτίσεις wBQ: κτήσεις (*expugnationes*) RJy ὑπ᾽ : ἀπ᾽ Q

is attractive about these things [whenever they are present]? At any rate one ignores health when one has it and freedom from pain. When they are present they hold no attraction for us, nor do they make any addition to *eudaimonia*, and when they are absent, one seeks them because of the presence of griefs; it is sensible to consider [these things] necessities but not goods. Nor indeed are they to be counted [as contributing] towards the end, but even when they are absent and their opposites present, the end must be kept intact.

7. Why, therefore, does the *eudaimōn* wish these things to be present and reject their opposites? We will say that it is not because they bring any addition to *eudaimonia*, but rather to his existence. [He avoids] the opposite of these [necessities] either because [they contribute] towards non-existence or because being present they disturb the end, not through taking it away, but because the one who has the best, wants to have this alone, not something else with it, which, whenever present, doesn't take it away, but nevertheless also exists beside it. But, in general, if something which the *eudaimōn* doesn't want, is present [anyway], it doesn't take away, as a result, anything of his *eudaimonia;* or therefore he would change each day and fall from his *eudaimonia*, for example, if he should lose a slave-boy, or, indeed, any one of his possessions. Indeed there would be a thousand things, which not having happened in line with his intention, in no way disturb the end which is present to him. But [one must consider] great upheavals, they say, and not just minor incidents of bad luck. But what would be [considered] big among human events, so as not to be despised by someone who has ascended higher than all of these things, and is dependent on nothing of the things below? For he who does not think pieces of good fortune great, no matter how significant they are, such as kingships and rule of cities and races, and founding of colonies and cities, not even if they should come about through him; why will he think

ἀρχῶν καὶ πόλεως αὐτοῦ κατασκαφὴν ἡγήσεταί τι εἶναι μέγα; εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ κακὸν μέγα ἢ ὅλως κακόν, γελοῖος ἂν εἴη τοῦ δόγματος καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι σπουδαῖος εἴη ξύλα καὶ λίθους καὶ νὴ Δία θανάτους θνητῶν μέγα ἡγούμενος, ᾧ φαμεν δεῖν δόγμα παρεῖναι περὶ θανάτου τὸ ἄμεινον ζωῆς τῆς μετὰ σώματος εἶναι. αὐτὸς δὲ εἰ τυθείη, κακὸν οἰήσεται αὐτῷ τὸν θάνατον, ὅτι παρὰ βωμοῖς τέθνηκεν; ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὴ ταφείη, πάντως που καὶ ὑπὲρ γῆς καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν τεθὲν τὸ σῶμα σαπείη. εἰ δ᾽ ὅτι μὴ πολυδαπάνως, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνωνύμως τέθαπται οὐκ ἀξιωθεὶς ὑψηλοῦ μνήματος, τῆς μικρολογίας. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ αἰχμάλωτος ἄγοιτο, πάρ τοί ἐστιν ὁδὸς ἐξιέναι, εἰ μὴ εἴη εὐδαιμονεῖν. εἰ δὲ οἰκεῖοι αὐτῷ αἰχμάλωτοι, οἷον ἑλκόμεναι νυοὶ καὶ θυγατέρες—— τί οὖν, φήσομεν, εἰ ἀποθνῄσκοι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον ἑωρακώς; ἆρ᾽ ἂν οὕτω δόξης ἔχοι ἀπιών, ὡς μὴ ἂν τούτων ἐνδεχομένων γενέσθαι; ἀλλ᾽ ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη. οὐκ ἂν οὖν δοξάσειεν, ὡς ἐνδέχεται τοιαύταις τύχαις τοὺς οἰκείους περιπεσεῖν; ἆρ᾽ οὖν διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἂν δόξαι ὡς καὶ γενησομένου ἂν οὐκ εὐδαίμων; ἢ καὶ δοξάζων οὕτως εὐδαίμων· ὥστε καὶ γινομένου. ἐνθυμοῖτο γὰρ ἄν, ὡς ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς φύσις τοιαύτη, οἵα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φέρειν, καὶ ἕπεσθαι χρή. καὶ πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ ἄμεινον αἰχμάλωτοι γενόμενοι πράξουσι. καὶ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς δὲ βαρυνομένοις ἀπελθεῖν· ἢ μένοντες ἢ εὐλόγως μένουσι καὶ οὐδὲν δεινόν, ἢ ἀλόγως μένοντες, δέον μή, αὐτοῖς αἴτιοι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄνοιαν οἰκείων ὄντων αὐτὸς ἐν κακῷ ἔσται καὶ εἰς ἄλλων εὐτυχίας καὶ δυστυχίας ἀναρτήσεται.

7. 21–22 cf. Epictet. *Diss.* i. 28. 14, p. 97. 21–22 28 cf. Plut. *An uitios. ad inf. suff.* 3. 499 d; Sen. *De tranquill. an.* 14. 3 31–32 = Hom. *I* 43 31–33 cf. Epictet. *Diss.* i. 28. 26, p. 99. 10–12 33 cf. Hom. *X* 65

7. 27 *τέθνηκεν* A^{1mg}xyQ: *τέθηκεν* E: *τέθυται* A 29 *ὅτι* : *ἔτι* B^{ac}(prob., *ε* in *ο* mut.)RJ 33 *νυοὶ* A^{pc}(*υ* in ras., sed exp.)xy: *υἱοὶ* A^{ac}(prob.) E^{ac}(*ν*E^{s})Q 34 *τοιούτων* Q 38 *δόξαι* : *δοξάσαι* Kirchhoff

expulsion from power or the destruction of his own city to be something important? For if [he really considered such things] to be a great evil, or evil at all, his way of thinking would be laughable and he would no longer be a *spoudaios*, if he thought that wood and stones and, by Zeus, the death of mortals, was a serious matter, [this man] in whom we say ought to be present this view concerning death, that it is better than life with the body. If he himself should be offered as a sacrifice, will he think his death to be an evil, because he has died by the altars? And if he should be unburied, his body will rot anyway both under and above the ground. And if [it is a concern] that he is buried inexpensively and without name, not being thought worthy of a lofty memorial, how trivial! And if he should be led off as a captive, the exit is there for him, if he cannot achieve *eudaimonia*. And if his own relations should be enslaved, for example, if daughters-in-law and daughters were to be dragged off—what, then, would we say, if he had died not having seen such a thing? While dying would he hold an opinion like this, that it is not possible for these things to happen? That, indeed, would be absurd. Would he not think that it is possible for such fortunes to befall his relations? And because he holds an opinion like this, would it prevent him from being *eudaimōn*? Even believing this could happen, he remains *eudaimōn*, as much as when it comes to pass. For he would understand that the nature of this all is of such a kind, of the kind that indeed brings such things, and one must accept it. Indeed many people would do better becoming captives. And if they find this burdensome, [it is possible for them] to exit; or if they remain, either they remain because it is reasonable, and nothing terrible [is present], or they remain unreasonably, when they should not, and that is their own fault. For certainly not through the foolishness of others will he be [drawn] into evil, even if they are relatives, and he will not be dependent on the good and bad fortune of others.

8. *Τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀλγηδόνων αὐτοῦ, ὅταν σφοδραὶ ὦσιν, ἕως δύναται φέρειν, οἴσει· εἰ δὲ ὑπερβάλλουσιν, ἐξοίσουσι. καὶ οὐκ ἐλεεινὸς ἔσται* < *καὶ* > *ἐν τῷ ἀλγεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτοῦ* [*καὶ ἐν τῷ*] *ἔνδον φέγγος οἷον ἐν λαμπτῆρι φῶς πολλοῦ ἔξωθεν πνέοντος ἐν πολλῇ ζάλῃ ἀνέμων καὶ χειμῶνι. ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ παρακολουθοῖ, ἢ παρατείνοι τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον αἰρόμενον, ὥστε ἐν τῷ σφοδρῷ ὅμως μὴ ἀποκτιννύναι; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν παρατείνοι, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν βουλεύσεται· οὐ γὰρ ἀφῄρηται τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἐν τούτοις. χρὴ δὲ εἰδέναι, ὡς οὐχ, οἷα τοῖς ἄλλοις φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ φανεῖται ἕκαστα, καὶ οὐ μέχρι τοῦ εἴσω ἕκαστα οὔτε τὰ ἄλλα,* [*οὔτε ἀλγεινὰ*] *οὔτε τὰ λυπηρά. καὶ ὅταν περὶ ἄλλους τὰ ἀλγεινά; ἀσθένεια γὰρ εἴη ψυχῆς ἡμετέρας. καὶ τοῦτο μαρτυρεῖ, ὅταν λανθάνειν ἡμᾶς κέρδος ἡγώμεθα καὶ ἀποθανόντων ἡμῶν, εἰ γίγνοιτο, κέρδος εἶναι τιθεμένων καὶ οὐ τὸ ἐκείνων ἔτι σκοπουμένων, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτῶν, ὅπως μὴ λυποίμεθα. τοῦτο δὲ ἡμετέρα ἤδη ἀσθένεια, ἣν δεῖ περιαιρεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐῶντας φοβεῖσθαι μὴ γένηται. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι οὕτως ἡμᾶς πεφυκέναι, ὥστε ἀλγεῖν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν οἰκείων συμφοραῖς, γιγνωσκέτω, ὅτι οὐ πάντες οὕτω, καὶ ὅτι τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως πρὸς τὸ ἄμεινον ἄγειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον παρὰ τοὺς πολλούς· κάλλιον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐνδιδόναι τοῖς νομιζομένοις τῇ κοινῇ φύσει δεινοῖς εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ἰδιωτικῶς δεῖ, ἀλλ' οἷον ἀθλητὴν μέγαν διακεῖσθαι τὰς τῆς τύχης πληγὰς ἀμυνόμενον, γινώσκοντα μὲν ὅτι τινὶ φύσει ταῦτα οὐκ ἀρεστά, τῇ δὲ αὐτοῦ φύσει οἰστά, οὐχ ὡς δεινά, ἀλλ' ὡς παισὶ φοβερά. ταῦτ' οὖν ἤθελεν; ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ μὴ θελητά, ὅταν παρῇ, ἀρετὴν*

8. 2 cf. Epicurus *Fr.* 447 Usener 4–5 cf. Empedocl. *Fr.* B 84. 3–4; Plat. *Resp.* 496 d 7 et *Tim.* 43 c 3

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8. 3 *καὶ ἐν τῶ Enn.*: *ἐν τῷ* Kirchhoff: *καίεται ἐν τῷ* Sleeman: *καίεται* H.-S.^{1}: del. Theiler 10 *τοιαῦτα* : *ταῦτα* Q 11 *τὰ* om. Q 17 *λυπώμεθα* Q 27 *παισὶ* : *πᾶσι* J (*παισὶ* J$^{\gamma\rho mg}$)Q

8. His own pains, whenever they are extreme, while he is able to bear them, he will bear them; but if they overpower him, they will carry him off. But he will not be pitied even in his pain, since there is splendour inside him, like the light in a lamp when a terrific gale blows outside in a great tumult of wind and storm. And if he should become unconscious, or the pain grips him to such an extent, so as to be excessive, but nevertheless doesn't kill him? And if it continues, he will consider what he must do, for it has not deprived him of his power of self-determination in this situation. It is necessary to understand that such things appear to the *spoudaios* not as they appear to other men, neither the other things, not pains nor sorrows, reach the inner man. And whenever the pains concern others? It would be a weakness of our soul [to show concern for them]. And this is borne out in that we think it a gain whenever [another's suffering] escapes our attention, and our death, if it comes about, we consider a gain, no longer considering it from the position of others, but from our own, in order that we might not be grieved. But this is merely our weakness, which we must remove, and not allow ourselves to be fearful lest it should happen. And if someone should say that we have been naturally formed in this way, so as to feel pained at the misfortunes of our own people, let him know, it is not this way for everyone, and that it is the concern of excellence to bring ordinary nature towards the better and finer in contrast to the multitude; and it is finer not to yield to what ordinary nature considers terrible. For one must not [live] in an untrained manner, but like a great combatant be in a state to ward off fortune's blows, knowing that to some natures these things are not pleasing, but that his own nature can tolerate them, not as terrible things, but as childish fears. Does he want these things? No, but whenever these unwanted things are present, he has excellence to face

καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἔχει δυσκίνητον καὶ δυσπαθῆ τὴν ψυχὴν παρέχουσαν.

9. *Ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν μὴ παρακολουθῇ βαπτισθεὶς ἢ νόσοις ἢ μάγων τέχναις; ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν φυλάξουσιν αὐτὸν σπουδαῖον εἶναι οὕτως ἔχοντα καὶ οἷα ἐν ὕπνῳ κοιμώμενον, τί κωλύει εὐδαίμονα αὐτὸν εἶναι; ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἀφαιροῦνται τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αὐτόν, οὐδ᾽ ὑπὸ λόγον ποιοῦνται τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον, ὡς μὴ πάντα τὸν βίον εὐδαιμονεῖν λέγειν· εἰ δὲ μὴ σπουδαῖον φήσουσιν, οὐ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου ἔτι τὸν λόγον ποιοῦνται. ἡμεῖς δὲ ὑποθέμενοι σπουδαῖον, εἰ εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἕως ἂν εἴη σπουδαῖος, ζητοῦμεν. ἀλλ᾽ ἔστω σπουδαῖος, φασί· μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μηδ᾽ ἐνεργῶν κατ᾽ ἀρετήν, πῶς ἂν εὐδαίμων εἴη; ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν μὴ αἰσθάνοιτο ὅτι ὑγιαίνοι, ὑγιαίνει οὐδὲν ἧττον, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὅτι καλός, οὐδὲν ἧττον καλός· εἰ δὲ ὅτι σοφὸς μὴ αἰσθάνοιτο, ἧττον σοφὸς ἂν εἴη; εἰ μή πού τις λέγοι ὡς ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ γὰρ δεῖ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ παρακολουθεῖν αὐτῷ παρεῖναι· ἐν γὰρ τῇ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν σοφίᾳ καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν παρεῖναι. ἐπακτοῦ μὲν οὖν ὄντος τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ τῆς σοφίας λέγοι ἄν τι ἴσως ὁ λόγος οὗτος· εἰ δ᾽ ἡ τῆς σοφίας ὑπόστασις ἐν οὐσίᾳ τινί, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, οὐκ ἀπόλωλε δὲ αὕτη ἡ οὐσία ἔν τε τῷ κοιμωμένῳ καὶ ὅλως ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ μὴ παρακολουθεῖν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτὴ ἐνέργεια ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἄυπνος ἐνέργεια, ἐνεργοῖ μὲν ἂν καὶ τότε ὁ σπουδαῖος ᾗ τοιοῦτος· λανθάνοι δ᾽ ἂν αὕτη ἡ ἐνέργεια οὐκ αὐτὸν πάντα, ἀλλά τι μέρος αὐτοῦ· οἷον καὶ τῆς φυτικῆς ἐνεργείας ἐνεργούσης οὐκ ἔρχεται εἰς τὸν ἄλλον ἄνθρωπον ἡ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἀντίληψις τῷ αἰσθητικῷ, καί, εἴπερ ἦμεν τὸ φυτικὸν ἡμῶν*

9. 1–5 cf. Epictet. *Diss.* iii. 2. 5, p. 240. 6–9

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9. 9 *εἴη* *Enn.*: *ᾗ* A^{3s} 14 *εἰ* : *ἢ* Q 17 *οὖν* om. Jy 18 *οὗτος* om. y *δ᾽ ἡ* : *δὴ* Q 19 *ὑποστάσης* Q 20 *κοιμωμένῳ* : *κειμένω* Q 25 *φυσικῆς* y 7 *φυσικὸν* y *ἡμῶν* A^{1mg} om. w

them, rendering the soul difficult to disturb and upset [30].

9. But whenever someone is unconscious, having been overwhelmed by illness or magic? And if they maintain that he is a *spoudaios* while he is like this, just as he is while being asleep, what prevents him from possessing *eudaimonia*? Since they do not remove him from his *eudaimonia* while he sleeps, [5] nor do they take into account this time in order to say that he has not been *eudaimōn* all his life. But if they will say that he is not a *spoudaios* [while in this state], they are no longer giving an account concerning the *spoudaios*. But we, taking it that he is a *spoudaios*, are examining whether or not he is *eudaimōn* as long as he is a *spoudaios*. [10] Well, let him be a *spoudaios*, they say; but without perceiving or being active in accordance with excellence, how could he be *eudaimōn*? But if one does not perceive that one is healthy, one is healthy nonetheless, and if one does not [perceive that one is] beautiful, one is beautiful nonetheless, and if one does not perceive that one is wise, will one be any less wise? Perhaps someone might say with regard to wisdom, [15] that he must have perception and consciousness for it to be present, for it is in active wisdom that *eudaimonia* is present. If thinking and wisdom were imported [from outside *Nous*], this argument would perhaps make sense; but if the essential nature of wisdom is in a substance, or rather in the substance, [20] and this substance is not destroyed in someone sleeping, or, in general, in what is called not conscious to oneself; this activity of the substance is in him and such an activity is sleepless, then the *spoudaios*, in that he is a *spoudaios*, would be active even then. This activity would not escape the attention of all of him, but only a part of him; [25] as is the case when our vegetative soul is active, the conscious apprehension of such activity through sense-perception does not go to the other man, and, if we were our

ἡμεῖς, ἡμεῖς ἂν ἐνεργοῦντες ἦμεν· νῦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐσμέν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοοῦντος ἐνέργεια· ὥστε ἐνεργοῦντος ἐκείνου ἐνεργοῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς.

10. *Λανθάνει* δὲ ἴσως τῷ μὴ περὶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν αἰσθητῶν· διὰ γὰρ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὥσπερ μέσης περὶ ταῦτα ἐνεργεῖν δοκεῖ καὶ περὶ τούτων. αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ νοῦς διὰ τί οὐκ ἐνεργήσει καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ περὶ αὐτὸν ἡ πρὸ αἰσθήσεως καὶ ὅλως ἀντιλήψεως; δεῖ γὰρ τὸ πρὸ ἀντιλήψεως ἐνέργημα εἶναι, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ εἶναι. καὶ ἔοικεν ἡ ἀντίληψις εἶναι καὶ γίνεσθαι ἀνακάμπτοντος τοῦ νοήματος καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος τοῦ κατὰ τὸ ζῆν τῆς ψυχῆς οἷον ἀπωσθέντος πάλιν, ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ περὶ τὸ λεῖον καὶ λαμπρὸν ἡσυχάζον. ὡς οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις παρόντος μὲν τοῦ κατόπτρου ἐγένετο τὸ εἴδωλον, μὴ παρόντος δὲ ἢ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντος ἐνεργείᾳ πάρεστιν οὗ τὸ εἴδωλον ἦν ἄν, οὕτω καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν ἡσυχίαν μὲν ἄγοντος τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν τοιούτου, ᾧ ἐμφαίνεται τὰ τῆς διανοίας καὶ τοῦ νοῦ εἰκονίσματα, ἐνορᾶται ταῦτα καὶ οἷον αἰσθητῶς γινώσκεται μετὰ τῆς προτέρας γνώσεως, ὅτι ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ διάνοια ἐνεργεῖ. συγκλασθέντος δὲ τούτου διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ταραττομένην ἁρμονίαν ἄνευ εἰδώλου ἡ διάνοια καὶ ὁ νοῦς νοεῖ καὶ ἄνευ φαντασίας ἡ νόησις τότε· ὥστε καὶ τοιοῦτον ἄν τι νοοῖτο μετὰ φαντασίας τὴν νόησιν γίνεσθαι οὐκ οὔσης τῆς νοήσεως φαντασίας. πολλὰς δ' ἄν τις εὕροι καὶ ἐγρηγορότων καλὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ θεωρίας καὶ πράξεις, ὅτε θεωροῦμεν καὶ ὅτε πράττομεν, τὸ παρακολουθεῖν ἡμᾶς

10. 6 = Parm. *Fr.* B3 (= Plot. III. 8. 8. 8 et V. 1. 8. 17) 20 cf. Aristot. *De an.* *Γ* 7. 431^{a}16–17

10. 1 τῷ μὴ : τῶ μὴ τῶ μὴ A^{ac}(prob., alterum τῶ μὴ eras.) E 2 μέσης περὶ ταῦτα coniungenda 3 δοκεῖ $\mathrm{J}^{\gamma\rho mg}$y: δεῖ wxQ 4 $ἡ^{2}$ wx: ἢ Q: ᾖ y 7–8 τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος idem fere atque ἡ διάνοια, cf. lin. 14 et 16 et 18; τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος–ψυχῆς *quod agit secundum animae uitam* Fic. recte 8 τοῦ wxQ: νοῦ Theiler: om. y 12 ἐνεργείᾳ wx: ἐνέργεια yQ ἦν ἄν transp. Q

vegetative soul, we would be active [whether we were conscious of it or not]. However, we are not this, but we are the activity of *Nous;* [30] so if that were active, we [too] would be active.

10. Perhaps it [noetic activity] escapes our attention because it is not involved with any sense-objects; through sensation as an intermediary, we are necessarily active concerning these things and on account of these things [the objects of sense]. But *Nous* itself, why will it not be active, and the soul concerning it [be active], which comes before perception and conscious apprehension in general? [5] For it is necessary for there to be activity before there is conscious apprehension of [this activity], if to think and to be are the same. Conscious apprehension seems to exist and come into being when the activity of *Nous* is bent back, and the activity according to the life of the [higher] soul, is in a way thrust back, as happens in a mirror-image when the smooth and bright surface is peaceful. Therefore, in these circumstances, [10] when the mirror is present, the image forms, but when it [the mirror] is not present, or is not operational in this way, [the activity] from where the image would have come, is [still] present in actuality; in the same way also concerning the soul, when that which is within us is at peace, in which the images of discursive thought and *Nous* are manifested, [15] one sees these things reflected and one knows them in a way as in sense-perception, but with the prior knowledge that *Nous* and discursive thought are active. But when this is broken because the harmony of the body is being disturbed, then discursive thought and noetic activity take place without an image and noetic activity is then without *phantasmata;* so one might think something of this sort, [20] that noetic activity [usually] occurs with *phantasmata* but noetic activity is not comprised of *phantasmata.* One could find also in our wakeful life many fine activities, both reflections and actions, when we theorize and when we act, without us being conscious of these things.

αὐταῖς οὐκ ἐχούσας. οὐ γὰρ τὸν ἀναγινώσκοντα ἀνάγκη παρακολουθεῖν ὅτι ἀναγινώσκει καὶ τότε μάλιστα, ὅτε μετὰ τοῦ συντόνου ἀναγινώσκοι· οὐδὲ ὁ ἀνδριζόμενος ὅτι ἀνδρίζεται καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρίαν ἐνεργεῖ ὅσῳ ἐνεργεῖ· καὶ ἄλλα μυρία· ὥστε τὰς παρακολουθήσεις κινδυνεύειν ἀμυδροτέρας αὐτὰς τὰς ἐνεργείας αἷς παρακολουθοῦσι ποιεῖν, μόνας δὲ αὐτὰς οὔσας καθαρὰς τότε εἶναι καὶ μᾶλλον ἐνεργεῖν καὶ μᾶλλον ζῆν καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθει τῶν σπουδαίων γενομένων μᾶλλον τὸ ζῆν εἶναι, οὐ κεχυμένον εἰς αἴσθησιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ συνηγμένον.

11. Εἰ δέ τινες μηδὲ ζῆν λέγοιεν τὸν τοιοῦτον, ζῆν μὲν αὐτὸν φήσομεν, λανθάνειν δ' αὐτοὺς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τοῦ τοιούτου, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ζῆν. εἰ δὲ μὴ πείθοιντο, ἀξιώσομεν αὐτοὺς ὑποθεμένους τὸν ζῶντα καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον οὕτω ζητεῖν εἰ εὐδαίμων, μηδὲ τὸ ζῆν αὐτοῦ ἐλαττώσαντας τὸ εὖ ζῆν ζητεῖν εἰ πάρεστι μηδὲ ἀνελόντας τὸν ἄνθρωπον περὶ εὐδαιμονίας ἀνθρώπου ζητεῖν μηδὲ τὸν σπουδαῖον συγχωρήσαντας εἰς τὸ εἴσω ἐπεστράφθαι ἐν ταῖς ἔξωθεν ἐνεργείαις αὐτὸν ζητεῖν μηδὲ ὅλως τὸ βουλητὸν αὐτοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἔξω. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ ὑπόστασις εὐδαιμονίας εἴη, εἰ τὰ ἔξω βουλητὰ λέγοι καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον βούλεσθαι ταῦτα. ἐθέλοι γὰρ ἂν καὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους εὖ πράττειν καὶ μηδὲν τῶν κακῶν περὶ μηδένα εἶναι· ἀλλὰ μὴ γινομένων ὅμως εὐδαίμων. εἰ δέ τις παράλογον ἂν αὐτὸν ποιήσειν φήσει, εἰ ταῦτα ἐθελήσει—μὴ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὰ κακὰ μὴ εἶναι—δῆλον ὅτι συγχωρήσει ἡμῖν ἐπιστρέφουσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν βούλησιν εἰς τὸ εἴσω.

12. Τὸ δὲ ἡδὺ τῷ βίῳ τῷ τοιούτῳ ὅταν ἀπαιτῶσιν, οὐ

11. 8 cf. Epictet. *Diss.* i. 4. 18 15–16 cf. Plat. *Theaet.* 176 a 5
12. 1–4 cf. Plat. *Phileb.* 65 c–d

11. 8 ἐπεστράφθαι Jy: ἐπεστρέφθαι A^{ac}(έ in ά mut. A^{1})EBRQ 11 λέγοι (τις tacite supplendum; an ὁ σπουδαῖος ipse subiectum?) *Enn.*: λέγοιεν Müller

For the reader is not necessarily conscious that he is reading, especially when he is reading intently; nor the man being brave that he is being brave and acts with courage while he acts; and there are countless other examples; so that consciousness threatens to make dimmer these very activities which they are conscious of performing, but when these [activities] are alone, then they are pure and more active and more alive; moreover when the *spoudaioi* are in such a state, they possess more life, when it is not spilled out in sensation, but gathered together in the same thing in itself.

11. But if some were to say that such a person is not living, we will say that he lives, but that the *eudaimonia* of such a person escapes them, as also does his life. If they are not persuaded, we will ask them to begin with the living person and the *spoudaios* and thus inquire if he is *eudaimōn*, and not having diminished his life to look to see if living well is present [to him], nor having removed his humanity to seek for human *eudaimonia*, nor to concede that the *spoudaios* turns inwards and then to seek him in external activities, nor, in general, to look for the object of his will in external things. For thus real existence would be denied to *eudaimonia*, if one were to say that external things were objects of the will and that the *spoudaios* willed these things. For he would want all men to do well and no-one to be involved in evils, but if this does not happen, he is nevertheless *eudaimōn*. And if someone will say that this will make him irrational, if he were to wish these things—for it is impossible for evils not to exist—it is clear that he will agree with us in turning his will inwards.

12. Whenever they demand to know where pleasure is to be

τὰς τῶν ἀκολάστων οὐδὲ τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἡδονὰς ἀξιώσουσι παρεῖναι—αὗται γὰρ ἀδύνατοι παρεῖναι καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀφανιοῦσιν—οὐδὲ μὴν τὰς περιχαρίας—διὰ τί γάρ;—ἀλλὰ τὰς συνούσας παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐν κινήσεσιν οὔσας, οὐδὲ γινομένας τοίνυν· ἤδη γὰρ τὰ ἀγαθὰ πάρεστι, καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ πάρεστι· καὶ ἕστηκε τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἵλεων τοῦτο· ἵλεως δὲ ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀεὶ καὶ κατάστασις ἥσυχος καὶ ἀγαπητὴ ἡ διάθεσις ἣν οὐδὲν τῶν λεγομένων κακῶν παρακινεῖ, εἴπερ σπουδαῖος. εἰ δέ τις ἄλλο εἶδος ἡδονῆς περὶ τὸν [σπουδαῖον] βίον ζητεῖ, οὐ τὸν σπουδαῖον βίον ζητεῖ.

13. *Οὐδ' αἱ ἐνέργειαι δὲ διὰ τὰς τύχας ἐμποδίζοιντο ἄν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλαι ἂν κατ' ἄλλας γίγνοιντο τύχας, πᾶσαι δὲ ὅμως καλαὶ καὶ καλλίους ἴσως ὅσῳ περιστατικαί. αἱ δὲ κατὰ τὰς θεωρίας ἐνέργειαι αἱ μὲν καθ' ἕκαστα τάχα ἄν, οἷον ἃς ζητήσας ἂν καὶ σκεψάμενος προφέροι· τὸ δὲ μέγιστον μάθημα πρόχειρον ἀεὶ καὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦτο μᾶλλον, κἂν ἐν τῷ Φαλάριδος ταύρῳ λεγομένῳ ᾖ, ὃ μάτην λέγεται ἡδὺ δὶς ἢ καὶ πολλάκις λεγόμενον. ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ τὸ φθεγξάμενον τοῦτο αὐτό ἐστι τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀλγεῖν ὑπάρχον, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀλγοῦν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, ὃ συνὸν αὐτῷ, ἕως ἂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνῇ, οὐκ ἀπολελείψεται τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅλου θέας.*

14. *Τὸ δὲ μὴ συναμφότερον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ μάλιστα τὸν σπουδαῖον μαρτυρεῖ καὶ ὁ χωρισμὸς ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἡ τῶν λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν τοῦ σώματος*

13. 3 *περιστατικαί* cf. *Stoic. Vet. Fr.* iii, n. 496 5–6 = Plat. *Resp.* 505 a 2 7 cf. Epicurea *Fr.* 601 Usener et *Stoic. Vet. Fr.* iii, n. 586 **14.** 1 cf. Plat. *Alcib.* 130 c 1–2

12. 4 *περιχαρίας* EQ: *περιχαρείας* Ax: *ἐπιχαρίας* y **13.** 4 *τάχα ἄν* scil. *ἐμποδίζοιντο* 10 *αὐτῷ* Theiler, nam ad 11 *συνῇ* idem obiectum *τῷ σώματι* subintellegendum: *ἑαυτῷ* *Enn.* 11 *ἀπολελείψεται* wBJy: *ἀπολείψεται* RQ

found in such a life, they will not value the presence of the pleasures of the licentious nor [any] bodily pleasures—for it is impossible for these to be present and they will destroy *eudaimonia*—nor certainly are there excessive joys—for why should [they be present]?—but the [pleasures] accompanying the presence of goods, not those consisting in movements, nor in processes, moreover; for already the goods are present, and he is present to himself; and this pleasure and contentment are stable; for the *spoudaios* is always content and his state peaceful and his disposition satisfied which none of what are said to be evils disturbs, if [he is] a *spoudaios*. But if someone is looking for another form of pleasure concerning this life, it is not the life of the *spoudaios* he seeks.

13. The activities [of the *spoudaios*] will not be impeded through chance, and other [activities] will take place through other fortune, but nevertheless all [his activities] are fine, perhaps finer, inasmuch as they are due to random circumstances. The activities concerning contemplation, the ones perhaps related to particular things might be impeded,—for example, those that would involve investigation and examination; but 'the greatest learning' is always at hand and with him and this is so, even in the so-called bull of Phalaris, which in vain is said to be pleasant, whether it is said twice or indeed many times. For there, [according to them], what cries out is the same thing as is in pain, but [according to us], what suffers pain is one thing, while there is another, which is with it, while it is compelled to accompany it, does not leave behind the vision of the total Good.

14. The combination [of body and soul] is not the man, and especially not the *spoudaios*; the separation from the body and contempt for the so-called goods of the body is evidence of this.

καταφρόνησις. τὸ δὲ καθόσον ἀξιοῦν τὸ ζῷον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι γελοῖον εὐζωίας τῆς εὐδαιμονίας οὔσης, ἣ περὶ ψυχὴν συνίσταται, ἐνεργείας ταύτης οὔσης καὶ ψυχῆς οὐ πάσης—οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῆς φυτικῆς, ἵν' ἂν καὶ ἐφήψατο σώματος· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τοῦτο ἦν σώματος μέγεθος καὶ εὐεξία—οὐδ' αὖ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι εὖ, ἐπεὶ καὶ κινδυνεύσουσιν αἱ τούτων πλεονεξίαι βαρύνασαι πρὸς αὐτὰς φέρειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον. ἀντισηκώσεως δὲ οἷον ἐπὶ θάτερα πρὸς τὰ ἄριστα γενομένης μινύθειν καὶ χείρω τὰ σωματικὰ ποιεῖν, ἵνα δεικνύοιτο οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄλλος ὢν ἢ τὰ ἔξω. ὁ δὲ τῶν τῇδε ἄνθρωπος ἔστω καὶ καλὸς καὶ μέγας καὶ πλούσιος καὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἄρχων ὡς ἂν ὢν τοῦδε τοῦ τόπου, καὶ οὐ φθονητέον αὐτῷ τῶν τοιούτων ἠπατημένῳ. περὶ δὲ σοφὸν ταῦτα ἴσως μὲν ἂν οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν γένοιτο, γενομένων δὲ ἐλαττώσει αὐτός, εἴπερ αὐτοῦ κήδεται. καὶ ἐλαττώσει μὲν καὶ μαρανεῖ ἀμελείᾳ τὰς τοῦ σώματος πλεονεξίας, ἀρχὰς δὲ ἀποθήσεται. σώματος δὲ ὑγίειαν φυλάττων οὐκ ἄπειρος νόσων εἶναι παντάπασι βουλήσεται· οὐδὲ μὴν οὐδὲ ἄπειρον εἶναι ἀλγηδόνων· ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ γινομένων νέος ὢν μαθεῖν βουλήσεται, ἤδη δὲ ἐν γήρᾳ ὢν οὔτε ταύτας οὔτε ἡδονὰς ἐνοχλεῖν οὐδέ τι τῶν τῇδε οὔτε προσηνὲς οὔτε ἐναντίον, ἵνα μὴ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα βλέπῃ. γινόμενος δ' ἐν ἀλγηδόσι τὴν πρὸς ταύτας αὐτῷ πεπορισμένην δύναμιν ἀντιτάξει οὔτε προσθήκην ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ ὑγιείαις καὶ ἀπονίαις πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν λαμβάνων οὔτε ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ ἐλάττωσιν ταύτης ἐν

14. 16 cf. Plat. *Theaet.* 176 a 7–8

14. 7 *φυτικῆς* xQ: *φυσικῆς* A(*τι* A[1s])Ey 10 *κινδυνεύσουσιν* wBJQ: *κινδυνεύουσιν* Ry 12 ⟨*δεῖ*⟩ *καὶ* Müller 13 *σωματικὰ* Dodds: *σώματα* *Enn.* 17 *σοφῶν* Q 19 *αὐτοῦ* *sui* 20 *τὰς* : *τῆς* y 22 *ἄπειρον εἶναι* (scil. *τὸν σοφὸν*) ExyQ: *ἄπειρος εἶναι* A, sed uerba *ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ γινομένων* uetant hic suppleri *βουλήσεται* 26 *γενόμενος* Q

It is ridiculous to maintain that *eudaimonia* extends as far as the living body, since *eudaimonia* is the good life, which is concerned with soul, being an activity of this [soul], but not all of it—for it is not [an activity] of the vegetative soul, which would connect it with the body. For certainly this *eudaimonia* is not in the size and health of the body—nor again in the excellence of its sense-perception, since indeed the excesses of these things will run the risk of weighing him down and bringing the man to them. A sort of counter-balancing must come about in the direction of the other side towards the best things, to diminish and make worse the bodily things, in order to demonstrate that this man is other than his external circumstances. Let the man concerned with these [externals] be beautiful and tall and rich and the leader of all men, inasmuch as he is of this place, but one must not envy his [possession] of such things by which he is led astray. Perhaps the wise man will not have these things to begin with, but if he comes to possess them, he himself will reduce them, if he cares for himself. And he will reduce and extinguish with lack of concern the advantages of the body, and he will put aside positions of authority. While being mindful of his bodily health, he will not want to be entirely without experience of illness, nor indeed without experience of pain; but even if these do not come about [of themselves], he will want to learn about them when he is young, but when he is already old [he will want] neither these things nor pleasures to interfere with him, nor anything from this place, either agreeable or the reverse, in order that he may not have to look to the body. When he finds himself in pain, he will oppose it with the power provided for him against these things; neither in pleasures or health or in the absence of pain [will he find] an addition to his *eudaimonia*, nor will the presence of their opposites remove or

τοῖς ἐναντίοις τούτων. τοῦ γὰρ ἐναντίου μὴ προστιθέντος τῷ αὐτῷ πῶς ἂν τὸ ἐναντίον ἀφαιροῖ;

15. *Ἀλλ' εἰ δύο εἶεν σοφοί, τῷ δὲ ἑτέρῳ παρείη ὅσα κατὰ φύσιν λέγεται, τῷ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, ἴσον φήσομεν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν αὐτοῖς παρεῖναι; φήσομεν, εἴπερ ἐπίσης σοφοί. εἰ δὲ καλὸς τὸ σῶμα ὁ ἕτερος καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα μὴ πρὸς σοφίαν μηδὲ ὅλως πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου θέαν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον εἶναι, τί τοῦτο ἂν εἴη; ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ὁ ταῦτα ἔχων σεμνυνεῖται ὡς μᾶλλον εὐδαίμων τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν πρὸς αὐλητικὸν τέλος ἡ τούτων πλεονεξία συμβάλλοιτο. ἀλλὰ γὰρ θεωροῦμεν τὸν εὐδαίμονα μετὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀσθενείας φρικτὰ καὶ δεινὰ νομίζοντες, ἃ μὴ ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων νομίσειεν· ἢ οὔπω οὔτε σοφὸς οὔτε εὐδαίμων εἴη μὴ τὰς περὶ τούτων φαντασίας ἁπάσας ἀλλαξάμενος καὶ οἷον ἄλλος παντάπασι γενόμενος πιστεύσας ἑαυτῷ, ὅτι μηδέν ποτε κακὸν ἕξει· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἀδεὴς ἔσται περὶ πάντα. ἢ δειλαίνων περί τινα οὐ τέλεος πρὸς ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ ἥμισύς τις ἔσται. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἀπροαίρετον αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον πρὸ κρίσεως δέος κἂν ποτε πρὸς ἄλλοις ἔχοντι γένηται, προσελθὼν ὁ σοφὸς ἀπώσεται καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ κινηθέντα οἷον πρὸς λύπας παῖδα καταπαύσει ἢ ἀπειλῇ ἢ λόγῳ· ἀπειλῇ δὲ ἀπαθεῖ, οἷον εἰ ἐμβλέψαντος σεμνὸν μόνον παῖς ἐκπλαγείη. οὐ μὴν διὰ ταῦτα ἄφιλος οὐδὲ ἀγνώμων ὁ τοιοῦτος· τοιοῦτος γὰρ καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ. ἀποδιδοὺς οὖν ὅσα αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς φίλοις φίλος ἂν εἴη μάλιστα μετὰ τοῦ νοῦν ἔχειν.*

16. *Εἰ δέ τις μὴ ἐνταῦθα ἐν τῷ νῷ τούτῳ ἄρας θήσει τὸν σπουδαῖον, κατάγοι δὲ πρὸς τύχας καὶ ταύτας*

15. 19–20 cf. Plat. *Phaed.* 77 e 5

15. 1 *δὲ* xU^{ac}(exp.): *δ'* w: *μὲν* SCQ **16** *τις ἔσται* : *τίς ἐστιν* Q
16. 1–2 *ἄρας θήσει* Kirchhoff: *ἄρας θήσειε* wxy uix recte, nam *ἔθησα* Plotinus non adhibet: *ἀριθμήσειε* Q

diminish it. For if the opposite has added nothing to the same thing, how could the opposite take anything away from it?

15. But if there were two wise men, and to one was present as much of what is said to be according to nature, and to the other the opposites; will we say that *eudaimonia* is present to them equally? We will say that, if they are equally wise. And if one has beauty of body and all the other things, as many as make no contribution to wisdom, nor to excellence in total, or to the vision of the best or to being the best, why would this matter? Since the one who has these things does not pride himself that he is more *eudaimōn* than the one not having them; for, in the end, an excess of these things would not contribute to making him even a flute-player. For indeed we consider *eudaimonia* in terms of our own weaknesses, regarding as frightening and terrible that which the *eudaimōn* does not; or he would not yet be either wise or *eudaimōn*, not having rid himself of all the *phantasmata* concerning these things, and becoming, as it were, another person entirely, trusting in himself, that evil will not ever take hold of him. For in this way, certainly, he will be fearless concerning all things. If he is cowardly regarding something, then he is not complete with regard to excellence, and will be a half-man. And when an involuntary fear takes hold of him before he can evaluate it, having his attention on other things, the wise man, appearing, will drive it away and will check the child in him which has been moved to distress, either by a threat or by reason, but with an unemotional threat, as a child might be stunned having received a single severe glance. For such a person is not, on account of this, unfriendly or hardhearted; for such a person [will act like this] concerning himself and his own affairs. Therefore rendering to his friends as much as he renders to himself, he will really be a friend because of his union with *Nous*.

16. But if one will not set the *spoudaios* aloft here in this *Nous*, but would bring him down to chance and will fear that these things

φοβήσεται περὶ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι, οὔτε σπουδαῖον τηρήσει, οἷον ἀξιοῦμεν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐπιεικῆ ἄνθρωπον, καὶ μικτὸν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ διδοὺς μικτὸν βίον ἔκ τινος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ ἀποδώσει τῷ τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιον γενέσθαι. ὃς εἰ καὶ γένοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ὀνομάζεσθαι εὐδαίμων εἴη ἄξιος οὐκ ἔχων τὸ μέγα οὔτε ἐν ἀξίᾳ σοφίας οὔτε ἐν καθαρότητι ἀγαθοῦ. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν ἐν τῷ κοινῷ εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν. ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἐκεῖθεν ἄνωθεν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀξιοῖ λαμβάνειν καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο βλέπειν τὸν μέλλοντα σοφὸν καὶ εὐδαίμονα ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἐκείνῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνο ζῆν. τοῦτο οὖν δεῖ ἔχειν μόνον πρὸς τὸ τέλος, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὡς ἂν καὶ τόπους μεταβάλλοι οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τόπων προσθήκην πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὡς στοχαζόμενος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων περικεχυμένων αὐτόν, οἷον εἰ ὡδὶ κατακείσεται ἢ ὡδί, διδοὺς μὲν τούτῳ ὅσα πρὸς τὴν χρείαν καὶ δύναται, αὐτὸς δὲ ὢν ἄλλος οὐ κωλυόμενος καὶ τοῦτον ἀφεῖναι, καὶ ἀφήσων δὲ ἐν καιρῷ φύσεως, κύριος δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὢν τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τούτου. ὥστε αὐτῷ τὰ ἔργα τὰ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντείνοντα ἔσται, τὰ δ' οὐ τοῦ τέλους χάριν καὶ ὅλως οὐκ αὐτοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ προσεζευγμένου, οὗ φροντιεῖ καὶ ἀνέξεται, ἕως δυνατόν, οἱονεὶ μουσικὸς λύρας, ἕως οἷόν τε χρῆσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλην ἀλλάξεται, ἢ ἀφήσει τὰς λύρας χρήσεις καὶ τοῦ εἰς λύραν ἐνεργεῖν ἀφέξεται ἄλλο ἔργον ἄνευ λύρας ἔχων καὶ κειμένην πλησίον περιόψεται ᾄδων ἄνευ ὀργάνων. καὶ οὐ μάτην αὐτῷ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὸ ὄργανον ἐδόθη· ἐχρήσατο γὰρ αὐτῷ ἤδη πολλάκις.

16. 11 cf. Plat. *Symp.* 212 a 1 11–12 cf. Plat. *Resp.* 427 d 5–6 12 cf. Plat. *Theaet.* 176 b 1

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16. 3 *οὔτε* : *οὐδὲ* Theiler, sed 3–4 *οὔτε..καὶ* = *οὔτε..τε* 15–16 *στοχαζόμενος* absolute et *καὶ—αὐτόν* uertendum: *licet alia ei circumfusa sint* 17 *τούτῳ* *isti* homini sensibili 19 *ἀφήσωμεν* y 21 *τοῦ* om. Q 26 *ἄλλον* y

can concern him, he will not be observing the *spoudaios*, as we conceive him to be, but the reasonable man, giving him a mixture of good and bad; he will assign to such a one [the *spoudaios*] a life which is also a mixture of some good and bad, and this cannot easily occur. And if such a person came to exist, he would not merit being called *eudaimōn*, not having greatness, either in worth of wisdom, or in clarity of good. Therefore it is not in the common life [of body and soul] that one lives the *eudaimōn* life. For indeed Plato correctly taught that the one intending to be wise and possess *eudaimonia* thinks fit to take his good from up there, and to look towards that, and to be like that, and to live according to that. So it is necessary to have this alone as the end, and all other circumstances he would change as he would his lodgings, not having [any expectation] of increasing his *eudaimonia* from [changing] lodgings, but guessing, as it were, at the other conditions surrounding him if he lodges here or there, giving to this [combination of body and soul] as much as it needs, and he is able, but he himself is other and is not prevented from abandoning this, and he will abandon it in nature's appropriate time, and he himself is in control concerning this decision. So that some of his activities will contribute to *eudaimonia*, but others will not be for the sake of the end, and not really for him [the *spoudaios*] but for what is attached to him, which he will care for and put up with, while he is able, like a musician with a lyre, while he is able to use it, but if he is not able to use it he will exchange it for another, or he will abandon using the lyre, and he will give up the activity directed to it, having another task now not requiring a lyre, and he will ignore it lying nearby singing now without an instrument. But the instrument was not given to him in vain at the beginning, for he has used it many times already.

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COMMENTARY

CHAPTER 1

Chapters 1 and 2[1] consist of a critical examination of the views of some previous thinkers on the nature of *eudaimonia*.[2] The structure of chapter 1 is established through a critique of two equations: *eudaimonia* as τὸ εὖ ζῆν (living well) and *eudaimonia* as a τέλος (end). Plotinus begins by attacking the equation of living well and *eudaimonia*, which was accepted by Aristotle,[3] Epicurus, and the Stoics. Without further qualification in ontological terms, this equation, Plotinus insists, logically gives plants and animals the possibility of a share in *eudaimonia*. Since, Plotinus insists, *mutatis mutandis*, plants and animals can satisfy the basic criteria of living lives proper to their own natures without impediments, and living lives through to their own proper ends, then they cannot be denied *eudaimonia*, if *eudaimonia* is to be found in life in general. Plotinus will argue in chs. 3 and 4 that just as there are various degrees of life, all proceeding from the One, so too there are various degrees of good lives. But *eudaimonia* is living life at the level of *Nous*, fullest life, something of which humanity alone is capable.[4] To tie *eudaimonia* to a particular

[1] Marsilio Ficino, the 15th-cent. Florentine philosopher and scholar, is responsible for the present chapter divisions within the *Enneads*. Ficino translated the *Enneads* into Latin in 1486, and in 1491 he added a commentary. For ease of reference to the H/S[2] text, I have retained the divisions. It is clear, however, that in terms of content, chs. 1 and 2 should be read as one.

[2] Plotinus sets out to show that his predecessors have not understood what life is at it highest level and how this is related to the good and *eudaimonia*. In general, see Rist, *Road to Reality*, 139–52.

[3] R. M. Mossé-Bastide claims that the entire treatise is directed against Aristotle, *La Pensée philosophique de Plotin*, (1972), 155 n. 4. Although I agree that Plotinus is certainly keen to refute Aristotle's views, it can be seen, even from this first chapter, that the Stoics and Epicureans are also of major concern to him. Indeed, in this first chapter, the bulk of the criticism, it seems to me, is directed against Stoicism.

[4] As R. T. Ciapalo observes, the noetic level *is* life, all other living things merely *have* life (my italics), 'The Relation of Plotinian *Eudaimonia* to the Life of the Serious Man in Treatise I.4 (46)', (1997), 489.

faculty of life, such as sense-perception or reason, faculties existing on lower rungs of the ontological ladder, is to jeopardize possession of *eudaimonia* for humanity. This is the criticism levelled at the various schools in these opening chapters. Plotinus will exclude plants and animals from a share in *eudaimonia*, not because they lack sense-perception or reason, faculties not present in their natures, but because they lack the superabundance of life in *Nous*, which is the hallmark of *eudaimonia*.[5]

1. 1–3 τὸ εὖ ζῆν . . . μεταδώσομεν; *In saying that . . . to the other living things?*: Plotinus begins with a criticism that he feels can be directed legitimately at Aristotle (*EN* 1095ᵃ19–20; 1098ᵇ20–1; *EE* 1219ᵇ1–2), the Stoics, and Epicureans (*SVF* iii. 17). He equates τὸ εὖ ζῆν and τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν again in ch. 5. 4. As has been pointed out by Atkinson,[6] the technique of beginning his treatises with a question is very common in the *Enneads*. This entire treatise is structured, in fact, on a dialectical formula of question and answer, which reflects, undoubtedly, the oral discussions in Plotinus' school (see *VP* 13. 10 ff.).[7]

1. 1–2 τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τιθέμενοι *In saying that living well and* eudaimonia *are in the same thing*: The majority of commentators consider this to be a reference to Aristotle's *EN* 1098ᵇ20–1 where we find: συνᾴδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαίμονα 'In harmony with our account, too, is the idea that the *eudaimōn* person both lives well and does well' (adapted), thus Armstrong, H/S², B/T, and Himmerich.[8] See

[5] See ch. 3. 25–6: μόνῳ ἂν τῷ ἄγαν ζῶντι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχοι '*only to whatever lives superabundantly would* eudaimonia *belong*'.

[6] M. Atkinson, *A Commentary on Plotinus,* Ennead *V.1*, (1983), 1.

[7] See J. H. Heiser, *Logos and Language in the Philosophy of Plotinus*, (1991), 1–2.

[8] W. Himmerich, Eudaimonia: *Die Lehre des Plotin von der Selbstverwirklichung des Menschen*, (1959), 163. Against this see L. P. Gerson, *Plotinus*, (1994), 282 n. 5 who suggests that here at 1098ᵇ20–1 Aristotle 'does not define happiness as living well' but actually says that 'the happy man is one who lives well harmonizes (συνᾴδει) with the λόγος of happiness . . . given at 1098ᵃ16–18'. This seems to me to be dealing in semantics. Aristotle clearly is agreeing here that *eudaimonia* is tied to living well. There can be no doubt that Aristotle equated *eudaimonia* with living well, as the further references from the *EE* and *Politics* given below demonstrate. See also R. Kraut, *Aristotle on the Human Good*, (2002), 53 n. 4 where we find: 'In his practical work, he (Aristotle) regards *eudaimōn* as a mere substitute for *eu zēn* ("living well")'.

also Graeser[9] and, more recently, Schniewind.[10] The majority of modern opinion is in favour of seeing this as a reference to Aristotle. See *Magna Moralia* 1184^{b}27 ff.; *Politics* 1331^{b}39, and 1325^{a}22 for a very similar phrase. In addition, a line from the *EE* has not been noted by commentators previously but seems to me worthy of attention. At 1219^{b}1 we find: τό τε γὰρ εὖ πράττειν καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν 'For we think to do well and to live well are the same as to be *eudaimōn*' (adapted). Here we find the actual phrasing used by Plotinus, while in *EN* 1098^{b}20–1 we have τὸν εὐδαίμονα and not τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν and ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ is not present at all. In addition, this line from the *EE* is followed by a qualification: ὧν ἕκαστον χρῆσίς ἐστι καὶ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις 'but each of these, both life and action, is an employment and activity'. The force of τὸ εὖ ζῆν as an activity is spelled out here, and as we shall see below (see the commentary on line 2), Plotinus is particularly critical of Aristotle's view that *eudaimonia* must necessarily consist of activity. Bréhier[11] suggests that the majority of the fifty-four treatises have as their starting point a passage in Plato or Aristotle, and it seems to me that *EE* 1219^{b}1 ff. might be seen as the starting point for *Ennead* I. 4. If Plotinus were quoting from the *EE* this would also have relevance for our understanding of the chronological order of Aristotle's ethical writings.[12]

Although most scholars list this opening line as a reference to Aristotle, we should bear in mind in the light of the remainder of

[9] A. Graeser, *Plotinus and the Stoics*, (1972), 58. Graeser suggests that Plotinus is referring to Plato's *Republic* 354a1 where we find: Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε εὖ ζῶν μακάριός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ τἀναντία 'So the one living well, is blessed and *eudaimōn*, the one not, is the opposite'. He suggests that Plotinus is referring to this to point out the ἀπορία that a Platonist has to face. This is highly unlikely. Plotinus understood Platonic *eudaimonia* in terms of ontology. Plato's references to *eudaimonia* in terms of living and doing well (see *Charmides* 172a; *Gorgias* 507c; and *Alcibiades* 116b) were viewed by Plotinus within the metaphysical framework that we find throughout the *Enneads*. The criticism here is directed at those whose equation of living well and *eudaimonia* is not confined to the ontological level of *Nous*.

[10] Schniewind, *L'Éthique du Sage*, 71. I owe the references to the *Charmides*, *Gorgias* and *Alcibiades* to Schniweind, see n. 5.

[11] E. Bréhier, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, (1958), 27.

[12] See the note on 1. 2–3 and the reference to the debate concerning the chronology of Aristotle's works.

this chapter, where the Stoics especially and Epicurus come in for criticism, a passage in Michael of Ephesus' commentary on the *EN* of Aristotle[13] where we learn that both these schools held this view also. τὸ δὲ εὖ ζῆν καὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς καὶ κατ' Ἐπίκουρον εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστι 'living well according to both them [the Stoics] and Epicurus is to be *eudaimōn*.'[14] This is noted by B/T, Kalligas, and Graeser,[15] the last of whom as a result claims: 'It is difficult to decide against whom Plotinus is actually arguing'. For this equation of τὸ εὖ ζῆν and τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν in Stoicism, see also *SVF* iii. 65.

1. 1 τὸ εὖ ζῆν *living well*:[16] In the light of Aristotle's use of this phrase it is easy to see why Plotinus is critical. Aristotle conceives of τὸ εὖ ζῆν as active; *eudaimonia* is regarded as something inherently, and, for the most part, manifestly active. In the light of this, the critique that follows makes good sense. Aristotle's emphasis on activity, and his failure to raise *eudaimonia* to the fullest level of life, leaves Plotinus able to ask the following questions regarding irrational creatures: if *eudaimonia* is made up of a life of activity, then an active life without impediments is surely *eudaimōn* (lines 3–4) and, again, if *eudaimonia* is activity, and one performs one's natural activity, then one must surely possess *eudaimonia* (lines 5–6)?

That Aristotle did think *eudaimonia* to consist in activity is clear. See *EE* 1219^a11–1219^b8 and 1219^b18–1219^b20 where Aristotle explains: ὅμοιοι γὰρ καθεύδοντες πάντες. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἀργία ψυχῆς ὁ ὕπνος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐνέργεια 'all men are alike when asleep. The reason for this is that sleep is inaction of the spirit, not an activity'. See also *EN* 1099^a1–2; 1099^a29–30; 1100^b10; 1100^b19–20; 1100^b33; 1102^b5–8; 1144^a5–6; 1153^b16; 1169^b29; 1170^a7–11; 1177^a6–22; 1177^b1 ff.; 1177^b23–4; *Politics* 1323^b32–4;

[13] Michael of Ephesus was an Aristotelian commentator who lived in the first half of the 12th cent. AD. See H. P. F. Mercken, 'The Greek commentators on Aristotle's *Ethics*', in R. Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed*, (1990), 429–36.

[14] Michael of Ephesus, *A Commentary on Aristotle's N.E.* (*CAG*. Vol. XX), ed. G. Heylbut, (1889), 598 = *SVF* iii. 17 [henceforth: *Comm. in Arist. Graeca*]

[15] Greaser notes that this increases the difficulty of determining the object of Plotinus' criticism here, *Plotinus and the Stoics*, 58.

[16] I translate the phrase τὸ εὖ ζῆν as 'living well' as this captures best the idea of activity which is vital to our understanding of Plotinus' criticism here. Others prefer 'the good life', which, legitimate as it is as a translation, tends to conceal the nature of the criticism here.

$1325^{a}32$ (ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξίς ἐστιν 'for *eudaimonia* is an activity'); $1325^{b}14$–16; $1328^{a}37$–8; $1332^{a}9$–10; *Poetics* $1450^{a}17$ ff.; *Metaphysics* $1072^{b}23$–31; $1075^{a}8$–10; and *Magna Moralia* $1184^{b}27$–$1185^{a}14$. This was noted as long ago as Stewart.[17] Burnet[18] helps us to place the *Politics* in the chronology of Aristotle's works by recognizing this feature. See Nussbaum[19] who collects and presents evidence for this view of *eudaimonia* as an activity. Plotinus, against Aristotle, sees obvious activity as irrelevant to *eudaimonia*; indeed he will claim in chs. 9 and 10 that the good man can be unconscious, active only on an unseen level, and still possess *eudaimonia*.

1. 1 τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν[20] *eudaimonia*: Plotinus uses the verbal noun form here, with its attendant suggestion of activity, to reinforce his criticism of Aristotle and the other schools in their equation of *eudaimonia* with active life.[21] To say what Plotinus thought τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν consisted of at this stage would be to prejudge the issue. It will become clear from the commentary however, that he thought it to be a state achieved when the descended soul reunites with its higher part in the timelessness of *Nous*. In ch. 10 he will call this state a substance, the substance of *Nous*. In view of this, translations of τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν as 'happiness' or even 'well-being' do no justice to Plotinus' intent. Ciapalo[22] translates it as 'the good state of one's inner reality' which is, I suppose, as close to what Plotinus means as we can get with a limited phrase. Since no single term

[17] 'It is Aristotle's object, in the *EN* to give a new meaning to this accepted term (εὐδαιμονίας). The popular view regarded "happiness" as consisting in the favour of Heaven and Fortune, and in the multitude of man's possessions. Aristotle shows that it consists, not in what a man has or receives, but in what he is or does. It is an active function (ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς), not a condition of passivity. It is "noble living"—τὸ εὖ ζῆν in the active sense' (J. A. Stewart, *Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle*, (1892), 44).

[18] 'In the *Politics* Aristotle more and more tends to substitute this phrase (τὸ εὖ ζῆν) for the name εὐδαιμονία which he had borrowed from the Academy. It emphasises the view that a good life is an ἐνέργεια' (J. Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle*, (1900), 15).

[19] M. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness*, (1986), 323–4.

[20] For a fuller summary of this word as used in Greek philosophy see the introduction to the commentary on *Ennead* 1.4 'Die Glückseligkeit' begun by Harder and completed by Beutler and Theiler, 309–11 in vol. Vb.

[21] See Schniewind, *L'Éthique du Sage*, 69 n. 2, who agrees that this is the case.

[22] R. T. Ciapalo, ' *"Life" (Zôê) in Plotinus' Explanation of Reality*', (1987), 219 n. 2.

suffices, I will simply transliterate rather than translate the term and hope that by the end of the commentary, the meaning, with all its implications, will be clear. On the difficulties of translating the term, note the comments by Vlastos.[23] See also Nussbaum,[24] and Kraut.[25]

1. 1 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ *in the same thing*: Plotinus is referring here simply to life, without ontological qualification. Plotinus has begun *in medias res*. The background to this treatise clearly involved an attack on the materialist schools at a fundamental level. This is the first important block in the dialectical structure of Plotinus' anti-Aristotelian, anti-Stoic, and anti-Epicurean argument. Thus it is of vital importance to note the force of ἐν in this sentence, which has been missed by previous translators. Plotinus insists that τὸ εὖ ζῆν and τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν are *in* the same thing, i.e. life. But living well when it is equated with *eudaimonia* means, in Plotinian ontology, living life at the level of *Nous*. Living well, in human terms, means having no deficiency in life. Other lives, those of plants and animals, live outside the hypostasis of *Nous*, and have only a share in life and so are capable only of living well on their respective ontological levels. For Plotinus, τὸ εὖ ζῆν and τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν are indeed *in* life, even if life ranges across a number of ontological levels, from the very fullest to lives permitting of degrees.[26] In Plotinian terms, living well for

[23] G. Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, (1991), 201. Vlastos highlights the serious difficulty in translating this word. 'Happiness for *eudaimonia* is a more contentious matter. Leading Aristotelians, Ross and Ackrill, have claimed that "well-being" would be a better translation. But in their own translations of the *Nicomachean Ethics* both stick to happiness all the same. It is not hard to see why they would and should. "Well-being" has no adjectival or adverbial forms. This may seem a small matter to armchair translators, philosophers dogmatizing on how others should do the job. Not so if one is struggling with its nitty-gritty, trying for clause-by-clause English counterparts that might be faithful to the sentence-structure, no less than the sense of the Greek original . . . *Eudaimonia* fits perfectly street-Greek and Aristophanic slapstick, yet also, no less perfectly, the most exalted passages of tragedy.'

[24] Nussbaum, *Fragility of Goodness*, 6 n. †.

[25] Kraut, *Aristotle on the Human Good*, 3.

[26] The translations of MacKenna, Bréhier, Bouillet, Cilento, Armstrong, and most recently Linguiti, are therefore flawed in this respect. Armstrong translates: 'Suppose we assume the good life and well-being to be one and the same'. This omission of the force of ἐν in the translation misdirects us to a contrast between living well and *eudaimonia*.

humanity, what he calls *eudaimonia*, is in *ἄλλο εἶδος ζωῆς* 'another species of life' which does not permit of degrees. See ch. 3. 16 ff., where this interpretation makes good sense in the light of what is said there. Also see Schroeder,[27] Gerson,[28] and O'Meara,[29] who notes that Plotinus' attacks on his predecessors can sometimes shape the position that he ends up defending.

1. 2–3 *καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ἆρα τούτων μεταδώσομεν;* *will we also be giving [a share] of them to the other living things?*: Following the line we have taken thus far, that *τὸ εὖ ζῆν* denotes activity, we can see the sense of Plotinus' criticism. If *eudaimonia* is simply a matter of activity, then we cannot deny it to other active living things. Yet there is surely a difficulty here. Plotinus was well versed in Aristotle's ethical works (*VP* 13.13), and so must have been aware that Aristotle considered *eudaimonia* something only humanity could possess.[30] At *EN* $1178^{a}5$ ff., we find: *σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα εὐδαιμονίας, τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως* 'Another indication of this is that the other animals do not share in *eudaimonia*, being completely deprived of this sort of activity [i.e. contemplation]' (adapted). In addition Michael of Ephesus comments on this passage as follows: *ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰς τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων, Ἐπικουρείων τε καὶ τῶν ὕστερον Στωικῶν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας*

[27] F. M. Schroeder, 'Plotinus and Aristotle on the Good Life', (1997), 215. One might say, as Schroeder correctly points out, that Plotinus does agree with Aristotle that *τὸ εὖ ζῆν* and *τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν* are the same thing, but this is only true on the noetic level, that is, at a level outside of body. When Plotinus equates living well with *eudaimonia*, he is considering the fullest good life available. That *eudaimonia* does not descend below the noetic level is made clear in chs. 3. 26 and 14. 4–7.

[28] Gerson is therefore mistaken, I feel, to suggest (*Plotinus*, 188): 'Indeed he [Plotinus] takes so seriously the identification of goodness with a goal of intrinsically satisfying experiences that he sees nothing logically untoward in saying that plants and animals are happy if they attain their natural states (see I.4.1.10–15).' Plants and animals may live well but they can never possess *eudaimonia* because they can never possess fullest life in *Nous*.

[29] D. J. O'Meara, *Plotinus: An Introduction to the* Enneads, (1995), 15. In ch. 3 Plotinus begins to explain his own view of *eudaimonia* by arguing that it must indeed be set in life.

[30] Plotinus must certainly have been aware that Aristotle considered *eudaimonia* as something only humans were capable of achieving, but his definitions of *eudaimonia* are at times so general that all other living things must necessarily be included.

ὑπολήψεις δύναται τις εὐδαιμονίαν μεταδιδόναι καὶ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῴοις, κατ' ἐμὲ δὲ καὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὅσοι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐν νοερᾷ ζωῇ ἱστῶμεν, ἀδύνατον κατὰ ταύτην εὐδαιμονεῖν τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζῴων, ἐστερημένα νοῦ καὶ ζωῆς λογικῆς 'because according to the assumptions of the other philosophers, Epicurus and the later Stoics, concerning *eudaimonia*, one can give a share of *eudaimonia* to the irrational creatures, but according to Plato, and myself, and the others, as many as place *eudaimonia* in the noetic life, it is impossible on this basis to [give a share] of *eudaimonia* to the irrational creatures, who are deprived of intellect and rational life'.[31] Interestingly, Michael of Ephesus, in lines directly following this passage, seems to borrow his arguments from *Ennead* I. 4 [46] 1, this very chapter, to attack Epicurus and the later Stoics (see *SVF* III. 17). Presumably he felt that Plotinus' criticisms here were not directed against Aristotle and that Aristotle's placing of *eudaimonia* in rational life had excluded him from such an attack.

Is then Plotinus simply being unfair to Aristotle, as Ciapalo[32] suggests? Is he isolating certain ideas and attacking them without regard for Aristotle's overall thought? Let us consider things from Plotinus' perspective. Aristotle considered *eudaimonia* to consist of ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια ... κατ' ἀρετήν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην 'an activity of the soul ... in accordance with excellence (and if there are more excellences than one, in accordance with the best and most complete)' *EN* 1098^a16–18. Rationality is not specifically mentioned in this definition. Aristotle simply adds later at 1178^b24–5: σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα εὐδαιμονίας, τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως 'Another indication of this is that the other animals do not share in *eudaimonia*, being completely deprived of this activity [i.e. contemplation]' (adapted). Yet at 1178^a5–6 he has stated: τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἑκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἥδιστόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ 'what belongs to each kind of creature by nature is best and most pleasant for each'. See also *EN* 1099^b32–1100^a3 and *EE* 1217^a18 ff. If *eudaimonia* is an activity according to excellence, why are plants and animals not *eudaimōn* when they live according to their excellence? That this is what Plotinus is getting at is

[31] *Comm. in Arist. Graeca* 598.
[32] Ciapalo, '"*Life*" *in Plotinus' Explanation of Reality*', 226 n. 9.

made clear from the criticism that follows i.e., why are they not *eudaimōn* when they perform the functions proper to them without impediments? Aristotle, in Plotinus' view, simply excludes plants and animals from *eudaimonia*, yet the basis for their exclusion, rationality, is not germane to the Aristotelian definition of *eudaimonia*. If *eudaimonia* is a matter of activity, then all other animals that live actively must be capable of achieving it. Aristotle would like to deny it to them: οὐ γάρ ἐστιν εὐδαίμων ἵππος οὐδ' ὄρνις οὐδ' ἰχθὺς οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν ὄντων οὐθέν, ὃ μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἐν τῇ φύσει μετέχει θείου τινός, 'for a horse is not *eudaimōn*, nor a bird nor a fish nor any other existing thing which does not according to its designation have in its nature a share in the divine' *EE* 1217ª26–8 (adapted). Aristotle excludes them because they cannot contemplate.[33] But if *eudaimonia* is equivalent to living well, and living well for irrational creatures is their ability to live well in their proper ways and achieve their proper ends, then they must, in Plotinus' view, be considered *eudaimōn*? This is spelled out in more detail in the criticisms that follow.

1. 3–4 εἰ γὰρ . . . διεξάγειν *For if . . . without impediment*: Although Plotinus agrees with the equation of living well and *eudaimonia* when humanity is under discussion, he undermines this equation at any level below humanity. Plotinus takes advantage of the ambiguity in Aristotle's use of the phrase τὸ εὖ ζῆν by beginning in a biological rather than an ethical context.[34] Lines 3–4 have been ascribed to *EN* 1153ᵇ11 by H/S², Armstrong, and B/T, who also direct us to *Politics* 1295ª37. See also Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Ethical Problems* 143. 12–144. 4. Aristotle in *EN* 1153ᵇ11 is making room for pleasure in his definition of *eudaimonia*. Pleasure is, he says, ἀνεμποδίστως 'unimpeded' activity which is the essence of *eudaimonia*. Plotinus sees this as tantamount to saying that if a living thing is active and not impeded in its activity then it possesses *eudaimonia*. From a Plotinian standpoint, Aristotle is not the only one guilty of incoherence here; his criticism is equally valid against some of the Stoics.

[33] See R. Sorabji, *Animal Minds and Human Morals*, (1993), 12–16, esp. p. 14 nn., for Aristotle's denial of reason (*logos*) and intellect (*nous*) to animals.

[34] See Schroeder, 'Plotinus and Aristotle on the Good Life', 213, and Schniewind, *L'Éthique du Sage*, 72.

In Cicero's *Tusc. Disp.* we find the Stoic view: *neque est ullum, quod non ita vigeat interiore quodam motu et suis in quoque seminibus inclusis, ut aut flores aut fruges fundat aut bacas omniaque in omnibus, quantum in ipsis est, nulla vi impediente perfecta sint* 'nor is there any plant which fails, by the energy of a sort of inner movement and the power of the seeds enclosed in each of them, to put out in profusion either flowers or fruit or berries, while all of them are perfect in all things to the limit of their natures, if no outside force prevents' 5. 37 (King trans.).[35] See also DL 7. 86. If a plant possesses the best life possible for it, then, it, too, must be *eudaimōn*. Graeser[36] is one of the few modern commentators to devote reasonable attention to the Stoics in regard to this opening chapter. Armstrong maintains that Plotinus doesn't seriously turn his attention to them until well into chapter 2.

1. 4 ἐν εὐζωίᾳ *[in possession of] a good life*: B/T refer again to *EN* 1098^b21.

1. 5 καὶ γὰρ εἴτε ἐν εὐπαθείᾳ τὴν εὐζωίαν τις θήσεται *For whether one sets the good life in good experience*: Having criticized, in a general way, the absence of an ontological framework in the equation of *τὸ εὖ ζῆν* and *τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν*, which can be traced to Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Epicureans, Plotinus, in selecting this phrase, would now appear to focus directly on the Stoics.

1. 5 εὐπαθείᾳ *in good experience*: That this is Stoic terminology has been noted by only a few commentators.[37] *Εὐπαθείαι* characterize the Stoic sage.[38] *Εἶναι δὲ καὶ εὐπαθείας φασὶ τρεῖς, χαράν, εὐλάβειαν, βούλησιν* 'And they say that there are three good experiences: joy, caution and wishing' (DL 7. 116, Hicks trans. adapted).[39] See also Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones* 6. 15 (*SVF* iii. 437) and Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 4. 12–14. Which Stoic first used the term is a matter of dispute. Rist[40] initially argued that the theory of *εὐπαθείαι* belonged to Zeno but later became less

[35] See G. Striker, *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics*, (1996), 229.

[36] Graeser, *Plotinus and the Stoics*, 58 ff.

[37] B/T and Graeser, *Plotinus and the Stoics*, 58 being among the few. See *SVF* iii. 431.

[38] See R. Sharples, *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, (1996), 70.

[39] See G. van Riel, *Pleasure and the Good Life*, (2000), 90–1.

[40] J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, (1969), 31–2.

certain about this.[41] Pohlenz[42] thought the term to be later than Chrysippus. For a comprehensive list of the various theorists in this dispute, see Inwood.[43] See also Bussanich[44] for Plato's use of this term and its possible influence on Plotinus.

1. 5–6 εἴτε ἐν ἔργῳ οἰκείῳ τελειουμένῳ *or in the completion of one's appropriate function*: H/S[2] refer to Aristotle's *EN* 1106ª23–4 and *EN* 1177ª16–17, where we find that *eudaimonia* consists of ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν 'the activity of this, [viz. contemplation] in accordance with its own proper excellence' (adapted). B/T note that the phrase οἰκεῖον ἔργον is not distinctively Aristotelian, but they too consider *EN* 1106ª23 a reasonable equivalent. They refer us further back to ἔργον and οἰκείαν ἀρετήν in Plato's *Republic* 353b1 ff., where we find interesting verbal parallels. See again *EN* 1178ª5–6. It is possible that Plotinus has Aristotle in mind here since it cannot be doubted that Aristotle considered *eudaimonia* to belong to whatever performed its appropriate function, although, again, Aristotle was thinking only in terms of human beings.

But Plotinus here may also be attacking the Stoics, particularly since εὐπαθείᾳ in the previous line is certainly recognized Stoic terminology. B/T refer to Epictetus, *Disc.* 1. 16. 21 where we find: τοῦτό μου τὸ ἔργον ἐστίν, ποιῶ αὐτὸ οὐδ' ἐγκαταλείψω τὴν τάξιν ταύτην 'This is my function; I do it and will not desert this post' (Oldfather trans. adapted). See, in addition, Epictetus, *Man.* 24. 4 where we have ἱκανὸν δέ, ἐὰν ἕκαστος ἐκπληρώσῃ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον 'But it is sufficient if each man fulfil his own proper function' (Oldfather trans.). Also note Epictetus, *Disc.* 1. 4. 17; 3. 3. 1–2; 3. 18. 6–9; 3. 26. 29; 4. 8. 24; 4. 12. 6, 10; and 4. 8. 43 where we find τὰ οἰκεῖα ἔργα.

The idea that each living thing has a proper function can be linked certainly to Stoicism. Often we find the term καθήκοντα, which is reasonably translated I think as 'proper function' by Long and Sedley.[45] Regarding its use by the Stoics they refer us to Cicero, *De Finibus* 3. 20–2 = L/S 59D, DL 7. 88 = L/S 59J, DL 7. 108–9 = L/S

[41] J. M. Rist, 'The Stoic Concept of Detachment', in Rist (ed.), *The Stoics*, (1978), 259.

[42] M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa* (1949), i. 152, ii. 83.

[43] B. Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism*, (1985), 305–6.

[44] J. Bussanich, *The One and its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus*, (1988), 179.

[45] L/S i. 359.

59E, Plutarch, *Comm. Not.* 1069e = L/S 59A, and Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Mathematicos* 11. 200–1 = L/S 59G. For a good summary of the Stoic idea of proper function, see Long and Sedley.[46] Important for us is the fact that the Stoics extended the concept of a proper function to animals and plants:[47] *ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα διατείνει· ὁρᾶσθαι γὰρ κἀπὶ τούτων καθήκοντα. κατωνομάσθαι δ' οὕτως ὑπὸ πρώτου Ζήνωνος τὸ καθῆκον, ἀπὸ τοῦ κατά τινας ἥκειν τῆς προσονομασίας εἰλημμένης. ἐνέργημα δ' αὐτὸ εἶναι ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν κατασκευαῖς οἰκεῖον* 'which [i.e. proper function] also extends to plants and animals. For proper functions can be seen in them as well. Zeno was the first to use this term *καθῆκον*, the name being derived from *κατά τινας ἥκειν*, "to have arrived in accordance with certain persons". Proper function is an activity appropriate to constitutions that accord with nature' (L/S trans. adapted) DL 7. 107 (*SVF* iii. 493 part) = L/S 29C. See also Stobaeus, *Eklogai* 2. 85.13–86.4 (*SVF* iii. 494) = L/S 29B, and Epictetus, *Disc.* 4. 5. 13–14. The concept of one's *eudaimonia* resulting from the completion of one's appropriate function therefore can be located quite clearly in both Aristotle and the Stoics.

1. 6–7 κατ' ἄμφω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὑπάρξει *in both cases it will be available to the other living things too*: Although both the Stoics and Aristotle considered the faculty of reason as indispensable to their respective concepts of *eudaimonia*, their approach, Plotinus insists, allows the possibility of *eudaimonia* to all other life-forms. Their definitions of *eudaimonia* situate it on the lowest ontological level and as a result do not necessarily exclude the lowest life-forms. Their definitions of *eudaimonia* simply attach the criterion of reason, or the ability to contemplate, and as a result dismiss the lower life-forms. Plotinus, however, insists that *eudaimonia* can only be attained at the level of *Nous*, the fullest level of life, an ontological level beyond the reach of the irrational creatures, and this is why he denies them any share of it. See chapters 3 and 4. If Aristotle, the Stoics, and Epicurus wish to consider this world the real and only

[46] L/S i. 364–8.

[47] See in addition Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 1. 34, where Epicurus also gives a function to animals.

existent one, then they cannot simply dismiss the lower forms of life; they too must be accounted for. See ch. 3. 37 ff.

1. 7–8 *καὶ γὰρ εὐπαθεῖν ἐνδέχοιτο ἂν καὶ ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἔργῳ εἶναι* *For it would be possible to undergo both good experiences and to function in accordance with one's nature*: Plotinus' use of *εὐπαθεῖν* and *κατὰ φύσιν* suggests that he is continuing his critique of the Stoics. For the life *κατὰ φύσιν*, see DL 7. 87–8; Cicero, *De Finibus* 3. 31; Epictetus, *Disc.* 1. 11. 6; and the commentary on line 29 below. Aristotle, however, cannot be ruled out here either, since he thought we were to some degree led *κατὰ φύσιν*, see *EN* $1097^{b}30$ and $1177^{a}14$. The phrase *κατὰ φύσιν*, however, was certainly more widely recognized as a Stoic formula.

1. 8–10 *τὰ μουσικὰ τῶν ζῴων . . . τὴν ζωὴν ἔχει* *musical animals . . . have the life preferable to them*: It is perhaps pointless to look for a reason as to why Plotinus should select musical animals as opposed to any other kinds of creature. The singing of birds whose tunes would seem to indicate a cheerful nature is possibly what he has in mind. The use of *ᾄδοντα* would appear to confirm that Plotinus is thinking of birds here, but it is also quite possible that he has cicadas in mind. Bréhier inserts 'les oiseaux' into his translation and is followed in this by Schniewind.[48] Michael of Ephesus[49] also preserves this example. The reappearance of *πέφυκε* might well confirm that the Stoics are his concern here.[50]

1. 10–11 *καὶ τοίνυν καὶ εἰ τέλος τι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τιθέμεθα* *And then, also, if we suppose* eudaimonia *to be in a particular end*: Plotinus begins his critique of *eudaimonia* as an end, which shapes the second part of this chapter. The criticism here is the same as that in the opening lines: if one grants *eudaimonia* to whatever reaches the natural end of its life, then all living things are capable of acquiring *eudaimonia*. It is quite natural for Plotinus to move from *οἰκεῖον ἔργον* to *τὸ τέλος* since 'investigation of the end is a func-

[48] Schniewind, *L'Éthique du Sage*, 73.

[49] *Comm. in Arist. Graeca* 598.

[50] See R. Ferwerda, *La Signification des images et des métaphores dans la pensée de Plotin*, (1965), 96–7. Here Ferwerda refers to an interesting passage in Epictetus, *Disc.* 1. 16. 20. *τί γὰρ ἄλλο δύναμαι γέρων χωλὸς εἰ μὴ ὑμνεῖν τὸν θεόν; εἰ γοῦν ἀηδὼν ἤμην, ἐποίουν τὰ τῆς ἀηδόνος, εἰ κύκνος, τὰ τοῦ κύκνου* 'What else am I, a lame old man, able to do but to sing hymns to God? If, at any rate, I was a nightingale, I would sing as a nightingale; if a swan as a swan.'

tionalist inquiry, a specification of the kind of life which will enable a person to fulfil his or her nature'.[51] Once again, previous commentators H/S², B/T, Bréhier, and Armstrong, universally assign this line to Aristotle, *EN* 1176^b31. That Aristotle considered *eudaimonia* to be an end is beyond doubt, see *EN* 1097^b7–8; 1099^b17; 1101^a18–19; 1097^a23; 1098^b19; 1176^a31–2; *EE* 1214^b10; 1218^b25; 1219^b16; 1219^a10; 1220^a4; *Politics* 1278^b24; 1331^b38; *Rhetoric* 1360^b5; and Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Ethical Problems* 148. 29–30B.[52] See, in addition, *Ethical Problems*, 119. 18–23.

However, if we acknowledge *how* Plotinus defines this end: *ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔσχατον τῆς ἐν φύσει ὀρέξεως* 'which is the final point of desire in [some thing's] nature', we have surely returned to Stoic terminology, as is noted by B/T. The Stoics clearly make *eudaimonia* an end. Long and Sedley[53] list Stobaeus, *Eklogai* 2. 77. 16–27[54] (*SVF* iii. 16) = L/S 63A; 2. 75. 11 –76, 8 = L/S 63B; DL 7. 87–9 = L/S 63C; Seneca, *Ep.* 76. 9–10 (*SVF* iii. 200) = L/S 63D; Epictetus, *Disc.* 1. 6. 12–22 = L/S 63E; Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 5. 81–2 = L/S 63M; and Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 5. 16 = L/S 63K.[55] To this may be added Cicero, *De Finibus* 3. 26 and 4. 14–15.

1. 11–12 *ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔσχατον τῆς ἐν φύσει ὀρέξεως* *which is the final point of desire in [some thing's] nature*: That Plotinus has the Stoics in mind more than Aristotle would seem to be confirmed by this terminology. This is noted by H/S² who cite Stobaeus, *Eklogai* 2. 76. 16W = (*SVF* iii. 3), and add *SVF* iii. 65 in the *fontes addendi.* Llorens agrees that the material in *SVF* iii. 65 is not Aristotelian but Stoic. See also Michael of Ephesus,[56] and Graeser,[57] who suggests that

[51] L/S i. 398.

[52] At this point in the *Ethical Problems* Alexander of Aphrodisias makes clear that he is discussing *eudaimonia* as a human end. If Plotinus read the commentaries of Alexander as *VP* 14. 10–14 says he did, then he was well aware of this.

[53] On the end, and happiness in general in Stoicism, see L/S i. 394–410.

[54] The author is Arius Didymus. For a discussion of this passage, see T. Engberg-Pedersen, *The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis*, (1990), 27–35.

[55] *ὅπου δὲ τὸ τέλος, ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἑκάστου* 'and where its end is, there too exists its interest and its good'.

[56] *πάλιν εἰ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστι κατὰ τοὺς Στωικοὺς τὸ ἔσχατον τῆς φυσικῆς ὀρέξεως, ἐφ' ἐλθοῦσα ἡ φύσις τὸ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος* 'Again if *eudaimonia*, according to the Stoics, is the final point of desire in nature, which the nature goes through for the sake of the end' *Comm. in Arist. Graeca* 599.

[57] Graeser, *Plotinus and the Stoics*, 57.

Plotinus is 'stoicizing' in this phrase. But note also *fr.* 32 II 6–10 of Diogenes of Oinoanda where we find: *τί δὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστιν καὶ οὗ κατὰ τὸ [ἔ]σχατον ἡ φύσις ἡμῶ[ν] ὀρέγεται, [τ]ὴν μὲν [ἡ]δονὴν λ[έγ]ω* 'What is *eudaimonia* and what does our nature reach for to the end, I say it is pleasure'. Epicurus then, in addition to the Stoics, may be the object of Plotinus' critique here, particularly as Smith has reminded us that Epicureanism in the second century AD was by no means as dead a philosophy as is commonly believed.[58]

1. 12 *ὀρέξεως* *of desire*: On Plotinus' use of this term see Gerson.[59]

1. 12–13 *καὶ ταύτῃ . . . εἰς ἔσχατον ἀφικνουμένων* *here also . . . when they arrive at this final point*: Plotinus now states what is for him a necessary conclusion. See lines 2, 4–5, and 7. If everything has a function or a natural inclination that leads to an end, which is simply the ultimate term of natural desire, and this is equal to *eudaimonia*, then we shall have to include plants and animals. See *Ennead* III. 8 [30] 1. 1 ff. where Plotinus agrees that all living things can live out lives to the best of their abilities and so have the best possible lives for themselves. They do not however share in *eudaimonia*, which is life in *Nous*, where one lives superabundantly (*ἄγαν*), as he tells us in ch. 3. 26. Other lives are only traces of reality and as such can never aspire to *eudaimonia*.

1. 13 *ἀφικνουμένων* '*when they arrive*': On this use of the genitive absolute here, see Schwyzer in *R-E* 21. 518. 53 ff.

1. 13–15 *εἰς ὃ ἐλθοῦσιν ἵσταται ἡ ἐν αὐτοῖς φύσις . . . πληρώσασα ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος* *when they reach it, the nature in them comes to a stop . . . having fulfilled it from beginning to end*: Bréhier considers this to be an argument directed against Aristotle's view of *eudaimonia* in *EN* 1097^a26 ff., where Aristotle views *eudaimonia* as final, self-sufficient, and desirable. However see Seneca, *Ep.* 124. 11 ff., where plants are accorded a certain good life when they complete their proper life cycle. They are denied true good because they do not have reason.

[58] M. F. Smith, *Diogenes of Oinoanda* (1993). See 38, 124 and the supporting evidence given there. See also Lucian's *Sale of Philosophies*, 19, which helps confirm that Epicureanism was still alive in the 2nd cent. AD.

[59] Gerson, *Plotinus*, 152–5.

1. 15–16 εἰ δέ τις . . . τὰ ζῷα τὰ ἄλλα *But if someone . . . to the other living things*: Schniewind[60] thinks this τις refers to Aristotle, but it could refer also to a number of the Stoics. Aristotle explicitly denies *eudaimonia* to plants and animals in *EN* 1097^{b}25 ff., and to animals in *EN* 1099^{b}32–3 and 1178^{b}27–8. In the *EE* he does this again at 1216^{a}1–10. But as we saw above, Seneca, too, considered that *eudaimonia* could not be present in irrational lives, see *Ep.* 124. 11 ff. See also Epictetus, *Disc.* 2. 8. 1–7, where the true good is emphatically denied to plants and animals.

1. 17 τοῖς ἀτιμοτάτοις *to the least valued of them*: Presumably this refers to the plants that are mentioned in the line that follows. H/S^{2} and B/T refer to Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Mathematicos* 11. 97, where Epicurus is attacked along these lines for simply equating *eudaimonia* with pleasure.

1. 19 ἐξελιττομένην *unfurls*: Harder suggests that this term achieved canonical usage in Plotinus and forms the basis of our notion of development [*evolutio*] precisely because of Plotinus. He refers to its use by an unknown author to describe the opening out of a plant. We are referred also to *Ennead* III. 7 [45] 11. 24 and V. 3 [49] 10. 57, where the term is used in reference to emanation, highlighting the ideas of 'unfolding' and subsequent 'multiplicity'. Harder further suggests that the term had become highly significant ontologically. Plotinus does like to characterize the life of a plant with the terms ἀρχή and τέλος, that is, life as a meaningful whole, but there is surely a significant difference between a life unfurling and a life evolving. In addition, the *Lexicon Plot.* shows a quite limited use of this term and, it seems to me, certainly an exaggeration to claim that it achieved canonical usage.

1. 19–21 πρῶτον μὲν. . . ὅτι μὴ πολλοῦ ἄξια αὐτῷ δοκεῖ εἶναι; *first, . . . because he doesn't think them to be worth much?*: We come now to the crux of Plotinus' criticism. The three critical points he makes above in lines 1–2, 6, and 11 make complete sense in the light of this sentence. Plotinus is not concerned that Aristotle and the Stoics conceive *eudaimonia* as belonging to the rational life, with which he agrees (see ch. 4. 3–4); he is, however, concerned with their approach. Aristotle had dismissed the Platonic Forms in *Metaphysics* 990^{b}1 ff., and *EN*

[60] *L'Éthique du Sage*, 74 n. 1.

1096a17 ff. He has chosen to begin his inquiry on a material-bound level. Yet beginning on this level he has simply ignored plants and animals and proceeded to humanity because it has the faculty of reason and the ability to contemplate. He has chosen to ignore plants, in Plotinus' view, simply because he doesn't think them worth much. See *De Partibus Animalium* 655b28-656a14.

Epictetus, too, might well be Plotinus' target here. In *Disc.* 2. 8. 5 ff. he states that plants and animals do not have a share in *eudaimonia* since they are here for others' use, and not of primary importance, '*οὐκ αὐτὰ προηγούμενα*'. Plotinus views things differently: *τεκμαίρεσθαι δὲ δεῖ τοιαύτην τινὰ εἶναι τὴν τάξιν ἀεὶ τῶν ὅλων ἐκ τῶν ὁρωμένων ἐν τῷ παντί, ὡς εἰς ἅπαν χωρεῖ καὶ ὅ τι μικρότατον . . . ἡ ποικίλη θαυματουργία καὶ τὸ μέχρι τῶν ἐμφύτων καρποῖς καὶ ἔτι φύλλοις τὸ εὐειδὲς καὶ τὸ ῥᾷστα εὐανθὲς καὶ ῥαδινὸν καὶ ποικίλον* 'We must conclude that the universal order is for ever something of this kind from the evidence of what we see in the All, how this order extends to everything, even to the smallest, . . . and the beauty of appearance which extends to the fruits and even the leaves of plants, and their beauty of flower which comes so effortlessly, and their delicacy and variety' *Ennead* III. 2 [47] 13. 18–25. See III. 2 [47] 16. 17 ff. for Plotinus' valuation of any sort of life.

1. 21–3 *τοῖς δὲ φυτοῖς οὐκ ἀναγκάζοιτο ἂν διδόναι . . . ὅτι μὴ αἴσθησις πάρεστιν αὐτοῖς* *One would not be forced to give to plants . . . because sense-perception is not present in them*: Again one might consider that this is directed particularly against Epictetus. In the passage from the *Disc.* just noted, 2. 8. 4 ff., not only does Epictetus deny *eudaimonia* to plants because they are not of primary importance, but he also denies it to them because, as he says, they have no faculty for using external impressions, '*τὰ φυτὰ οὐδὲ φαντασίαις χρηστικά ἐστιν*', which is surely what Plotinus means here by plants not having sensations, although the word *αἴσθησις* is not used by Epictetus. What Plotinus says from lines 19–23 would seem to me to be a direct response to this passage from Epictetus.[61] However, see chapter 2. 1–2

[61] See also ch. 7. 31–32, where we find strong linguistic parallels between Epictetus and Plotinus. Graeser suggests that the very wording there implies an intimate knowledge of Epictetus, see *Plotinus and the Stoics*, 82. It is quite reasonable to suggest that Plotinus was familiar with the writings of Epictetus. Epictetus' work was clearly well known and widely distributed soon after his

where this phrase is repeated, and most commentators have considered that it is directed against Aristotle.

1. 23–6 ***εἴη δ' ἄν τις*** *But perhaps there might be someone*: This objection follows logically from what has been said. Plotinus feels one could reasonably object to the exclusion of plants by Aristotle, or the Stoics, according to their own criteria for the determination of *eudaimonia*. If plants live out lives in ways proper to them, the analogy here being the production of fruit (*καρπὸν αὖ φέρειν*), who is to say they do not possess *eudaimonia*? Again *εὐπαθεῖν* would draw our attention to the Stoics as opposed to Aristotle (see comm. on line 5 above). As was explained in the commentary on lines 6–7, Plotinus excludes plants and animals from *eudaimonia* not because they lack any human quality,[62] but because they lack life at the level of *Nous*.

1. 26–7 ***εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡδονὴ τὸ τέλος καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὸ εὖ ζῆν*** *If, then, pleasure is the end and living well is in it*: H/S², followed by Armstrong, refer to DL 2. 88, where Aristippus and the Cyrenaics are credited with this formula. See also Cicero, *De Finibus* 2. 34 and Epictetus, *Disc.* 3. 24. 37–8. Armstrong further notes that both Epicurus and the Cyrenaics[63] held this doctrine, but since Epicurus is alluded to in the following line Plotinus is likely to be referring only to the Cyrenaics here.[64] What is important for us to note here, as well as in the remainder of this chapter, is that Plotinus does not turn to the various schools to attack their dogma *per se*,

death. The importance of the *Discourses* persisted right through to at least the 6th cent., when the Neoplatonist Simplicius thought it worthy of a large commentary.

[62] In *Ennead* III. 3 [48] 3. 9 ff. Plotinus adds: 'just as there is no blame attaching to the production of plants because they have no sense perception (*μὴ αἰσθάνεται*) nor in the case of the other animals because they are not like men.'

[63] The Cyrenaics were a minor Socratic school founded by Aristippus of Cyrene (DL 2. 86–7). That the doctrine *ἡδονὴ τὸ τέλος* was propounded by Aristippus the elder is not altogether undisputed. It should be noted though that later Cyrenaics, such as Anniceris, rejected the very idea of a goal in life.

[64] But see J. Dillon and L. Gerson, *Neoplatonic Philosophy: Introductory Readings*, (2004), 13 n. 8, who suggest that this refers to Epicurus.

but rather to continue the criticism voiced right from the start of this chapter.

1. 28 *καὶ εἰ ἀταραξία δὲ εἴη* *and if tranquillity is [the end sought]*: That this is the Epicurean view is confirmed by H/S^2, B/T, Armstrong, and Llorens. DL 10. 128 is the *locus classicus.* Long and Sedley[65] indicate also Epicurus, *Letter to Menoeceus* 127 ff. and Lucretius, 2. 1 ff. Linguiti notes also *Letter to Herodotus* 82. 1 and *Letter to Pythocles* 85. 10. Plotinus treats Epicurus in a cursory manner here which tallies with Rist's[66] view that this treatise 'is aimed at those at least partially converted and aware of Plotinus' view on Epicureanism'. In general, I think that it is fair to say that Plotinus does not give a great deal of attention to Epicurus' ethical theory. This in part may be explained by a lack of Epicurean metaphysics and logic in support of an ethical theory. It is true that the inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda may support the idea that Epicurean philosophy was still popular in the second century AD. But does Diogenes reflect a general trend? Plotinus will come back to Epicurean ethics in chapter 2. 21–6, and in chapter 12 he does note the Epicurean hierarchy of kinetic and katastematic pleasures.

1. 29–30 *καὶ εἰ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν δὲ λέγοιτο τὸ εὖ ζῆν εἶναι* *and if someone should say that living well is the life according to nature*: This is Stoic dogma. For its origin among the Cynics, see Rist.[67] For a good summary of what to live according to nature meant to various Stoics, see Inwood.[68] H/S^2 direct us to Plutarch, *Comm. Not.* 23. 1 (= *SVF* i. 183). See also *SVF* iii. 16, 17; Cicero, *De Finibus* 2. 34; 3. 31, 61; 4. 26; DL 7. 87–9; Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 3. 12; Epictetus, *Disc.* 1. 26. 1–2; 2. 6. 9 (=*SVF* iii. 191); and Seneca, *De Vita Beata* 3. 3. This criticism of the Stoics brings this chapter to a close. Plotinus finishes on a note that he has sounded throughout: if *τὸ εὖ ζῆν* is simply a matter of living a natural life, how can we possibly exclude other living things?

[65] L/S i. 112–25.

[66] Rist, *Road to Reality*, 139.

[67] Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, 62.

[68] *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, (1999), 684–7.

CHAPTER 2

Marsilio Ficino's division of this first section of Plotinus' criticism of his predecessors into two chapters is hardly warranted in terms of the subject matter. The criticism begun in ch. 1 continues here in ch. 2, although, as is noted by Himmerich,[1] there is a change in perspective here as Plotinus moves away from a critique of the general equations presented in ch. 1 to a more detailed examination of the Stoic position.[2] Plotinus at first questions the Stoic valuation of sense-perception and its relationship to living well. He begins by picking up a remark of Epictetus, first noted in ch. 1. 21–3, that plants cannot possess *eudaimonia* because they have no capacity even for sense-perception. This remark, Plotinus contends, gives importance to sense-perception, rather than reason, and so is misguided. In the second part of the chapter Plotinus acknowledges the Stoics' astute placing of *eudaimonia* in the rational life,[3] but argues that since reason is in their view tied to a sense reality, they have no satisfactory explanation for asserting its importance in relation to the good for man. His own view, which he begins to outline in ch. 3, asserts that the good for man exists on a higher metaphysical level and is not linked to any particular faculty of life, but to the totality of life in *Nous*.

2. 1–2 τοῖς μέντοι . . . διδόναι *So those who . . . to all living things*: As in the previous chapter, Plotinus reviews his predecessor's opinions from the vantage point of his own metaphysical hierarchy. He scrutinizes their statements as one who conceives *eudaimonia* as life in *Nous* and as a consequence he refuses *eudaimonia* to lesser living things. But, in his view, attempts at exclusion of other living things

[1] Himmerich, Eudaimonia, 29 ff.

[2] See Schniewind, *L'Éthique du Sage*, 74–5 who also discusses briefly this change of perspective.

[3] As Long and Sedley note: 'Stoic teleology, as in Aristotle's psychology and ethics, draws its essential content from the sharp distinction between rationality, which unites man and god, and the other attributes of human life which are shared by the animals' (L/S i. 400).

simply on the basis of μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι (their lack of sense-perception), a simple faculty of life, only serves to jeopardize humanity's exclusive relationship with *eudaimonia.* In chs. 9 and 10 Plotinus will argue that even consciousness on the empirical level is not necessary for *eudaimonia;* so much less, then, is sense-perception a *sine qua non.*

2. 1–2 τοῖς μέντοι φυτοῖς διὰ τὸ μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐ διδόντες *So those who do not allow [*eudaimonia*] to plants*: H/S^2, followed by Armstrong, suggest that this is a reference to Aristotle's *EN* 1178b28 where it is claimed that Aristotle denies *eudaimonia* to plants because they lack sense-perception. That is not the case. First, at *EN* 1178b28 ff. Aristotle does not specifically deny *eudaimonia* to plants but rather to τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα (that is, apart from humanity). Second, and more importantly, Aristotle does not deny the other animals *eudaimonia* because they lack sense-perception (αἴσθησις) but because they are unable to engage in contemplation (θεωρία). In Aristotle's view contemplation is the most divine-like aspect which humanity possesses, and in contemplating, we are most like God, and therefore in a *eudaimōn* state. It is possession of this faculty that makes *eudaimonia* possible, and thus plants and the lower animals are necessarily excluded. Clearly that is not the view being criticized here.[4]

[4] If one does wish to ascribe these opening lines to Aristotle, *EE* 1216a2 ff. is a better reference. There, Aristotle does deny *eudaimonia* to plants (and children) because they live a vegetative existence which one might equate with μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι. See also *De Anima* 424a33 where Aristotle does specifically deny sense-perception (οὐκ αἰσθάνεται) to plants. Yet here the context is different: Aristotle is not concerned with *eudaimonia* but simply with an explanation of sense-perception. Aristotle also denies sense-perception to plants in *De Plantis* 815b22–34, 816b1, but once again it is not in connection with *eudaimonia.* Aristotle would certainly not have allowed *eudaimonia* to plants but what must be made clear is that his criterion for marginalizing plants was not a lack of sense-perception. Support for this view can be found in *EN* 1097b33 ff., where Aristotle does exclude plants from the possibility of possessing *eudaimonia* because they have only θρεπτικὴν καὶ αὐξητικὴν ζωήν 'the life of nutrition and growth', but this does not imply that possession of αἴσθησις would have allowed them in, because in the following sentence, Aristotle excludes horses, oxen and animals in general for the very reason that they have a share only of αἰσθητική τις 'a sense life'. In *De Sensu* Aristotle states that τοῖς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως τυγχάνουσι τοῦ εὖ ἕνεκα· πολλὰς γὰρ εἰσαγγέλλουσι διαφοράς, ἐξ ὧν ἥ τε τῶν νοητῶν ἐγγίνεται

Plotinus' argument here, was first presented in ch. 1. 21–3.[5] In the commentary there I suggested that this criticism made better sense if it was directed against Epictetus rather than Aristotle.[6] By *αἴσθησις* Plotinus means sense-perception as is clear from the way he defines it in the lines that follow. Although Epictetus does not use the word *αἴσθησις*, it is clear from *τὰ φυτὰ οὐδὲ φαντασίαις χρηστικά ἐστιν* that that is what he means. Plants do not even have the ability to sense; they can make no use of external impressions.[7] The emphasis here on *αἴσθησις* is also particularly relevant to Stoicism since the Stoic *λόγος* is fundamentally based on sensory knowledge,[8] which is not the case for Aristotle. This passage from Epictetus seems to me then a better place to start in trying to determine the object of Plotinus' criticism in these opening lines.

2. 2 οὐδὲ τοῖς ζῴοις ἤδη ἅπασι διδόναι *in danger of denying it to all living things*: What Plotinus means here can be understood only if we are aware of the full implications of his concept of *eudaimonia*,

φρόνησις καὶ ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν 'while in those that have intelligence also these senses exist for the sake of well-being; for they inform us of many differences, from which arises understanding both of the objects of thought and of the affairs of practical life' 437^a2–3 (Hett trans.). Once again, as at *EN* 1178^b28 ff., it is the rational life which is the key, and not *αἴσθησις*.

[5] *τοῖς δὲ φυτοῖς οὐκ ἀναγκάζοιτο ἂν διδόναι … ὅτι μὴ αἴσθησις πάρεστιν αὐτοῖς* 'Then, one is not compelled to allow to plants what one allows to all other living beings; for plants have no sense-perception'.

[6] In Epictetus *Disc.* 2. 8. 2–5 we find: *τίς οὖν οὐσία θεοῦ; σάρξ; μὴ γένοιτο. ἀγρός; μὴ γένοιτο. φήμη; μὴ γένοιτο. νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, λόγος ὀρθός. ἐνταῦθα τοίνυν ἁπλῶς ζήτει τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἐπεί τοι μή τι αὐτὴν ἐν φυτῷ ζητεῖς; οὔ. μή τι ἐν ἀλόγῳ; οὔ … τὰ φυτὰ οὐδὲ φαντασίαις χρηστικά ἐστιν. διὰ τοῦτο οὐ λέγεις ἐπ' αὐτῶν τὸ ἀγαθόν. δεῖται οὖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν χρήσεως φαντασιῶν.* 'What, then, is the true nature of God? Flesh? Far from it! Land? Far from it! Fame? Far from it! It is intelligence, knowledge, right-reason. Here, therefore, and only here, shall you seek the true nature of the good. Surely you do not seek it at all in a plant, do you? No. Nor in an irrational creature? No … plants are incapable of dealing even with external impressions; for that reason you do not speak of the "good" in referring to them. The good requires, therefore, the faculty of using external impressions.' Now this seems to me much closer to what Plotinus is attacking. Epictetus lived and taught at Rome until AD 89. His writings were clearly influential upon Marcus Aurelius (AD 121–80).

[7] See also Porphyry, *Ad Gaurem* 6. 3 (p. 43. 2–5) where it is stated that plants cannot receive *phantasia*.

[8] See Epictetus, *Disc.* 1. 18. 1 ff.

implications which are explicitly laid out in chs. 9 and 10. There, Plotinus explains that *eudaimonia* is established on the level of *Nous*. As such it is independent of the temporal world, and, in particular, independent of any individual's empirical knowledge of its existence. In other words we do not need to be conscious of our *eudaimonia* in the temporal sphere to maintain its existence at the level of *Nous*. The sensory world is the last (in time), and the least perfect emanation from the One, see *Ennead* V. 2 [11] 2. The activity of *Nous*, where *eudaimonia* exists, is prior to sense-perception, (see *Ennead* v. 5 [32] 1. 15 ff.), and in no way dependent on it. So Plotinus argues here that if *eudaimonia* depends on something as basic as sense-perception, then even humanity would be capable of losing its *eudaimonia*, if for some reason it lost its ability to perceive through the senses.

2. 3–7 εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο λέγουσι . . . δεῖ γὰρ ἡδὺ εἶναι *For if they mean this by sense-perception ... for it [will] necessarily be pleasant*: In Plotinian terms *eudaimonia* exists on the level of *Nous*. Lack of sense-perception of this *eudaimonia* at a lower ontological level does not detract from its existence. What exists, exists prior to any sense-perception of it, and by the same token it is good and remains good whether apprehended or not. Plotinus, as in ch. 1, criticizes his predecessors on their own terms: surely a natural and proper state for any living creature is good for that creature regardless of any self-perception of its own good. To make self-perception of one's natural good a *sine qua non* for the existence of a good life is to endanger a good life for any living thing.

2. 3–4 εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο λέγουσι, τὸ τὸ πάθος μὴ λανθάνειν *For if they mean this by sense-perception, to be aware of an affection*: H/S[2] direct us to Plato's *Philebus* 33d8–9 where Plato is discussing the nature of sense-perception. Kalligas further refers to *Ennead* IV. 4 [28] 8. 8–13 where it is noted that the soul is capable of being unaware of sensations experienced by the body; a fuller statement on the nature of sense-perception may be found in *Ennead* III. 6 [26] 1. 1 ff.[9] Plotinus is making clear that it is sense-perception that is under discussion, that is, that the soul is aware of the affection. This

[9] *Τὰς αἰσθήσεις οὐ πάθη λέγοντες εἶναι, ἐνεργείας δὲ περὶ παθήματα καὶ κρίσεις, τῶν μὲν παθῶν περὶ ἄλλο γινομένων, οἷον τὸ σῶμα φέρε τὸ τοιόνδε, τῆς δὲ κρίσεως περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, οὐ τῆς κρίσεως πάθους οὔσης* 'We say that sense perceptions are not affections but activities and judgements concerned with

clarity is required since the Stoics had forged distinct meanings for the term *αἴσθησις*, as is noted by Rist.[10] Thus Plotinus begins by defining *αἴσθησις* as sense-perception so that no confusion arises.[11]

2. 4–5 *δεῖ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ πάθος πρὸ τοῦ μὴ λανθάνειν* *the affection itself must be good prior to one's awareness of it*: Plotinus considers the actual affection prior to any sort of sense-perception of it. The Plotinian parallel is of course that *eudaimonia* is prior to any sort of self-consciousness of it, and, ultimately, self-consciousness of it is irrelevant to its existence. This is elucidated by means of two examples that follow. MacKenna is so keen to make this clear that he extends the Greek text quite substantially to arrive at the following translation: 'By sensation can be meant, only, perception of state, and the state of well-being must be a Good in itself quite apart from the perception.'

2. 5–6 *οἷον τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν, κἂν λανθάνῃ, καὶ οἰκεῖον εἶναι* *as for example to be in a natural state, even if one is not aware [that it is a natural state] and to be in one's own appropriate state*: If one exists in one's natural state surely that state must be good. Lack of sense-perception does not diminish that good. Similarly, if it is one's appropriate state, then it is the good for whatever is concerned, even for a plant. Why bring sense-perception into it? My earlier suggestion that Epictetus is his concern here is substantiated by

affections; affections belong to something else, say, for instance, to the body qualified in a particular way, but the judgements belong to the soul, and the judgement is not an affection'. See B. Fleet, *Plotinus:* Ennead *III.6*: *On the Impassivity of the Bodiless* (1995), 71–2.

[10] Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, 135. Rist refers to Galen in support, *In Hipp. De Medic. Off.* vol. 18b, p. 654 K (*SVF* ii. 75). See also Striker, *Essays*, 62 n. 60 for some criticism of this view. The evidence, however, in DL 7. 52 would seem to support Rist's suggestion: *αἴσθησις δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τοὺς Στωικοὺς τό τ' ἀφ' ἡγεμονικοῦ πνεῦμα ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις διῆκον καὶ ἡ δι' αὐτῶν κατάληψις καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια κατασκευή, καθ' ἥν τινες πηροὶ γίνονται. καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια δὲ αἴσθησις καλεῖται.* 'The Stoics apply the term sense or sensation to three things: (1) the current passing from the principal part of the soul to the senses, (2) apprehension by means of the senses, (3) the apparatus of the sense-organs, in which some persons are deficient. Moreover, the activity of the sense-organs is also called sensation' (Hicks trans.).

[11] See H. Blumenthal, 'Plotinus' Adaptation of Aristotle's Psychology, Sensation, Imagination and Memory', in R. B. Harris (ed.) *The Significance of Neoplatonism*, (1976), 45.

continued use of Stoic terminology. For κατὰ φύσιν see Epictetus, *Disc.* 1. 26. 1–2; 2. 6. 9 = (*SVF* iii. 191), and for οἰκεῖον see *Disc.* 4. 8. 43. The term οἰκείωσις is distinctively Stoic. For them it represented the first instinct of any living creature, that is, the instinct to be its natural self. See Edelstein,[12] Sandbach,[13] Pembroke,[14] Striker,[15] Sharples,[16] and the full-length study of this term by Engberg-Pedersen.[17]

2. 6–7 καὶ ὅτι ἡδύ· δεῖ γὰρ ἡδὺ εἶναι *and that it is pleasant; for it [will] necessarily be pleasant*: As B/T note, Müller and Bréhier mistakenly excise this line. Plotinus simply affirms that the natural and proper state for any living creature is pleasant.

2. 7–9 ὥστε ἀγαθοῦ τούτου ... προσλαμβάνειν, *Just as this good ... sense-perception?*: Again this is simply an extension of the criticism levelled throughout ch. 1. The world of sensory phenomena is the last and lowest emanation from the One, see *Ennead* IV. 8 [6] 6. 9 and IV. 6 [41] 3. 5 ff. As such it is the best possible world at this level and its inhabitants, when they live in their proper ways, are living the best possible lives. It is this theme of emanation that is uppermost in Plotinus' mind. What has come down is as good as it can be. A plant may not be constructed to receive sense impressions, but it is constructed to live in its own proper way: why bring sense-perception into it? The Stoics begin with sense-perception because the Stoic λόγος is fundamentally based on sensory knowledge, but, Plotinus insists, according to their own terminology, i.e. κατὰ φύσιν and οἰκεῖον, they must allow plants a share of *eudaimonia.* Marcus Aurelius admits: οἷον ὅτι, ὅπου ζῆν ἔστιν, ἐκεῖ καὶ εὖ ζῆν 'Where it is possible to live, there also is it possible to live well' (*Meditations*, 5. 16).

2. 9–11 εἰ μὴ ἄρα ... ἀλλὰ τῇ γνώσει καὶ αἰσθήσει; *Unless ... but to knowledge and sense-perception of it?*: Plotinus continues in a logical step-by-step manner. If we are to begin with sense-perception, as Epictetus insists we do, then *eudaimonia* must result not from the

[12] L. Edelstein, *The Meaning of Stoicism*, (1966), 35 ff.

[13] F. H. Sandbach, *The Stoics*, (1975), 34 ff.

[14] G. S. Pembroke, 'Oikeiôsis', in A. A. Long (ed.), *Problems in Stoicism*, (1971), 115–59.

[15] G. Striker, 'The Role of oikeiôsis in Stoic Ethics', in Striker, *Essays*, 281–97.

[16] Sharples, *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, 100 ff.

[17] Engberg-Pedersen, *The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis.*

creature's own natural state but from the activity of sense-perception itself. Since we must begin with sense-perception, then the activity of the sense-life must be the criterion in defining *eudaimonia.* Harder thought that the transmitted text was not sound and deleted ἢ καταστάσει in which he was followed by B/T. H/S^2 allowed it to stand initially, but later bracketed it in their *addenda ad textum* in vol. iii. It does seem an unnecessary addition here.

2. 11–13 ἀλλ' οὕτω γε ... ὁτουοῦν ἀντιλαμβανομένοις *But in that case ... to whatever can lay hold of it [through sense-perception]*: If, then, Plotinus insists, the activity of the sense life is the good, then the logical conclusion is that all life that has sense-perception has the possibility of possessing the good. Is the good then simply the activity of sense-perception *per se*?

2. 13–15 εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ... λέγουσιν; *But if they say ... is good?*: The conclusion follows: if *eudaimonia* requires αἴσθησις, then (*a*) the experience itself cannot be the good (lines 4–9) and, (*b*) if knowledge and sense-perception of the experience is the good, then it is the activity of sense-perception itself and not the perception through the senses of an object of a particular kind that is the good (lines 10–13). Therefore Plotinus enquires how, if neither of these components is the good, their combination can possibly be the good?

2. 15–21 εἰ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ... δυνάμεως *But if the affection ... sense-perception*: Having dismissed the view that the faculty of αἴσθησις is necessary for the acquisition of *eudaimonia*, Plotinus acknowledges the importance of reason. This is, he agrees, a more important faculty in terms of achieving *eudaimonia.* But his criticism of the Stoics continues. He accepts their setting of *eudaimonia* in a rational life, but criticizes their lack of a supporting ontological and metaphysical framework. See lines 31 ff.

2. 18–19 δεῖ γνῶναι οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἡδύ, ἀλλ' ὅτι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθὸν *is it necessary not only to know that this is pleasant but that this is [also] the good*: As Van Riel notes, the judgement made here is made by discursive reasoning and not the intuitively contemplating Intellect, that is, it is a reasoning of the embodied soul.[18]

2. 21–6 οὐ τοίνυν τοῖς ἡδομένοις τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὑπάρξει ... οὐδαμοῦ δὲ κρεῖττον ἄλογον λόγου *Then living well will not then belong to those*

[18] See van Riel, *Pleasure and the Good Life*, 99 and n. 20.

who feel pleasure ... and that which doesn't have reason is in no way superior to reason:[19] Plotinus' introduction of the term pleasure in this passage causes a problem. It is difficult to decide whether he is simply using pleasure in this passage as an example of a result of sense-perception or whether he is focusing his attention on another philosophical school/s. His criticism of those who emphasize the importance of sense-perception is equally valid against those who considered pleasure to be an end. That living well will necessarily be pleasant has already been noted in lines 6 and 7 of this chapter. Van Riel[20] considers this to be an attack on Epicurus. It does, indeed, seem to me that Plotinus may well have turned his attention to Epicurus who made living well exclusively dependent on sense-perception. It might of course, also, refer to the Cyrenaics, whom he included on his agenda in the final section of ch. 1. They considered pleasure to be the good (see Cicero, *De Finibus* 1. 23–30; DL 10. 129), and argued that sense-perception was the only criterion in the evaluation of *eudaimonia*. See also Cicero, *Tusc. Disp*. 3. 41–2 and Epicurus, *Letter to Menoeceus* 129. The point being made is that a faculty ontologically superior to sense-perception is necessary to determine whether or not the object perceived is the good.

In his sermon *Jacob and the Happy Life*, St Ambrose used sections of *Ennead* 1. 4 [46]. This is the first passage that Ambrose borrowed. See Appendix 1 for a list of the passages concerned.

2. 26 οὐδαμοῦ δὲ κρεῖττον ἄλογον λόγου *and that which doesn't have reason is in no way superior to reason*: Epicurus maintained the opposite view, see *Letter to Herodotus* 82.

[19] The influence of Neoplatonism on Christian philosophy has been well documented; see G. Watson, *Greek Philosophy and the Christian Notion of God*, (1994). P. Courcelle, *Recherches sur les Confessions de Saint Augustin*, (1968), 106 ff. notes St Ambrose's use of *Enneads* 1. 6 [1] and 1. 8 [51] in *De Isaac* and *De Bono Mortis* respectively. Without doubt 1. 4 [46] and its use in *Jacob and the Happy Life* can be added to this list. I owe this observation to Michael McHugh. See his *Jacob and the Happy Life* in *Saint Ambrose: Seven Exegetical Works*, (1972). See Appendix 1. Throughout *De Jacob*, large parts of 1. 4 [46] are quoted verbatim. The first passage St Ambrose borrows is the present one reproduced in *De Jacob* 1. 7. 28.

[20] *Pleasure and the Good Life*, 106.

2. 26–8 *πῶς ἂν οὖν ὁ λόγος . . . κρεῖττον εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ* *How could reason . . . to be better than itself?*: The subordinate genus containing the *ἄλογον* (line 26) resides on an inferior ontological and metaphysical level. The subordinate genus contains the world of sense-perception, which is an image of *Nous* brought forth by the World Soul, see *Ennead* v. 2 [11] 1. 13–28. Plotinus is here reinforcing the dialectical character of his argument, which will form the basis for his metaphysical assertions in chs. 3 and 4.

2. 27–8 *ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ γένει* *in a subordinate genus*: This terminology is used quite frequently by Plotinus to describe the gradation of life, its inferiority increasing as it moves further and further from the One. See *Ennead* i. 8 [51] 7. 3 ff. and i. 8 [51] 8. 20. The concept of a sensory world as subordinate to the real world of *Nous* is Platonic. See *Phaedo* 64c–70b and *Theaetetus* 176a for just a few examples of this thinking.

2. 31–2 *καὶ ὅσοι δὲ ἐν λογικῇ ζωῇ εἶναι λέγουσιν* *And those who say that [*eudaimonia*] is to be found in a rational life*: This specific comment regarding rationality convinces Armstrong, B/T, and H/S[2] that Plotinus is *now* considering the Stoic viewpoint and they refer to *SVF* iii. 687 = DL 7. 130; Stobaeus 2. 75. 11; Seneca, *Ep.* 76. 9–10, and Plutarch, *On Moral Virtue* 441c. The obvious reference to the Stoics here has perhaps persuaded these commentators that what has come before cannot possibly be referring to the Stoics as well, which is presumably why the opening lines of this chapter have been credited to Aristotle, in spite of the evidence presented above, which links them to Epictetus.

2. 33 *καλῶς μὲν ἴσως ἂν λέγοιεν* *are perhaps speaking sensibly*: Plotinus concedes that the Stoics are at least in the right area when they identify the rational life as the key to *eudaimonia*. In his own view, (outlined in chs. 3 and 4), *eudaimonia* is possible only for the possessors of reason, since the first step in the return to *Nous* is the process of dialectic. See *Ennead* i. 3 [20] in general. The Stoics will be criticized (below) for not explaining satisfactorily *why* this is so. The Stoic *λόγος* is ultimately based on sensory knowledge while Plotinus' *eudaimōn* is guided by principles from *Nous*. Quite often throughout this treatise the Stoics and Plotinus appear, *prima facie*, to be in agreement, but differing metaphysical frameworks allow Plotinus to provide explanations for his assertions, based

on a many-layered ontology, and at the same time to criticize the Stoics because of their one-level material reality. See e.g. ch. 13. 6 ff.

2. 35–8 ἆρά γε τὸ λογικὸν προσλαμβάνεται . . . ᾗ κἂν μὴ δυνατὸς ᾖ ἀνιχνεύειν μηδὲ τυγχάνειν; *Does one introduce the rational . . . even if it was unable to track or discover the primary things according to nature?*: It has been pointed out by Armstrong[21] that Plotinus' criticism here is not new and that he attacks what was generally regarded as the weak point in Stoic ethical theory. This is correct up to a point. Plotinus is, however, not so much concerned with criticizing the jettisoning of τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν when excellence has been achieved, as he is to establish their grounds for the primacy of reason. In doing this he is directly continuing the theme begun in the first part of this chapter.

2. 37 τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν *the primary things according to nature*: These are natural things which the sage will select because they are conducive to excellence. They are not to be selected as ends in themselves, however, and they have no part in excellence. The concept of τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν was central not only to the Stoics but to the Academics and Peripatetics also. Cicero, who translates it as *prima secundum naturam* (*De Finibus* 5. 18), says that it was adopted directly from the Academics and Peripatetics by the Stoics, see *De Finibus* 5. 22.

Undoubtedly, it is meant by Plotinus in this passage to bring our attention to the last named school for they popularized it more than any of the others. Indeed it was in part the attitude of the various schools to this concept, which helped separate them in their ethical theories. One of the earliest users of the phrase seems to have been Carneades, although Cicero tells us that it did not originate with Carneades but that he upheld it for the purposes of argument. See *De Finibus* 5. 20. Dillon[22] suggests that the phrase did begin with Carneades. Antiochus of Ascalon used the concept with more vigour than Carneades and proceeded, it seems, to foist it back onto Xenocrates and Polemon. Antiochus used the phrase in his attempt at a synthesis of the thought of the various schools. The Stoics accepted the concept but, unlike Antiochus, they saw no need to retain

[21] Armstrong, *Plotinus*, i, rev. edn., 176 n. 1.

[22] J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, (1977), 74.

τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν when excellence had been achieved. For what it meant to Stoicism and how it placed them in relation to other schools, see Cicero, *De Finibus* 4. 78–80. Excellence was the sole good, while *τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν* were labelled indifferents. See *SVF* iii. 140, 141, and 181; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Soul* 2. 164. 3–9; Plutarch, *Comm. Not.* 1070f–1071e; Cicero, *De Finibus* 3. 22–5; 4. 26–7, 29–30, 39, 41, 57, 78; and Galen, *On Hippocrates and Plato's Doctrines* 5. 6. 10–14.[23]

2. 38–43 *ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν διὰ τὸ ἀνευρίσκειν μᾶλλον δύνασθαι . . . ἣν φαμεν ἀρετὴν εἶναι* *But if you [introduce reason] because it is better able to discover . . . which we call excellence*: This is the real thrust of Plotinus' critique and as we can see it is basically the same criticism that has been present throughout chapter 1. It is not the usual criticism levelled against the Stoics, i.e. why one should pursue the primary natural things when excellence is the only good, but the more specific criticism that if reason is used only to acquire the primary natural needs, then if other living things can acquire these primary natural things in another way, regardless of whether or not they possess reason, they must be said to be *eudaimōn*. This was a leitmotif in ch. 1. Reason is the faculty that divides man from beast because it gives man access to his real self on a higher ontological level, which constitutes his *eudaimonia*. If the Stoics use it only to secure *τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν* they are degrading its value. See Epictetus, *Disc.* 1. 20. 5–6.[24]

2. 41–3 *καὶ ὑπουργὸς ἂν ὁ λόγος . . . ἣν φαμεν ἀρετὴν εἶναι* *and reason would become a servant . . . which we call excellence*: This is a consequence that Plotinus infers dialectically (note *ἂν* in line 41) from the Stoic position. The Plotinian position is well stated by Plass.[25]

2. 42–3 *γίγνοιτο οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἡ τελείωσις αὐτοῦ* *nor, in turn, the perfection of it, which we call excellence*: With regard to

[23] See L/S i. 401–10.

[24] *ὁ οὖν λόγος πρὸς τί ποτε ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως παρείληπται; πρὸς χρῆσιν φαντασιῶν οἵαν δεῖ. αὐτὸς οὖν τί ἐστιν; σύστημα ἐκ ποιῶν φαντασιῶν* 'Well then, for what purpose have we received reason from nature? For the proper use of external impressions. What, then, is reason itself? Something composed of a certain kind of external impressions'. See also Plass, 'Plotinus' Ethical Theory', 249.

[25] 'Happiness must instead be focused in noetic life so that it is not an (external) quality of life but radically at one with it (1. 4. 3. 16 ff.). Once inside this space-less world, soul enjoys true virtue which is simply "to be active alone", free from interaction with an environment (1. 2. 3. 15)' (Plass, ibid.).

ἀρετή = τελείωσις τοῦ λόγου B/T refer us to 'reason' and 'perfected reason' in Cicero, *De Finibus* 3. 23; 'virtue' as 'perfect reason' in *De Finibus* 4. 35; Aristotle's *Physics* 246^b2 and 247^a2 where we find *αἱ ἀρεταὶ τελειώσεις* 'the perfect excellences'. See in addition Seneca, *Ep.* 76. 9–10 (= *SVF* iii. 200).

2. 43–4 εἰ δὲ φήσετε . . . ἀσπαστὸν εἶναι *But if you say . . . on its own merit*: This is certainly what the Stoics claimed and it resulted in much criticism of them. See Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Soul* 2. 164.3–9; Plutarch, *Comm. Not.* 1070f–1071e, 1072e–f; Cicero, *De Finibus* 3. 22; 4. 26–7, 29–30, 39, 78; 5. 20. See Kalligas's detailed note on this. For a brief history of this criticism see Long and Sedley.[26]

2. 46–52 ποιεῖν γὰρ δεῖ . . . αὐτοὺς λέγειν *For the study . . . explain its value*: Bréhier notes in his text at this point that the chapter's argument in its entirety is the classic argument against Stoic morality; he gives references to Cicero, *De Finibus* 3. 21–2; Plutarch, *Comm. Not.* 26; and a comparable critique in Cicero, *De Finibus* 4. 34–5. Note the ontological basis for Plotinus' argument here. Reason belongs to the hypostasis of *Nous* and it is on this basis that it holds a position of importance.

2. 52–5 ἀλλ' οὗτοι μέν . . . οἷς δυνατόν ἐστι τούτων *But these people . . . live well*: The chapter closes with a confirmation that *eudaimonia* for humanity exists outside of the material and sensory world. Having pointed out the inconsistencies of his predecessors, Plotinus will begin ch. 3 with his own account of *eudaimonia*. One notes here the sharpness of Plotinus' remarks, which may reflect the lateness of the treatise, and Plotinus' accumulated distaste for those who view reality in material terms only. Note also *Ennead* v. 9 [5] 1. 10–16 by way of contrast for a comment from a very early treatise where one finds a much lighter tone, although the criticism remains the same.[27]

[26] L/S i. 401–10. See also Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 70–4.

[27] *οἱ δὲ ἤρθησαν μὲν ὀλίγον ἐκ τῶν κάτω κινοῦντος αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡδέος τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς κρείττονος, ἀδυνατήσαντες δὲ ἰδεῖν τὸ ἄνω, ὡς οὐκ ἔχοντες ἄλλο, ὅπου στήσονται, κατηνέχθησαν σὺν τῷ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὀνόματι ἐπὶ πράξεις καὶ ἐκλογὰς τῶν κάτω, ἀφ' ὧν ἐπεχείρησαν τὸ πρῶτον αἴρεσθαι* 'Others have risen a little from the things below because the better part of their soul has urged them on from the pleasant to a greater beauty; but since they were unable to see what is above, as they have no other ground to stand on they are brought down, with the name of excellence, to practical choices of the things below from which they tried to raise themselves at first' (adapted).

CHAPTER 3

Chapters 3 and 4 should be read as one. There is no significant change in terms of subject matter or format to warrant the division imposed by Marsilio Ficino.[1] Ch. 3 begins to set out Plotinus' own view of the nature of *eudaimonia*, although his critique of the Stoics and Aristotle continues as part of setting out his own position. There is, however, a lack of clarity in Plotinus writing here, and it must be attributed to his waning powers at the time of writing.[2]

Plotinus begins by pointing out that *eudaimonia* must indeed be set in life, but life in the *Enneads* is an equivocal term, meaning one thing in plants, another in non-rational animals, and something else again in rational animals. Living things of the lower orders, plants and animals, are capable of living well and so achieving their respective good lives, each to the degree that is possible for them. Living well for humanity, *eudaimonia*, is fullest life, life in the noetic realm. Plants and animals are capable of possessing only an image of this, because they can possess only an image of perfect life. Plotinus, in this chapter, begins to outline the metaphysics that underpins this viewpoint.[3] Since only a superabundance of life, as he refers to it in line 24 of this chapter, establishes *eudaimonia*, those who begin with rational life are in danger of locating *eudaimonia* within a faculty of life, and not in the totality of life itself.

3. 1–2 Ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τί ποτε τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπολαμβάνομεν εἶναι *Let us say, starting from the beginning, what it is that we consider* eudaimonia *to be*: Having pointed out inconsistencies in his predecessors' views, Plotinus feels the need to begin ἐξ ἀρχῆς. B/T note the similarity with Aristotle's methodology in the attempt to begin afresh. They refer to *De Anima* 412^{a}2, and to Seneca, *Vita Beata* 1. 1, 4. 1 ff. for other parallels.

[1] See ch. 1 n. 1.
[2] See *VP* 6. 34–7
[3] Plotinus is using the terms 'life' and 'good' synonymously. Both stretch from the noetic to the sensory world.

3. 2–6 τιθέμενοι δὴ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐν ζωῇ ... οὗ ἐπεφύκει δεκτικὰ πάντα τὰ ζῷα εἶναι *Setting* eudaimonia *in life ... [something] which by nature all living things [were capable of] receiving*: Plotinus begins to give his own assessment of *eudaimonia* which clearly is shaped by his criticism of the Stoics, begun in ch. 2. 32. *Eudaimonia* must be set in life but the term 'life' must not be applied to all living things in the same way. The term 'life' must be qualified, not in terms of faculties, but ontologically (lines 20–6 below). Aristotle does appear to begin his enquiry into *eudaimonia* with life in general, but quickly dismisses the lower life forms in favour of a consideration of human good living only. See *EN* $1097^{b}35$ ff.; $1102^{a}15$–16; *EE* $1217^{a}19$ ff.; and Himmerich.[4] Kalligas notes the following in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, διὸ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία· ζωὴ γὰρ ποία τίς ἐστιν.[5] As is clear from *EN* $1177^{a}13$–21 Aristotle considers this 'life' to be the rational part of the psyche, the part capable of contemplation, and so excludes all else. For a detailed study of the nature of life in Plotinus, see Ciapalo.[6]

3. 3–6 εἰ μὲν συνώνυμον τὸ ζῆν ἐποιούμεθα ... οὗ ἐπεφύκει δεκτικὰ πάντα τὰ ζῷα εἶναι *if we made 'life' mean the same thing in every case, ... which by nature all living things [were capable of] receiving*: Setting *eudaimonia* in 'life' Plotinus acknowledges that all living things have the capacity to live well.[7] But 'life' does not mean the

[4] Himmerich, Eudaimonia, 23.

[5] 'and life in the soul (and hence also happiness, since happiness is a particular kind of life)' $1050^{b}1$–2 (Tredennick trans.).

[6] Ciapalo, ' "Life" in Plotinus' Explanation of Reality'.

[7] See *Ennead* III. 2 [47] 3. 31–3; III. 3 [48] 3. 6 ff.; and V. 5 [32] 9. 36 ff. Note Plotinus' lack of emphasis on any particular quality of life. For instance, nature too, Plotinus explains, is capable of contemplation although τὴν μὲν δὴ ἐκ λόγου οὐκ ἔχει 'it certainly does not have the contemplation that comes from reasoning' (III. 8 [30] 3. 13). Nature's contemplation is of a different sort, see III. 8 [30] 3. 13 ff. Since all activity of the soul must be contemplation, even if one stage is weaker than another, the soul in that which is produced must always be of the same kind as its producer, (see III. 8 [30] 5. 24; III. 8 [30] 7. 1 ff.). If all things, not only rational but also irrational living things, aspire to contemplation and direct their gaze to this end (see III. 8 [30] 8. 26; III. 8 [30] 1. 1 ff.; III. 8 [30] 7. 1 ff.), they must be able to live well. That does not mean, as Rist (*Road to Reality*, 143) has conjectured, that just as there are degrees of life, so too there must be degrees of *eudaimonia*. All life proceeds from the One and living things aspire to live the best lives possible for them. But Plotinus makes clear that *eudaimonia* is the preserve of human beings, who are the only ones capable of participating in the fullest life in *Nous*. μόνῳ ἂν τῷ ἄγαν ζῶντι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχοι (line 26 below).

same thing in every case as will be made clear below (lines 24–6), and not all living things have the capacity to receive *eudaimonia*. Plotinus excludes irrational life from *eudaimonia*, because the term 'life' does not apply to all living things in the same way, even if all life comes from the One. There are degrees of life, and only those who live life in *Nous* possess *eudaimonia*. Living well varies in meaning according to the degree of life possessed: *οὕτως γὰρ ὁ λόγος φησὶν ἄλλο ἄλλως ζῆν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ* 'for in this way the account explains that different things in the Whole live in different ways' (*Ennead* IV. 4 [28] 36. 16–17). See also III. 2 [47] 3. 36–41, where Plotinus lists the various degrees of life possible and indicates that everything seeks after the good and attains it in proportion to its own power. We are reminded that we must not demand equal shares for things that are not equal.[8] Kalligas highlights a similar view, which can be traced to Antiochus of Ascalon of the Old Academy, where it is agreed that all living things attempt to realize the potential of their various natures, but obviously this means different things for different life-forms (Cicero, *De Finibus* 5. 25–6).

3. 6–7 *καὶ οὐκ . . . οὐκέτι* *And we did not . . . the irrational*: This indicates that Plotinus has been continuing the criticism directed against the Stoics in the latter part of ch. 2. See comments on lines 9–11 below. Aristotle also admits that irrational things (plants and animals) can to some degree have good or bad lives (see *EE* 1217^a28–9), but then he dismisses them from a consideration of *eudaimonia* because they do not share *θείου τινός*. See *EN* 1178^b25 ff.; *EE* 1217^a40; and Himmerich.[9] Yet if *τὸ εὖ ζῆν* and *τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν* are in one and the same thing, i.e. life, why bring rationality into the discussion?

3. 6 *τὰ ζῷα* *living things*: *τὰ ζῷα* here must also refer to all living things, not just humanity. B/T, Armstrong, Bréhier, and Llorens consider that Plotinus here means only living beings, i.e. nothing below

[8] Plotinus, in describing his metaphysical hierarchy, often begins with life in its most basic sense, that of nutrition and growth in plants. See *Ennead* III. 2 [47] 3. 21 ff.; III. 8 [30] 1. 1 ff.; IV. 3 [27] 8. 45; IV. 4 [28] 1. 29; IV. 3 [27] 23. 35–6; IV. 3 [27] 19. 19; V. 1 [10] 4. 5; VI. 7 [38] 11. 6 ff.; VI. 9 [9] 1. 10–11. See also *Phaedo* 70d–e where Plato begins with plants and all things which may be said to have been born.

[9] Himmerich, Eudaimonia, 19.

animal life; Bréhier and Llorens specifically designate animal life in their translations 'les êtres vivants' and 'los animals'. MacKenna, on the other hand, extends the meaning to 'every living thing', which is, I think, the correct interpretation. The point that Plotinus is making is that all living things, by virtue of the fact that they have life, have the ability to live well. He has already stated that his inquiry is to begin with τὸ ζῆν (line 3). In addition, the interpretation of τὰ ζῷα in earlier chapters of this *Ennead* corroborates what I am arguing for here. The clearest example can be found in ch. 1. 16 where τὰ ζῷα are obviously inclusive of all living things—plants are specifically mentioned. It is used again in ch. 1. 20, and that plants are included is clear from the context. Plants are to be included because they have life, see ch. 1. 24–5.

3. 7–8 ζωὴ γὰρ ἦν τὸ κοινόν *for life was common to both*: We must begin with life, for life is the common denominator. Life belongs to the rational and to the irrational, which includes plants, if we are to accept the evidence presented. There is no doubt that Plotinus considered plants to be alive; see *Ennead* VI. 7 [38] 11. 6 ff. where he even sets plants at the noetic level. See also ch. 1. 20–1 and 24–5 where Plotinus insists that plants cannot simply be dismissed.[10]

3. 8–9 ὃ δεκτικὸν τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔμελλεν εἶναι *and [both, by virtue] of being capable of receiving it, were intended to be able to achieve* eudaimonia: τοῦ αὐτοῦ refers to life transmitted through the power of soul to all living things in the same way. Life emanates from the One through the various hypostatic levels and all living things receive it to the best of their abilities. See *Ennead* I. 1 [53] 8. 9–23. Armstrong's translation of δεκτικὸν as 'acquisition' is slightly misleading. A human being might certainly acquire *eudaimonia*, but one simply receives life.

3. 9 εἴπερ ἐν ζωῇ τινι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπῆρχεν *if* eudaimonia *existed in a life*: This refers back to line 3: εἰ μὲν συνώνυμον τὸ ζῆν ἐποιούμεθα 'if we made "life" mean the same thing in every case'. If *eudaimonia* exists in life without ontological qualification, then all living things

[10] We may possibly see the influence of Plato's *Timaeus* here: ἃ δὴ νῦν ἥμερα δένδρα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ σπέρματα παιδευθέντα ὑπὸ γεωργίας τιθασῶς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔσχεν ... πᾶν γὰρ οὖν ὅτιπερ ἂν μετάσχῃ τοῦ ζῆν, ζῷον μὲν ἂν ἐν δίκῃ λέγοιτο ὀρθότατα 'These are trees, plants, and seeds, now tamed and schooled by husbandry into domestication with us. ... Anything that has life has every right to be called a living creature in the proper sense' (77a7–77b2).

are capable of acquiring it. MacKenna's translation, 'simply life', captures well what Plotinus means here.

3. 9–12 ὅθεν, οἶμαι . . . ἠγνόησαν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν οὐδὲ ζωὴν ὑποτιθέμενοι *On this account, I think that . . . did not recognize that [they were] not placing* eudaimonia *in life at all*: Plotinus points out that those who place *eudaimonia* in a rational life are, in fact, placing *eudaimonia* in a quality of life, rather that life itself. This could refer to both Aristotle and the Stoics.[11] The Stoics have been his concern since ch. 2. 31. See *SVF* iii. 687; DL 7. 130; Stobaeus 2. 75. 11; Seneca, *Ep.* 76. 9–10 (*SVF* iii. 200a) and Plutarch, *Virt. Mor.* 441c. In one sense the Stoics are probably victims here of post-Aristotelian philosophy, which, as Rist[12] has pointed out, came gradually to be understood as philosophy largely governed by Aristotle, rather than philosophy simply posterior and unrelated to him. Aristotle's *Ethics* are concerned essentially only with the good life for human beings, and, although the Stoics had regard for nature at all levels, when they came to examine how one lives well, they tended to explore only its human aspect, quite possibly under the direct influence of Aristotle.

[11] Verum bonum nec in arboribus nec in mutis animalibus; hoc quod in illis bonum est precario bonum dicitur. 'quod est'? inquis. hoc quod secundum cuiusque naturam est. bonum quidem cadere in mutum animal nullo modo potest; felicioris meliorisque naturae est. nisi ubi rationi locus est, bonum non est. quattuor hae naturae sunt, arboris, animalis, hominis, dei: haec duo, quae rationalia sunt, eandem naturam habent, illo diversa sunt quod alterum immortale, alterum mortale est. ex his ergo unius bonum natura perficit, dei scilicet, alterius cura, hominis. Cetera tantum in sua natura perfecta sunt, non vere perfecta, a quibus abest ratio. Hoc enim demum perfectum est quod secundum universam naturam perfectum, universa autem natura rationalis est: cetera possunt in suo genere esse perfecta. 'The truly good does not exist in trees or dumb animals. That which is good in these is good by indulgence. "What is it?" you say. It is what accords with the nature of each of them. But the good can in no way fall to a dumb animal. It belongs to a happier and superior nature. There is no good except where there is a place for reason. Of these four natures, tree, animal, man and god, the last two, which are rational, have the same nature; they differ by the fact that one is immortal, the other mortal. The good of one of them, god's of course, is perfect by nature, the other's, man's, by practice. The remainder which lack reason are perfect only in their own nature, not truly perfect. For that is finally perfect which is perfect in accordance with universal nature, and universal nature is rational. Other things can be perfect in their own kind' (Seneca, *Ep.* 124. 13–14; L/S trans.).

[12] Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, 1. (Rist is himself quoting Edelstein, *The Meaning of Stoicism*, 19–22.) See also Enberg-Pedersen, *The Stoic Theory of* Oikeiosis, 16–35.

3. 12–15 ποιότητα δὲ . . . ὥστε περὶ ἄλλο εἶδος ζωῆς *They would have to say... that is, on another species of life*: Plotinus insists that it is only the totality of life in *Nous* which ensures *eudaimonia*. Situating *eudaimonia* in rational life, they restrict it to an inferior ontological level.

3. 15–16 περὶ γὰρ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο ἡ εὐδαιμονία συνίσταται· ὥστε περὶ ἄλλο εἶδος ζωῆς eudaimonia *is constructed on this [life] in its totality, that is, on another species of life*: τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο picks up ζωή from the previous sentence. The disjointed nature of this chapter is evident as Plotinus now returns to his original starting point in line 2 above, where he was before he took up his critique of the Stoics again. The metaphysics which follows sets out Plotinus' ontology; this is the basis for Plotinus' criticism of the other schools. The other species[13] of life is that in *Nous*, the reflection of which, through the power of soul, constitutes the sensory life-forms. Plotinus makes it very clear that he is not using 'species' here as a logical distinction within a genus. He is referring to the overflow from the One; what has become known as the P- Series, where species are arranged in prior-posterior order in relation to emanation.[14] Armstrong,[15] too, notes that Plotinus wants to make clear that he is not simply referring to the sort of logical division between genus and species that Aristotle notes in *Categories* 14^b33 ff., but to ontological hierarchical levels of life. See e.g. *Ennead* VI. 3 [44] 7. 1 ff., where Plotinus notes that everything in the sensory world is posterior to everything in the noetic, which is prior. See the following note.

3. 16–18 λέγω δὲ οὐχ . . . τὸ δὲ ὕστερον εἶναι *I do not mean ... posterior*: B/T note that this terminology was developed by Aristotle during his polemics against the Platonic doctrine of the theory of Forms. They refer to *Metaphysics* 999^a6 ff.[16] Plotinus, however, has adopted Aristotle's terminology of πρότερον and ὕστερον and used it

[13] The word in its meaning of universal abstract reality probably began with Socrates. It is used extensively in Plato from the earliest works, *Euthyphro* 6d11, *Greater Hippias* 289d4, through the middle dialogues, *Meno* 72c7, *Phaedo* 103e3, *Republic* 511a3, 596a6; to the later ones, *Parmenides* 129a1, 131c9, *Timaeus* 35a4, and *Laws* 632e1. εἶδος is used in a variety of ways throughout the *Enneads*, see the *Lexicon Plot.* 290–9.

[14] See A. C. Lloyd, *The Anatomy of Neoplatonism*, (1990), esp. ch. 3.

[15] Armstrong, *Plotinus*, i, rev. edn., 178 n. 1.

[16] See *Metaphysics* 1018b9 ff., and in general, J. J. Cleary, *Aristotle on the Many Senses of Priority*, (1988).

to explain his own metaphysical structuring of reality. All things overflow from the One and thus all contain life to some degree, see *Ennead* v. 2 [11] 1. 1 ff. Plotinus envisages a series of levels of life, where each posterior level of life is dependent on the prior level before it, of which it is merely an image, but the prior level is not in any way dependent on the posterior level. See *Ennead* v. 2 [11] 1. 8 ff.; iv. 5 [29] 7. 50–1; v. 1 [10] 1. 28; v. 5 [32] 9. 5 ff.; vi. 9 [9] 2. 31–32; vi. 2 [43] 17. 17; vi. 1 [42] 25. 17.

Plotinus, by using the term 'life' as a homonym, where all life emerges from the One in a series of images, has used Aristotelian terms to re-establish a Platonic path between the noetic and sensory, a path signposted with the terms priority and posteriority, which as Blumenthal noted, ultimately 'forced Aristotle back into the service of Platonism'.[17] See also Augustine, *Confessions* 12. 24 (40), which Chadwick[18] sees as quite possibly influenced by this passage in Plotinus.

3. 18–24 πολλαχῶς . . . ὡς εἴδωλον αὖ τοῦ εὖ *Now 'life' . . . the image of another good*: See *Ennead* iii. 8 [30] 8. 12–20, where the same idea is expressed. Plotinus illustrates the true nature of *eudaimonia* and the good life. As B/T note, the gradation here is to be found in Aristotle's *De Anima* 413ᵃ22–5.[19] See also *Topics* 148ᵃ29–31, where it is stated that life obviously has a different meaning for plants and animals. Indeed, in spite of their disparate metaphysical systems the views of Plotinus and Aristotle, with regard to the various levels of life, are strikingly similar. B/T also refer to *Metaphysics* 1003ᵃ33.

Although Aristotle, like Plotinus, considered all things that possessed soul to be alive, his view of simple vegetation is strangely dismissive. He accepts that plants are alive because they possess the

[17] I borrow this phrase from an article by H. Blumenthal, 'Aristotle in the Service of Platonism', (1993). For an excellent uncomplicated analysis of this, see D. O'Meara, 'The Hierarchial Ordering of Reality in Plotinus', in Gerson, *Cambridge Companion*, 66–81.

[18] H. Chadwick, *Saint Augustine: Confessions*, (1991), 269 n. 27.

[19] *πλεοναχῶς δὲ τοῦ ζῆν λεγομένου, κἂν ἕν τι τούτων ἐνυπάρχῃ μόνον, ζῆν αὐτό φαμεν, οἷον νοῦς αἴσθησις, κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἡ κατὰ τόπον, ἔτι κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τροφὴν καὶ φθίσις τε καὶ αὔξησις* 'But the word living is used in many senses, and we say that a thing lives if any one of the following is present in it—mind, sensation, movement or rest in space, besides the movement implied in nutrition and decay or growth' (Hett trans.).

faculty of nutrition, see *De Anima* 413ª25–6. Animals are distinguished by the ability to sense, see *De Anima* 413b3–4, and *De Partibus Animalium* 655ᵇ28–656ª4. Plotinus, by contrast, begins on the highest ontological level. All things possess soul, and so have a life, which derives ultimately from the One, see *Ennead* v. 2 [11] 1. 2. When life is to be assessed, plants too must be included: see *Ennead* iii. 2 [47] 3. 23; iii. 4 [15] 1. 4 ff.; iii. 4 [15] 6. 39; iv. 3 [27] 8. 45 ff.; iv. 4 [28] 22. 1. See also vi. 7 [38] 11. 10 ff. where Plotinus extends life even to rocks and earth; the notion may well come from a Stoic influence, as is argued by Theiler.[20] The fact that everything has life means that everything has the possibility of achieving its respective good life. Lower living things must not be dismissed because they lack faculties that other living things possess. This was the main point of chs. 1 and 2, and it is emphasized here once again.

3. 21 ἄλλως δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου *and in another way of irrational life*: Plotinus follows Aristotle, *De Anima* 413ᵇ2, and Epictetus, *Disc.* 2. 8. 1–5 in making sensation the dividing line between plants and animals. In *Ennead* iii. 2 [47] 3. 36 ff. we find: *καὶ τὰ μὲν τοῦ εἶναι μετέχειν δοκεῖ μόνον, τὰ δὲ τοῦ ζῆν, τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἤδη λόγον ἔχει, τὰ δὲ πᾶσαν ζωήν* 'And some things appear to participate only in being, others in life, others more fully in life in that they have sense-perception, others at the next stage have reason, and others the fullness of life'. These divisions are equivalent to inanimate objects, plants, animals, humanity, and humanity at the noetic level; see also *Ennead* iii. 4 [15] 2. 1 ff.

3. 21–2 καὶ τρανότητι καὶ ἀμυδρότητι *according to clarity and dimness*: Whatever connections have been seen between Plotinus and Aristotle or the Stoics thus far must now be abandoned, because these terms highlight the essential difference in their metaphysical constructs. Plotinus rounds off the divisions among the life-forms with the general concept of emanation. That which remains close to its source is marked by the clarity of its life, that which has moved further away, is marked by dimness. We had *τρανοτέρᾳ ζωῇ* in ch. 2. 31. Its counterpart *ἀμυδρότερα* refers to the sensory world and can be traced to Plato for its use in this context; see *Phaedrus* 250b.

[20] W. Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*, *Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus* (1964), 74.

O'Meara[21] notes the importance of these terms in demarcating the various ontological levels. He refers to *Ennead* I. 6 [1] 5. 35; II. 4 [12] 5. 7–8; VI. 6 [34] 18. 12–17; VI. 7 [38] 9. 15–20. See in addition *Ennead* II. 3 [52] 11. 3; II. 5 [25] 5. 21; II. 9 [33] 4. 11; II. 9 [33] 12. 8; IV. 3 [27] 9. 28; IV. 3 [27] 25. 37–8; VI. 7 [38] 5. 30; VI. 7 [38] 15. 4; VI. 7 [38] 5. 20.

3. 23–4 *καὶ εἰ εἴδωλον ἄλλο ἄλλου, δηλονότι καὶ τὸ εὖ ὡς εἴδωλον αὖ τοῦ εὖ* *And if one thing is an image of another, clearly its good is the image of another good*: This process of emanation is described in *Ennead* V. 2 [11] 1. 7 ff. That there are resultant levels of life, and the fact that one level is an image of another, is often noted by Plotinus. For just a few examples see *Ennead* I. 1 [53] 8. 16 ff.; I. 7 [54] 2. 3 ff.; V. 3 [49] 8. 9–10; VI. 1 [42] 10. 58. Again the important point is made, the good life, albeit an image, belongs to lower living things also. Each possesses it according to its own abilities; see *Ennead* III. 2 [47] 3. 32–3.[22]

3. 24–8 *εἰ δὲ ὅτῳ ἄγαν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν... καὶ ἡ τέλειος ζωή* *And if* eudaimonia ... *and is the perfect life*: This, it seems to me, establishes clearly that *eudaimonia*, as opposed to 'living well' is the preserve of humanity. Although Plotinus agrees that the irrational living things can live well, he does not say that they can be *eudaimōn*. Here he explicitly links *eudaimonia* to the plenitude of life in *Nous*. Later in ch. 14. 4–8, he states that *eudaimonia* does not extend to the living body, only to the soul, and, interestingly, not to the growth soul, which presumably means that plants could not be referred to as *eudaimōn*, regardless of how good their lives were.

It soon becomes clear that in spite of the earlier critique of the various schools for not taking into account the good lives of lower living things, from this point onwards, Plotinus also concentrates on humanity. See Blumenthal,[23] who notes that Aristotle in fact paid a lot more attention to plants and animals than Plotinus ever did. Plotinus gives greater thought to the lower life-forms for the purposes of argumentation, but ultimately shows little interest in the workings of the soul at the level of plants and animals.

[21] D. J. O'Meara, *Structures Hiérarchiques dans la Pensée de Plotin*, (1975), 87 n. 5.

[22] Linguiti refers to W. Beierwaltes, *Die Metaphysik des Lichtes in der Philosophie Plotins*, (1961), 334–62.

[23] Blumenthal, 'Plotinus' Adaptation of Aristotle's Psychology', 55.

3. 24–5 ***εἰ δὲ ὅτῳ ἄγαν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν . . . τὸ εὖ*** *And if the good belongs to whatever has a superabundance of life*: The good can belong only to that which has a superabundance of life.[24] ἄγαν as a description of plenitude is used here, and in line 26 below. Harder, commenting on this compares ἄγαν to the Latin *nimium*, which he says can also simply note a high degree, without the nuance of excess, as the context here requires. I don't agree that Plotinus thought of *Nous* as subject to excess, which contains an element of negativity. Potinus sees *Nous* as teeming with life, but not containing any unwanted element, as is noted by Ciapalo.[25] ὑπερπλῆρες is used at *Ennead* v. 2 [11] 1. 9 in reference to the superabundance of the One. Plotinus does however use the term ἄγαν where it must signify the idea of excess, but not in relation to *Nous*, see *Ennead* I. 6 [1] 5. 55.[26]

3. 24–5 ***τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ὃ μηδενὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἐλλείπει*** *this is whatever is in no way lacking in life*: The chief characteristic of the noetic realm is that it contains all life, see *Ennead* III. 2 [47] 3. 31 where we are told: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔξω ζητεῖ 'it seeks nothing outside itself'. See also *Ennead* VI. 6 [34] 18. 13 where it is οὐδεμιᾷ ζωῇ ἐλλεῖπον 'deficient in no life'. Only humanity can occupy this level.[27]

3. 27–8 ***εἴπερ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὸ ἄριστον τὸ ὄντως ἐν ζωῇ καὶ ἡ τέλειος ζωή*** *if that which is really the best in life is in real beings and is the perfect life*: *Eudaimonia* will be achieved only if the *spoudaios* is truly alive, that is, if he has chosen to become conscious in the highest part of his soul, which has remained in *Nous*. This is what constitutes being really alive, since the life of *Nous* is real being.[28] It should be noted that life in itself does not guarantee either good lives for lower

[24] I translate ἄγαν as superabundance in order to capture the idea of absolutely full life, with no deficiencies.

[25] 'The Relation of Plotinian *Eudaimonia*', 491, n. 7.

[26] In its most famous usage it does carry the meaning of excess. The words μηδὲν ἄγαν (nothing to excess) were inscribed on the temple walls of the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi.

[27] As Armstrong observes (*The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe*, (1940), 101): 'It must be remembered, however, that for Plotinus man is a "bridge-being", intermediate between the two worlds. He alone is present in the intelligible personally in his own right, the other creatures only by their archetypes.'

[28] εἴπερ οὖν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν κατὰ ζωὴν ἀγαθήν, δηλονότι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος αὐτὴν θετέον ζωήν· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρίστη 'So if *eudaimonia* is a matter of good life, obviously the life concerned must be that of real being; for this is the best (adapted)' (*Ennead* I. 5 [36] 7. 20–2).

living things (see *Ennead* I. 7 [54] 3. 1 ff.) or *eudaimonia* for humanity (see *Ennead* III. 2 [47] 4. 45–8 and III. 3 [48] 1. 19 ff.).

3. 28–31 *οὕτω γὰρ . . . εἰς τὸ ἀρίστῃ εἶναι;* *For in this way . . . to make it the best life?*: What Plotinus means here is that a purified soul, which occupies a place in *Nous*, so to speak, is itself a Form, see *Ennead* I. 6 [1] 6. 13–14. As a forming principle it is a one/many. Elsewhere Plotinus quotes Anaxagoras[29] to illustrate this: *πάντα δὲ ὁμοῦ ἐκεῖ* 'all things are together there' *Ennead* V. 9 [5] 6. 3. The *eudaimōn*, then, is not only himself but all other things also, separate but also all together: *ὁ νοῦς ἐστιν ὁμοῦ πάντα καὶ αὖ οὐχ ὁμοῦ* '*Nous* is all things together and also not together' (*Ennead* V. 9 [5] 6. 8–9). The argument here is that everything is present in *Nous* and so nothing need be brought from outside. The statement that *Nous* is self-contained and needs nothing from outside is made again in *Ennead* V. 3 [49] 5. 34, where we find: *οὐδ' αὖ ἐπακτὸν τὸ ζῆν οὐδὲ τὸ νοεῖν ἄλλῳ ὄντι* 'nor again are life and thought brought in from outside to something else', see also *Ennead* IV. 7 [2] 11. 3. For the perfect life as life in *Nous*, see *Ennead* VI. 7 [38] 8. 27 and VI. 7 [38] 41. 15 ff., where *Nous* is described as the nature that needs nothing.

3. 31–2 *εἰ δέ τις τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν ἐρεῖ, οἰκεῖος μὲν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν, οὐ μὴν τὸ αἴτιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐνυπάρχον ζητοῦμεν* *If someone will say the 'nature of the Good', that would be appropriate to our account, but we are seeking that in which it [*eudaimonia*] exists, not the cause*: *τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν* is the Plotinian One. See *Ennead* I. 8 [51] 2. 1; I. 6 [1] 9. 38; II. 9 [33] 1. 1; VI. 7 [38] 15. 13; VI. 7 [38] 28. 26; VI. 7 [38] 33. 22; and VI. 7 [38] 16. 27, where the same phrase is used explicitly to denote the One. Linguiti also correctly notes *Ennead* VI. 8 [39] 7. 3 and 13. 16–17. *οἰκεῖος μὲν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν* may well refer to Plato's *Philebus* 60b10–c4 where we find: *τὴν τἀγαθοῦ διαφέρειν φύσιν τῷδε τῶν ἄλλων . . . παρείη τοῦτ' ἀεὶ τῶν ζῴων διὰ τέλους πάντως καὶ πάντῃ, μηδενὸς ἑτέρου ποτὲ ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἱκανὸν τελεώτατον ἔχειν* 'the nature of the Good differs from everything else in this way . . . a creature that possesses it permanently, completely, and absolutely, has never any need of anything else; its satisfaction is perfect' (adapted).[30] For the

[29] *Fr.* B1 Diels.

[30] See ch. 4. 19–20 where the One as transcendent Good is contrasted with the good in *Nous*, the good available to us as humans in possession of *eudaimonia*.

One as the cause of all else, see *Ennead* I. 8 [51] 2. 29; V. 1 [10] 8. 6; V. 3 [49] 17. 13; VI. 7 [38] 16. 27–30; VI. 7 [38] 42. 11; VI. 9 [9] 3. 49; VI. 9 [9] 6. 27.

3. 33–40 ὅτι δ' ἡ τελεία ζωὴ καὶ ἡ ἀληθινὴ . . . τὴν τελειοτάτην εἶναι *Often it has been said that the perfect life and the true life . . . the most perfect life*: The chapter closes with a reaffirmation of the Plotinian hierarchy and its various levels of life. This is one of the key texts selected by Ciapalo[31] to explain *eudaimonia* as the good state of one's inner reality, which is identical with life in *Nous* for those beings who have life superabundantly.

3. 33–4 ὅτι δ' ἡ τελεία ζωὴ καὶ ἡ ἀληθινὴ καὶ ὄντως ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ νοερᾷ φύσει *that the perfect life and the true life and the real life is that in the noetic nature*: H/S[2] refer to *Ennead* VI. 6 [34] 18, where the completeness of the noetic hypostasis is outlined. Ciapalo gives us a more appropriate reference when he selects *Ennead* VI. 9 [9] 9.[32] For *Nous'* possession of ἡ τελεία ζωὴ καὶ ἡ ἀληθινὴ καὶ ὄντως, see *Ennead* V. 5 [32] 2. 18; V. 5 [32] 3. 1–2; V. 8 [31] 4. 1 ff.; V. 9 [5] 5. 13; IV. 7 [38] 10. 36 ff.; V. 5 [32] 1. 1; VI. 9 [9] 9. 15. Kalligas notes VI. 6 [34] 18. 12–13, where *Nous* is described as ἀρίστην τὴν ζωὴν ἔχον, οὐδεμιᾷ ζωῇ ἐλλεῖπον 'having the best of life, deficient in no life'.

3. 35 καὶ ὅτι αἱ ἄλλαι ἀτελεῖς καὶ ἰνδάλματα *and that the other [lives] are imperfect and are [only] reflections of life*: Having examined the world of noetic reality, Plotinus now gives an appraisal of its counterpart. αἱ ἄλλαι refers to the lives of the creatures in the sense world, which includes humanity, although humanity can also occupy a position in the noetic hypostasis because of its dual nature. αἱ ἄλλαι are described in *Ennead* VI. 7 [38] 15. 4 as σμικραὶ καὶ ἀμυδραὶ καὶ εὐτελεῖς 'little and dim and cheap'. The sensory world as a reflection of the noetic world is a principal tenet of Neoplatonic philosophy. The lower level is only an image of the higher. See *Ennead* V. 5 [32] 10. 1 ff.; I. 8 [51] 4. 30; VI. 7 [38] 40. 19; IV. 4 [28]

[31] R. T. Ciapalo, Dissertation Abstracts International, 48: 6 (Dec. 1987), 1467-A.

[32] 'Νοῦς is perfect life because Its self-kinesis which is intellection is Its very nature and essential act. Its self-originated and loving movement from active dynamis to energeia marks the generation of Its contents: the Forms, which themselves are also intellects and lives' (ibid.).

13. 3 ff.; VI. 7 [38] 15. 8–9; and V. 5 [32] 5. 13–14, where the noetic world itself is only a trace of the One: *ὥστ' εἶναι τὸ εἶναι ἴχνος τοῦ ἑνος* 'so that being is a trace of the One'.

3. 36–7 καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον ζωαὶ ἢ τοὐναντίον *and no more lives than their opposite*: An example of the striking tension within Plotinus' thought. Here, in contrast to the noetic world, life in the sensory world is dismissed almost as worthless, yet in *Ennead* VI. 7 [38] 11. 20 Plotinus is at pains to point out that even the Earth itself is living. Regarding the Earth he says: *δεῖ δὴ μορφήν τινα εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα καὶ λόγον* 'It must certainly even here below be a pattern and a forming principle'.

3. 37 πολλάκις μὲν εἴρηται *often it has been said*: See *Ennead* VI. 7 [38] 18 and Bodéüs.[33]

CHAPTER 4

Having established how one must measure *eudaimonia* in ch. 3, Plotinus begins this chapter by affirming that human beings can possess the complete life. The chapter is structured on a series of questions and answers, which characterize the *spoudaios* living on the noetic level. A central concern for Plotinus here is to make clear that the *eudaimōn*, since he exists at the noetic level, lacks nothing. All reality is within him and is available to him, if he chooses to turn away from the sensory world and integrate himself with his higher soul or, as Plotinus says here, become actually what he is potentially. The final part of ch. 4 turns to the question of whether or not the *eudaimōn* can be affected by adverse fortune, which is a theme he takes up immediately in ch. 5.

4. 1–5 Εἰ μὲν οὖν . . . σκεπτέον πῶς ἐστι τοῦτο *If, then . . . we must consider how this is so*: Plotinus makes clear that *eudaimonia* is possible for humanity. The ontological framework for this was laid out in ch. 3. As Kalligas notes, these opening lines echo *EN* $1178^{b}1$ ff.,

[33] R. Bodéüs, 'L'Autre Homme de Plotin', (1983), 256.

and *Metaphysics* 1072^{b}24–5, where Aristotle is discussing the nature of *eudaimonia* among the gods.[1]

4. 1 τὴν τελείαν ζωὴν *the perfect life*: This is the region of fullest life, linked previously (ch. 3. 24, 26) to the idea of superabundance. Ch. 3. 33–7 also informed us that this life belonged to the hypostasis of noetic reality. See *EE* 1219^{a}38–9, where Aristotle states: *εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ζωῆς τελείας ἐνέργεια κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν τελείαν* 'it would follow that *eudaimonia* is an activity of perfect life in accordance with perfect goodness', although Aristotle and Plotinus conceive of this perfect life in radically different ways.

4. 6–8 λέγω δὲ ὧδε . . . δῆλον καὶ ἐξ ἄλλων *I mean this . . . and true noetic activity*: This was made clear in ch. 2. 19 ff. and in the final lines of ch. 3.[2] For how this perfect life differs ontologically from Aristotle's perfect life, see *Ennead* I. 5 [36] 7. 20–30, as is noted by Kalligas.

4. 7–8 καὶ λογισμὸν καὶ νοῦν ἀληθινόν *but also reasoning, and true noetic [activity]*: On the *λογισμὸς* see H. J. Blumenthal.[3]

4. 8–9 ἀλλ᾽ ἆρά γε ὡς ἄλλος ὢν ἄλλο τοῦτο ἔχει; *But does he have this as something other than himself?*: This is the first in a series of questions that give structure to this chapter. This question is of vital

[1] Rist, too, recognizes the Aristotelian background to this and notes that Plotinus, at this point, simply assumes that *eudaimonia* is possible for man, an assumption that he will defend in the remainder of this *Ennead* (*Road To Reality*, 144).

[2] In *Ennead* I. 1 [53], the treatise written just before I. 4 [46] we find: *ὡς τὴν αἴσθησιν τὴν ἔξω εἴδωλον εἶναι ταύτης, ἐκείνην δὲ ἀληθεστέραν τῇ οὐσίᾳ οὖσαν εἰδῶν μόνων ἀπαθῶς εἶναι θεωρίαν. ἀπὸ δὴ τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν, ἀφ᾽ ὧν ψυχὴ ἤδη παραδέχεται μόνη τὴν τοῦ ζῴου ἡγεμονίαν, διάνοιαι δὴ καὶ δόξαι καὶ νοήσεις· ἔνθα δὴ ἡμεῖς μάλιστα* 'so external sensation is the image of this perception of the soul, which is in its essence truer and is a contemplation of forms alone without being affected. From these forms, from which the soul alone receives its lordship over the living being, come reasonings, and opinions and noetic acts; and this is precisely where 'we' are' (ch. 7. 12–17, adapted). See also *Ennead* I. 1 [53] 10. 7 ff. and I. 1 [53] 13. 5 ff. B/T also note a relevant passage at III. 4 [15] 2. 3 ff.

[3] 'It hardly needs saying that there was a precedent for the two senses of *νοῦς* in the Peripatetic tradition, but it is interesting to note that Alexander [of Aphrodisias], whom Plotinus read (cf. Porphyry, *Vita Plot.* 14. 10–14), talks of *ὁ κυρίως νοῦς* as opposed to that *ἐν ἡμῖν de Anima* 89. 19 ff. This is not to imply that Plotinus' *Νοῦς* and *διάνοια* correspond to Aristotle's active and passive reason, though the idea of a *nous* that is separate and always active must have helped in the formation of Plotinus' doctrine of the undescended intelligence', *Plotinus' Psychology: His Doctrine of the Embodied Soul* (1971), 104.

importance because it directs us to a central tenet in Plotinus' philosophy. Having established that perfect life exists only on an ontological level higher than that at which we find sensation, Plotinus now explains that it is our higher soul, our *νοῦς ἀληθινός*, which really lives, and as a result makes *eudaimonia* possible.[4] In *Ennead* II. 3 [52] 9. 24–7 we are told: *τῆς δὲ ἑτέρας τῆς ἔξω ἡ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω φορὰ καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ θεῖον ὧν οὐδεὶς κρατεῖ, ἀλλ' ἢ προσχρῆται, ἵν' ᾖ ἐκεῖνο καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ζῇ ἀναχωρήσας* 'but to the other soul, which is outside the body, belongs the ascent to the higher world, to the fair and divine which no one masters, but either makes use of it that *he may be it and live by it*, having withdrawn himself' (adapted; my italics). It is not enough to be aware of our higher soul, we must become it in actuality. See *Ennead* V. 3 [49] 4. 29–31 and, in general, Armstrong,[5] and Smith.[6]

4. 9–10 *ἢ οὐδ' ἔστιν ὅλως ἄνθρωπος μὴ οὐ καὶ τοῦτο* *No, he is not really a man if he does not have this*: A very important statement which underpins Plotinus' metaphysics. What makes us human is each man's soul having belonged originally to the noetic hypostasis. See *Ennead* V. 1 [10] 1. 1–3.[7] More importantly, Plotinus tells us that a part of this soul has not descended from *Nous* but still resides there. *ἤδη γὰρ αἰσθητικοῦ ὄντος τοῦ γενομένου ἐπηκολούθησεν αὕτη τρανοτέραν ζωὴν διδοῦσα· μᾶλλον δ' οὐδ' ἐπηκολούθησεν, ἀλλὰ οἷον προσέθηκεν αὑτήν· οὐ γὰρ ἐξίσταται τοῦ νοητοῦ* 'For when the man who came to be already had sense-perception, this soul followed on and gave a brighter life; or rather it did not follow, but in a way attached itself; for it does not go out of the noetic realm' (*Ennead* VI. 7 [38] 5. 26–29) (adapted), see also IV. 8 [6] 8. 3). This is what makes

[4] 'Plotinus rejects the Aristotelian definition of man as a rational animal. For "animal" means "a compound of body and soul" but the body is not an essential part of man ... Instead Plotinus proposes to define man primarily as the intelligible man, or the human soul existing on the intelligible level' (E. K. Emilsson, *Plotinus on Sense-Perception*, (1988), 26).

[5] A. H. Armstrong, 'Studies in Traditional Anthropology II—Plotinus: Man's Higher Self', (1948), 405–18.

[6] A. Smith, 'Unconsciousness and Quasiconsciousness in Plotinus', (1978), 292–3.

[7] *Τί ποτε ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ πεποιηκὸς τὰς ψυχὰς πατρὸς θεοῦ ἐπιλαθέσθαι, καὶ μοίρας ἐκεῖθεν οὔσας καὶ ὅλως ἐκείνου ἀγνοῆσαι καὶ ἑαυτὰς καὶ ἐκεῖνον*; 'what is it, then, which has made the souls forget their father, God, and be ignorant of themselves and him, even though they are parts which come from this higher world and altogether belong to it?'

us human beings distinct from any other life-form. Other life-forms are represented in *Nous* by an archetypal form; man is present in his own right.[8]

4. 10 ἢ δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ *either potentially or in actuality*: These terms, and their use by Plotinus, have their origin in Aristotle. In *Metaphysics* 1042^{a}28 the expressions δυνάμει and ἐνεργείᾳ are used by Aristotle to explain the movement of things from an unformed to a formed state. It seems to me that Plotinus uses these terms in a normal Aristotelian manner, but clearly outside an Aristotelian metaphysical framework. Man has true intelligence only potentially when the part of his soul in the world of sense-perception gains control and prevents him from perceiving the true realities which the upper part of the soul contemplates, see *Ennead* IV. 8 [6] 8. 4–6. Armstrong[9] indicates that the doctrine—that our consciousness of what goes on in the soul is limited and dependent on our bodily condition—is also to be found in *Ennead* IV. 3 [27] 30; we shall examine this more fully in ch. 10. Man has true intelligence and so consequently perfect life when his intelligence becomes actual, that is, when he becomes conscious in his higher self on the noetic level. The sensory world is characterized by potentiality (see *Enneads* II. 5 [25] 1. 6 and I. 1 [53] 11. 5–8), while the noetic realm is characterized by actuality: *καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἄρα καὶ ἐνέργεια τὰ πάντα καὶ ζωαὶ τὰ πάντα καὶ ὁ τόπος ὁ ἐκεῖ τόπος ἐστὶ ζωῆς καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ ἀληθοῦς ψυχῆς τε καὶ νοῦ* ‘all things there, then, both exist actually and are actualities, and all are lives, and the region there is a region of life and the origin and spring of true soul and *nous*’ (*Ennead* II. 5 [25] 3. 38–40) (adapted). See also *Ennead* V. 3 [49] 5. 32–33; V. 3 [49] 7. 17 ff.; V. 9 [5] 10. 14; IV. 4 [28] 2. 9–14; IV. 4 [28] 4. 16 ff. Plotinus uses these terms to help differentiate hypostatic levels.

Rist[10] observes regarding this chapter: ‘but Plotinus shows as he continues in this chapter that he is giving us a rather unusual

[8] Armstrong, *Architecture of the Intelligible Universe*, 101. Armstrong adds elsewhere: ‘His conviction never seems to waver that our highest part, our true self, whether it can be properly described as Intellect or as soul conformed to Intellect, remains permanently above, eternally stable and indefectible’, ‘Salvation, Plotinian and Christian’, (1957), 134.

[9] Armstrong, *Plotinus*, iv. 420.

[10] Rist, *Plotinus: Road to Reality*, (1971), 149–50.

interpretation of the notions of potency and act. It is not the case in this chapter that the man whose life contains the thing which causes happiness, namely the Good, only possesses happiness potentially. This 'potentially' happy man also possesses the Good—and thus his higher self is happy—yet he is not wholly identified with it in his conscious self. Thus potential happiness in this chapter does not imply that a man is not actually happy, but that his happiness has not yet banished the transient distractions of sense to the bodily limbo in which they belong'. Rist, I think, is mistaken here on two counts.[11] First he is confusing the soul and the self. The self is the conscious level on which we happen to be operating, which can be at any level of soul.[12] Secondly, we do not possess *eudaimonia* in actuality, until we purify ourselves of body, and in so doing become conscious on the level of the higher soul. Before becoming conscious on the higher level, we possess the good potentially but this does not mean that 'our higher self is happy' as Rist suggests. We (*ἡμεῖς*) are the conscious level on which we operate and so 'we' do not possess *eudaimonia* until we become conscious on the noetic level, because only in *Nous* is *eudaimonia* possible, as ch. 3 indicated. As Plotinus puts it here, we possess *eudaimonia* only when we live at the level of the higher self in actuality. Thus contrary to what Rist says, potential happiness, to use his terms, means exactly that; that one is potentially but not actually *eudaimōn*. See the commentary on ch. 9. 24–5, where this point is touched on again. The priority of actuality to potentiality is also stressed by Plotinus. *πρῶτον γὰρ δεῖ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι, τὰ δ' ὕστερα εἶναι δυνάμει τὰ πρὸ αὐτῶν* 'For that which is actual must be first, and those that come after must be potentially those before them' (*Ennead* VI. 7 [2] 17. 6–8).[13]

4. 11–19 ἀλλ' ὡς μέρος . . . ἔχει *But will we say . . . by virtue of what he has*: This is another passage which St. Ambrose took from *Ennead*

[11] Bodéüs, too, is not convinced by Rist here ('L'Autre Homme de Plotin', 258–9).

[12] G. J. P. O'Daly, *Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self*, (1973), 49.

[13] As J. Katz has noted: 'Plotinus is particularly fond of Aristotle's principle that actuality precedes potentiality; this principle in Plotinus' system serves to support the conception of the ontological priority of the One or Good' (*Plotinus' Search for the Good*, (1950), 4).

I. 4 [46] and inserted, almost verbatim, into his essay *Jacob and the Happy Life.* See Appendix 1.

4. 11–12 ἀλλ' ὡς μέρος ... τὸ τέλειον εἶναι; *But will we say ... as a part of him?*: The second question in this chapter directs our attention to the fact that actual *eudaimonia* is not a part but all of the real man. As we shall see in ch. 10, *eudaimonia* exists in the activity of the noetic hypostasis, and as such it is substance. As substance it is all that the *spoudaios* is, or, in the terms already used, we might say that the *spoudaios* exists now in actuality. Ch. 14 will also make clear that the *spoudaios* is not the composite of soul and body. (see Ch. 14. 11–14).

4. 12–15 ἢ τὸν μὲν ἄλλον ἄνθρωπον ... εἶναι τοῦτο *The other man ... and is this*: The contrast highlighted by μὲν and δὲ is important. They mark an ontological ascent, highlighting the contrast between having the potential to and becoming in actuality *eudaimōn.*[14] ἔστι δὴ νοῦς τις αὐτὸς γεγονώς, ὅτε τὰ ἄλλα ἀφεὶς ἑαυτοῦ τούτῳ καὶ τοῦτον βλέπει, αὐτῷ δὲ ἑαυτόν. ὡς δὴ οὖν νοῦς ἑαυτὸν ὁρᾷ. 'A man has certainly become *Nous* when he lets all the rest which belongs to him go and looks at this with this and himself with himself: that is, it is as *Nous* he sees himself' (*Ennead* v. 3 [49] 4. 29–31) (adapted). Linguiti also notes *Ennead* I. 1 [53] 8. 1–6. Plass[15] has an interesting note on how ἤδη can be used in Plotinus to signal the instant of transition from a temporal process to a timeless state. He refers to *Ennead* I. 2 [19] 4. 5, where it is used in this way. Significantly ἤδη here in line 14 is followed by the perfect tense μεταβέβηκε. This signals the arrival of the *spoudaios* into the timelessness and spacelessness of *Nous*, which marks his *eudaimonia.* Note its force again in line 16, and see in addition *Ennead* I. 5 [36] 3 and VI. 9 [9] 9. 48.

4. 15–17 περικεῖσθαι δ' αὐτῷ ... συνηρτημένα *The other things now ... through an act of will*: The idea of the body as something simply attached to soul which can be cast off at any time can be found in Plato's *Phaedo* 66c ff., and was accepted by Plotinus as a central Platonic tenet. It is quite possible that through Plotinus the image

[14] See Schniewind, *L'Éthique du Sage*, 85–95 for a thorough discussion of Plotinus' use of ἡ ἄλλος ἄνθρωπος in I. 4 [46] and in other treatises to highlight the ontological distinction between the *spoudaios* who has become other, and *is Nous*, and the man who has the potential to do this but has not yet exercised that potential.

[15] Plass, 'Plotinus' Ethical Theory', 250.

of the body as a cloak was carried to Porphyry (see *On Abstinence from Killing Animals* I. 31; II. 46N, *On the Cave of the Nymphs* 66. 13 ff.), who specifically isolated the concept of *phantasia* as the covering of the soul. On this see Watson.[16] Watson goes on to trace the use of this imagery through to Damascius, and Olympiodorus, Neoplatonists of the sixth century.[17] Plotinus' most comprehensive coverage of the topic is to be found in *Ennead* I. 1 [53], although the image of the soul 'wearing' a body is not found there. Soul's attachment to body only comes about through a deliberate act on the part of the soul. The individual soul turns from its source, world soul, and chooses to animate the body that it has illuminated, rather than return to the noetic hypostasis. For Plotinus' explanation of why a soul does this, see *Enneads* IV. 8 [6], and V. 1 [10] 1–2. On the descent of the individual soul to body see Rist.[18]

4. 16–17 ἃ δὴ οὐδὲ μέρη αὐτοῦ ἄν τις θεῖτο οὐκ ἐθέλοντι περικείμενα *one would say are not part of him because he does not want them to surround him*: See *Ennead* V. 1 [10] 3. 12–13, and I. 1 [53] 13. 6. The body is an encumbrance, something that is carried by the *spoudaios against his will*, which the soul of the philosopher will heed as little as possible.[19] This is of course basically a Platonic position,

[16] '[T]he notion of *phantasia* as a veil or a cloak or a covering did not originate with Porphyry. Philo had said that the soul must put off the body and things dear to the body. And that is why, he says, the High Priest is not to enter the Holy of Holies in his robe, but must put off the tunic (*chitōn*) of opinion (*doxa*) and *phantasia*, and leave it there for those who love outward things and value appearance above reality (*Leg. All.* II,56)' (G. Watson, 'Gregory of Nyssa's Use of Philosophy in the *Life of Moses*', (1987), 108). See also G. Watson, *Phantasia in Classical Thought*, (1988), 104 ff.

[17] Watson, 'Gregory of Nyssa's Use of Philosophy', 108 ff. On this point see also A. C. Lloyd, 'The Later Neoplatonists', in A. H. Armstrong (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, (1967), 289 ff.

[18] Rist, *Road to Reality*, ch. 8.

[19] *λέγω δὲ ἣ τὸ μὲν κεχωρισμένον, ὅπερ τὸ χρώμενον, τὸ δὲ μεμιγμένον ὁπωσοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ ὂν ἐν τάξει τοῦ ᾧ χρῆται, ἵνα τοῦτο ἡ φιλοσοφία καὶ αὐτὸ ἐπιστρέφῃ πρὸς τὸ χρώμενον καὶ τὸ χρώμενον ἀπάγῃ, ὅσον μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ἀπὸ τοῦ ᾧ χρῆται, ὡς μὴ ἀεὶ μηδὲ χρῆσθαι* 'I mean that one part is separate, the part which uses the body, and the other somehow mixed with body and on a level with that which it uses. In this case philosophy should turn this lower part towards the using part, and draw the using part away from that which it uses, insofar as the connection is not absolutely necessary, so that it may not always have even to use it' (*Ennead* I. 1 [53] 3. 21–6).

although modified somewhat by Plotinus. In the *Phaedo* we hear of the separation of the soul from the bodily encumbrance (80d–81a), and in the *Symposium* we find the basis for Plotinus' mystical ascent from the body to the soul's true home in *Nous*, (see 210a–212a). Plotinus modified the Platonic doctrine so that the Forms, *Nous* and the One are all to be found within man too, see *Ennead* v. 1 [10] 10. 6. We do not want the body and we are exhorted to leave it behind, see *Ennead* II. 9 [33] 6. 40–43, and v. 1 [10] 10. 24 ff. where Plotinus confirms that this exhortation is essentially Platonic. See also *Ennead* II. 3 [52] 9. 20 where it is stressed again with quotations from *Theaetetus* 176a8–b1 and *Phaedo* 67c6. Yet we should note, as Robin[20] does, that Plotinus wants to go beyond noetic activity to a state of rapture, which is over and above anything in Plato.

4. 17 κατὰ βούλησιν *an act of will*: Regarding the will, see ch. 6. 14 where I treat of this term in detail.

4. 17 συνηρτημένα *connected*: As B/T note that this term is used in a similar manner in *Ennead* I. 1 [53] 9. 25. The verb here is a compound of ἀρτάω. Note its use again in line 27 below with a different prefix.

4. 18–19 τούτῳ τοίνυν τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν; ἢ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὅπερ ἔχει *What then is the good for this man? He himself [is the good] for himself by virtue of what he has*: This is a focal point in Plotinian philosophy. The various hypostatic levels, while existing outside of us, also exist within us, πάντα εἴσω (*Ennead* III. 8 [30] 6. 40).[21] This thinking was to influence Augustine strongly.[22] The God within us

[20] R. Robin, *Greek Thought*, (1928), 371.

[21] This is made clear in *Ennead* VI. 9 [9] 3. 18-22: *ἐπαναγαγεῖν ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐσχάτων ὄντων, κακίας τε πάσης ἀπηλλαγμένον εἶναι ἅτε πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν σπεύδοντα γενέσθαι, ἐπί τε τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀρχὴν ἀναβεβηκέναι καὶ ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν γενέσθαι ἀρχῆς καὶ ἑνὸς θεατὴν ἐσόμενον* 'one must lift oneself up from the things of sense which are the last and lowest and become freed from all evil since one is hastening to the Good, and ascend to the principle in oneself and become one from many, when one is going to behold the Principle and the One'. See also VI. 9 [9] 11. 11-21, 38-9 and VI. 5 [23] 1. 3.

[22] Et inde admonitus redire ad memet ipsum, intravi in intima mea ... intravi et vidi qualicumque oculo animae meae supra eundem oculum animae meae, supra mentem meam, lucem incommutabilem 'And being hence admonished to return to myself, I entered into mine own inwards ... Into myself I went, and with the eyes of my soul (such as it was) I discovered over the same eye of my soul, over my mind, the unchangeable light of the Lord' *Confessions* 7. 10, Watts trans.). There was of course a fundamental difference regarding interiority in

was a notable feature in the writings of the Roman Stoics, see Seneca, *Ep.* 41. 1, and Epictetus, *Disc.* 2. 8. 11–14. However, its appearance in Plotinus most likely derives ultimately from Plato, see *Republic* 589a7–b1 where Plato talks about ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος 'the man within'.
4. 19–20 τὸ δὲ ἐπέκεινα αἴτιον τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἄλλως ἀγαθόν, αὐτῷ παρὸν ἄλλως *The transcendent cause [the Good] is [the cause] of the good in him and is in another way good, present to him in another way*: The terse construction of the Greek here has caused some translators to expand and amplify their translations, especially Bréhier who wishes to leave us in no doubt as to what Plotinus means.[23] As Bréhier indicates, τὸ ἐπέκεινα αἴτιον here must surely refer to the transcendent Good. For the transcendent Good as cause, see line 33 of the previous chapter, and for τὸ ἐπέκεινα αἴτιον, see Plato, *Republic* 509b9 and 587c1. In the *Enneads* Plotinus frequently emphasizes the transcendence of the One. Although he is reluctant to speak about something beyond words (see *Enneads* vi. 8 [39] 8 and v. 3 [49]13. 1–6 διὸ καὶ ἄρρητον τῇ ἀληθείᾳ), necessity compels the use of certain terms in describing It (see *Ennead* ii. 9 [33] 1.6–8). The One is clearly different from all else. What Plotinus means by καὶ ἄλλως ἀγαθόν is that the Good in Transcendent Good is different from the good immanent in man. In *Ennead* vi. 9 [9] 6. 56–7 he tells us: οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ ἀγαθὸν λεκτέον τοῦτο, ὃ παρέχει, ἀλλὰ ἄλλως τἀγαθον ὑπὲρ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθά 'we must not even call this One good, the good which he gives, but the Good in another way beyond all goods'. See also *Ennead* v. 3 [49] 11. 24–5, where the name 'the Good' is permitted only so long as it is clear that it means that which is before all things. O'Daly[24] is in agreement with this viewpoint, but see Kristeller,[25] who thinks that the passage means that the self is one with the Absolute Good. The good for man, then, is of a different order. After purification we live again fully in *Nous*, in his own words: εἰς ὃ δὴ ἀναβάντες

Augustine and Plotinus. See P. Brown, *Augustine of Hippo*, (1967), 245: R. A. Markus, 'Marius Victorinus and Augustine', in Armstrong, *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* 360; and W. Beierwaltes, *Regio Beatitudinis: Augustine's Concept of Happiness* (1981), 58.

[23] 'Mais la cause du bien qui est en lui, c'est le Bien qui est au delà de l'Intelligence; et il est, en un sens, tout autre que le bien qui est en lui'.

[24] O'Daly, *Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self*, 80.

[25] P. O. Kristeller, *Der Begriff der Seele in der Ethik des Plotin*, (1929), 69.

καὶ γενόμενοι τοῦτο μόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἀφέντες 'when we ascend to this and become this alone and let the rest go' (*Ennead* VI. 8 [39] 15. 21–2, see also *Ennead* VI. 7 [38] 35. 3 ff.). Then we turn to gaze on the One and so possess *our* fullest good, see *Ennead* VI. 9 [9] 9. 11–12.

4. 20–1 μαρτύριον δὲ . . . ἔχοντα *There is evidence . . . to be anything else*: Plotinus reiterates an idea put forward in ch. 3.31, that perfection is evidenced by the fact that nothing else need be added or sought after. This concept of *αὐτάρκης* (see below, line 24) is used of the differing hypostatic levels, see *Ennead* III. 2 [47] 3, where it is even used of the sensory world. Here, however, we find it in its most common usage, as soul in *Nous*: *ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ ζωὴν ἄλλην ἴσχει τότε καὶ προσιοῦσα καὶ ἤδη προσελθοῦσα καὶ μετασχοῦσα αὐτοῦ. ὥστε γνῶναι διατεθεῖσαν, ὅτι πάρεστιν ὁ χορηγὸς ἀληθινῆς ζωῆς, καὶ δεῖ οὐδενὸς ἔτι* 'the soul then has another life and draws near, and has already come near and has a part in him, and so is in a state to know that the giver of true life is present and we need nothing more' *Ennead* VI. 9 [9] 9. 47–50, see also *Ennead* I. 1 [53] 2. 22 ff.; VI 5 [23] 12. 15–19; VI. 9 [9] 11. 10; VI. 7 [38] 12. 22; VI. 7 [38] 15. 28; VI. 7 [38] 26. 14. So the soul ascends and by turning from all objects of sense, it becomes *Nous*, and so possesses all things.[26] Nothing therefore need be sought after; indeed Porphyry, as is noted by Lloyd,[27] grasped the important philosophical significance of this: 'Once the undiminishable and inexhaustible nature of reality is grasped, he says, if you add to it something in the category of place or of relation this might seem to entail a diminution of it in proportion as it could have lacked that property: but you would not have diminished reality, the reversion would be in yourself away from reality, because you have hidden the meaning of it behind a screen of imagery'. It should be noted, however, that technically the soul will always have need of the One's presence even when it needs nothing else. This criterion of *οὐκ ἐνδεές* is also used of the One, but again its unique position is acknowledged (see *Ennead* VI. 9 [9] 6. 24–7). See also *Ennead* VI. 7 [38] 23. 7 and VI. 7 [38] 37. 30–1.

[26] As Armstrong notes: 'One discovers oneself as part of the largest possible whole, and a part which in a sense is that whole. The boundaries of the self are those of the intelligible cosmos'. 'The Apprehension of Divinity in Plotinus', in Harris, (ed.) *The Significance of Neoplatonism*, (1976), 195.

[27] Lloyd, 'The Later Neoplatonists', 289. Lloyd is paraphrasing Porphyry, *Sent.* no. 40 § 1 Mommert.

4. 23–5 αὐτάρκης οὖν . . . εἰς κτῆσιν ἀγαθοῦ *Therefore the one . . . possession of the good*: This assertion is central to both Plotinus' ethics and metaphysics. The *spoudaios* is invulnerable to externals because of his ontological status in *Nous*. See Schniewind[28] who discusses the change in the text here between the *editio maior* and the *editio minor* of H-S, not noted in their *addenda* in volume 3. The *editio maior* reads Κἂν σπουδαῖος ᾖ αὐτάρκης εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν 'Et s'il est *spoudaios*, il sera autosuffisant pour atteindre le bonheur' (Schniewind trans.). This is the reading preferred by Schniewind because it supports the idea that the state of being *spoudaios* is prior to self-sufficiency and possession of *eudaimonia*.

4. 24 σπουδαῖος *spoudaios*: In the *Enneads spoudaios* refers to the excellent man who has detached himself from body, and become conscious on the level of *Nous*, enjoying fullest life as a one and many. It is very difficult to find a single word in translation that encapsulates all that Plotinus means by *spoudaios*.[29] It has been translated in a variety of ways.[30]

4. 24 αὐτάρκης *self-sufficient*: For τὸ εὖ ζῆν as αὐτάρκης, see Plato, *Republic* 387d12; *Philebus* 60c1 ff., 67a7; and Aristotle, *EN* 1097^b8. It is an important criterion for Aristotle in assessing living well for humanity. Plotinus uses the same term, but of course conceives of it in a profoundly different metaphysical sense from Aristotle. See *Ennead* I. 1 [53] 2. 22–3, where soul in *Nous* is characterized as αὐτάρκες, and *Ennead* V. 3 [49] 17. 13–14, where the One is itself beyond self-sufficiency (ἐπέκεινα αὐταρκείας).

4. 25–8 ἀλλ' ὃ ζητεῖ . . . τοιούτου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐστί *And what he seeks . . . of such a man*: H/S^2 refer to Plato's *Alcibiades I* 131a2–3 and indeed there is a strong similarity between the two passages: ὅστις ἄρα τῶν τοῦ σώματός τι γιγνώσκει, τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀλλ' οὐχ αὑτὸν ἔγνωκεν

[28] See Schniewind, *L'Éthique du Sage*, 120–1, and 'The Social Concern of the Plotinian Sage', in A. Smith (ed.), *The Philosopher and Society in Late Antiquity*, (2005), 61 n. 17.

[29] See Schniewind, *L'Éthique du Sage*, 29–47 for a detailed analysis of the use of this term in the philosophical tradition before Plotinus. Schniewind's analysis highlights the difficulty of finding a single word to express the full meaning of this term. She transliterates it throughout her book and I do throughout this commentary.

[30] Armstrong 'the virtuous or good man', MacKenna 'the Proficient', Bréhier, 'sage' and more recently Ciapalo, 'serious man'.

'And anyone who gets to know something belonging to the body knows the things that are his, but not himself' (Lamb trans.) Yet we must not confine this idea to the *Alcibiades* alone as it is central to Plato's philosophy, and is to be found throughout his dialogues, most notably in the *Phaedo* where much of the discussion is given over to showing the division between body and soul and the fact that the real man is his soul. See *Phaedo* 82a–83e, 114e, 115c–e. On this matter see O'Daly.[31] Kalligas notes *Ennead* I. 1 [53] 7. 17–18 where Plotinus explains that the body with its sense-life belongs to us but that the real man lives on a higher ontological level where thought begins. In general see *Ennead* I. 1 [53] for an assessment of what a living being is in Plotinian terms.

4. 27 προσηρτημένῳ *connected*: Rist[32] notes the importance of this word and contrasts it with *συνηρτημένα* in line 17: 'The body, for the happy man, has become not an essential, but a mere adjunct: it is *προσηρτημένον* in I. 4. 4. 27, whereas the elements of the true personality are *συνηρτημένα* in line 17'. That said, see *Ennead* I. 1 [53] 9. 25, where *συνηρτημένων* is used of the connection to the joint entity.

4. 29–30 καὶ γινώσκει . . . τῆς αὑτοῦ παραιρούμενος ζωῆς *He recognizes . . . from his own life*: Plotinus spells out that the life of the *spoudaios* is the activity of his higher soul which remains always in *Nous*, see *Ennead* II. 9 [33] 2. 4–5. The body, which came into being later, has its own life, which will not interfere with the man who is *eudaimōn*.

4. 30–6 οὐδ' ἐν τύχαις τοίνυν ἐναντίαις . . . οὐ τὰς λύπας οὐ δέξεται *Not even in adverse fortunes . . . he [the* spoudaios*] will not admit pains of this sort*: Chs. 5, 6, 7, and 8 take up this idea and examine it in detail. This passage is borrowed by St Ambrose, see *Jacob and the Happy Life*, 1. 7. 31 (Appendix 1).

4. 30–2 οὐδ' ἐν τύχαις τοίνυν ἐναντίαις ἐλαττώσεται εἰς εὐδαιμονεῖν· μένει γὰρ καὶ ὣς ἡ τοιαύτη ζωή *Not even in adverse fortunes will his* eudaimonia *be diminished; for, even so, such a life remains [with him]*: As Armstrong[33] has indicated, Plotinus is here defending what was essentially a Stoic position against an attack along Peripatetic lines.

[31] O'Daly, *Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self*, 10.
[32] Rist, *Road to Reality*, 145.
[33] Armstrong, *Plotinus* i. 184.

Aristotle had considered that although the *spoudaios* would not be easily shaken from his *eudaimonia*, serious misfortunes would affect him, see *EN* 1100^a5 ff. The Stoics held the opposite view that *eudaimonia* was based solely on excellence and that the presence or absence of external goods, or the occurrence of disasters, did not impinge on the sage's *eudaimonia*. See Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 5. 1, 40–1 and *SVF* iii. 585, where even the sufferings of Priam do not disturb the sage's *eudaimonia*. The Stoics came under strenuous attack for holding this viewpoint; but how they would have defended themselves is not clear since detailed arguments defending their conception of *eudaimonia* have not survived. Clearly they did not do so in the Plotinian manner, where *eudaimonia* is removed from body and placed in *Nous*, which is not only free from material disturbance but is also outside of time, see *Ennead* I. 5 [36] 7. 20–30.

4. 32–3 ἀποθνῃσκόντων τε οἰκείων καὶ φίλων οἶδε τὸν θάνατον ὅ τι ἐστίν *when relations and friends die he understands what death is*: Plotinus now begins to examine in detail the question of bad fortune and the good man's reaction to it. Certain passages in Plato's *Republic* may well have been in his mind at this point; see 387d–388a, 603e–604a, where Plato states that misfortunes, including the deaths of friends and relations, will not interfere with the life of a good man. See also *Menexenus* 247e–248d, where virtue is considered the best protection against losing riches or children. For the direct influence of this thinking on Augustine, see *Confessions* 9. 12.

CHAPTER 5

Chapter 4 stated Plotinus' fundamental metaphysical position: the body lives its own life, which does not impede the life of the *spoudaios* who has reascended to *Nous*, wherein lies the source of his *eudaimonia*. In order to develop the treatise dialectically Plotinus now raises a number of objections to this position. Marsilio Ficino's removal of this material to a new chapter is sensible. The objections are from opponents who fundamentally believe that man is both body and soul, and that *eudaimonia* must be sought in the combination. Plotinus presents what were, in the main, most

probably long-standing Peripatetic criticisms of Stoic ethical theory.[1] At the core of this chapter, then, is the perceived connection between soul and body. Plotinus must deal with these objections because, like the Stoics, he considered *eudaimonia* to be independent of bodily affections and external misfortunes. The closeness of Plotinian and Stoic ethical thought here is noted by Bouillet[2] and Murray.[3] External goods are unnecessary for the acquisition of *eudaimonia*.[4] Both the Plotinian *spoudaios* and the Stoic sage are fortified by excellence alone (see Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 2. 29; 5. 1; 5. 19; 5. 40–1). But Plotinian excellence is of a different order from that of the Stoics (see *Ennead* I. 2 [19]), and Plotinus will defend his position in a way that the Stoics could not, by removing the *eudaimōn* to a higher metaphysical plane. Aristotle, in contrast to Plotinus and the Stoics, argued that major misfortunes could shake the happy man from his *eudaimonia* (*EN* 1100a5–9; *Magna Moralia* 1206b30–5), and that external goods were necessary for the good life (*EN* 1178a23 ff.; 1099a31–1099b8). The purpose of this crucial chapter then is to raise these, and other, objections, which will be considered in the remainder of this treatise.[5]

5. 1–11 *Ἀλγηδόνες δὲ τί . . . τὴν σώματος φύσιν* *But what about pains . . . the nature of body*: The essentially dialectical nature of Plotinus' writings is evident here as he voices objections that must be accounted for if the treatise is to progress. Plotinus sets out what is

[1] Plotinus, *Enneads*, i. 184. There is no doubt that Aristotle's successors developed their ethical teaching in opposition to the Stoics. For the revival of Aristotelianism, see M. Frede, *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, (1999), 772–6.

[2] Bouillet, *Les* Ennéades *de Plotin*, i. 148.

[3] J. Murray, 'The Ascent of Plotinus to God', (1951), 232. See also *Tusc. Disp.* 5. 47 where Cicero sets out the opposing views of Aristotle and the Stoics.

[4] Armstrong considers this to be the main theme of *Ennead* I. 4 [46]. See *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, 228.

[5] Schniewind (*L'Éthique du Sage*, 66) considers that these are merely hypothetical objections, evidenced in the fact that Plotinus does not seriously consider the subject matter in them. One might describe these objections as hypothetical, but they have a firm basis in the philosophies of Plotinus' opponents. They were important issues, and, although Plotinus does not consider them as serious objections, given his own ontology, he does devote time to explaining why these objections are misconceived in the remainder of this treatise. That these issues had been one of the dominant themes of Middle Platonism is noted by Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 44.

essentially a Peripatetic stance regarding the vulnerability of the *spoudaios* in the face of fortune and bodily frailty. This first part of this opening passage, lines 1–5, is to be found repeated in *Jacob and the Happy Life*. See Appendix 1.

5. 1–2 Ἀλγηδόνες δὲ τί καὶ νόσοι καὶ τὰ ὅλως κωλύοντα ἐνεργεῖν; *But what about pains and illness, and in general that which impedes activity?*: As has been noted by Bréhier, Bouillet, and Armstrong, Plotinus begins by presenting essentially an Aristotelian critique of the *spoudaios'* ability to sustain his *eudaimonia* in the face of misfortune.[6] The Platonic background to the problem of body's susceptibility to disturbance is to be found in Plato's *Phaedo*.[7] I noted in ch. 1 the importance of activity in Aristotle's concept of living well.[8] I suggested there that Aristotle used phrases such *τὸ εὖ ζῆν*, *τὸ εὖ πράττειν*, and *τὸ καλῶς* specifically to indicate the active nature of *eudaimonia*. That these objections can be traced directly to Aristotle, then, is not surprising. Aristotle's concern with *τὰ ὅλως κωλύοντα ἐνεργεῖν* is mentioned briefly again in the following chapter, but it is not until the beginning of ch. 13 that they are considered in any detail. See also *Jacob and the Happy Life* 1. 8. 37 (Appendix 1).

5. 1 Ἀλγηδόνες *Pains*: Bouillet directs us to *EN* 1153^{b}2–3[9] where pain is considered an evil, being in some way an impediment to activity,

[6] *ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία τῶν τελείων· διὸ προσδεῖται ὁ εὐδαίμων τῶν ἐν σώματι ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδίζηται ταῦτα.* '*eudaimonia* is something complete. This is why, in order for a person to be *eudaimōn*, he needs also the goods relating to the body, and external goods, and those fortune brings, i.e. in order for him not to be impeded in these respects' (*EN* 1153^{b}16–19, adapted). See also *Politics* 1331^{b}39 ff. and Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 5. 23–5, where Cicero mentions Theophrastus' essay *Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας*, which offered a long discussion on the reasons why a man being tortured is not in a position to achieve *eudaimonia*. Unfortunately this work has been lost.

[7] *ἔτι δέ, ἄν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν … εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἴσεσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα* 'and any diseases which attack us hinder our quest for reality … if we are ever to have pure knowledge of anything, we must get rid of the body and contemplate things by themselves with the soul by itself' (66c1–2, 66d8–e2). Kalligas notes *Crit.* 47d7–e4 and, less usefully, *Gorgias* 512a2–5.

[8] See comm. on *τὸ εὖ ζῆν* in ch. 1. 1.

[9] *ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συμβαίνοντα θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται τὸ μακάριον· λύπας τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει καὶ ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς ἐνεργείαις* 'and if they turn out in the opposite way, they crush and maim one's blessedness; for they bring on pains, and obstruct many sorts of activities'.

see also *EN* $1100^{b}28$–30. Stoic indifference to pain is recorded by Cicero in *Tusc. Disp.*: 'hoc doce, doleam necne doleam nihil interesse.'—'Numquam quidquam,' inquit, 'ad beate quidem vivendum, quod est in una virtute positum' ' "Tell me that it makes no difference whether I am in pain or not in pain." "It never makes any difference," says he, "to the fact of leading a happy life, which is based on virtue alone" ' (2. 29, King trans.). See also *Tusc. Disp.* 5. 76–7. Plotinus concurs with this viewpoint, but as I have indicated, for very different reasons. As is common in Plotinus, a topic is introduced briefly, only to be set aside, and then taken up again at a later stage. In this case, the topic of pain is returned to in ch. 8, and there examined in more detail. In general his position is that pain operates on the body, but has no hold on a man's higher soul, wherein lies his *eudaimonia*. See *Ennead* I. 1 [53] 2. 21, where he notes with regard to the soul: *τὸ δ' ἀλγεῖν ἔτι πόρρω* 'Pain is far from it too'. See also *Ennead* IV. 4 [28] 19 where the effects of pain on both the body and soul are examined.

5. 1 νόσοι *illness*: For a Stoic response to illness as an impediment, see Epictetus *Man.* 9.[10] See also Epictetus *Disc.* 3. 26. 37. Plotinus' response to the suggestion that disease is an impediment may be found in the treatise *On Providence*. Not poverty, not disease, not misfortune will prevent the excellent individual from achieving *eudaimonia*.[11] See also *Ennead* III. 2 [47] 6. 1 ff. and III. 3 [48] 2. 1. For an explanation of what evils, illness, and poverty are in Plotinian

[10] *Νόσος σώματός ἐστιν ἐμπόδιον, προαιρέσεως δὲ οὔ, . . . καὶ τοῦτο ἐφ' ἑκάστου τῶν ἐμπιπτόντων ἐπίλεγε· εὑρήσεις γὰρ αὐτὸ ἄλλου τινὸς ἐμπόδιον, σὸν δὲ οὔ.* 'Disease is an impediment to the body, but not to the moral purpose . . . And say this to yourself at each thing that befalls you; for you will find the thing to be an impediment to something else, but not to yourself.'

[11] *Εἰ τοίνυν καὶ ψυχαῖς ἐν τῷδε τῷ παντὶ ἔξεστιν εὐδαίμοσιν εἶναι, εἴ τινες μὴ εὐδαίμονες, οὐκ αἰτιατέον τὸν τόπον, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐκείνων ἀδυναμίας οὐ δυνηθείσας καλῶς ἐναγωνίσασθαι, οὗ δὴ ἆθλα ἀρετῆς πρόκειται. καὶ μὴ θείους δὲ γενομένους θεῖον βίον μὴ ἔχειν τί δεινόν; πενίαι δὲ καὶ νόσοι τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς οὐδέν, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς σύμφορα· καὶ ἀνάγκη νοσεῖν σώματα ἔχουσι.* 'If then it is possible for souls to be well off in this All, we must not blame the place if some are not well off, but their own incapacity, in that they have not been able to take a noble part in the contest for which the prizes of virtue are offered. Why is it disconcerting if men who have not become godlike do not have a godlike life? And poverty, too, and sickness, are nothing to the good, but advantageous to the bad; and men must fall sick if they have bodies' (*Ennead* III. 2 [47] 5. 1–7).

terms, see *Ennead* I. 8 [51] 5. 19 ff. Plotinus claims that we should expect such misfortunes and train ourselves to cope, see *Ennead* III. 2 [47] 8. 16 ff. Note also an interesting passage in III. 2 [47] 5. 6–32, where Plotinus considers sickness in a quite positive light, certainly in comparison with Aristotle. Illness, he says, should not necessarily be viewed as a hindrance.[12]

5. 1–2 *τὰ ὅλως κωλύοντα ἐνεργεῖν* *and in general that which impedes activity*: For the Stoic attitude to general misfortune as an impediment, see Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 4. 49.

5. 2 *εἰ δὲ δὴ μηδ᾽ ἑαυτῷ παρακολουθοῖ;* *And if he is not conscious to himself?*: It is the strong element of activity inherent in Aristotle's concept of *eudaimonia* which lies behind this objection.[13] The kind of consciousness Plotinus is referring to here is a simple lack of consciousness of the empirical self, as is the case when one is asleep. In this state one is unaware of the world of sense-perception, and, in Plotinian ontology, one is also, at the level of the lower soul which animates body, unaware of the activity in the higher soul of the real man in *Nous*. Plotinus responds to this objection in quite a detailed manner in chs. 9 and 10. In brief, he will claim that the *spoudaios* has become *Nous*, and whether his empirical self on a lower ontological level is conscious of his *eudaimonia* or not, his *eudaimonia* remains

[12] *καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτοῖς συνήνεγκε τοῖς παθοῦσιν, οἷον πενία καὶ νόσος, ἡ δὲ κακία εἰργάσατό τι χρήσιμον εἰς τὸ ὅλον παράδειγμα δίκης γενομένη καὶ πολλὰ ἐξ αὑτῆς χρήσιμα παρασχομένη. καὶ γὰρ ἐγρηγορότας ἐποίησε καὶ νοῦν καὶ σύνεσιν ἐγείρει πονηρίας ὁδοῖς ἀντιταττομένων, καὶ μανθάνειν δὲ ποιεῖ οἷον ἀγαθὸν ἀρετὴ παραθέσει κακῶν ὧν οἱ πονηροὶ ἔχουσι.* 'And some troubles are profitable to the sufferers themselves, poverty and sickness for instance, and vice works something useful to the whole by becoming an example of just punishment; and also of itself it offers much that is of use. For it makes men awake and wakes up the intelligence and understanding of those who are opposed to the ways of wickedness, and makes us learn what a good virtue is in comparison with the evils of which the wicked have a share' (*Ennead* III. 2 [47] 5. 15–21).

[13] *τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἕξιν ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, οἷον τῷ καθεύδοντι ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐξηργηκότι, τὴν δ᾽ ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷόν τε· πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ πράξει* 'for it is possible for the disposition to be present and yet to produce nothing good, as for example in the case of the person who is asleep, or in some other way rendered inactive, but the same will not hold of the activity: the person will necessarily be doing something, and will do (it) well' (*EN* $1098^{b}33$–$1099^{a}2$). See also *EN* $1095^{b}32$–$1096^{a}2$; $1176^{a}34$–$1176^{b}1$; *EE* $1216^{a}3$–8 and Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness*, (1986), 323.

ever active. The *spoudaios* remains aware of his *eudaimonia* at the level of his higher soul. *λανθάνοι δ' ἂν αὕτη ἡ ἐνέργεια οὐκ αὐτὸν πάντα, ἀλλά τι μέρος αὐτοῦ* 'It will not be the whole of him which is unaware of this activity, but only a part of him' (ch. 9. 24–5).

5. 2–3 *γένοιτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐκ φαρμάκων καί τινων νόσων* *This could happen because of drugs and some illnesses*: The same problem of how the *spoudaios* might lose consciousness is addressed in the first lines of ch. 9: *'Ἀλλ' ὅταν μὴ παρακολουθῇ βαπτισθεὶς ἢ νόσοις ἢ μάγων τέχναις*; 'But [what about] whenever someone is unconscious, having been overcome by illness or magic?' The Plotinian reply to this is based on the view that the higher soul is separate from body, and thus the *eudaimonia* of the *spoudaios* is independent of bodily affections. The topic is discussed in detail in ch. 9.[14] See also *Ennead* IV. 4 [28] 43. 1, where Plotinus asks: *ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος πῶς ὑπὸ γοητείας καὶ φαρμάκων*; 'But how is the *spoudaios* affected by magic and drugs?' There, however, in answering, Plotinus concentrates on the effect of magic on the *spoudaios* and as a result the passage fails to augment the explanation given in ch. 9, except in that it shows that magic, like illnesses, only affects the body, not the higher soul.[15]

5. 4–5 *πενίας γὰρ καὶ ἀδοξίας ἐατέον* *One might discount poverty and disgrace*: At this point Plotinus switches to a consideration of external fortunes. On the face of it, he seems reluctant to bring these matters into the discussion (*ἐατέον*). Chs. 7 and 13 also highlight the unimportance of external fortunes. For Aristotle, however, external fortunes cannot be dismissed so lightly: *φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν πενίαν νόσον ... ἔνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρόν, οἷον ἀδοξίαν* 'Now we fear all bad things, e.g. loss of reputation, poverty, disease ... since there are some things which we actually should fear, and fearing them is a fine thing, while

[14] For a comprehensive discussion of consciousness in Plotinus, see R. Schwyzer, 'Bewusst und Unbewusst bei Plotin', (1960), 343–90 and for a short but incisive note on Plotinian terms regarding consciousness, see H. Van Zandt Cobb, 'The Concept of Consciousness in Plotinus', (1938), p.xxxii. More recently, see R. E. Aquila, 'On Plotinus and the "Togetherness" of Consciousness', (1992), 7–32.

[15] For the effects of magic on the *spoudaios*, see Armstrong, 'Plotinus', in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, 207–8, and in general, Armstrong, 'Was Plotinus a Magician?' (1955–6), 73–9. One can also consult E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, (1951), 286–9.

not fearing them is shameful, e.g. loss of reputation' (*EN* 1115ᵃ10–13). Indeed the linguistic parallel in the listing of *ἀδοξίαν*, *πενίαν*, and *νόσον* here may well suggest that Plotinus had this particular passage in mind. Cicero's *Tusc. Disp.* 5. 88–9 demonstrates clearly that neither Epicurus, nor the Stoics, is the focus of Plotinus' attention here.

5. 6–7 καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολυθρυλλήτους αὖ μάλιστα Πριαμικὰς τύχας *and especially the much talked about fortunes of Priam*: References to the fate of Priam can be found in Aristotle's *EN* at 1100ᵃ8 and 1101ᵃ8, as is noted by H/S[2], Armstrong, Llorens, and B/T. Bréhier, too, observes that Priam's fate was the classic Aristotelian concern regarding the invulnerability of the *eudaimōn*. B/T and H/S[2] also mention *SVF* iii. 585 where we find: *οἱ Στωϊκοὶ εὐδαίμονα λέγουσι τὸν τὰς Πριαμικὰς συμφορὰς ὑπόμενοντα* 'The Stoics say that the *eudaimōn* survives the misfortunes of Priam'.[16]

Priam's fate was, as an old man, to see his city, Troy, sacked by the Greeks. Many of his sons were killed in the war, notably Hektor by Achilles. Priam then had to ransom back the mutilated body of Hektor, and was himself, killed by Neoptolemus, the son of Achilles. The fate of Priam was often used in arguments in antiquity as an example of how disasters can arrive even at a late stage in life and jeopardize even the *eudaimonia* of the *spoudaios*. See Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 1. 85 and Nussbaum,[17] where Aristotle's use of Priam's fate in the *EN* is examined in detail.

The Stoics classed the misfortunes of Priam as unpreferred indifferents, and argued that such things could not disturb the *eudaimonia* of the Stoic sage. See Seneca, *De Vita Beata* 4. 2, 4. 5, 5. 3; Epictetus, *Disc.* 2. 23. 19–20; Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 4. 39; DL 7. 127; and Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 5. 41. In the *Tusculan Disputations* Cicero is keen to accept this Stoic doctrine but the common sense of Aristotle's critique forces him to admit: ex eo libro, quem ad me accuratissime scripsisti, . . . virtutem ad beate vivendum se ipsa esse contentam . . .

[16] The same concern is mentioned again by Aristotle in *EN* 1153ᵇ19–21: *οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλαις περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ᾖ ἀγαθός, ἢ ἑκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν* 'Those who claim that the man being broken on the wheel and engulfed by great misfortunes is happy, provided he is a good character, are talking nonsense whether they mean to or not.' See also *EN* 1176ᵃ35.

[17] Nussbaum, *Fragility of Goodness*, 328–32.

Equidem eos casus, in quibus me fortuna vehementer exercuit, mecum ipse considerans huic incipio sententiae diffidere interdum et humani generis imbecillitatem fragilitatemque extimescere 'for from the book you have written with such sedulous care and dedicated to me ... I have realised the strength of your conviction that virtue is self-sufficient for the happy life ... for my part, when I consider with myself the hazards in which fortune has tried me so severely, there are moments when I begin to lose confidence in this opinion of yours and feel exceeding fear of the weakness and frailty of mankind' (5. 1–4, King trans.). The difficulties of ill-fortune are considered by Cicero at the beginning of ch. 5, in his discussions at Tusculum. Indeed the subject matter there is strikingly similar to what we find here.[18] The speaker, represented by Atticus in the discussion, is attacking the Stoic viewpoint from a Peripatetic stance.[19]

Once again this Aristotelian objection is more effective against Stoic than Plotinian ethics. The Plotinian response to the fate of Priam is to be found in chs. 7 and 13, where it is the removal of *eudaimonia* to a higher metaphysical level, which enables Plotinus to argue that misfortunes, regardless of their severity, do not touch the real man.[20] In general, see *Ennead* I. 1 [53] for a fuller explanation.

5. 7–9 ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ . . . τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον εἶναι *for even if . . . something one wants*: This is integral to the Aristotelian view of *eudaimonia,*

[18] Nam etiam in tormentis recte, honeste, laudabiliter et ob eam rem bene vivi potest, dum modo intelligas quid nunc dicam bene; dico enim constanter, graviter, sapienter, fortiter: haec etiam in eculeum coniiciuntur, quo vita non aspirat beata. 'For even in torture a man can live rightly, honourably, praiseworthily and for that reason lead a good life, provided only you understand the sense in which I now use the term good; for I mean living consistently, with dignity, wisdom, courage: these qualities too are thrown along with their possessor on the rack, and for that the happy life has no ambition' (5. 12–13, King trans.).

[19] With regard to Cicero's sources here M. Grant suggests that: 'He (Cicero) quotes the Peripatetic Dicaearchus, Aristotle's pupil (1.10.21) and notes that on 29 May, 45 BC he was asking Atticus for some of Dicaearchus' works' (*Cicero: On the Good Life*, (1971), 49).

[20] τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, ὃ συνὸν ἑαυτῷ, ἕως ἂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνῇ, οὐκ ἀπολελείψεται τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅλου θέας 'and there is another which, even while it is compelled to accompany that which suffers pain, remains in its own company and will not fall short of the vision of the universal good' (ch. 13. 10–12).

see *EN* 1111^{b}28 and 1113^{a}15 ff. H/S^{2} and B/T refer to further supporting evidence from Alexander of Aphrodisias in *De Anima*, Suppl. Aristotle ii. 1. 159. 18, and Linguiti also correctly notes 162. 16–18. What needs to be made clear is that Plotinus is using *ἡ βούλησις* in an Aristotelian manner, that is, to mean simply 'wish' or 'want'. Plotinus is presenting a Peripatetic objection that he will refute in the next chapter. In Aristotle, *ἡ βούλησις* tends to operate with bodily faculties, such as appetite (*ἡ γὰρ βούλησις ὄρεξις*), *De Anima* 433^{a}24. See also 414^{b}2–3 where appetite is said to consist of *ἡ βούλησις*, among other things.

In ch. 6, however, Plotinus will talk about *ἡ βούλησις* in a radically different way. There Plotinus clearly means something much stronger than 'wish' or 'want'; he is undoubtedly referring to what we would term 'the will'. *ἡ βούλησις* there is tied to the pursuit of *eudaimonia,* and those who employ it with regard simply to the presence or absence of goods, will be accused of misapplying it (6. 19–21). See comm. on ch. 6. 14.

5. 10–11 *μὴ συναριθμεῖσθαι δ' αὐτοῦ τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὴν σώματος φύσιν* *without adding to his substance the nature of body*: The objections continue, and it is clear that they are essentially Aristotelian. See *EN* 1178^{b}33–5 where we are told: *Δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτος εὐμηρίας ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντι· οὐ γὰρ αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τροφὴν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν ὑπάρχειν* 'But the one who is happy will also need external prosperity, in so far as he is human; for human nature is not self-sufficient for the purposes of reflection, but needs bodily health too, and the availability of nourishment and other kinds of servicing'. See also *EN* 1178^{a}25 ff.; *De Anima* 408^{b}13–15, 413^{a}4–5, and 414^{a}20 ff. More extreme views are to found among Aristotle's followers, Dicaearchus, Aristoxenus, and Strato.[21] See also Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 1. 51–2. H/S^{2} in their *fontes addendi* in vol. iii see a reference to the Pythagoreans here, and refer to Ps.-Archytas fr. 46 Nolle = p. 11. 4–5 Thesleff in Stobaeus, *Anthology* iii. 1. 112, pp. 61.20–62.2 where we find: *ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος οὐχ ἁ*

[21] Dicaearchus, fr. 7–12 Wehrli; Aristoxenus fr. 118–21 in Fragments, ed. F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles*, 10. vols. (Basel, 1944–59). I owe these references to P. Merlan, 'Greek Philosophy from Plato to Plotinus', in Armstrong, *Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, 111.

ψυχὰ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σῶμα· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ζῷον, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοιούτων ἄνθρωπος 'For man is not soul alone, but also body. The living being is from a compound, and man is from such things'.[22]

5. 12 *αἱ τοῦ σώματος πείσεις* *the affections of the body*: B/T highlight a verbal parallel in Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 7. 55. 2, *τὰς σωματικὰς πείσεις*. The phrase there is being employed to help defend the invulnerability of reason against passion, the essential Stoic position now being criticized by the Peripatetics. See also *Ennead* I. 1 [53] 4. 17, where Plotinus makes his view clear: *οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο οὖν πείσεται τὰ σώματος πάθη, ὅτι διαπέπλεκται* 'this sort of interweaving will not make it [the soul] subject to the affections of the body'.

5. 14–16 *ἡδονῆς δὲ συναριθμουμένης . . . γίγνοιτο;* *But when pleasure is counted . . . is a* spoudaios?: The issue of pleasure as part of the good life will be taken up in ch. 12. Plotinus does believe that pleasure has a part to play in the life of the *spoudaios*. Although he is critical of Aristotle's belief in the essential interconnectedness of body and soul, he does seem to have been influenced by the Aristotelian idea that pleasure in the good life follows on when we attain to our highest level of being. At *EN* 1174^{b}31–3 we find: *τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα* 'Pleasure completes the activity not in the way the disposition present in the subject completes it, but as a sort of supervenient end, like the bloom of manhood on those in their prime'.

Plotinus fundamentally disagrees with the opinion of Epicurus that pleasures of the body have any part to play in the good life.[23] In ch. 12, he will dismiss brusquely the Epicurean view of bodily pleasure, and, yet, in accordance with his methodology, in the same chapter, he will make use of their hierarchy of kinetic and katastematic pleasures.[24] In Stoicism, in some texts (*SVF* iii. 443–5), pleasure

[22] For a good assessment of the relationship between body and soul, see A. M. N. Rich, 'Body and Soul in the Philosophy of Plotinus' (1963), 1–15 and more recently, S. Clark, 'Plotinus: Body and Soul', in L.P. Gerson, (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus*, Gerson, (1996), 275–91. To see how Plotinus views the meeting of body and soul, see K. Corrigan, 'Body's Approach to Soul: An Examination of a Recurrent Theme in the *Enneads*', (1985), 37–52.

[23] Usener 409, 70, which is Athenaeus 546F (L/S 21M).

[24] B/T suggest here that Epicurus' writings were no longer a consideration for Plotinus.

is to be eradicated totally from the good life, and even if the sage does feel pleasure, and as a human being it would at some point be difficult for him not to, he must treat it as a matter of indifference (*SVF* iii. 117 and 115).[25] See ch. 12 where pleasure and its relationship to *eudaimonia* is examined in some detail.

5. 16–24 Ἀλλὰ θεοῖς μὲν ... πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔχειν *For such a state ... with regard to* eudaimonia: The chapter finishes with a recognized Aristotelian position regarding the nature of human beings. Body must not be dismissed from the equation; its concerns must also be addressed. If we are to accept the testimony of Cicero, as noted by Dillon,[26] this was also the view of the Old Academy in general, that is, of Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemon. It is certainly Aristotle's position in *EN* 1178^{b}6 ff., where he is considering *θεωρία* (contemplation) as co-extensive with *eudaimonia: τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει ... Δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐημερίας ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντι· οὐ γὰρ αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τροφὴν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν ὑπάρχειν* 'For the life of gods is blessedly happy throughout, while that of human beings is so to the extent that there belongs to it some kind of semblance of this sort of activity ... But the one who is happy will also need external prosperity, in so far as he is human; for human nature is not self-sufficient for the purposes of reflection, but needs bodily health too, and the availability of nourishment and other kinds of servicing' (1178^{b}26–7; 33–5). See also comm. on ch. 4. 2–4 where the same question is addressed. Harder cites relevant passages in Seneca, *Natural Questions* and Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 1. 66, and Llorens notes that the idea is to be found as far back as Homer, *Iliad*, 24. 525–33. To make ourselves like to God, of course, goes back to Plato, see *Phaedrus* 246d, 248a and *Theaetetus* 176a–c.

5. 18 χείρονος *a worse part*: See *Ennead* I. 1 [53] 9. 6–7 where we are told 'Evil is done when we are mastered by what is worse in us' (*ὑπὸ τοῦ χείρονος*). See also *Ennead* v. 3 [49] 3. 39 where it is equated with sense-perception (*χείρονος μὲν τῆς αἰσθήσεως*).

[25] See the excellent excursus on the relationship between pleasure and the good life in Epicurus and the Stoics in Van Riel, *Pleasure and the Good Life*, 79–93, to which I am indebted.

[26] Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 18.

5. 21 τὸ κρεῖττον *the better part*: Obviously the counterpart of *τοῦ χείρονος* in line 18. Its position in the text here has not gone unchallenged. Müller deleted it, while Bréhier bracketed it. I see no good reason to reject it here; indeed it reappears in ch. 6 and retains the same meaning there. *βελτίονος* in used in *Ennead* v. 3 [49] 3. 40.

5. 22–4 ἢ ἀπορρήξαντα δεῖ σῶμα . . . πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔχειν *Or it is necessary to cut away the body . . . with regard to* eudaimonia: This view would fly in the face of, not only Peripatetics, but also a number of other schools. B/T here refer to the views of Antiochus of Ascalon as presented by Cicero, especially *De Finibus* 5. 34, where we are told: Atqui perspicuum est hominem e corpore animoque constare 'Now it is clear that man consists of body and mind.' We have already stated that Cicero, most probably on the authority of Antiochus, considered the views of the Old Academy and the Lyceum to be basically the same on this topic. See above lines 16–24. B/T also refer to *De Finibus* 4. 16. In addition see the information collected by Dillon.[27]

CHAPTER 6

Ficino's chapter division here is justified. The material in this chapter is clearly a direct response to the content in ch. 5. That chapter presented a number of criticisms, which focused on the inability of the *spoudaios* to sustain his *eudaimonia* in the face of adversity. We identified these as essentially Peripatetic objections and suggested that they were most likely directed originally against Stoic opponents. Since ch. 5 presented these objections at length, and since, by and large, the remainder of this treatise is bound up with solutions to these problems, Plotinus obviously felt that they were important considerations of which he, too, was obliged to take account. As I noted in the preceding chapter, Armstrong[1] considered these problems and their solutions to be the main theme of this treatise. Ch. 6

[27] Ibid. 73 on Antiochus' ethics.

[1] See 'Plotinus', in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, 228.

responds to the Peripatetic objections by separating *eudaimonia* from the goods and necessities associated with the body. It explains why the *spoudaios* would prefer their presence, but it also makes clear that they are not part of the end at which he aims.

6. 1–7 ***Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν . . . ἠρίθμηται;*** *But if* . . . eudaimonia?: Plotinus responds directly to the questions he raised in the opening section of ch. 5. 1–8, which we recognized as Peripatetic in origin. His response is to point out that that bodily impediments, and external misfortunes, have no place in his account of *eudaimonia* for man. The *eudaimōn* resides in his higher soul and has no contact with the body. See ch. 14. 4–5 where we find: *τὸ δὲ καθόσον ἀξιοῦν τὸ ζῷον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι γελοῖον* 'It is ridiculous to maintain that *eudaimonia* extends as far as the living body' (adapted).

6. 1–3 ***Ἀλλ εἰ μὲν . . . ὁ λόγος*** *But if our account* . . . *disasters*: Although this is clearly a reference to Aristotle's position, a literal translation of these lines is misleading. Most commentators have translated *ἐν* literally: Armstrong, 'consist in'; Bréhier 'consistât à'. What Plotinus means, however, is something akin to *depend on*, because Aristotle certainly did not consider *eudaimonia* to consist in what Plotinus lists.[2] Aristotle never suggests that the *absence* of such impediments constitutes *eudaimonia*. In fact, in *EN* 1153^{b}24 he argues that excessive good fortune can be in itself an impediment to acquiring *eudaimonia*.

Plotinus begins by explaining that *eudaimonia* exists separately from body: absence of pain and illness do not constitute *eudaimonia*, nor can their presence destroy it. Although he would seem here to be responding directly to Peripatetic criticism, note that the idea that the absence of some thing positively constitutes some thing else is Epicurean: *ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις* 'The limit of pleasure is determined by the removal of all pain'.[3] Note too that *ἀλγεῖν* is specific Epicurean terminology.[4] It may well be that Plotinus has Epicureans in mind here also.

Plotinus acknowledges elsewhere, that on one level, the problems of pain and disease certainly seem real, and even the *spoudaios* must

[2] MacKenna accepts the need to widen the translation: 'Now if happiness did indeed *require* freedom from pain'.

[3] *Principal Doctrines* 3, *Epicurea*, ed. H. Usener (1887).

[4] See L/S 21C, 21D, 21E, 21I, and 21J.

account in some way for body,[5] but the *eudaimōn* has already escaped these evils, see *Ennead* I. 8 [51] 5. 21–30. The philosopher's return to *Nous* establishes *eudaimonia*, which is independent of the body.

6. 3 ἐδίδου ὁ λόγος *our account taught*: Plotinus uses the term ὁ λόγος quite frequently; its origin is to be found in Plato.[6]

6. 3–4 οὐκ ἦν τῶν ἐναντίων παρόντων εἶναι ὁντινοῦν εὐδαίμονα eudaimonia *would not be [possible], whenever any of these contraries was present*: Plotinian *eudaimonia* is of a different order from that of Aristotle, the Stoics, and Epicurus. Plotinus is set to explain by way of his many-tiered metaphysical structure why Aristotelian objections can be overruled, a route the Stoics could not travel with their one-level material reality. They, too, will find themselves the object of his criticism, see chapter 13. 8–10. The impediments listed above—ἀλγεῖν, νοσεῖν, δυστυχεῖν, and συμφοραῖς μεγάλαις περιπίπτειν concern Aristotle because they hamper the activity of the *spoudaios*. But, for Plotinus, the presence or absence of misfortune is of no consequence to the man who has integrated his real self into his higher soul. See *Ennead* IV. 3 [27] 16. 3 ff., where poverty, and sickness, and unjust punishments, are of no concern for the *spoudaios*.

6. 4–5 εἰ δ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κτήσει τοῦτο ἐστι κείμενον *But if this [*eudaimonia*] lies in possession of the true good*: This true good is what was referred to in ᾗ αὐτος αὐτῷ ὅπερ ἔχει of ch. 4. 18–19, as 'his own good'. We all have the potential for possession of this good. It is, as Plotinus has indicated on numerous occasions, within us (see the references in ch. 4. 18–19). Plotinus, however, seldom mentions that although we all have this potentially, only the philosopher can actually achieve possession of it. It was left to Porphyry[7] to draw attention to this in an explicit manner. As was pointed out before, St Ambrose

[5] λέγω δὲ ἡμῖν τῇ ἄλλῃ ψυχῇ, ἅτε καὶ τοῦ τοιοῦδε σώματος οὐκ ἀλλοτρίου, ἀλλ' ἡμῶν ὄντος· διὸ καὶ μέλει ἡμῖν αὐτοῦ ὡς ἡμῶν ὄντος . . . ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὸ κύριον, ἡμῶν δὴ ἄλλως ὅμως τοῦτο. διὸ καὶ ἡδομένου καὶ ἀλγοῦντος μέλει 'When I say "for us" I am referring to the other soul, since the qualified body does not belong to someone else, but it is ours, and so we are concerned with it because it belongs to us . . . "We ourselves" refers to the dominant and essential part of us; this body is in a different way ours, but ours all the same. So we are concerned with its pains and pleasures' (*Ennead* IV. 4 [28] 18. 10–16).

[6] See Heiser, *Logos and Language*, ch. 1.

[7] A. Smith, *Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition*, (1974), 71.

in his sermons often quoted directly from Plotinus without acknowledgement. Ch. 6. 1–5 is to be found, practically in its entirety, in *Jacob and the Happy Life*, 1. 7. 32, see Appendix 1.

6. 5–6 *τί δεῖ παρέντας τοῦτο . . . τὰ ἄλλα ζητεῖν* *why is it necessary to put it aside . . . to judge* eudaimonia: There has been some speculation regarding the order of the text here.[8] Plotinus emphasizes a point, one that he has just touched on in previous chapters. Ch. 4, in particular, laid the groundwork for the question now posed. It was stated there that *τὰ ἄλλα* were not part of the *eudaimōn* life, only being sought after for the body joined to the *spoudaios* (27). Ch. 5 examined *τὰ ἄλλα* in detail and dismissed them as constituents of *eudaimonia*. Ch. 6 now makes the point that we must look only to the *ἀληθινὸς ἀγαθός* in judging *eudaimonia*.

6. 7–10 *εἰ μὲν γὰρ συμφόρησις ἦν . . . παρεῖναι ζητεῖν* *For if it was a collection . . . these things present also*: Plotinus notes that if we are to accept Aristotle's criteria for achieving *eudaimonia*, we must necessarily include many things, which would in his view, certainly endanger the acquisition of *eudaimonia*. He probably has in mind here Aristotle's division of goods in *EN* 1098^{b}13–14.[9] Aristotle, it should be noted, did not create the three classes of goods, nor was he the first to

[8] Bréhier conjectures *οὐ πρὸς* in place of *τὸ πρὸς* and translates thus: 'Pourquoi, sans le prendre en considération, juger que l'homme heureux recherche des choses qui ne sont . . .'. This is a translation that certainly makes the best sense in the context. Harder rearranged the text more radically: *τί δεῖ ζητεῖν, παρέντας κρίνειν βλέποντας τοῦτο*. This radically alters the text, but does not, it seems to me, improve the sense. B/T returned to the more usual wording. Armstrong retains the orthodox text of H/S^2 and yet still emerges with Bréhier's translation! 'But if well-being is to be found in possession of the true good, why should we disregard this and omit to use it as a standard to which to look in judging well-being, and look for . . .'. Bréhier's gloss is very tempting, but I suggest that the text of H/S^2 does make sense as it stands, and so I have retained it. The sense here is that if we look towards the 'true good', then we must not assess the *eudaimōn* life in terms of other things.

[9] There Aristotle notes that goods have been divided into three classes: *τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα* 'with some said to be external, and others said to relate to soul and body'. At 19–20 Aristotle makes the division twofold as *τῶν ἐκτός* are now set beside *τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν* and seems to include *τῶν περὶ σῶμα*. Although Aristotle stresses the importance of *τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν*, he does consider the other goods to be indispensable, *τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον* 'and of the remaining goods, some are necessary [to happiness]' (*EN* 1099^{b}27–8).

insist that the three classes were necessary for *eudaimonia.* He states that the divisions had already been made, see *EN* 1098^b12.[10]

6. 10–13 εἰ δὲ τὸ τέλος . . . ἐγκολπίσασθαι *But if it is necessary . . . to grasp to itself*: The end which Plotinus has in mind is the return of the soul to its original home in *Nous.* For the process of purification see the commentary on ch. 8. 22 ff., where the first stage, the attainment of civic excellence, and the second stage, separation from the body, are described.

6. 10 εἰ δὲ τὸ τέλος ἕν τι εἶναι ἀλλ' οὐ πολλὰ δεῖ *But if it is necessary for the end to be a single thing and not many*: Plotinus stresses that the end is singular—in sharp contrast to the variety of goods and necessities listed by some of his predecessors. He emphasizes this again in line 31 below. See also chs. 7. 5 and 16. 13 where he warns: *τοῦτο οὖν δεῖ ἔχειν μόνον πρὸς τὸ τέλος* 'It is necessary to have this alone as the end.' Regarding *τὸ τέλος ἕν*, B/T refer us to *Comm. Not.* 26 (1071a), where Plutarch castigates the Stoics for having two goals or aims.[11] This was of course a much-discussed weak point in Stoic ethics and Plotinus has already made reference to it in ch. 3. 25 ff. A Stoic defence against this charge of dual ends is presented in Cicero's *De Finibus* 3. 22.[12] Despite the apparent similarity in the ethical theory of Plotinus and the Stoics, they too, now, come in for criticism, as Plotinus distances himself from their material-bound ontology.

[10] It is clear that the both the Old Academy (Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemon) and Aristotle shared the belief that external goods were necessary in some measure for *eudaimonia,* see *Fr.* 58 in L. Tarán (*Speusippus of Athens: A Critical Study with a Collection of the Related Texts and Commentary,* (1981), see also Dillon, *The Middle Platonists,* 18, 73–4).

[11] *παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστι δύο τέλη καὶ σκοποὺς προκεῖσθαι τοῦ βίου καὶ μὴ πάντων ὅσα πράττομεν ἐφ' ἕν τι γίγνεσθαι τὴν ἀναφοράν, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλόν ἐστι παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἄλλο μὲν εἶναι τέλος ἐπ' ἄλλο δὲ τῶν πραττομένων ἕκαστον ἀναφέρεσθαι. τούτων δ' αὐτοὺς ὑπομένειν ἀνάγκη θάτερον.* 'It is at odds with the common conception that life have two goals or aims set up for it and that the point of reference for all our actions be not some single thing, but it is still further at odds with the common conception that one thing be the goal and each particular action be referred to another. Yet in one of these alternatives they (the Stoics) must acquiesce' (Cherniss trans.).

[12] Sed ex hoc primum error tollendus est, ne quis sequi existimet ut duo sint ultima bonorum. Ut enim si cui propositum sit collineare hastam aliquo aut sagittam, sicut nos ultimum in bonis dicimus, sic illi facere omnia quae possit ut collineet: huic in eiusmodi similitudine omnia sint facienda ut collineet, et

6. 12 ***ἔσχατον*** *end point*: This term was used twice in chapter one to describe the *τέλος*. See lines 11 and 13 where I translated it as 'final point'. It is used here in the same way. B/T refer to *De Finibus* 3. 22 and emphasize Cicero's use of the Latin equivalent, *ultimum*, in describing the final good for the Stoics.

6. 13–23 ***ἡ δὲ ζήτησις αὕτη καὶ ἡ βούλησις. . . καὶ οὐ δήπου βουλητὸν τὸ τῆς ἐκκλίσεως τῆς τοιαύτης*** *This search and this willing ... but of course such avoidance is not the goal of the will*: A very important distinction is made here between *wishing* necessities in the material environment and *willing* the good for ourselves. This is what Plass[13] calls a 'distinction between non-environmental will (*boulēsis*) and environmental wish (*thelein*)'. Plass provides an excellently detailed commentary on these lines in the article just cited.[14] The idea that we can perform actions that we appear to want, but ultimately lead to that which we do not will, is to be found in Plato's *Gorgias*, which is in all likelihood the source of Plotinus' distinction here. See Plato, *Gorgias* 466a8–468e5.

6. 13–14 ***ἡ δὲ ζήτησις αὕτη καὶ ἡ βούλησις οὐχὶ τὸ μὴ ἐν τούτῳ εἶναι*** *This search and this willing are certainly not aimed at our being in this [state]*: The double negatives are intended to reinforce the idea that the *spoudaios* does *not* will to have goods and necessities present. Harder considered that *ἐν τούτῳ* referred to the material world (*in hoc mundo*), but, it seems to me, that it must refer to the

tamen, ut omnia faciat quo propositum assequatur, sit hoc quasi ultimum quale nos summum in vita bonum dicimus, illud autem ut feriat, quasi seligendum, non expetendum. 'It will be an error to infer that this view implies two Ultimate Goods. For though if a man were to make it his purpose to take a true aim with a spear or arrow at some mark, his ultimate end, corresponding to the ultimate good as we pronounce it, would be to do all that he could to aim straight: the man in this illustration would have to do everything to aim straight, and yet, although he did everything to attain his purpose, his "ultimate End", so to speak, would be what corresponded to what we call the Chief Good in the conduct of life, whereas the actual hitting of the mark would be in our phrase "to be chosen" but not "to be desired" ' (Rackham trans.).

[13] Plass, 'Plotinus' Ethical Theory', 251. Plass is correct here to distinguish between wish (*thelein*) and will (*boulēsis*), but it should be noted that Plotinus does not use these terms and their meanings consistently throughout the *Enneads*. See VI. 8 [39] 6. 1 ff.

[14] Ibid. 251–4.

combination of body and soul. The individual soul seeks to return to its original home in *Nous*, but this requires an act of will, if it is to remove itself from the combination (*τὸ συναμφότερον*).

6. 14 ἡ βούλησις *the will*: It is very difficult to define the exact nature of the 'will' in Plotinian philosophy. He does not confine himself to consistently fixed terminology.[15] The point being made here is that the will, used in its proper sense, is not concerned with bodily necessities but only with the good.[16] This point was made earlier in ch. 4. 17. What Plotinus means by will is something higher than discursive reasoning (*ὁ λογισμός*). As we shall see below, *ὁ λογισμός* is concerned with material necessities, while *ἡ βούλησις* is related more closely to *θεωρία*. *Ennead* vi. 8 [39] 6 helps clarify somewhat the nature of the Plotinian will.[17] *ἡ βούλησις*, then, is equivalent to the process whereby we rethink ourselves as *Nous*. It is a mental act; the will is the activity of *Nous*. Yet to will the good seems also to include a non-rational element. It is described in just such language in *Ennead* v. 5 [32] 4. 8: *χρὴ τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα ᾆξαι πρὸς ἕν*

[15] Leaving aside the term *boulēsis* altogether, C. H. Kahn notes the following: 'Plotinus, in his famous essay on "the will [*thelēma*] of the One", uses the terms "what is up to us" (to *eph hēmin*), "what is in one's own power" (*to autexousion*), and "what is free" (*to eleutheron*) as roughly interchangeable' ('Discovering the Will: From Aristotle to Augustine', in J. Dillon and A. A. Long (eds.), *The Question of Eclecticism* (1988), 251.

[16] As Plass explains: 'the former (will) is the driving force of true virtue and expresses its unity; in willing we 'are what we have' and seek no more because will embraces its object for its own sake', 'Plotinus' Ethical Theory', 251–2.

[17] *ὁ δὲ θεωρητικὸς νοῦς καὶ πρῶτος οὕτω τὸ ἐφ' αὑτῷ, ὅτι τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ μηδαμῶς ἐπ' ἄλλῳ, ἀλλὰ πᾶς ἐπέστραπται πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ κείμενος ἀνενδεὴς καὶ πλήρης ὑπάρχων καὶ οἷον κατὰ βούλησιν ζῶν· ἡ δὲ βούλησις ἡ νόησις, βούλησις δ' ἐλέχθη, ὅτι κατὰ νοῦν· ἡ γὰρ λεγομένη βούλησις τὸ κατὰ νοῦν μιμεῖται.* 'But the contemplative, that is the primary, *Nous* is what is in its own power in this way, that its work in no way depends on another, but it is all turned to itself and its work is itself and it rests in the Good, being without need and fulfilled, and, one might say living according to its will; but its will is its thought, but was called will, because it was to its mind; for what is called will imitates what is to its mind' (32–8, adapted). As Armstrong observes: 'The whole passage shows clearly how Plotinus, like other Greek philosophers, makes no sharp distinction between thinking and willing'. *Plotinus*, vol. vii, 245–6. See G. Leroux, *Plotin, Traité sur la liberté et la volonté de l'Un (Ennéade VI 8 [39])*, (1990).

'you must rush to One'. Below (17) ᾇξαι is replaced with ἔφεσις. This corresponds to the *leap* the soul made in its original descent due to its τόλμα 'daring', see *Ennead* v. 1. [10] 1. 4. On the non-rational and instinctive drive involved in this descent, see Rist.[18]

6. 14–15 ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ αὐτῇ φύσει *for these things [necessities] are not in it [the soul] by nature*: Plotinus is here speaking about the un-descended higher soul[19] (*Ennead* iv. 8 [6] 8. 2–3), the part of the soul which does not come down to body. The nature of this part of the soul is intellectual, and is not concerned with the affairs of the body listed in lines 1–3 of this chapter. See *Ennead* iv. 8 [6] 8. 13 ff. where this is explained again. When Plotinus speaks about the descended soul, it is a very different matter. Because this power of the soul has chosen to unite, in whatever degree, with body, then sickness and misfortune do belong to the nature of the composite: καὶ ἀνάγκη νοσεῖν σώματα ἔχουσι 'and men must fall sick if they have bodies' (*Ennead* iii. 2 [47] 5. 7).

6. 15–16 ὁ λογισμὸς *the reasoning faculty*: This is the faculty of discursive reasoning. It is the method of calculation for the soul in the world of sense-perception, a reflection of the non-discursive reasoning of *Nous*, which does not calculate (μηδὲ ἐκ λογισμοῦ), *Ennead* iv. 8 [6] 8. 15). ὁ λογισμός then, is responsible either for seeking or for avoiding necessities associated with the body. At *Ennead* i. 2 [19] 1. 17 we are told that it is concerned with practical wisdom: φρόνησιν μὲν περὶ τὸ λογιζόμενον 'practical wisdom ... has to do with discursive reasoning'. ὁ λογισμός is related to the middle soul, above the growth soul (ἡ φυτίκη), and below the higher soul, which remains in *Nous*. We saw just such a gradation in ch. 4. 6–8.

6. 15–16 φεύγει ὁ λογισμὸς ἀποικονομούμενος ἢ καὶ προσλαμβάνων ζητεῖ *the reasoning faculty seeks either to flee, trying to get rid of them, or it seeks to grasp them*: As Bréhier and B/T, followed by Llorens note, Plotinus now borrows the well-known Stoic theory of the preferred (προηγμένα). The Stoics regarded virtue (excellence) as

[18] J. M. Rist, 'Prohairesis: Proclus, Plotinus et Alii', (1960), 109 ff.

[19] αὐτῇ refers to the higher soul, and not just the soul in general, as is suggested by H/S^2 in their *apparatus criticus*.

the sole constituent of *eudaimonia*: DL 7. 89; Epictetus, *Disc.* 1. 4. 3; Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 5. 40–1; 2. 29, and *De Finibus* 3. 24–6. Things conventionally regarded as good and bad, such as wealth, health, and reputation, have no share in *eudaimonia,* and it is possible to be happy without them. They are to be labelled indifferents, see DL 7. 104–5. Yet some of these indifferents will be in accordance with the subject's nature (*κατὰ φύσιν*); others will not. Those in accordance with nature are termed *προηγμένα* and may be selected as having a relative value, although they in no way help constitute *eudaimonia.* Plotinus agrees with the Stoics that external goods and natural advantages are indifferents, and yet on occasions may be sought, see ch. 2. 35 ff. where he criticized the Stoics for not knowing *why* this is so.

Yet the theory of the *ἀδιάφορα* caused much criticism of the Stoics, and was generally regarded as the weak point in their ethics. If excellence is the only good, why pursue these indifferents at all? Some critics saw this as setting up more than a single *τέλος*, see Plutarch, *Comm. Not.* 1070f–1071e. Plotinus himself criticized this very idea a few lines above (11), and he will return to it at the close of this chapter. He thinks that he escapes the criticism levelled against the Stoics by indicating man's dual nature. See ch. 13 where he attacks the Stoics, in view of their one-level metaphysics, for arguing that a man could remain *eudaimōn* in the Bull of Phalaris. Yet, Plotinus obviously felt the need to justify the selection of natural advantages and external goods by reason; thus the long ch. 7 that follows is taken up with a detailed examination of these indifferents. His answer will be that they contribute to existence, not to *eudaimonia*, which remains on a higher hypostatic level.

6. 16 *ἀποικονομούμενος* *trying to get rid*: B/T refer to *Ennead* v. 9 [5] 1. 6. where this term is used again in the same context of avoiding what are mistakenly termed evils.

6. 17 *αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ ἔφεσις πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον αὐτῆς* *This longing [of the soul] is towards the better part of itself*: Plotinus is referring to the desire to become conscious in the higher part of the soul, which remains in *Nous.* This longing is satisfied through the will. See the comments on 6. 14 above.

6. 17 *τὸ κρεῖττον* *the better part*: In ch. 5. 21 *τὸ κρεῖττον* was contrasted with *τὸ χεῖρον*. It seems to me that *τὸ κρεῖττον* has a technical usage in Plotinus. In many places it refers specifically to the

higher part of the soul, which remains in *Nous*, and not simply to anything better in general, which is the impression one might get from some translations.[20] For *τὸ κρεῖττον* having this explicit meaning of the higher part of the soul, see *Ennead* IV. 3 [27] 32. 6–9 where we find: *πρέπει δὲ τὴν μὲν χείρονα καὶ τῶν τῆς ἑτέρας ἐνεργημάτων ἐφίεσθαι τῆς μνήμης καὶ μάλιστα, ὅταν ἀστεία ᾖ καὶ αὐτή· γένοιτο γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀμείνων καὶ τῇ παιδεύσει τῇ παρὰ τῆς κρείττονος.* 'It is proper for the worse part of the soul to aspire to the activities of the memory of the higher soul, especially when it is of good quality itself: for a lower soul can be comparatively good from the beginning and can become so as a result of education by the higher soul' (adapted).[21] Note also that in *Ennead* III. 4 [15] 2. 10–11 it is because of *τὸ κρεῖττον* that we are human and not a lower life-form.

6. 17 *οὗ ἐγγενομένου* *and when this comes to be*: This occurs when the man has established himself in *Nous*, and wills this way of life in the highest part of his soul. Bodéüs suggests that the entire treatise is bent on highlighting the soul in this state.[22]

6. 18 *ἀποπεπλήρωται καὶ ἕστη* *it is filled up and at rest*: These are the characteristic features of the soul of the man who lives the *eudaimōn* life. See chapter 4, 20–22 and *Ennead* III. 8 [30] 6. 13–15, where these terms are used again to describe the higher soul returned to *Nous*.

6. 19–24 *τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων τι παρεῖναι οὐ βούλησις ἂν εἴη . . . τῆς ἐκκλίσεως τῆς τοιαύτης* *The presence of any of the necessities would not be a matter of will . . . of such avoidance*: H/S^2 refer to *EN* 1111^{b}26–8 where Aristotle states: *ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλος ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα, προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἁρμόζει· ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι* (lines 26–30) 'Further, wish is more for the end, whereas decision is about what forwards the end,

[20] Armstrong translates: 'towards that which is better than itself'. This should read 'towards that which is better *in* itself'. MacKenna is closer to the mark with 'towards the soul's own highest and noblest' as is Bréhier with 'tend à une réalité, superieure à l'âme'.

[21] See also *Ennead* I. 1 [53] 13. 6; III. 4 [15] 2. 7; III. 4 [15] 2. 10; III. 5 [50] 8. 12; III. 5 [50] 9. 1; IV. 7 [2] 4. 5; IV. 7 [2] 8^3. 21; VI. 9 [9] 2. 39.

[22] Bodéüs, 'L'Autre homme de Plotin', 257.

as e.g. we wish to be healthy, whereas we decide on the things through which we shall be healthy, and we wish to be happy, and say that we wish it, whereas it is out of keeping to say "we decide to be happy"; for generally decision appears to be about things that depend on us.' It seems to me that Aristotle is striving here to make the very distinction concerning the will that Plotinus is trying to present. Aristotle is attempting to make distinctions in his terminology. *ἡ βούλησις* is reserved for selection of the end, while *ἡ προαίρεσις* is restricted to choice of the means.[23] Plotinus criticizes Aristotle not because *ἡ βούλησις* is used with regard to the end, for this is what Plotinus too wants to do. Aristotle is criticized because he considers that the end includes elements such as health, and wealth, which Plotinus categorizes as necessities, but not goods. Thus Aristotle is guilty of using *ἡ βούλησις* with regard to necessities, which Plotinus does not accept. You must not will necessities he tells us. The point being made by Plotinus is well formulated by Plass.[24]

6. 20 κυρίως … ἀλλὰ μὴ καταχρώμενος *properly … and not misuse it*: Will in its rightful sense can be directed only to the good for man. Bouillet refers to *Ennead* VI. 8 in a somewhat loose manner, whereas B/T direct us more specifically, but misleadingly, to *Ennead* VI. 8 [39] 6. 27 where we find: *καὶ αὕτη ἡ βούλησις ἡ κυρία καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς οὖσα* 'and the will which has the mastery and is independent'. There are two different meanings involved. *κυρίως* here (6. 20) must mean 'properly', but at VI. 8 [39] 6. 27, the reference is to its more common meaning of 'authoritatively'. The will is misused, in Plotinus' opinion, when it is used with regard to goods and necessities for the body.

6. 23 τῆς ἐκκλίσεως *avoidance*: Note also *ἐκκλίνομεν* in line 22, and *ἐκκλίσεως* again in line 24. It was suggested above that Plotinus had borrowed the Stoic theory of the preferred (16). The use of *ἐκκλίσεως* here supports that theory. See Plutarch, *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* 1034e. See also *Ennead* I. 8 [51] 15. 6–7, where Plotinus uses this term again in the same context, contrasting it with *ἡ ὄρεξις* 'aim' or 'desire'.

[23] For a good analysis of the will from Aristotle to Augustine, see Kahn, 'Discovering the Will', 234–59. One will not find in Greek philosophy the modern notion of the will.

[24] '[W]e do not will to avoid evils (though we wish to do so), rather we will not to have to avoid them (i.e. we will to be safe in Mind)' (Plass, 'Plotinus' Ethical Theory', 252, and see 258 n. 18).

6. 24–30 ***μαρτυρεῖ . . . φάσκειν εἶναι*** *And these things . . . but not goods*: Why necessities, such as health, are not to be counted as part of *eudaimonia,* is now explained in greater detail. Again this may not be directed solely against Aristotle, but at any school that considered health or freedom from pain to be goods.

6. 29–32 ***εὔλογον ἀναγκαῖα . . . ἀκέραιον τὸ τέλος τηρητέον*** *it is sensible to consider [these things] necessities . . . the end must be kept intact*: B/T refer to Cicero, *Republic* 1. 27, where it is also pointed out that necessities ought not to be confused with goods; Cicero's source is, almost certainly, the Stoic Panaetius. Plotinus returns to a point that he made as early as line 5 of this chapter. *Eudaimonia* is to be found in the true good, and this is the single end that must be sought.

CHAPTER 7

In ch. 6, when discussing external goods, Plotinus declared that we do sometimes seek to acquire them even though they are not of our essential nature (6. 14–17). We saw that the Stoics too favoured such a theory, and as a result were strongly criticized for seeking what is beneficial according to nature (*κατὰ φύσιν*), and then excluding such things from the end (*τὸ τέλος*). Plotinus obviously felt the need to defend his own position, and thus the opening section of this chapter (lines 1–14) explains in detail why necessities may be sought for the composite (*τὸ συναμφότερον*), without endangering the *eudaimonia* of the *spoudaios.* Neither necessities, nor misfortunes, will add to, or detract from, a man's *eudaimonia*, which is lived on a higher ontological level. The remainder of the chapter (lines 14–47) consists of a response to an Aristotelian query regarding the impact of major misfortunes, as opposed to small pieces of bad luck. Plotinus here demonstrates that the *spoudaios* views matters *sub specie aeternitatis,* understanding the unimportance of misfortune, regardless of its extent, and is dismissive of the significance of power or prestige.

7. 1–2 ***Διὰ τί οὖν. . . ἀπωθεῖται;*** *Why, therefore, . . . opposites*: Like chs. 1 and 5, ch. 7 begins in an interrogative manner. Marsilio Ficino's

division of material here is once again questionable, as Plotinus simply continues his discussion concerning necessities for the body. Plotinus begins at once to address the issue. If necessities make no addition to *eudaimonia*, then the wish to acquire them needs to be examined. This question is surely prompted by the criticism that was levelled against the Stoics when they argued that excellence was the only good, and yet, advised that we should also select the primary things according to nature (τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν). *See Cicero, De Finibus* 3. 22. If the primary things are not to form part of the final good, then why select them? For criticism of the Stoics along these lines see Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1070f–1071e (L/S 64C); Cicero, *De Finibus* 4. 26–39 (L/S 64K), 4. 78 (L/S 64L), and Galen, *On Hippocrates' and Plato's Doctrines* 5. 6. 10–14 (L/S 64I).

7. 1 ἐθέλει *wish*: Note the use of this particular verb. Plotinus made clear in the previous chapter that while *eudaimonia* must be willed, necessities are merely wished for.

7. 2–8 ἢ φήσομεν . . . κἀκείνου ὄντος *We will say . . . also exist beside it*: In this passage Plotinus attempts to distance himself from the Stoics and explain *why* we should seek some things and avoid others. Note the direct force of φήσομεν. Plotinus concedes that necessities have no value whatsoever for the *eudaimonia* of the *spoudaios*.[1] They do, however, contribute to his existence. They have a value for the body–soul compound on the sensory level.[2] As materialists, with their one-level reality, the Stoics had difficulty in explaining their seeking after things of relative value only to dismiss them from the final good. Plotinus sees his differing levels of reality as a solution to

[1] ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν οὐ ποιεῖ προσθήκην πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐδ' αὖ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν ἀφαιρεῖ τοῦ κακοῦ τοῦ ἐν φαύλοις, τί διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως; 'But if what is according to nature brings no addition to *eudaimonia*, nor, correspondingly, does that which is contrary to nature take any thing away of the evil which is in the bad, what does it matter if it is this way or that?' (*Ennead* III. 2 [47] 6. 5–8).

[2] As R. T. Wallis observes: 'Similarly a modicum of external goods will certainly contribute to the preservation and harmony of man's lower nature (*Ennead* I.4.7.1–8), (though an excess of them will prove a hindrance, *Ennead* I.4.14.9–11). Hence the sage will normally give the body what it needs, for instance, to preserve its health, but, once again, without identifying himself with his lower nature (*Ennead* I.4.4.25–30, 16.13–29)', *Neoplatonism*, (1972), 83.

this problem. St Ambrose too echoes this passage in *Jacob and the Happy Life* 1. 8. 34 (see Appendix 1).

7. 2–3 **ἢ φήσομεν . . . ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸ εἶναι** *We will say . . . but rather to his existence*: Here the important distinction is made between life lived in its fullest in *Nous*, and life by degree, diminishing the further we proceed from *Nous*. Necessities for the body–soul compound are necessities for something that enjoys life only on a low ontological level. This body–soul compound has attached itself to real being, which is life at its fullest, see *Ennead* I. 1 [53] 12. 14 ff. External advantages may help towards existence, but they have no value for the real self of the philosopher, which occupies the realm of real being wherein lies his *eudaimonia*.

7. 4 **τὰ δ ἐναντία τούτων ἢ πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι** *[He avoids] the opposite of these [necessities] either because [they contribute] towards his non-existence*: *Prima facie* this view seems difficult to reconcile with Plotinus' general teaching on *eudaimonia* as presented in chs. 3, 4, and 5. Here we are discussing ὁ εὐδαιμῶν, someone in possession of *eudaimonia*. We are told that the *eudaimōn* avoids natural disadvantages because they help towards the death of the body. But why should he do this? If he is now living fully in *Nous* (which he must be if he is *eudaimōn*), why should he attempt to preserve the life of the body? There seems to be no specific answer to this in the *Enneads*. But we do find the following at *Ennead* I. 9 [16] 1. 15–19: καὶ εἰ εἱμαρμένος χρόνος ὁ δοθεὶς ἑκάστῳ, πρὸ τούτου οὐκ εὐτυχές, εἰ μή, ὥσπερ φαμέν, ἀναγκαῖον. εἰ δέ, οἷος ἕκαστος ἔξεισι, ταύτην ἴσχει ἐκεῖ τάξιν, εἰς τὸ προκόπτειν οὔσης ἐπιδόσεως οὐκ ἐξακτέον. 'And if each man has a destined time allotted to him, it is not a good thing to go out before it, unless, as we maintain, it is necessary. And if each man's rank in the other world depends on his state when he goes out, one must not take out the soul as long as there is any possibility of progress.'[3] Yet one could argue here that no further progress can be possible for the *spoudaios*, since *eudaimonia* is an absolute and cannot be qualified. Plotinus himself, according to Porphyry, paid scant attention to his body, see *VP* 2. 1–16. See also ch. 14. 19–20, where the *spoudaios* extinguishes his bodily advantages by neglect.

[3] Note Plato's *Phaedo* 62b1 ff., where we find the injunction that the soldier should not desert his post. This would seem to have carried its influence right through to Plotinus.

We are also told at *Ennead* II. 1 [40] 4. 32–3 that if body ceased to exist, soul would not be distressed. As we shall see from the note directly following this, Plotinus does explain why the *spoudaios* ought to avoid bodily disadvantages, which might cause distress, but why the *spoudaios* would avoid death of the body is not made clear in the *Enneads*. See below, lines 43–5 on legitimate suicide, and in general *Ennead* I. 9 [16]. See also Appendix 2.

7. 4–8 ἢ ὅτι ἐνοχλεῖ τῷ τέλει παρόντα . . . ἔστι δ᾽ ὅμως κἀκείνου ὄντος *or because being present they disturb the end* . . . *but nevertheless also exist beside it*: It is very important that we make complete sense of this passage. Plotinus is arguing that the sage should avoid bodily disadvantages. He should avoid them even though they can have no effect on his *eudaimonia*, which as we saw in ch. 4, exists on a higher ontological level. He should avoid them not because they can impinge on his *eudaimonia*, but because, on the empirical level, they can impinge on his consciousness of that *eudaimonia*. In the Plotinian metaphysical structure, images that converge in the area of empirical consciousness come from two different sources, from *Nous* and from the sensory world.[4] If pain, taking a specific bodily disadvantage, becomes too intense, the images from sense-perception will dominate, and disturb consciousness of intellectual activity in *Nous* i.e. consciousness of *eudaimonia*. Indeed if the pain becomes too intense, consciousness of *eudaimonia* at the empirical level may disappear altogether, although his *eudaimonia* will remain intact, as is pointed out in chs. 9 and 10. The point being made here is that the *spoudaios* wishes to contemplate *Nous* alone. This is also made clear in ch. 14. 21–6. The *spoudaios* does not want to be conscious of body; therefore the more care he takes of it the fewer reasons it will have to make demands on him.

7. 8–10 ὅλως δὲ οὐκ . . . τι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας *But, in general,* . . . *anything of his* eudaimonia: The point is stressed throughout the remainder of this treatise. *Eudaimonia* is established when the *spoudaios* lives fully again in the higher part of his soul, which has remained in *Nous*. *Eudaimonia*, once established, is outside time and place, in the eternity of *Nous*. Whatever else may happen to the *spoudaios*, that is, whatever may befall the combination of body and

[4] See Atkinson, Ennead *V.1*, 245. See also *Ennead* IV. 3 [27] 30. 13–16.

soul (*τὸ συναμφότερον*), his *eudaimonia* cannot be disturbed, only his consciousness of it on the empirical level. The effect of circumstances on the *spoudaios* was obviously a bone of contention among the various philosophical schools and Plotinus devotes twelve of the sixteen chapters in this treatise to spelling out in detail why the *eudaimonia* of the *spoudaios* is not subject to change.

7. 10–14 ***ἢ οὕτω γε . . . τοῦ παρόντος τέλους αὐτῷ*** *or therefore . . . the end which is present to him*: This would seem to be directed mostly against Aristotle. External prosperity was a reasonably significant constituent of Aristotle's concept of *eudaimonia,* see *EN* $1099^{a}31$–$1099^{b}6$.[5] The Stoics, however, were in agreement with Plotinus on this: external fortunes were of no consequence to the sage. See Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 7. 27, and Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 5. 40–1, but the Stoics, too, will be criticized for not explaining properly, in metaphysical terms, why this is so. See ch. 13. 9–13.

7. 11 ***οἷον εἰ καὶ παῖδα ἀποβάλλοι . . . τοῦ παρόντος τέλους αὐτῷ*** *for example, if he should lose a slave-boy . . . the end which is present to him*: On this matter B/T refer to Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 9. 40. 9, where we are warned not to bother with such prayers as *πῶς μὴ ἀποβάλω τὸ τεκνίον* 'How may I not lose my little child?' B/T obviously felt that *παῖδα* here meant child as did MacKenna, Bréhier, and Bouillet. Armstrong and Igal favour servant. It is not possible to be certain, but I would suggest that the word taken in context should

[5] *φαίνεται δ' ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη, καθάπερ εἴπομεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, δὶα φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως· ἐνίων δὲ τητώμενοι ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας εὐτεκνίας κάλλους· οὐ πάνυ γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν παναίσχης ἢ δυσγενὴς ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος, ἔτι δ' ἴσως ἧττον, εἴ τῳ πάγκακοι παῖδες εἶεν ἢ φίλοι, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες τεθνᾶσιν.* 'Nevertheless it (*eudaimonia*) clearly also requires external goods in addition, as we have said; for it is impossible, or not easy, to perform fine actions if one is without resources. For in the first place many things are done by means of friends, or wealth, or political power, as if by means of tools; and then again, there are some things the lack of which is like a stain on happiness, things like good birth, being blessed in one's children, beauty; for the person who is extremely ugly, or of low birth, or on his own without children is someone we would not be altogether inclined to call happy, and even less inclined, presumably, if someone had totally depraved children or friends, or ones who were good but dead.' See also *EN* $1099^{b}28$–9, $1153^{b}17$–19, $1178^{b}33$ ff.; *Rhetoric* $1360^{b}5$–$1360^{b}34$; and *Politics* $1323^{b}1$ ff.

be rendered slave-boy. Plotinus is discussing the loss of possessions, and to list a slave-boy as a possession would be quite acceptable, but to place the loss of a child in this company would seem unnecessarily harsh. The casualness introduced by ἤ would seem to me to confirm that he is referring to a servant.

Notice too the passage from Aristotle (*EN* 1099^{a}31–1099^{b}6) referred to in the commentary on 7. 10–14 above, and given in full in footnote 5. It seems likely to me that the sentiments expressed here by Plotinus are a fairly direct response to what Aristotle has to say there. Other evidence to suggest that this passage in Aristotle was familiar to Plotinus may be found in ch. 15, where more of what Aristotle lists here as impediments to *eudaimonia* are rejected by Plotinus. Plotinus' *spoudaios* does not have to overcome these difficulties; his ontological status shields him from them all. St Ambrose borrows again from Plotinus here; see Appendix 1.

7. 14 **ἀλλὰ τὰ μεγάλα, φασί, καὶ οὐ τὰ τυχόντα** *But [one must consider] great upheavals, they say, and not just minor incidents of bad luck*: *φασί* introduces Aristotelian objections. The remainder of the chapter is responding to this interjection. In *EN* 1100^{a}5 ff., we are referred to the disasters of Priam, and at *EN* 1101^{a}9–11 we are told specifically that the *eudaimonia* of the *spoudaios* will not be disturbed easily; it will endure many and severe disasters. See also *EN* 1100^{b}28–30.

7. 14–17 **τὶ δ' ἂν εἴη . . . ἐξηρτημένου;** *But what would be . . . things below?*: Plotinus' response to such Aristotelian concerns is based firmly on a generic view of existence. Naturally this metaphysic finds its origins in Plato: *ᾗι οὖν ὑπάρχει διανοίᾳ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας, οἷόν τε οἴει τούτῳ μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον* 'Do you think that a mind habituated to thoughts of grandeur and the contemplation of all time and all existence can deem this life of man a thing of great concern?' (*Republic* 486a8–10). Indeed this was a passage that influenced later writers. It is to be found practically verbatim in Marcus Aurelius' *Meditations* 7. 35. See also Longinus, *On the Sublime* 35 for its influence. As B/T have indicated, similar sentiments are expressed by Scipio in Cicero, *De Re Publica* 1. 26, and in *Tusc. Disp.* 4. 37.[6]

[6] [I]s est beatus, cui nihil humanarum rerum aut intolerabile ad demittendum animum aut nimis laetabile ad efferendum videri potest. Quid enim videatur ei magnum in rebus humanis, cui aeternitas omnis totiusque mundi

7. 17–22 τὰς μὲν εὐτυχίας . . . ἡγήσεταί τι εἶναι μέγα; *he who does not think . . . something important?*: Note again the closeness of the Stoic and Plotinian ethical thought on this matter. Consider what Epictetus says: *τίνα δὲ καὶ λέγεις τὰ τηλικαῦτα; πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ ἀπωλείας πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατασκαφὰς πόλεων; καὶ τί μέγα ἔχει ταῦτα;* 'But what do you mean by "matters of such great import?" Wars and factions and deaths of many men and destruction of cities? And what is there great in all this?' (*Disc.* 1. 28. 14). See also 1. 28. 26–8. Indeed Graeser,[7] rightly in my opinion, refers to Plotinus' debt to Epictetus for this present passage and below (lines 31–3). We are told how we should react to such occurrences in *Ennead* III. 2 [47] 15. 43–7.[8] Why misfortunes should happen to the *spoudaios* is explained below at line 39.

7. 18 ἐὰν *however*: As the *Lexicon Plot.* demonstrates, *ἐὰν* when used in a relative clause in Plotinus is not conditional. Kirchhoff printed *ἂν* in his text and has been followed in this by Armstrong. H/S[2] retain *ἐὰν*, but note its non-conditional use here, referring also to a similar non-conditional usage in *Ennead* II. 2 [14] 1. 48. The *Lexicon Plot.* adds III. 2 [47] 16. 20, and IV. 8 [6] 3. 25.

7. 22–4 εἰ δὲ δὴ . . . ἡγούμενος *For if . . . a serious matter*: Kalligas notes the use of *νὴ Δία* for rhetorical purposes, but claims that it was already so colourless that it could be used by Josephus, *Against Apion* I. 255. He also refers to its use by Anaxagoras 59A33 (DK); DL 2. 55; and again by Plotinus in *Enneads* III. 1 [3] 7. 20, III. 2 [47] 3. 16, and V. 3 [49] 7. 13. All commentators have noted the effect that the stirring words of this passage had on St Augustine. We are told of the comfort

nota sit magnitudo? '[H]e is the happy man who can think no human occurrence insupportable to the point of dispiriting him, or unduly delight to the point of rousing him to ecstasy. For what can seem of moment in human occurrences to a man who keeps all eternity before his eyes and knows the vastness of the universe?' (*Tusc. Disp.* 4. 37, King trans.).

[7] A. Graeser, *Plotinus and the Stoics*, (1972), 82.

[8] *ὥσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν θεάτρων ταῖς σκηναῖς, οὕτω χρὴ καὶ τοὺς φόνους θεᾶσθαι καὶ πάντας θανάτους καὶ πόλεων ἁλώσεις καὶ ἁρπαγάς, μεταθέσεις πάντα καὶ μετασχηματίσεις καὶ θρήνων καὶ οἰμωγῶν ὑποκρίσεις.* 'We should be spectators of murders, and all deaths, and takings and sackings of cities, as if they were on the stages of theatres, all changes of scenery and costume and acted wailings and weepings.'

that the lines brought to him in his final days when the Vandals were besieging Hippo.[9] Plato, it seems likely, was the source of this way of thinking, see *Republic* 387d5–6, and 486b1–2. See also Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 5. 29, 7. 35, and Seneca, *Ep.* 78. 6.

7. 24–6 ᾧ φαμεν . . . μετὰ σώματος εἶναι *[this man] in whom . . . with the body*: This is further explained in the treatise which follows *Ennead* I. 4 [46] chronologically, III. 2 [47]. The best exposition is to be found in his final treatise 'On the Primal Good', *Ennead* I. 7 [54]. There in ch. 3, Plotinus explains in detail why death is better than life with the body.[10] Katz[11] notes the Epicurean tone in these sentiments concerning the nothingness of death, and Bouillet refers us to Herodotus I, 31. 3 where Solon notes, regarding the fortunes of Cleobis and Biton: *διέδεξέ τε ἐν τούτοισι ὁ θεὸς ὡς ἄμεινον εἴη ἀνθρώπῳ τεθνάναι μᾶλλον ἢ ζώειν* 'the god showed thereby how much better for man is death than life'.

7. 26–34 αὐτὸς δὲ εἰ τυθείη . . . ἑωρακώς; *If he himself should be offered . . . not having seen such a thing?*: The text here is structured so that we have five sentences beginning with *εἰ*, loosely tied to the main clause in 34–6. They are not, however, genuine conditionals, being

[9] [E]t se inter haec mala cuiusdam sapientis sententia consulobatur dicentis: Non erit magnus magnum putans, quod cadunt ligna et lapides et moriuntur mortales. 'In the midst of these evils he was comforted by the saying of a certain wise man: He is no great man who thinks it a great thing that sticks and stones should fall, and that men, who must die, should die' (Possidius, *Vita Augustini*, 28. 11, Brown trans.). Brown further refers to Pellegrino, *Possidio*, 226 n. 14, and *Augustine of Hippo*, (1967), 425–6.

[10] *εἰ δ' ἔστι ζωὴ καὶ ψυχὴ μετὰ θάνατον, ἤδη ἂν εἴη ἀγαθόν, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ἐνεργεῖ τὰ αὐτῆς ἄνευ σώματος . . . ἀλλ' εἰ ἀγαθὴ ἡ ζωή, πῶς ὁ θάνατος οὐ κακόν; ἢ ἀγαθὴ μὲν ἡ ζωὴ οἷς ἐστιν, ἀγαθὸν οὐ καθόσον σύνοδος, ἀλλ' ὅτι δι' ἀρετῆς ἀμύνεται τὸ κακόν· ὁ δὲ θάνατος μᾶλλον ἀγαθόν. ἢ λεκτέον αὐτὴν μὲν τὴν ἐν σώματι ζωὴν κακὸν παρ' αὐτῆς, τῇ δὲ ἀρετῇ ἐν ἀγαθῷ γίνεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ ζῶσαν τὸ σύνθετον, ἀλλ' ἤδη χωρίζουσαν ἑαυτήν.* 'But if life and soul exist after death, then there is good, in proportion as it pursues its proper activity better without the body . . . But if life is good, how can death not be an evil? Life is good to those for whom it is a good, not in so far as it is a union but because by virtue it keeps away evil; and death is a greater good. We must say that life in a body is an evil in itself, but the soul comes into good by its *virtue*, by not living the life of the compound but separating itself even now' (*Ennead* I. 7 [54] 3. 7–22).

[11] Katz, *Plotinus' Search for the Good*, 5.

structured rather in an interrogative manner. In terms of content, note a passage in Marcus Aurelius' *Meditations* 5. 33.[12] One reason why such things might happen to a man is given in *Ennead* III. 2 [47] 13. 11–15: *μὴ γὰρ δὴ κατὰ συντυχίαν δοῦλον μηδὲ αἰχμάλωτον ὡς ἔτυχε μηδὲ ὑβρισθῆναι εἰς σῶμα εἰκῇ, ἀλλ' ἦν ποτε ταῦτα ποιήσας, ἃ νῦν ἐστι πάσχων· καὶ μητέρα τις ἀνελὼν ὑπὸ παιδὸς ἀναιρεθήσεται γενόμενος γυνή, καὶ βιασάμενος γυναῖκα ἔσται, ἵνα βιασθῇ.* 'There is certainly no accident in a man's becoming a slave, nor is he taken prisoner in war by chance, nor is outrage done on his body without due cause, but he was once the doer of that which he now suffers; and a man who made away with his mother will be made away with by a son when he has become a woman, and one who has raped a woman will be a woman in order to be raped.' This idea is not often discussed in Plotinus and may be something borrowed from Plato, see *Phaedo* 81e–82b. It is a very primitive idea and it is difficult to say if either Plato or Plotinus meant it literally.

7. 27 **παρὰ βωμοῖς** *by the altars*: Bréhier sees this as a reference to the Epicurean habit of presenting the sacrifice of Iphigenia as an example of bad fortune. I suggest, however, that Priam's death is a more obvious choice. In ch. 5. 6–7 we have already had a direct reference to Priam's fate and see line 34 below.

7. 28 **ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ταφείη . . . σαπείη** *And if he should be unburied . . . the ground*: H/S[2] and Bouillet refer to Plutarch's *An vitiositas ad infelicitatem sufficiat* 3. 499d, and Bouillet notes that this is a reference to a saying of Theodorus of Cyrene (see below). B/T refer to Cicero's *Tusc. Disp.* 1. 102. We can see from this that none of the schools of philosophy really cared anything for the body after death. It was one of the few points of agreement. In *Tusc. Disp.* 1. 102 ff. Cicero quotes various opinions with regard to the burial of the body. The Cynic Theodorus' reply to King Lysimachus' threat, noted above,

[12] *ὅσον οὐδέπω σποδὸς ἢ σκελετός, καὶ ἤτοι ὄνομα ἢ οὐδὲ ὄνομα· τὸ δὲ ὄνομα ψόφος καὶ ἀπήχημα. τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πολυτίμητα κενὰ καὶ σαπρὰ καὶ μικρὰ καὶ κυνίδια διαδακνόμενα καὶ παιδία φιλόνεικα, γελῶντα, εἶτα εὐθὺς κλαίοντα.* 'In a short time, ashes or a bare anatomy, and either a name or not even a name; and if a name, then a sound and an echo. And all that is prized in life empty, rotten, and petty; puppies biting one another, little children quarrelling, laughing, and then soon crying.'

is found there: Theodori quidem nihil interest humane an sublime putescat 'it makes no difference to Theodorus whether he rots on the ground or in the air' (103, King trans.). Diogenes the Cynic's disregard for his body is mentioned, and Socrates' lack of concern for his body is also noted. See also Xenophon, *Mem.* 1. 2. 53–4, and Aristotle, *EE* 1235^{a}37 ff., who quotes Socrates' opinion about the uselessness of corpses. Kalligas notes disregard for the corpse in Epictetus, *Disc.* 4. 7. 31, and B/T further direct us to *SVF* iii. 751; Seneca, *Ep.* 92, 34; Epicurus, *Fr.* 578 (Usener), and Lucretius 3. 870 ff. St Ambrose borrows this passage also, see Appendix 1.

7. 31–2 ἀλλ' εἰ αἰχμάλωτος ἄγοιτο... εἰ μὴ εἴη εὐδαιμονεῖν *And if he should be led off as a captive ... if he cannot achieve* eudaimonia: I agree with Armstrong, and Dillon against Rist, that Plotinus is suggesting suicide here as a viable option.[13] But suicide in Plotinus requires desperate circumstances. Porphyry's own experience is evidence of this, see *VP* 11. 11–15 where Plotinus encourages Porphyry to resist his suicidal urge because it doesn't come from a rational disposition. See chs. 8. 5–9, and 16. 17–20, where the topic of suicide appears again, and see Appendix 2 where Plotinus' attitude to suicide is discussed in full.

In Epictetus, *Disc.* 1. 28. 26–7, being dragged off as a captive is listed as an imaginary evil: *ὅταν οὖν γυναῖκες ἄγωνται καὶ παιδία αἰχμαλωτίζηται καὶ ὅταν αὐτοὶ κατασφάζωνται, ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι κακά*; 'Then when women are driven off into captivity, and children are enslaved and when the men themselves are slaughtered, are not all these things evil?' The verbal similarity is impressive.[14]

7. 31–2 πάρ τοί ἐστιν ὁδὸς *the exit is there for him*: H/S^2 note *Iliad* 9. 43. Although the matter under discussion there is not death, but simply exit to ships, it is certainly not uncommon for Plotinus to quote out of context.

7. 32–6 εἰ δὲ οἰκεῖοι αὐτῷ αἰχμάλωτοι ... ἀλλ' ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη *And if his own relations should be enslaved ... That, indeed, would be absurd*: The point Plotinus begins to make here is dealt with extensively in

[13] See J. Dillon, 'Singing without an Instrument: Plotinus on Suicide', (1994), 231–8.

[14] See ch. 2 n. 4 where I have already noted Plotinus' obvious familiarity with Epictetus. See also Greaser, *Plotinus and the Stoics*, 82.

the treatises that follow I. 4 chronologically, that is III. 2 [47] and III. 3 [48]. The world of sense, although guided by Providence (III. 2 [47] 7. 34 ff.), produces events in a haphazard fashion because this is, after all, only a world of images. So the endless strife between humanity, nature, and other animals, is simply the work of actors on a stage (III. 2 [47] 15. 21–3), children's games (36), which have no effect on the real (inner) man (51–62). Plotinus emphasizes that, even if someone escaped terrors, to think that they could not occur would be foolish. H/S^2, Armstrong, and B/T again draw our attention to the *Iliad* 22. 65. H/S^2 add *Iliad* 22. 62 in their *fontes addendi*, where Priam recounts the abduction of his daughters and daughters-in-law by the Achaians.

7. 33 *νυοὶ* *daughters-in-law*: Bouillet notes that some MSS carry *υἱοί* (sons), which he prefers. Most commentators, however, retain *νυοὶ*. It is difficult to have any certainty on this matter, but I see no good reason to reject *νυοὶ*. I think it less likely that *υἱοί* would be dragged off, rather than killed on the spot. On allusions to Homer in Plotinus see Lamberton.[15]

7. 36–40 *οὐκ ἂν οὖν δοξάσειεν . . . ὥστε καὶ γινομένου* *Would he not think . . . as much as when it comes to pass*: On this see Plass.[16] The Stoics too believed that misfortunes to oneself, or others, did not disturb the sage's *eudaimonia*, see *SVF* iii. 585.

7. 40–2 *ἐνθυμοῖτο γὰρ ἂν . . . καὶ ἕπεσθαι χρή* *For he would understand . . . and one must accept it*: This is a topic which Plotinus took up and explained in more detail in *Enneads* III. 2 [47] and III. 3 [48]. He makes clear there that misfortunes may happen to good and bad alike, not because Providence does not extend to the earth, but because this world is simply an image, an imperfect reproduction of the realm of *Nous*, and we must not demand perfection in what is not perfect. See *Enneads* III. 2 [47] 7. 1–3 and III. 2 [47] 11. 5–6. We are told how to behave amid misfortune in III. 2 [47] 15. 43–53. The important point is made in III. 3 [48] 2. 1–3: *αἱ δὲ συντυχίαι οὐ κύριαι τοῦ εὖ, ἀκολουθοῦσι δὲ καὶ αὗται συμφώνως τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν καὶ ἴασιν ἀκολουθίᾳ ἐμπλεκεῖσαι* 'Chance circumstances are not responsible for the good life, but they, too, follow harmoniously on the causes

[15] R. Lamberton, *Homer the Theologian: Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and Growth of the Epic Tradition*, (1992), 83–108.

[16] Plass, 'Plotinus' Ethical Thought', 258 n. 19.

before them, and proceed woven into the chain of causation by so following.'

7. 41–2 **καὶ ἕπεσθαι χρή** *and one must accept it*: This was of course a vital element in Stoic philosophy. We find it as early as the teaching of Cleanthes: *ὡς ἕψομαί γ' ἄοκνος· ἢν δέ γε μὴ θέλω, κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι* 'I will follow without fear, even if I do not want to, being evil, nonetheless I will follow' (*SVF* i. 527). B/T note a passage in Marcus Aurelius: *καὶ ὅτι μόνῳ τῷ λογικῷ ζῴῳ δέδοται τὸ ἑκουσίως ἕπεσθαι τοῖς γινομένοις, τὸ δὲ ἕπεσθαι ψιλὸν πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον* 'and that to the rational creature only it is given to obey circumstances of his own will, while mere obedience is necessary for all' (*Meditations* 10. 28). See also Seneca, *De Vita Beata* 15. 5.

7. 42–3 **καὶ πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ ἄμεινον αἰχμάλωται γενόμενοι πράξουσι** *Indeed many people would do better becoming captives*: Presumably Plotinus means by this that some people will benefit if they are forced to live with very little so that they do not become enmeshed in the externals of the outer man. Intelligence and excellence are thus brought into play. See ch. 14. 21 ff. where we are told that experience of pain and illness benefits us. This idea is found also in *Ennead* III. 2 [47] 5. 15–21 and IV. 3 [27] 16. 21–2, where even suffering will be good for the *spoudaios.*

7. 43–5 **καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς δὲ βαρυνομένοις ἀπελθεῖν . . . αὐτοῖς αἴτιοι** *And if they find this burdensome, [it is possible for them] to exit; . . . that is their own fault*: Suicide was mentioned earlier in this chapter in lines 31–2. Bréhier considers that what is said here is a contradiction of what Plotinus said in an earlier treatise, *Ennead* I. 9. I do not think that this is so. Yet there certainly seems to be some tension in his thought on this matter. What Plotinus argues for here in this chapter (43–7) is suicide when there are certain impediments to *eudaimonia.* Nothing to contradict this is said in I. 9. There we are encouraged not to depart this life through disgust, grief, or anger (10–11), but only if it is necessary *ἀναγκαῖον* (17); this is further qualified: *εἰς τὸ προκόπτειν οὔσης ἐπιδόσεως οὐκ ἐξακτέον* 'as long as there is no possibility of progress' (18–19). Thus suicide is permissible when the subject can advance no further. In *Ennead* I. 9 [16] reasons for not going out of the body are presented forcefully, while I. 4 [46] 7 emphasizes more fully the subject's own ability to depart this life, yet the main thesis is unchanged: suicide is permissible when certain conditions prevail.

See comm. on chs 8. 8–9, 16. 17–19, and Appendix 2, where a more detailed analysis of Plotinus' views on suicide is presented.

7. 45–7 οὐ γὰρ δὴ . . . ἀναρτήσεται *For certainly not . . . fortune of others*: This should not suggest that the Plotinian *spoudaios* is uncaring, but only that his *eudaimonia* is such that the vicissitudes of the temporal world cannot disturb it; the misfortunes may come to himself or his relations or to other people.

CHAPTER 8

Chapter 7 considered the impact of general misfortunes on the *eudaimonia* of the *spoudaios*. Ch. 8 takes account of the more specific problem of pain, and how the *spoudaios* will deal with it. As he did in the previous chapter, Plotinus again examines how we should behave when not only ourselves, but others also, are involved. Suicide is again suggested as a viable option to extreme distress. In general Plotinus' response to the problem of pain is as it was in ch. 7: *eudaimonia* exists on an ontological level separate from that of body, and when the *spoudaios* establishes consciousness at that level of the higher soul, pain cannot affect him, but only the compound of soul and body.

8. 1–2 τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀλγηδόνων αὐτοῦ . . . ἐξοίσουσι *His own pains . . . will carry him off*: The specific problem of pain was first introduced in ch. 1.5. Ch. 8 begins in a similar manner starting with the problem of pain, and then moving directly to a consideration of a lack of consciousness in the *spoudaios*. Plotinus begins with a simple statement: the body can only bear so much pain, and when the pain becomes too great, the body dies. This insight is obviously not unique to Plotinus. For a similar view from the Stoics, see Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 7. 33.[1] H/S^2, and Armstrong refer to Epicurus *fr.* 447 (Usener) where much the same thing is said.

[1] There, however, *πόνος* is used not *ἡ ἀλγηδών*, but the meaning is the same: *περὶ πόνου· τὸ μὲν ἀφόρητον ἐξάγει· τὸ δὲ χρονίζον, φορητόν*. 'On pain: what we cannot bear removes us from life; what lasts can be borne' H/S and Armstrong refer to Epicurus *fr.* 447 (Usener): *οἱ μεγάλοι πόνοι συντόμως ἐξάγουσιν, οἱ δὲ χρόνιοι μέγεθος οὐκ ἔχουσιν*. 'Great pains shortly remove us from life, while long-lasting pains have no magnitude.' Boulliet also notes Seneca, *De Providentia* 3.

8. 2–5 οὐκ ἐλεεινὸς ἔσται < καὶ > ἐν τῷ ἀλγεῖν . . . ἐν πολλῇ ζάλῃ ἀνέμων καὶ χειμῶνι *But he will not be pitied even in his pain, . . . in a great tumult of wind and storm*: Armstrong, and H/S² suggest that there may be a reminiscence of Empedocles here and they cite *Fr.* B. 84 (H. Diels, and W. Kranz (eds.), *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 10th edn., Berlin, 1952), although Armstrong acknowledges that the context here is quite different: the storm lantern in Empedocles is only an analogy for the structure of the eye. H/S² also refer to Plato's *Republic* 496d5–9.[2] It should be noted though that Plotinus is discussing the inner and outer man while Plato is concerned with man and the activities of the world around him. Again H/S²' reference to Plato's *Timaeus* 43c3 is of no real help since it gives only a single linguistic similarity (ζάλη), in a context completely alien to what Plotinus is saying here. H/S² also refer to *EN* 1100ᵇ30–31 in their *fontes addendi.* B/T indicate an extended version of the lantern analogy in *Ennead* vi. 4 [22] 7. 22 ff. The passage, however, is not particularly helpful since it is primarily concerned with highlighting the undiminishing nature of the light although omnipresent in the body, while the analogy here is concerned with the tranquillity of the light in the lantern in spite of unfavourable external conditions. B/T provide a better reference in Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 12. 15.[3] Bréhier too comments on this passage, and refers to Seneca, *Ep.* 54. 5.[4] It may well be, then, that Plotinus borrowed the lantern analogy directly from the Stoics. As is noted by McHugh, this passage is also

[2] *ταῦτα πάντα λογισμῷ λαβών, ἡσυχίαν ἔχων καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττων, οἷον ἐν χειμῶνι κονιορτοῦ καὶ ζάλης ὑπὸ πνεύματος φερομένου ὑπὸ τειχίον ἀποστάς, ὁρῶν τοὺς ἄλλους καταπιμπλαμένους ἀνομίας* 'for all these reasons I say the philosopher remains quiet, minds his own affair, and, as it were, standing aside under shelter of a wall in a storm and blast of dust and rain and seeing others filled full of lawlessness' (adapted).

[3] *ἢ τὸ μὲν τοῦ λύχνου φῶς, μέχρι σβεσθῇ, φαίνει καὶ τὴν αὐγὴν οὐκ ἀποβάλλει· ἡ δὲ ἐν σοὶ ἀλήθεια καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη προαποσβήσεται*; 'Does the light of the lamp shine and not lose its radiance until it be put out, and shall truth and justice and temperance be put out in you before the end?'

[4] Rogo, non stultissimum dicas, si quis existimet lucernae peius esse, cum extincta est, quam antequam accenditur? Nos quoque et extinguimur et accendimur 'and I ask you would you not say that one was the greatest of fools who believed that a lamp was worse off when it was extinguished than before it was lighted? We mortals also are lighted and extinguished' (Gummere trans.).

to be found in St Ambrose, *Jacob and the Happy Life* 1. 8. 36; see Appendix 1.

8. 3–4 **ἐν τῷ ἀλγεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτοῦ [καὶ ἐν τῷ] ἔνδον φέγγος** '*in his pain, since there is splendour inside him*': I print here the Greek text as it is revised by H/S² in their *addenda ad textum*. The first notable emendation of the text here was that of Sleeman who cleverly inserted καίεται ἐν τῷ in place of καὶ ἐν τῷ. *Καίεται* was retained by H/S¹ but deleted by Theiler. H/S² then deleted καίεται, followed by Armstrong, who bracketed it in his revised edition. The matter is not easily resolved, but I think that the text is safer without Sleeman's emendation and can certainly stand without it. In the *addenda ad textum*, H/S² print ἔσται < καὶ > ἐν τῷ ἀλγεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτοῦ [καὶ ἐν τῷ] ἔνδον φέγγος, which is also the B/T text. This has been accepted by Armstrong against Kirchhoff's and Bréhier's ἐν τῷ ἔνδον φέγγος.

8. 4 **φῶς** *light*: The light within is the soul. The soul as light is a very frequent metaphor in Plotinus. From many possible references, see *Ennead* I. 1 [53] 4. 16; I. 1 [53] 7. 4; I. 2 [19] 4. 23; VI. 4 [28] 3. 22–3. For the possible origin of the light analogy, see Wallis[5] who suggests that the source is to be found in Hinduism.

8. 5–7 **ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ παρακολουθοῖ. . . μὴ ἀποκτιννύναι;** *And if he should become unconscious … doesn't kill him?*: This is the first of two questions that shape the structure of the chapter. See also lines 12–13 below. These questions allow Plotinus to develop the treatise dialectically by setting out the appropriate response for the *spoudaios*. See Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 7. 33, and 7. 64 for a Stoic view of how to deal with pain. By μὴ παρακολουθοῖ Plotinus means the same as he did in ch. 5. 2 i.e. a simple lack of consciousness of the empirical self, as is the case when one is asleep. This state leaves one unaware of the world of sense-perception, and, one is also, at the level of the lower soul which animates body, unaware of the activity in the higher soul of the real man in *Nous*. See comm. on 5.2.

8. 8–9 **ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν παρατείνοι. . . ἐν τούτοις** *And if it continues … in this situation*: This seems to me to suggest suicide as a viable option for the *spoudaios* when he suffers from prolonged pain. Almost

[5] Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, 15.

certainly this found its way to Plotinus from Stoic influence.[6] See Appendix 2 on suicide. For suicide as a legitimate act in Stoicism see Cicero, *De Finibus* 3. 60–1 (L/S 66G), and DL 7. 130 (L/S 66H).

8. 9 αὐτεξούσιον *power of self-determination*: This is an interesting choice of words for Plotinus. Rist[7] has shown that it is used by Plotinus to describe the freedom of the soul in its descent to body. He directs us to *Ennead* III. 2 [47] 4. 36–8: *τὰ δὲ δι' αὐτὰ ἔχοντα κίνησιν αὐτεξούσιον ζῷα ῥέποι ἂν ὁτὲ μὲν πρὸς τὰ βελτίω, ὁτὲ δὲ πρὸς τὰ χείρω* 'But living beings which have of themselves a movement under their own control might incline sometimes to what is better, sometimes to what is worse'. *τὸ αὐτεξούσιον* then is normally used to describe the soul's power to descend from or ascend back to *Nous*, and although we see it used here with a slight variation, i.e. simply the soul's ability to leave body, I suggest that its use is not accidental but may be seen as a deliberate choice of a technical vocabulary intended to indicate soul's freedom to act. See also *Ennead* VI. 8 [39] 10. 27 and VI. 8 [39] 20. 34, where it is used to describe the freewill of the One. See also Atkinson[8] who directs us to its use in Albinus.

8. 9–12 χρὴ δὲ εἰδέναι . . . οὔτε τὰ λυπηρά *It is necessary to understand . . . reach the inner man*: This is the key point in this chapter. The *spoudaios* who has made the return to *Nous* sees his body for what it is, something that has attached itself to the real man in *Nous*. What affects the body can in no way interfere with the *eudaimonia* of the *spoudaios*, which remains on a higher hypostatic level. This is made clear in a number of passages. *ψυχὴ δὲ εἴ τις χωρίζεται, χωριστὰ καὶ ἴδια ἐνεργεῖ τὰ τοῦ σώματος πάθη οὐκ αὐτῆς τιθεμένη, ἅτε ἤδη ὁρῶσα, ὡς τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο* 'But any soul which is separating itself has separate activities of its own and does not consider the body's affections as belonging to itself, because it already sees that

[6] *εὐλόγως τέ φασιν ἐξάξειν ἑαυτὸν τοῦ βίου τὸν σοφόν, καὶ ὑπὲρ πατρίδος καὶ ὑπὲρ φίλων, κἂν ἐν σκληροτέρᾳ γένηται ἀλγηδόνι ἢ πηρώσεσιν ἢ νόσοις ἀνιάτοις.* 'They tell us that the wise man will for reasonable cause make his own exit from life, on his country's behalf or for the sake of his friends, or if he suffer intolerable pain, mutilation, or incurable disease'. Bouillet refers to Seneca, *De Providentia* 5.

[7] Rist, *Road to Reality*, 120–1. See also Rist, 'Prohairesis', 109.

[8] Atkinson, *Plotinus* Ennead *V. I*, 8–9.

body is one thing and soul is another' (*Ennead* II. 3 [52] 15. 25–8). See also I. 1 [53] 2. 15, 21–2; III. 2 [47] 6. 1 ff; and IV. 4 [28] 18. 10–19. For the closeness of the Stoic viewpoint see Seneca, *Ep.* 78. 11.

8. 11–12 ***καὶ οὐ μέχρι τοῦ εἴσω ἕκαστα οὔτε τὰ ἄλλα, οὔτε ἀλγεινὰ οὔτε τὰ λυπηρά*** *neither the other things, not pains nor sorrows, reach the inner man*: Although there is no indication that the text is corrupt here, H/S[2] following an emendation by B. S. Page, bracketed *οὔτε ἀλγεινά* in their *addenda ad textum*. However, I see no good reason for bracketing *οὔτε ἀλγεινά*. Since Plotinus is dealing specifically with pain in this section, it is not unreasonable that he should mark its presence with different words, highlighting it among *τὰ ἄλλα*. Therefore I read *οὔτε ἀλγεινὰ* without brackets, which is in fact the B/T text. For the inner man, see Augustine, *De Vera Religione* 34. 72.

8. 12–18 ***καὶ ὅταν*... *μὴ γένηται*** *And whenever ... lest it should happen*: Kalligas correctly draws attention to *Ennead* I. 1 [53] 10. 13–14, where Plotinus regards pity as a vice. The Stoic background to this passage should be noted. In Stoic ethics a passion was an impulse, which was excessive and disobedient to the dictates of reason, and so passions were to be suppressed. See *SVF* iii. 378 and 391. One of the four passions according to Stoicism was *λύπη* (*SVF* iii. 394). One of the constituents of *λύπη* was pity, and so pity was condemned.[9]

8. 12–13 ***καὶ ὅταν περὶ ἄλλους τὰ ἀλγεινά; ἀσθένεια ἂν εἴη ψυχῆς ἡμετέρας*** *And whenever the pains concern others? It would be a weakness of our soul [to show concern for them]*: This second interjection helps to shape the remainder of this chapter. The question emerges, I think, as a result of Plotinus' dialectical method. What Plotinus says here seems at odds with what he says in *Ennead* IV. 9 [8] 3. 1 ff.? There, in what is a very early treatise, Plotinus stresses the unity of all souls: *καὶ μὴν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων φησὶν ὁ λόγος καὶ συμπαθεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἡμᾶς καὶ συναλγοῦντας ἐκ τοῦ ὁρᾶν καὶ διαχεομένους καὶ εἰς τὸ φιλεῖν ἑλκομένους κατὰ φύσιν· μήποτε γὰρ τὸ φιλεῖν διὰ τοῦτο* 'Indeed, the argument deriving from facts opposed [to the assumption of complete separation of souls] asserts

[9] As Sandbach notes: 'The condemnation of pity has been bad for the Stoics' reputation. But it was logical if pity is understood as arising from the belief that what the other person suffers is really bad. If sorrow or resentment are not to be felt at one's own sufferings, why should they be felt for those of another?' (*The Stoics*, 61).

that we do share each other's experiences when *we suffer with others from seeing their pain* and feel happy and relaxed [in their company] and are naturally drawn to love them: for without a sharing of experience there could not be love for this reason' (my italics). This would seem to make the *spoudaios* of I. 4 [46] unfeeling because he does not share the experiences of others? Some attempt to avoid this position is found in ch. 15. 22–23: *οὐ μὴν διὰ ταῦτα ἄφιλος οὐδὲ ἀγνώμων ὁ τοιοῦτος· τοιοῦτος γὰρ καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ. ἀποδιδοὺς οὖν ὅσα αὑτῷ καὶ τοῖς φίλοις φίλος ἂν εἴη μάλιστα μετὰ τοῦ νοῦν ἔχειν* 'A man of this sort will not be unfriendly or unsympathetic; he will be like this to himself and in dealing with his own affairs but he will render to his friends all that he renders to himself, and so will be the best of friends as well as remaining intelligent'. But since the *spoudaios* will render very little non-philosophical comfort to himself, one can hardly see him as a sympathetic and caring friend to everyone, if we use these words in a customary manner. Yet, Plotinus, who was presumably a *spoudaios*, does not appear in Porphyry's *Life* as unsympathetic and uncaring to a whole range of people.[10]

Although there is no supporting manuscript evidence, with Harder against H/S[2] and Armstrong, I prefer *ἂν* to *γὰρ*. With a question mark after the *ὅταν* clause, *ἂν* seems to me to make better grammatical sense than *γὰρ*.

8. 14–17 *ὅταν λανθάνειν . . . ὅπως μὴ λυποίμεθα* *we think it a gain . . . in order that we might not be grieved*: Bouillet suggests that this is an allusion to certain poets who praised the happiness of men who were spared the spectacle of great disasters.[11]

8. 18–20 *εἰ δέ τις λέγοι. . . ὅτι οὐ πάντες οὕτω* *And if someone should say . . . it is not this way for everyone*: Once again the point is made that the *spoudaios* is not like other men, who live on the level of the body and soul combination. So what appears terrible to others does not frighten the *spoudaios* who lives in *Nous*, the highest part of his soul. As was noted above, the passage from *Ennead* IV. 9 [8] 3. 2 ff. (quoted in full above) makes the *spoudaios* seem cold and uncaring in

[10] For the difficulty of reconciling the ethical teaching of the *Enneads* with Plotinus' behaviour as described by Porphyry see McGroarty, 'The Ethics of Plotinus', 20–34 and more recently Schniewind, *L'Éthique du Sage*, 13–25.

[11] He refers to Aeschylus' *Seven against Thebes*, 327.

human terms. Bréhier finds the same theme in Epictetus at *Disc.* 3. 26. 4.[12] The Stoic background to this chapter is quite evident. The Plotinian *spoudaios* does not behave as others do. Plotinus, however, does not see the *spoudaios* as inhuman in his dealings with his fellow men (although it may seem like that outwardly), but, rather, as one who bestows real benefits on them, not irrationally based emotive camaraderie.[13] But why the *spoudaios* should bother with other people is not at all clear to me.[14]

8. 21 τῆς ἀρετῆς *of excellence*: Excellence[15] is a prerequisite for *eudaimonia*. In *Ennead* III. 2 [47] 4. 45–7, Plotinus warns that people must not demand to be *eudaimōn* who have not done what is required. In *Ennead* I. 5 [36] 2. 4–5, we are told that *eudaimonia* is measured by excellence. What does Plotinus mean by excellence here? The basis for Plotinus' treatment of excellence in *Ennead* I. 2 [19] is to be found in Plato's *Republic* 427e–434d, but Plotinus adapts Plato's description of civic justice to suit his own ends.[16] Excellence in Plotinus requires both moral and noetic activity. The *spoudaios* must first use practical wisdom in understanding the needs of the body, and limiting its desires. Practical wisdom is concerned with the sorts of actions we should perform. Having achieved this he moves

[12] *Ναί· ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ἐμοὶ πεινήσουσιν. Τί οὖν; μή τι καὶ ὁ ἐκείνων λιμὸς ἀλλαχοῦ που φέρει; οὐχὶ καὶ ἡ αὐτή που κάθοδος; τὰ κάτω τὰ αὐτά* 'yes, but my family too will starve—what then? Their starvation does not lead to some other end than yours, does it? Have they not also much the same descent thereto, and the same world below?'

[13] Rist, *Road to Reality*, 162–3.

[14] Schniewind, *L'Éthique du Sage*, 171–97 presents a more positive view concerning this.

[15] On this topic in general in Plotinus see Plass, 'Plotinus's Ethical Theory', 241–59.

[16] *ἢ ἐπειδὴ κακὴ μέν ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπεφυρμένη τῷ σώματι καὶ ὁμοπαθὴς γινομένη αὐτῷ καὶ πάντα συνδοξάζουσα, εἴη ἂν ἀγαθὴ καὶ ἀρετὴν ἔχουσα, εἰ μήτε συνδοξάζοι, ἀλλὰ μόνη ἐνεργοῖ—ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ φρονεῖν μήτε ὁμοπαθὴς εἴη—ὅπερ ἐστὶ σωφρονεῖν—μήτε φοβοῖτο ἀφισταμένη τοῦ σώματος—ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀνδρίζεσθαι—ἡγοῖτο δὲ λόγος καὶ νοῦς, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἀντιτείνοι—δικαιοσύνη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦτο* 'Since the soul is evil when it is thoroughly mixed with the body and shares its experiences and has all the same opinions, it will be good and possess excellence when it no longer has the same opinions but acts alone—this is intelligence and wisdom—and does not share the body's experiences—this is self-control—and is not afraid of departing from the body—this is courage—and is ruled by reason and *Nous*, without opposition—and this is justice' (adapted).

on to the next stage, which is contemplation, theoretical wisdom, the activity of *Nous*. See *Ennead* II. 9 [33] 15. 26–40 and I. 3 [20] 6. 15 ff. The *spoudaios*, then, must be morally excellent before he can attain to the higher excellences. The higher intellectual excellences Plotinus groups together in the wisdom to purify oneself of body. He would have found support for this in *Phaedo* 69b4 where Plato claims that true excellence exists only with wisdom. See *Ennead* I. 2 [19] 3. 12–19. Aristotle's *EN* also follows this pattern if, that is, one believes that book 10 of that text is in its proper place.

8. 22 παρὰ τοὺς πολλούς *in contrast to the multitude*: B/T refer to a tenuous parallel in Seneca's *De Vita Beata* I. 3 ff. where we find: atqui nulla res nos maioribus malis implicat, quam quod ad rumorem componimur, optima rati ea, quae magno adsensu recepta sunt, quodque exempla nobis multa sunt, nec ad rationem sed ad similitudinem vivimus 'Yet nothing involves us in greater trouble than the fact that we adapt ourselves to the common report in the belief that the best things are those that have met with great approval,—the fact that, having so many to follow, we live after the rule, not of reason but of imitation' (Basore trans.).

8. 24–30 οὐ γὰρ ἰδιωτικῶς δεῖ... δυσκίνητον καὶ δυσπαθῆ τὴν ψυχὴν παρέχουσαν *For one must not [live] in an untrained manner, ... rendering the soul difficult to disturb and upset*: The emphasis in the final passage is on the preparation of the individual to enable his soul to remain tranquil during external disturbances. This is elaborated on in the treatise which chronologically directly follows I. 4 [46], where Plotinus explains through analogy: *εἰ οὖν παῖδες ἀσκήσαντες μὲν τὰ σώματα, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς ὑπ' ἀπαιδευσίας τούτου χείρους γενόμενοι ἐν πάλῃ κρατοῖεν τῶν μήτε τὰ σώματα μήτε τὰς ψυχὰς πεπαιδευμένων καὶ τὰ σιτία αὐτῶν ἁρπάζοιεν καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια αὐτῶν τὰ ἁβρὰ λαμβάνοιεν, τί ἂν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ γέλως εἴη*; 'If some boys, who have kept their bodies in good training, but are inferior in soul to their bodily condition because of lack of education, win a wrestle with others who are trained neither in body or soul and grab their food and their dainty clothes, would the affair be anything but a joke?' (*Ennead* III. 2 [47] 8. 16–21). Also see Wallis[17] who sees this, rightly I think, as a blending of Platonic and Stoic themes. Behind

[17] Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, 82–3.

this lies the Platonic view that seeming undeserved misfortune is actually the result of bad behaviour in a previous life, combined with the Stoic view that such misfortune cannot impinge on the sage.

8. 24–5 οὐ γὰρ ἰδιωτικῶς . . . ἀμυνόμενον *For one must not . . . fortune's blows*: We are told exactly how to stand up to the blows of fortune in *Ennead* II. 9 [33] 18. 27–30. *ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐνθάδε ὄντες ἀρετῇ τὰς πληγὰς ἀπωθοίμεθ' ἂν ἤδη ὑπὸ μεγέθους γνώμης τὰς μὲν ἐλάττους, τὰς δὲ οὐδὲ πληττούσας ὑπὸ ἰσχύος γενομένας* 'We, while we are here, can already repel the strokes of fortune by excellence, and make some of them become less by greatness of mind and others not even troubles because of our strength' (adapted). The same thought is to be found in Cicero's *Tusc. Disp.* 2. 41 where his standpoint is that of the New Academy, but the passage could be from any Stoic handbook. In Epictetus, too, we find a parallel in which linguistic similarities should be noted: *οὐ γὰρ ἀποκνητέον τὸν ἀγῶνα τὸν μέγιστον ἀγωνιζομένοις ἀλλὰ καὶ πληγὰς ληπτέον* 'for men who are engaged in the greatest of contests ought not to flinch, but to take also the blows' (*Disc.* 3. 25. 2–3). See also Seneca *Ep.* 53. 12, and Appendix 1, where St Ambrose also borrows the analogy of the fighter warding off blows (*Jacob and the Happy Life*) 1. 8. 36. On the parallel of the athlete with the *spoudaios* in Plotinus and others, see Schniewind.[18]

8. 25–7 γινώσκοντα . . . ὡς παισὶ φοβερά *knowing . . . but as childish fears*: Stoicism manifests itself even more strongly here. There is a significant passage in Epictetus, who is in part quoting Plato's *Phaedo* 77e: *ταῦτα δ' ὁ Σωκράτης καλῶς ποιῶν μορμολύκεια ἐκάλει. ὡς γὰρ τοῖς παιδίοις τὰ προσωπεῖα φαίνεται δεινὰ καὶ φοβερὰ δι' ἀπειρίαν, τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἡμεῖς πάσχομεν πρὸς τὰ πράγματα δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ παιδία πρὸς τὰς μορμολύκειας.* 'But Socrates did well to call such things bugbears. For just as masks appear fearful and terrible to children because of inexperience, in some such manner we are also affected by events, and this for the same reason that children are affected by bugbears' (*Disc.* 2. 1. 15–16). B/T refer to *παιδίων δείματα* in Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 11, 23, but it should be noted that there, although Socrates is quoted again, it is people's opinions which are labelled

[18] Schniewind, *L'Éthique du Sage*, 152–3.

λαμίας; while Epictetus and Plotinus however, call the events themselves *παισὶ φοβέρα*. See also Plato, *Crito* 46c4–6.

8. 27–8 ταῦτ' οὖν ἤθελεν; *Does he want these things?*: Rist[19] sees in this sentence a question that he claims arises logically from Aristotle's *EN*, i.e. that the *spoudaios* will need a sphere of operation outside of himself (i.e. others' misfortunes) in order to display his own excellence. This may be so; but it is not at all clear that this line is referring to the misfortunes of others, but rather to the *spoudaios*' own personal misfortune, which is more in keeping with the sense of the passage. The fundamental difference between Plotinus and Aristotle on this topic is to be found in *Ennead* VI. 8 [39] 5. 13–18: *καὶ γὰρ εἴτις αἵρεσιν αὐτῇ δοίη τῇ ἀρετῇ, πότερα βούλεται, ἵν' ἔχοι ἐνεργεῖν, εἶναι πολέμους, ἵνα ἀνδρίζοιτο, καὶ εἶναι ἀδικίαν, ἵνα τὰ δίκαια ὁρίζῃ καὶ κατακοσμῇ . . . ἕλοιτο ἂν τὴν ἡσυχίαν τῶν πράξεων* 'For certainly if someone gave excellence itself the choice whether it would like in order to be active that there should be wars, that it might be brave, and that there should be injustice that it might define what is just and set things in order . . . it will choose to rest from its practical activities'.

CHAPTER 9

Chapters 9 and 10 should be read as one. There is little justification for Ficino's separation of the material here. In the chapters on which I have commented thus far, I have drawn attention to the apparent similarity between Plotinian and Stoic ethical thought, in terms of the sentiments expressed. These chapters, however, demonstrate the important differences in the two systems of ethics, by highlighting the complex metaphysics on which Plotinus bases his ethical theory. His ontology permits him to answer Peripatetic objections in ways the Stoics could not. The main point under consideration is the ability of the *spoudaios* to maintain his *eudaimonia* when deprived of consciousness of the empirical world. In Aristotle's view such inactivity would make *eudaimonia* impossible. Plotinus will argue

[19] Rist, *Road to Reality*, 161–2.

that *eudaimonia* belongs to the level of *Nous*, which remains active, and where the *spoudaios* remains conscious, even if such activity does not make itself known to the combination of body and soul. Neither consciousness of the physical world, nor indeed consciousness of this higher self in *Nous* on the level of the combination of body and soul, is necessary for *eudaimonia*, which, once achieved, continues in the timeless activity of *Nous*.[1]

9. 1–7 Ἀλλʼ ὅταν μὴ παρακολουθῇ ... ὡς μὴ πάντα τὸν βίον εὐδαιμονεῖν λέγειν *But whenever someone is unconscious... in order to say that he has not been* eudaimōn *all his life*: This opening section is clearly directed against the Stoics, as is noted by Dillon.[2] Aristotle, whose views are considered in the next section, did not believe the *spoudaios* was *eudaimōn* while asleep.[3] Plotinus begins by pointing out that being unconscious is no worse than being asleep in terms of maintaining *eudaimonia*. Thus if one considers someone *eudaimōn* who happens to be asleep, then one must consider him equally *eudaimōn* when not conscious.

9. 1–2 Ἀλλʼ ὅταν...τέχναις *But whenever... magic?*: This question provides the framework for chs. 9 and 10. The same question was asked earlier in chs. 5. 2 and 8. 5–6, and a similar question is asked in IV. 4 [28] 43. 1. As B/T note, this was a question that much troubled the Stoics. There was disagreement among the Stoics on whether or not excellence could be lost, see DL 7. 127 (= *SVF* iii. 237).[4] See also *SVF*

[1] *ἄλλο γὰρ ἡ νόησις, καὶ ἄλλο ἡ τῆς νοήσεως ἀντίληψις, καὶ νοοῦμεν μὲν ἀεί, ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα δὲ οὐκ ἀεί* 'The intellectual act is one thing and the apprehension of it another, and we are always intellectually active but do not always apprehend our activity' (*Ennead* IV. 3 [27] 30. 13–15). Armstrong notes with regard to this passage, and also with regard to *Ennead* I. 4 [46] 9–10, that 'consciousness in the ordinary sense, with memory, is thus secondary, dependent on our physical condition, and relatively unimportant. As it appears in an early, a middle-period, and a late treatise, Plotinus seems to have held this doctrine consistently throughout his writing period' (Armstrong, *The* Enneads, iv. 130–1 n. 1).

[2] Dillon, J., *Plotinus: The* Enneads, trans. S. MacKenna (1991), 39 n. 49.

[3] Aristotle, *EN* 1176ᵃ33–5

[4] *καὶ μὴν τὴν ἀρετὴν Χρύσιππος μὲν ἀποβλητήν, Κλεάνθης δὲ ἀναπόβλητον· ὁ μὲν ἀποβλητὴν διὰ μέθην καὶ μελαγχολίαν, ὁ δὲ ἀναπόβλητον διὰ βεβαίους καταλήψεις* 'Further, while Chrysippus holds that virtue can be lost, Cleanthes maintains that it cannot. According to the former it may be lost in consequence of drunkenness or melancholy; the latter takes it to be inalienable owing to the certainty of our mental apprehension'.

iii. 54 and 238. B/T refer to *Disc.* 1. 18. 23, 2. 17. 33, and 3. 2. 5, where Epictetus poses a number of questions regarding the invulnerability of the sage, or as he is referred to in 1. 18. 23, ὁ ἀήττητος 'the unconquerable man', who is being compared to a great athlete.[5] Although being unconscious is not specifically mentioned there, Epictetus does consider the invulnerability of the sage while asleep, drunk, dreaming and melancholy-mad—as μελαγχολώδης is translated by Oldfather. Kalligas refers to Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 6. 42, but he is confusing the idea of not being conscious of one's place in the great scheme of things with not being conscious to one's empirical self, which is what Plotinus is referring to here. It is clear from 9. 3 below that Plotinus is simply considering a lack of awareness of the empirical self.

9. 1 μὴ παρακολουθῇ *is unconscious*: The exposition of consciousness in Plotinus is troublesome and has sparked much debate.[6] Plotinus is himself largely responsible for our difficulty in understanding clearly what he means. Although he does attempt to establish a variety of terms to cater for the complexities of the process of consciousness, he does not always strictly adhere to his chosen terminology to describe the various phases of this process.[7] For the understanding of what Plotinus means by the terms for consciousness found in chs. 9 and 10, Warren and Smith's analysis is most useful. παρακολουθεῖν is not used frequently by Plotinus to denote consciousness, but when he does use it, he does so primarily to denote the kind of awareness peculiar to a human being, awareness

[5] See ch. 8. 24, where Plotinus uses the athlete analogy. There seems to me little doubt that Plotinus knew well Epictetus' philosophy.

[6] See Cobb, 'Concept of Consciousness', p. xxxii; Schwyzer, 'Bewusst und Unbewusst', 343–78; E. W. Warren, 'Consciousness in Plotinus', (1964), 83–97; Smith, 'Unconsciousness and Quasiconsciousness', 292–330; H. Wijsenbeek, 'Man as a Double Being. Some Remarks in Plotinus', (1985), 172–191; F. M. Schroeder, '*Synousia*, *Synaisthaesis* and *Synesis*. Presence and Dependence in the Plotinian Philosophy of Consciousness', (1987), 677–99; H. S. Schibli, 'Apprehending our Happiness: Antilepsis and the Middle Soul in Plotinus, *Ennead* I.4.10', (1989), 205–19; P. Hadot, 'Les niveaux de conscience dans les états Mystiques selon Plotin' (1980), 243–66; and Aquila, 'On Plotinus and the "Togetherness" of Consciousness', 7–32.

[7] Wijsenbeek, 'Man as a Double Being.' 172

of the empirical self.[8] παρακολουθεῖν can be translated literally 'to follow along with', and what Plotinus means in chs. 9 and 10 when he uses this term in relation to the *spoudaios*, is that there is no 'following along' to the τὸ φανταστικόν (Imagination),[9] of the images produced in *Nous* or the sense-faculties. Plotinus, here, in this first line, is referring to the occasions when images do not arrive from either *Nous* or the sensory world, which is effectively what happens when one is asleep (line 3).

9. 2 μάγων τέχναις *magic*: Plotinus' admits that magic can drive the *spoudaios* into a state of unconsciousness. Merlan[10] considered that Plotinus was a practising magician. This was refuted by Armstrong.[11]

9. 7–9 εἰ δὲ μὴ σπουδαῖον φήσουσιν ... ζητοῦμεν *But if they will say that he is not a spoudaios ... as long as he is a* spoudaios: The εἰ δὲ here picks up the εἰ μὲν in line 2, and marks a switch in focus to Aristotle. This passage is not really about whether or not excellence can be lost, but whether or not the man can still be regarded as *eudaimōn* while unconscious or asleep. Aristotle considered that the *spoudaios* did not maintain his *eudaimonia* while asleep or unconscious.[12] The εἰ δὲ also marks a development in the dialectical nature of Plotinus' argument in this chapter. The *spoudaios*, in Plotinus' view, is conscious on a higher metaphysical level, and, therefore, there is no need for consciousness on the level of the body and soul combination. If they remove his goodness, simply because he is not aware of it, then they are not discussing the ontologically superior status of the *spoudaios*, as Plotinus understands it.

[8] Warren, 'Consciousness in Plotinus', 89. He also notes, however, that παρακολουθεῖν may mean on occasion self-consciousness, depending on the context. Warren does concede though, as Arnou has noted, that παρακολουθεῖν normally refers to the activity of the soul on the rational level, while self-consciousness is proper to Intellect (R. Arnou, *Le Désir de Dieu dans la philosophie de Plotin*, (1967), 305–8).

[9] See comm. on 10. 12–16.

[10] Merlan, 'Plotinus and Magic', 341–8.

[11] Armstrong, 'Was Plotinus a Magician?', 73–9.

[12] εἴπομεν δὴ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι διὰ βίου ὑπάρχοι ἄν, φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον 'What we said, then, was that happiness was not a disposition; for if it were, even a person asleep his whole life might have it, living a plant's life' (*EN* 1176^a33–5). See also *EN* 1102^b5–8 and *EE* 1219^b18 ff.

9. 10–11 ***ἀλλ' ἔστω σπουδαῖος ... πῶς ἂν εὐδαίμων εἴη*:** *Well, let him be a* spoudaios... *how could he be* eudaimōn?: This is certainly targeting the Peripatetics. One of the main constituents of Aristotle's model of *eudaimonia* was activity in accordance with excellence. He frequently emphasizes that *eudaimonia* is impossible to achieve if the subject is inactive. See *EN* $1098^{a}7$, $1099^{a}2$; *EE* $1214^{b}20$ ff., *EE* $1215^{a}20$ ff., $1216^{a}1$ ff., $1219^{a}24$ ff., and $1219^{b}17$ ff.

9. 10 ***μὴ αἰσθανόμενος*** *without perceiving*: I do not agree with Wijsenbeek[13] that *μὴ αἰσθανόμενος* here has the same meaning as *μὴ παρακολουθῇ* in line 1 of this chapter, although as has been noted two different terms denoting the same mental state are by no means unusual in Plotinus. The difference here is that Plotinus is now dealing specifically with Aristotle. His attention is thus turned to consciousness of images created in the lower imagination only, since he is concerned to refute the Aristotelian necessity for consciousness of activities of the body/soul compound. *τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι* is used specifically to denote consciousness of images from the sensory world, but *παρακολουθεῖν* includes images from both faculties of imagination. This is confirmed below where Plotinus agrees that Aristotle would be correct if wisdom were something brought in *from outside*. See ch. 2. 1 ff. where *τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι* is linked directly to consciousness of the sensory world. *παρακολουθεῖν* could not be used for this specific purpose.

9. 11–14 ***ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μὴ αἰσθάνοιτο ... ἧττον σοφὸς ἂν εἴη;*** *But if one does not perceive... will one be any less wise?*: Plotinus now presents three analogies to help explain why the *spoudaios* does not need to be conscious on the level of the body/soul combination. Once again it is important to note the dialectical structure of Plotinus' argument here; these analogies make sense only when viewed against the background of differing ontological levels. Plotinus argues from the hypostatic rank of *Nous*. When reintegration has taken place, the *spoudaios* becomes, and remains, *eudaimōn*. Indeed, we cloud the issue by using temporal terms. *Eudaimonia* is not measured by time at all, but by excellence, see *Ennead* I. 5 [36] 2. 4–5. On the level of the body and soul combination, in the realm of time, we need not have

[13] Wijsenbeek, 'Man as a Double Being', 183.

consciousness of this *eudaimonia.* These analogies must be seen as the best attempt to explain what is in linguistic terms inexplicable, unless we agree that 'outside time' is a comprehensible phrase. They may then be poor analogies for the complexity of the Plotinian metaphysics concerning *eudaimonia* but surely adequate to emphasize the irrelevance of consciousness on the body/soul level to that same *eudaimonia.*

9. 11 *ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν μὴ αἰσθάνοιτο ὅτι ὑγιαίνοι, ὑγιαίνει οὐδὲν ἧττον* *But if one does not perceive that one is healthy, one is healthy nonetheless*: Plotinus likes to use the example of health as something, which when present, tends to escape our normal conscious activity, unlike its counterpart, illness. See *Ennead* v. 8 [31] 11. 27–31, where he explains that, in general, we are not conscious of health, because it is natural to us; it is what he calls *τὰ δὲ ἡμῶν* 'our own'. We do not normally perceive what is natural to us; rather our consciousness of health is like the self-consciousness (*σύνεσις*) of *Nous.*[14] Health, he says, sits by us, as something that belongs to us. Illness by contrast is something alien, different from us, which strikes us harder, and so we become conscious of it much more quickly. Health then, in his view, is a good example of something we possess, of which, for the most part, we are not conscious.

9. 14–17 *εἰ μή πού τις λέγοι . . . τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν παρεῖναι* *Perhaps someone might say... that* eudaimonia *is present*: Plotinus himself acknowledges that the third analogy, that of the wise man, is of a different order from the analogies of health and beauty. Plotinus' response to this interjection takes up the remainder of this chapter. Llorens notes that both Müller and Volkmann deleted *γὰρ* and that B/T considered it a colloquial conjunction, which reflected an imaginary interlocutor. It seems to me, however, that Plotinus continues his dialectical exercise by remaining focused solidly on Aristotle. In the *EN* Aristotle equates *eudaimonia* with an activity in accordance with wisdom (*ἐνεργειῶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν*) 1177^{a}24 and, more importantly, at 1144^{a}5–6 he states: *ἔπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι*

[14] For the self-consciousness of *Nous*, see A. C. Lloyd, 'Nosce te ipsum and conscientia', (1964), 188–200, and Schroeder, '*Synousia*, *Synaisthaesis* and *Synesis*', 677–99.

μέν, οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν· μέρος γὰρ οὖσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς τῷ ἔχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα 'The next point is the fact that they are productive: not in the way medical expertise produces health, but in the way health does—this is how wisdom 'produces' happiness; for since it is a part of excellence as a whole, it is the possession of it, *and its exercise*, that make a person happy' (my italics). It is correct to infer that Plotinus had this passage in mind, given that he, himself, has just used the example of health found here. See also *EN* 1179ᵃ30–2. On this basis Plotinus presents what would have been the obvious Aristotelian objection: the activity of wisdom requires perception (*τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι*) and consciousness (*τὸ παρακολουθεῖν*) of its presence.

9. 17–18 ἐπακτοῦ μὲν οὖν. . . ὁ λόγος οὗτος *If thinking . . . make sense*: *ὁ λόγος οὗτος* is the argument that one requires consciousness of one's activities to be *eudaimōn.* Plotinus can jettison the need for the *spoudaios* to be conscious on the level of the body and soul combination, since his *eudaimonia* is within, already operational on a level above that of discursive thought. We have already explored this area of his thought in ch. 4. 21 ff., where the *spoudaios*, if he is a *spoudaios*, i.e. an excellent individual, has all he needs for *eudaimonia.* For the completeness of life in *Nous*, see *Ennead* I. 1 [53] 2. 22 ff.; VI. 9 [9] 11. 10; VI. 7 [38] 12. 22; VI. 7 [38] 15. 28; VI. 7 [38] 26. 14.

9. 18–23 εἰ δ' ἡ σοφίας . . . ὁ σπουδαῖος ᾖ τοιοῦτος *but if the essential . . . active even then*: This is the core of chs. 9 and 10. Consciousness of the activities of the body and soul combination is not necessary for *eudaimonia.* The *spoudaios* is always active in the higher part of his soul in *Nous.*[15] This is the activity of wisdom, of which we are made aware through excellence. This wisdom is real being, the activity of *Nous.*

9. 18–19 εἰ δ' ἡ σοφίας ὑπόστασις ἐν οὐσίᾳ τινί, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ *but if the essential nature of wisdom is in a substance, or rather in the substance*: Plotinus is making clear that the wisdom referred to here, is a wisdom that exists at the highest ontological level below the One. This wisdom is real being; it is the One in multiplicity, existing at the level of *Nous.* It has nothing, and needs nothing, of what has

[15] P. Merlan indicates Aristotle as the source for this doctrine of a continually active *Nous.* See *Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness*, (1969), 13 ff.

come to exist after it. The nature of this wisdom is fully treated of in *Ennead* v. 8 [31]. In describing the nature of wisdom there Plotinus says: *ἡ ζωὴ σοφία, σοφία δὲ οὐ πορισθεῖσα λογισμοῖς, ὅτι ἀεὶ ἦν πᾶσα καὶ ἐλλείπουσα οὐδενί, ἵνα ζητήσεως δεηθῇ· ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἡ πρώτη καὶ οὐκ ἀπ' ἄλλης· καὶ ἡ οὐσία αὐτὴ σοφία, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτός, εἶτα σοφός.* 'This life is wisdom, wisdom not acquired by reasonings, because it was always all present, without any failing which would make it need to be searched for; but it is the first, not derived from any other wisdom; the very being of [*Nous*] is wisdom: it does not exist first and then become wise' (4. 36–40, adapted).

9. 20–3 οὐκ ἀπόλωλε δὲ αὕτη ... ὁ σπουδαῖος ᾖ τοιοῦτος *this substance is not destroyed ... would be active even then*: Having established that *eudaimonia* is equal to wisdom, which is the substance of the ever active *Nous*, it is not difficult to see why Plotinus can, metaphysically speaking, dismiss the lower level of consciousness. The thought in this passage has also been borrowed by St Ambrose, but perhaps *not in as blatant* a fashion as some of the other parts already noted, see Appendix 1.

9. 20–1 οὐκ ἀπόλωλε ... μὴ παρακολουθεῖν ἑαυτῷ *and this substance ... what is called not conscious to oneself* Confirmation that *μὴ παρακολουθεῖν* here refers to a simple lack of self-awareness on the level of the body and soul combination, since it is again equated with sleep and cannot be interpreted as the reflexive consciousness of *Nous*, in spite of *ἑαυτῷ*. Kalligas refers to an interesting passage in Aristotle's *On Sleep and Waking* 455^{b}3–10. There, Aristotle says sleep occurs when the primary organ through which one perceives everything is inoperative. How important this was for Plotinus is hard to say, but see ch. 10. 12–16 of this commentary for its possible influence on Plotinus' analysis of the function of the imagination.

9. 24–5 λανθάνοι δ' ἂν αὕτη ἡ ἐνέργεια οὐκ αὐτὸν πάντα, ἀλλά τι μέρος αὐτοῦ *This activity would not escape the attention of all of him, but only a part of him*: The part of him which doesn't notice is the part that is normally conscious at the level of the body/soul combination.[16] As Smith[17] notes, this also confirms that the *spoudaios* is still self-aware in *Nous*, his *eudaimonia* undiminished. His

[16] See my comments on *τὸ φανταστικόν* (the faculty of imagination), ch. 10. 12–16.

[17] Smith, 'Unconsciousness and Quasiconsciousness', 293.

self-consciousness in *Nous* remains active. Rist suggests that these lines indicate that the philosopher can lose his happiness.[18] I disagree with this. When the *spoudaios* has become *Nous*, he has achieved *eudaimonia*, which exists outside of time and space, and is thus incapable of being lost.[19] That *eudaimonia* is not measured by time but by excellence is confirmed in *Ennead* I. 5 [36] 2. 4–5. When we have become self-aware in our higher soul, we have become the real man, and *all* of the real man, as indeed Rist suggests. When the philosopher becomes unconscious in the body and soul combination, he does not possess again a divisible self, as Rist believes. The *spoudaios* remains self-aware on the level of his higher soul, and this higher soul is all that really exists. The soul does not really have parts (see *Ennead* IV. 3 [27] 2. 29 ff.), but powers projected from a source, which diminish the further they get from the source. What has attached itself to the *spoudaios* may be referred to as a part, but it is itself only animated by an image of real being, and is not part of the *spoudaios* in any strict sense.[20] Difficulties can arise in discussing what is non-spatial in spatial terms, as Blumenthal[21] has observed. We must not

[18] 'Plotinus tells us in *Ennead* I. 4. 9. 24–5 that when consciousness lapses the continuing wisdom of the sage is separated not from his whole self but from a part. It has been argued earlier, however, as we recall, that for the sage the divine element, the *Νοῦς*, is in fact the whole personality, and that what had previously been parts of his being are reduced to the level of mere accessories. It is hard to see how, if the sage when suffering loss of consciousness possesses once again a divisible self, Plotinus is not contradicting the previous tenor of his argument and suggesting strongly that the philosopher can lose his philosophical happiness' (*Road to Reality*, 147–8). See also Rist, J. M., 'Integration and Undescended Soul in Plotinus', (1967), 420, where the same opinion is also expressed.

[19] Plotinus describes the timelessness of *Nous* in *Ennead* III. 7 [45] 3. 30 ff.: 'Necessarily there will be no "was" about it, for what is there that was for it and has passed away? Nor any "will be", for what will be for it? So there remains for it only to be in its being just what it is ... The life, then, which belongs to that which exists and is in being, all together and full, completely without extension or interval, is that which we are looking for, eternity.'

[20] See in general O'Daly, *Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self*, 52–70, where he explains in some detail why the true self is not divisible.

[21] 'Since, however, the body belongs to us, it is also possible to speak of the faculties of the soul attached to it as parts of our soul ... and if this is so it is quite reasonable to speak of the vegetative soul sometimes as a faculty of our soul and sometimes as an importation from soul in its capacity of informing the natural objects of which the world consists' (*Plotinus' Psychology*, 29–30).

confuse the ego with the soul, as Dodds[22] showed when he called the ego 'a fluctuating spotlight of consciousness'. When the ego has once made the ascent/integration/separation, *eudaimonia* is assured.[23]

9. 25–30 *οἷον καὶ ... ἐνεργοῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς as is the case ... if that were active, we [too] would be active*: Plotinus ends this chapter with an analogy to demonstrate that we can be active in *Nous* without necessarily being conscious of this activity on the level of the body and soul combination. This is what the entire chapter has sought to prove, and chapter 10, which follows, examines this matter in even more detail.

9. 26–7 *ἡ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἀντίληψις τῷ αἰσθητικῷ the conscious apprehension of such activity through sense-perception*:

[22] E. R. Dodds, *Sources*, 385.

[23] Rist continues: 'And there is a further difficulty which cannot be neglected at this stage. If consciousness is ultimately irrelevant to the achieved happiness of the sage, and if, furthermore, there is in every man a higher self, which lives eternally "above" and is engaged in contemplation of the Forms, why should we not say that every man is equally happy? The answer to this question certainly cannot be, as we might have hoped, that happiness is the state achieved by the philosopher when he integrates his personality with the higher self and reduces the bodily aspects of the soul to the position of mere accessories, for Plotinus has now suggested that this integration can to some extent be reversed. The only answer seems to be the extremely paradoxical, but perhaps no less Plotinian position that everyone is in fact happy all the time, while the difference between the philosopher and the rest of mankind is that he is aware of the fact while they are not' (Rist, *Road to Reality*, 148). This viewpoint is also accepted by Bodéüs, 'L'Autre Homme de Plotin', 258. Again what Rist says here is clearly false. Although we all possess a higher self, which remains in *Nous*, *eudaimonia* belongs *only* to those who have made the ascent and actually lived this higher life. We are not 'happy all the time'; only the virtuous have *eudaimonia*; see *Ennead* I. 5 [36] 2. 4–5, where *eudaimonia* is measured by virtue, and ch. 4. 23–5. Again in *Ennead* III. 2 [47] 4. 45–7 we are told *οὐδ' ἀπαιτητέον τούτοις τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχειν, οἷς μὴ εἴργασται εὐδαιμονίας ἄξια*. 'People must not demand to be *eudaimōn* who have not done what deserves *eudaimonia*' (adapted). See also III. 2 [47] 5. 1 ff. Rist's conclusion that 'the only answer ... that everyone is in fact happy all the time ... he (i.e. the philosopher) is aware of the fact while they are not' is demonstrably false. We are told clearly in ch. 10 that even if the philosopher is unaware of this higher life, his *eudaimonia*, once achieved, continues regardless. The whole point of ch. 10 is to explain that consciousness of this higher life is *not* a *sine qua non* for *eudaimonia*. Consciousness of this higher life does not, therefore, separate the philosopher from the rest of mankind, but integration of his ego with his higher self through virtue, does so.

ἡ ἀντίληψις in Plotinus is the most common general term for consciousness.[24] ἡ ἀντίληψις operates through the formation of images. It can form images from the sensory world or from *Nous*; images which when grasped by the Imagination, allow the individual to be conscious of them.[25] In general then, we apprehend data from either the noetic or the sensory world; but consciousness occurs only when we produce an image that the soul is capable of grasping, which is what makes memory possible.[26] Antileptic activity with regard to the sensory world appears to involve a double operation.[27] When the sense organ is activated, the soul apprehends it, but we are not conscious of it until the soul produces an image in the Imagination. Plotinus uses the term sometimes to indicate only the first stage, but mostly he uses it to indicate that an image has been produced and that the soul is conscious of it.[28] Warren correctly notes that the antileptic activity referred to here in line 27 is an example of the first stage only.[29] Plotinus is demonstrating that sense activity can occur without *conscious* apprehension of it. It is clearly used here to mean lack of conscious apprehension because Plotinus explains that although we are not conscious of the process of growth through the senses, the activity still occurs. In the same way we can be unaware of *eudaimonia* in *Nous*.

9. 28–30 ***νῦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐσμέν . . . ἐνεργοῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς*** *However, we are not this . . . we [too] would be active*: Ficino's

[24] 'The most general expression for consciousness is ἀντίληψις, awareness, or cognition of an object; αἴσθησις, διάνοια, and νόησις are equally types of ἀντίληψις differing only in the form in which this awareness occurs and in the degree of truth value it represents' (Cobb, 'Concept of Consciousness', p. xxxii). But as Atkinson notes, although *antilepsis* is the most general term for apprehension, the sphere of its activity is also usually mentioned. He gives examples of ἀντίληψις τῷ αἰσθητικῷ from *Ennead* I. 4 [46] 9. 27 and ἡ τῆς νοήσεως ἀντίληψις in IV. 3 [27] 30. 14, (Ennead *V.1*, 241). See also Schwyzer, 'Bewusst und Unbewusst'.

[25] Warren, 'Consciousness in Plotinus', 84. Warren defines it as a fully conscious apprehension in the imagination.

[26] As Hadot notes: 'Consciousness is thus more of a memory than a presence', (P. Hadot, *Plotin or The Simplicity of Vision*, (1993), 32). See ch. 10. 19, where I argue that Plotinus calls the image grasped by soul a *phantasma* when it has been converted to a mental picture, and so made available for memory. This is what distinguishes *phantasma* from a mere image (εἴδωλον).

[27] Warren, 'Consciousness in Plotinus', 88.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

division of this material into chs. 9 and 10 makes little sense as Plotinus draws what is merely a temporary conclusion; the dialectical exercise continues immediately in ch. 10. Once again only the *spoudaios* is under discussion here. When he ascended he became *Nous*. *καὶ ἡ νόησις δὲ ἡμῶν οὕτω, ὅτι καὶ νοερὰ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ζωὴ κρείττων ἡ νόησις, καὶ ὅταν ψυχὴ νοῇ, καὶ ὅταν νοῦς ἐνεργῇ εἰς ἡμᾶς· μέρος γὰρ καὶ οὗτος ἡμῶν καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἄνιμεν.* 'And noetic activity is ours in the sense that the soul is noetic and noetic activity is its higher life, both when the soul operates noetically and when *Nous* acts upon us. For *Nous* too is a part of ourselves and to it we ascend' (*Ennead* I. 1 [53] 13. 5-8, adapted).

CHAPTER 10

Chapter 10 continues with the explanation that consciousness on the level of the combination of body and soul is not a necessity for *eudaimonia*. Ch. 9 finished with the affirmation that 'we are the activity of *Nous*' (line 29). Ch. 10 illustrates how this activity continues regardless of whether or not any image of it presents itself to the faculty of imagination. Plotinus is concerned to show that consciousness, on the level of the combination, of this higher self, operating in *Nous*, is irrelevant to the *eudaimonia* of the *spoudaios*. Indeed, as the examples in the later part of the chapter show, consciousness of this higher activity may even enfeeble it. The activity of our higher soul is in fact most pure when it is not spilt out into the faculty of imagination.

10. 1–3 *Λανθάνει δὲ ἴσως . . . περὶ τούτων* *Perhaps it escapes our attention . . . on account of these things [the objects of sense]*: Plotinus gives an explanation of why we are not normally aware of this unceasing activity of *Nous*. The activity, he suggests, escapes our attention because it is not involved with sense-objects. Noetic activity is normally derived from sense-perception. Generally, we are more aware of being noetically active in accordance with sensation, because of the other man who has attached himself to the true man; see

Ennead II. 3 [52] 9. 24 ff. and VI. 4 [22] 14. 15 ff. As a result we concentrate on the activities of the combination, especially as children (see I. 1 [53] 11. 1 ff.), and so are aware of being active primarily through sense-perception.[1] In *Ennead* V. 3 [49] 3. 40-2 we are told: *ἀλλ' αἴσθησις μὲν ἀεὶ ἡμέτερον δοκεῖ συγκεχωρημένον—ἀεὶ γὰρ αἰσθανόμεθα—νοῦς δὲ ἀμφισβητεῖται, καὶ ὅτι μὴ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ καὶ ὅτι χωριστός* 'and it is generally agreed that sense-perception is always ours—or we are always perceiving—but there is disagreement about *Nous*, both because we do not always use it and because it is separate' (adapted). See also *Ennead* IV. 8 [6] 4. 26–9.

10. 2–3 *διὰ γὰρ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὥσπερ μέσης περὶ ταῦτα ἐνεργεῖν δοκεῖ καὶ περὶ τούτων* *through sensation as an intermediary, we are necessarily active concerning these things and on account of these things [the objects of sense]*: as my translation indicates, I prefer *δεῖ* here in place of *δοκεῖ*, the accepted reading of H/S^2, B/T, and Armstrong. Bréhier too prefers *δεῖ* but then ignores the force of it in his translation and ends up saying something not to be found in the Greek at all.[2] Plotinus has just turned our attention to the objects of sense, explaining that it is on account of these that we fail to notice the activity of *Nous*. In this context *δεῖ* makes better sense than *δοκεῖ*, because Plotinus is attempting to explain why the objects of *Nous* are not always clearly available to the combination of body and soul. Of necessity the combination must take account of sense-perception or its results.[3] Bréhier also brackets *καὶ τούτων*, and may well be right to

[1] Thus the need to leave sense-perception behind when one enters *Nous* is stressed in *Ennead* V. 8 [31] 11. 9–12: *ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ κέρδος τοῦτ' ἔχει· ἀρχόμενος αἰσθάνεται αὑτοῦ, ἕως ἕτερός ἐστι· δραμὼν δὲ εἰς τὸ εἴσω ἔχει πᾶν, καὶ ἀφεὶς τὴν αἴσθησιν εἰς τοὐπίσω τοῦ ἕτερος εἶναι φόβῳ εἷς ἐστιν ἐκεῖ* 'In this turning he has the advantage that to begin with he perceives himself, while he is different from the god; then he hastens inward and has everything and leaves sense-perception behind in his fear of being different, and is one in that higher world' (adapted).

[2] '[C]ar ce n'est que par l'intermédiaire de la sensation qu'il peut rapporter son activité à des objets intellectuals.' MacKenna preserves the force of *δεῖ* but is rather loose with the remainder of the sentence: '[N]o doubt action upon material things, or action dictated by them, must proceed through the sensitive faculty which exists for that use.'

[3] Plotinus' account of sense-perception is quite a complicated matter. See E. K. Emilsson, *Plotinus on Sense Perception* (1988). What is clear though, and particularly relevant here, is that the combination of body and soul is always

do so, as it seems an awkward repetition, although it does emphasize our connection to body, and the necessity for us to deal with sensory phenomena.

10. 2 περὶ ταῦτα *concerning these things*: B/T note that *ταῦτα* are *τὰ αἰσθητά*, and they refer to *De Anima* 424^a4 and 431^a11, where sense-perception, as the intermediate stage between *τὰ αἰσθητά* and the soul's perception, is stressed. Although there is an important difference between Aristotle's and Plotinus' theories of sense-perception, in that Plotinus replaces Aristotle's use of a medium with the theory of *συμπάθεια*,[4] their concepts of how the soul finally perceives are strikingly similar. See below in line 19, where Plotinus uses *φαντασία* in the Aristotelian manner.

10. 3–5 αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ νοῦς…ὅλως ἀντιλήψεως *But* Nous *itself…conscious apprehension in general?*: It seems to me that Plotinus continues to develop this theme directly in response to Aristotle. Aristotle insists that soul does not think without creating a *phantasma* (*De Anima* 431^a 16–17; 432^a 3–9, and *On Memory and Recollection* 449^b 31).[5] But for Plotinus, operating within a different ontological framework, noetic activity takes place before *phantasmata* are created, and, more importantly, can take place whether *phantasmata* are created or not. This, then, is a fundamental question for Plotinus. The remainder of this chapter concerns itself with the ontological implications of the activity of *Nous* and its priority to any sort of consciousness on the level of the combination of the body and soul. In Plotinian terms *Nous* is prior, *πρότερος*, to the world of the

active with regard to sense-perception, regardless of whether or not one is a *spoudaios*. Plotinus explains it thus in *Ennead* I. 1 [53] 7. 6–12: *ἀλλὰ πῶς ἡμεῖς αἰσθανόμεθα; ἤ, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπηλλάγημεν τοῦ τοιούτου ζῴου, καὶ εἰ ἄλλα ἡμῖν τιμιώτερα εἰς τὴν ὅλην ἀνθρώπου οὐσίαν ἐκ πολλῶν οὖσαν πάρεστι. τὴν δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι δύναμιν οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἶναι δεῖ, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐγγιγνομένων τῷ ζῴῳ τύπων ἀντιληπτικὴν εἶναι μᾶλλον· νοητὰ γὰρ ἤδη ταῦτα* 'But then, how is it we who perceive? It is because we are not separated from the living being so qualified, even if other things too, of more value than we are, enter into the composition of the whole essence of man, which is made of many elements. And soul's power of sense-perception need not be perception of sense-objects, but rather it must be receptive of the impressions produced by sensation on the living being; these are already noetic entities' (adapted).

[4] Emilsson, *Plotinus on Sense-Perception*, 57.

[5] See Watson, *Phantasia in Classical Thought*, 14–34.

combination, which is ὕστερος. See comm. on ch. 3. 18–19, where these terms are used by Plotinus to explain the real world of *Nous* and its image in the sensory world. It is reasonable to expect that what creates the image will be prior to its product, and active regardless.

10. 4 ἡ ψυχὴ περὶ αὐτὸν *the soul concerning it*: This is our higher soul which remains in *Nous*.[6] Plotinus was greatly indebted to Aristotle's *De Anima* for this idea of an undescended part of the soul, which was not something he could find in the Platonic tradition.[7] This part of the soul belongs to *Nous* and this is the metaphysical basis of Plotinus' conception of *eudaimonia*.[8] Because this soul is forever in *Nous*, and is forever available to us, *eudaimonia* is always possible regardless of the disturbance to the body/soul combination. In *Ennead* I. 1 [53] 9. 1–4 the higher soul is cleared of responsibility for the body/soul combination.[9] This view of the higher soul was not readily accepted by later Neoplatonists who questioned its position in *Nous*.[10]

10. 4–5 ὅλως ἀντιλήψεως *conscious apprehension in general*: See comm. on ch. 9. 27.

10. 5–6 δεῖ γὰρ ... εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ εἶναι *For it is necessary ... if to think and to be are the same*: As H/S² and Armstrong note, this is a fragment from Parmenides. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι (*Fr.* B3, D/K). H/S² refer to *Ennead* III. 8 [30] 8. 8, and V. 1 [10]

[6] οὐ γὰρ ὅλη ἀπέστη, ἀλλ' ἔστι τι αὐτῆς οὐκ ἐληλυθός ... ταὐτὸν τῷ ἐκ τῆς ἄνω οὔσης καὶ τῆς ἐκεῖθεν ῥυείσης δὲ 'Because the whole of it did not depart, but there is something of it which did not come down ... soul is composed of the part which is above and that which is attached to that higher world but has flowed out' (*Ennead* IV. 2 [21] 1. 12 ff.).

[7] See H. J. Blumenthal, 'On Soul and Intellect', (1996), 92.

[8] Although I write as if there are clear divisions between the hypostatic levels, it is not the case that such divisions can clearly be established, see e.g. *Ennead* VI. 4 [22] 14.

[9] ἔσται τοίνυν ἐκείνης ἡμῖν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ φύσις ἀπηλλαγμένη αἰτίας κακῶν, ὅσα ἄνθρωπος ποιεῖ καὶ πάσχει· περὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῷον ταῦτα, τὸ κοινόν, ὡς εἴρηται 'The nature of that higher soul of ours will be free from all responsibility for the evil that man does and suffers; these concern the living being, the joint entity, as has been said'. But as A. Smith notes: 'Plotinus' general attitude to the relationship of body and transcendent soul is one of complex ambiguity' ('Action and Contemplation in Plotinus' (2005), 65).

[10] See Proclus, The *Elements of Theology*, prop. 211. For references to other Neoplatonists concerning this topic, see Blumenthal, *Plotinus' Psychology*, 6 n. 17.

8. 17, where it is repeated. Armstrong also notes *Ennead* v. 1 [10] 8. 17. In addition see v. 6 [24] 6. 22–3; v. 9 [5] 5. 29–30; vi. 7 [38] 41. 18–19, 36–7, where it is used again. In *Ennead* v. 9 [5] 8. 17 Being and *Nous* are said to be the one nature (*τό τε ὂν ὅ τε νοῦς*). Any attempt to explain what Parmenides actually meant by the line must give way to an explanation of how Plotinus uses it. Since he does quote it a number of times it is not difficult to see that he explains it in terms of the union of the activity of *Nous*, and the substance of real Being, at the level of *Nous.*[11] See comm. on ch. 9. 18–23. In general, Henry sees this union introduced primarily in response to Aristotle.[12]

10. 6–10 ***καὶ ἔοικεν ἡ ἀντίληψις εἶναι . . . ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ περὶ τὸ λεῖον καὶ λαμπρὸν ἡσυχάζον*** *Conscious apprehension seems to exist . . . as happens in a mirror-image when the smooth and bright surface is peaceful*: Plotinus here describes how, under normal conditions, we become, on the level of the body/soul combination, conscious of the unceasing activity of thought in *Nous*. Our higher soul, as a member of that world, is in touch continually with this activity, and 'we' on the level of the combination become aware of it too when the higher faculty of imagination (which we shall examine in line 22 below) produces images of this thought, which we can then grasp as *phantasmata*. This process is described in *Ennead* iv. 3 [27] 30. 7–11.[13]

[11] *ὁ νοῦς ἄρα τὰ ὄντα ὄντως, οὐχ οἷά ἐστιν ἄλλοθι νοῶν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν οὔτε πρὸ αὐτοῦ οὔτε μετ' αὐτόν· ἀλλὰ οἷον νομοθέτης πρῶτος, μᾶλλον δὲ νόμος αὐτὸς τοῦ εἶναι. ὀρθῶς ἄρα τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστί τε καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης ἐπιστήμη ταὐτὸν τῷ πράγματι* '*Nous* therefore really thinks the real beings, not as if they were somewhere else: for they are neither before it nor after it; but it is like the primary lawgiver, or rather is itself the law of being. So the statements are correct that 'thinking and being are the same thing' and 'knowledge of immaterial things is the same as its object' (*Ennead* v. 9 [5] 5. 26–31, adapted).

[12] Henry, P., 'The Place of Plotinus in the History of Thought', p. liv in Dillon, *Plotinus: The* Enneads. On Plotinus' use of this Parmenidean fragment see Atkinson, Ennead *V.1*, 193.

[13] *τὸ μὲν γὰρ νόημα ἀμερὲς καὶ οὔπω οἷον προεληλυθὸς εἰς τὸ ἔξω ἔνδον ὂν λανθάνει, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἀναπτύξας καὶ ἐπάγων ἐκ τοῦ νοήματος εἰς τὸ φανταστικὸν ἔδειξε τὸ νόημα οἷον ἐν κατόπτρῳ, καὶ ἡ ἀντίληψις αὐτοῦ οὕτω καὶ ἡ μονὴ καὶ μνήμη.* 'The noetic act is without parts and has not, so to speak, come out into the open, but remains unobserved within, but the verbal expression unfolds its content and brings it out of the noetic act into the image making power, and so shows the noetic act as if in a mirror, and this is how there is conscious apprehension and persistence and memory of it' (adapted).

Although imagination has clearly an active role in using images, Plotinus describes it here in a passive sense of simple reflection (it becomes what it reflects, *πάντα γίνεται* IV. 4 [28] 3. 11), but note IV. 5 [29] 7. 44 ff., where he insists that even a mirror-image must be regarded as activity. See also *Timaeus* 71 b1–4, where Plato is discussing the mortal parts of the soul. The liver is described as solid, smooth and bright (*λεῖον καὶ λαμπρὸν*); it is so constructed in order that the power of thought may be reflected in it as in a mirror (*ἐν κατόπτρῳ*). The verbal similarity is striking, although obviously neither the images, nor the liver, have any share in rationality.

10. 7–8 *καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος τοῦ κατὰ τὸ ζῆν τῆς ψυχῆς* *and the activity according to the life of the [higher] soul*: This is the life of the higher soul which contemplates the content of *Nous* non-discursively. The importance of this higher soul in Plotinus, and its criticism by later Neoplatonists, is discussed in comm. on line 3 above.

10. 9–10 *ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ περὶ τὸ λεῖον καὶ λαμπρὸν ἡσυχάζον* *as happens in a mirror-image when the smooth and bright surface is peaceful*: It seems to me that *τὸ λεῖον καὶ λαμπρὸν ἡσυχάζον* shows that Plotinus is thinking primarily about a reflection in a pool of water, rather than an actual polished surface of a mirror. Plotinus here uses the mirror analogy for the functioning of the *τὸ φανταστικόν*. He also uses it to explain the ontological links between the hypostases. With it he reminds us of the unreality of this sensory world which we inhabit. Just as our discursive thought is only an image of non-discursive thought in *Nous*, so, too, this entire sensory world is only an image, without substantial being. This helps to explain Plotinus' lack of regard for what happens here, in what is only a reflected world. See *Enneads* I. 1 [53] 8. 15–18; III. 6 [26] 14. 2; IV. 3 [27] 11. 7; IV. 3 [27] 12. 1–2; and VI. 4 [22] 10. 13. The ultimate source of the mirror analogy is, as is noted by H/S^2 in their *fontes addendi*, Plato's, *Timaeus* 46b2–3, see also *Timaeus* 71b–d. For a detailed discussion of archetypes and images in Plotinus see Wagner.[14]

10. 10–12 *ὡς οὖν ... τὸ εἴδωλον ἦν ἄν* *Therefore ... present in actuality*: This explains how *eudaimonia*, once established, continues regardless of the body/soul combination. The activity reflected in the mirror will continue regardless of the condition of the mirror and its

[14] M. Wagner, 'Plotinus' World', 13–42.

ability to reflect the activity. In what way the soul mirror, or *τὸ φανταστικόν*, might not be present is not at once obvious. Smith considers that it might be a gratuitous import from Plotinus' comparison of the *τὸ φανταστικόν* to a physical mirror.[15] This is indeed possible.

10. 12–16 *οὕτω καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν . . . μετὰ τῆς προτέρας γνώσεως* *in the same way also concerning the soul . . . as in sense-perception*: Plotinus is referring here to the power of *τὸ φανταστικόν*.[16] This is the normal centre of our conscious experience, where we are, by and large, made aware of our body/soul combination through sense-perception. But the power of imagination receives images from both the higher soul in *Nous*, and from the lower soul in the sensory world. We can in fact speak of a dual power of imagination.[17] It is, in fact, the higher power of imagination that Plotinus is referring to here, that which mirrors the images from *Nous*.[18] We are conscious of our combination *only* when we receive images from *Nous* or the sensory world. Most often we are conscious of the *phantasmata* formed in the lower imagination.[19] This process Plotinus describes as a mirror-activity, reflecting images from above and below. The activity of *Nous* is in fact degraded in this process of reflection, as it naturally suffers ontological degeneration in its attempt to meet sensory knowledge, while by contrast, sensory activity is upgraded, receiving a higher ontological status as its sensory image, in its immaterial form, is now more unified.[20] This, however, leaves Plotinus with a duality of images in both the lower and higher souls, which he tries to eliminate by claiming that when the higher and lower soul are in tune, the images become one, when that of the better soul becomes dominant (IV. 3. 31. 9–20).[21]

[15] Smith, 'Unconsciousness and Quasiconsciousness', 295.

[16] I translate *τὸ φανταστικόν* here as Imagination, aware that this has modern connotations which have no place in Plotinus' thought. Schibli refers to this power of imagination as a 'middle-soul' ('Apprehending our Happiness', 205–19).

[17] The higher imagination divides what is unified, while the lower imagination unifies what has been divided by the senses, Warren, 'Imagination in Plotinus', 278.

[18] See Wijsenbeek, 'Man as a Double Being', 184.

[19] See *Ennead* I. 1 [53] 11. 1 ff.

[20] Warren, 'Imagination in Plotinus', 278, 284.

[21] What happens when there is disharmony is explained by Plotinus in lines 13–21. His meaning here is far from clear and does not immediately concern us, but see Warren, 'Imagination in Plotinus', 283 and J. Dillon, 'Plotinus and the Transcendental Imagination', (1986), 55–64.

10. 17–19 συγκλασθέντος δὲ τούτου . . . καὶ ἄνευ φαντασίας ἡ νόησις τότε *But when this is broken . . . and noetic activity is then without* phantasmata: It is very seldom that Plotinus discusses consciousness without *phantasmata* in the *Enneads*. This is one of the few occasions. What exactly Plotinus means by the disruption of the harmony of the body is not clear. Presumably it is not simply a case when our body disrupts the imaging power, thus causing the images from the higher imagination to be confused with images from the lower.[22] It seems to me, however, that something else is meant because it is not simply a matter of confusion. The connection is actually broken (*συγκλασθέντος*), and no phantasmata (*ἄνευ φαντασίας*) are actually formed. It is this very idea that he tries to explain by the reading analogy (line 24 below). The situation he is referring to is one when the image-making faculty is inactive. If we accept Warren's[23] view, as I do, that 'the centre of our conscious everyday experience is not our metaphysical centre, reason, but the imagination', then *συγκλασθέντος δὲ τούτου* refers to a state of unconsciousness in the body/soul combination, with which he began chapter 9. The point is that consciousness in the body/soul combination, the making and grasping of images, is irrelevant to the activity of *Nous* itself, and this activity is of course what constitutes *eudaimonia*.

10. 19 ἄνευ φαντασίας *without* phantasmata: It is easy to recognize Plotinus' debt to Aristotle's *De Anima* 427[b]–429[a] regarding this term.[24] There Aristotle first explains what a *phantasma* is not. *φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα μετ' αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ δι' αἰσθήσεως,*

[22] This process is described in *Ennead* IV. 3 [27] 31. 9–20. Blumenthal thinks that this is what Plotinus means here, and he refers us to IV. 3 [27] 30. 13–16: *ἄλλο γὰρ ἡ νόησις, καὶ ἄλλο ἡ τῆς νοήσεως ἀντίληψις, καὶ νοοῦμεν μὲν ἀεί, ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα δὲ οὐκ ἀεί· τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι τὸ δεχόμενον οὐ μόνον δέχεται νοήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἰσθήσεις κατὰ θάτερα* 'The noetic act is one thing and the consciousness apprehension of it another, and we are always noetically active but we do not always consciously apprehend our activity; and this is so because that which receives it does not only receive noetic acts, but also, on its other side, perceptions' (adapted), Blumenthal, *Plotinus' Psychology*, 89.

[23] Warren, 'Consciousness in Plotinus', 85 n. 7.

[24] Although, it should be noted, there is little agreement that Aristotle had a unified concept of *phantasia*. It is a topic largely ignored in Plato (Watson, *Phantasia in Classical Thought*, 15).

οὐδὲ συμπλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως φαντασία ἂν εἴη 'It is clear, then, that *phantasia* cannot be either opinion in conjunction with sensation, or opinion based on sensation, or a blend of opinion and sensation' (428^a24–6, Hett trans.). Aristotle goes on to suggest that it is a movement, which does not occur apart from perception, and whatever possesses it often acts or is affected in accordance with it. Later, he suggests, it is a *κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένης* 'a movement produced by sensation actively operating' (429^a1–2, Hett trans.).[25] It is not sensation or thinking. Watson, in analysing Aristotle's concept of *phantasia*, suggests that Aristotle saw it as involved in both supplying the material on which the mind builds judgements and in the mutation of sense-perceptions into *phantasmata*, which are then available for the activity of the noetic soul.[26] There is no doubt, then, that Plotinus was greatly influenced by this thinking when he came to use the term himself, see Emilsson,[27] Blumenthal,[28] Clark,[29] and Watson.[30] Plotinus' theory of the power of imagination is, however, in the final analysis, a major development from Aristotle. In Aristotle *phantasia* is a function of the soul, which is dependent on body (*De Anima* 403^a8–10). But Plotinus has introduced a new, higher power, not concerned with body.[31] In Plotinus images come from above and below,[32] although when Plotinus talks about imagination, it is very frequently lower mind images he is discussing, imagination in conjunction with perception and desire, and its ability to distract the soul.[33] Blumenthal[34] argues for a sub-sensitive power of imagination, but he is, I think, rightly refuted by Emilsson.[35] What exactly does Plotinus

[25] For discussion of Aristotle's concept of *phantasia*, see Watson, *Phantasia in Classical Thought*, 14–34.
[26] Ibid. 26, 27.
[27] Emilsson, *Plotinus on Sense-Perception*, 108.
[28] Blumenthal, *Plotinus' Psychology*, 135 ff.
[29] Clark, '*Φαντασία* in Plotinus', 306 n. 33.
[30] Watson, *Phantasia in Classical Thought*, 100.
[31] See Dillon, 'Plotinus and the Transcendental Imagination', 55.
[32] For a good description of how this works in practice see Dillon, ibid. 56–61.
[33] Watson, *Phantasia in Classical Thought*, 98.
[34] Blumenthal, 'Plotinus' Adaptation of Aristotle's Psychology', 51–5.
[35] Emilsson, *Plotinus on Sense-Perception*, 167.

mean by a *phantasma*? It is clearly more than a mere image, for which Plotinus here uses τὸ εἴδωλον (lines 11 and 12 above). A *phantasma* would appear to be created when an image (εἴδωλον) is processed by the faculty of imagination, and memory of the resultant *phantasma* becomes possible.[36] Thus Plotinus says here that noetic activity normally occurs with *phantasmata*, he is careful not to use τὸ εἴδωλον (image) in this case. For extended analysis of how this power of imagination operates, see Warren,[37] Clark,[38] Dillon,[39] and Watson.[40]

10. 19–21 ὥστε καὶ τοιοῦτον . . . φαντασίας *so one might think . . .* phantasmata: Once again we see that Plotinus is focusing on the relationship between the activity of *Nous*, and our consciousness of this activity on the level of the body/soul combination. What he means here is that the activity of our higher soul in *Nous* is normally available to us through the medium of imagination. Remember that we are discussing only exceptional circumstances when this connection is disrupted by sickness or magic arts (9. 1). O'Daly[41] notes that lack of awareness does not necessarily lessen the experience and he refers to *Ennead* IV. 4 [28] 4. 10–11, where Plotinus says: καὶ μὴ παρακολουθοῦντα ὅτι ἔχει, ἔχειν παρ᾽ αὐτῷ ἰσχυροτέρως ἢ εἰ εἰδείη 'For it could happen that, even when one is not conscious that one has something, one holds it to oneself more strongly than if one knew'. This is what the remainder of this chapter attempts to explain through the analogies of reading and being courageous.

10. 21–4 πολλὰς δ᾽ ἄν τις εὕροι καὶ ἐγρηγορότων καλὰς ἐνεργείας . . . τὸ παρακολουθεῖν ἡμᾶς αὐταῖς οὐκ ἐχούσας *One could find also in our wakeful life many fine activities . . . without us being conscious of these things*: This passage is very important because it provides the link to what follows. Plotinus is explaining that we often perform activities during which no *phantasmata* are formed in the imagin-

[36] See *Ennead* IV. 4 [28] 8 where Plotinus explains why some images are not converted into *phantasmata* by the Imagination.
[37] Warren, 'Imagination in Plotinus', 277–85.
[38] Clark, 'Φαντασία in Plotinus', 297–309.
[39] Dillon, 'Plotinus and the Transcendental Imagination', 55–64.
[40] Watson, *Phantasia in Classical Thought*, 96–103.
[41] O'Daly, *Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self*, 110 n. 10.

ation, or if *phantasmata* are formed, we do not pay enough attention for us to be conscious of them. This may be the case with images from above (ὅτε θεωροῦμεν) and below (ὅτε πράττομεν). What he has in mind is, we infer, presumably habitual action. We are conscious, but not directly conscious of what we are doing. Images are being presented to the imagination, but as Plotinus notes, we may not observe them sufficiently in order to be conscious of them (*Ennead* IV. 4 [28] 8. 16 ff.).

10. 24–8 οὐ γὰρ τὸν ἀναγινώσκοντα ἀνάγκη παρακολουθεῖν ὅτι ἀναγινώσκει ... καὶ ἄλλα μυρία *For the reader is not necessarily conscious that he is reading ... and there are countless other examples*: Plotinus now gives examples of what he means, which have troubled some interpreters.[42] This much, it seems to me, is clear. The activity of *eudaimonia* exists in *Nous.* Its activity is ceaseless and we have *eudaimonia* when we establish ourselves there. Now whether we (ἡμεῖς),[43] on the body/soul combination level of image making, are aware of this activity or not, is irrelevant. The reading example explains this. We read (as we are active in *Nous*) regardless of whether we create *phantasmata* or not. We do not need to be conscious of what we are doing i.e. we do not make judgements on images as in a subject/object relationship, even if images are presented, because, as will be explained below, to make such judgments would destroy the act itself. The point is that we operate better when we operate directly without *phantasmata.* We read better when we are not conscious of a subject/object relationship in the act of reading. We have a purer level of knowledge when we don't use images. The reading example is, understandably, not a perfect representation of what happens in *Nous;*[44] it is an analogy at a different level of reality. The other example, of bravery, illustrates the same point. When we are being brave we do not necessarily reflect on the fact that we are being brave.

[42] See Smith, 'Unconsciousness and Quasiconsciousness', 294.

[43] On the importance of the use of ἡμεῖς in Plotinus see E. R. Dodds, 'Tradition and Personal Achievement in the Philosophy of Plotinus', (1960), 5 ff.

[44] 'A mystic can not adequately explain what he has seen because the human imagination does not (and can not) form an image of the object experienced without subjecting that object to ontological damage' (Warren, 'Consciousness in Plotinus', 86).

There is no intermediate stage involving the imagination. This direct activity of the soul in the body/soul combination is how our higher soul acts in *Nous*. We may be unconscious of this higher self, which was the whole point of the mirror analogy, but this is not necessarily a bad thing. Wijsenbeek[45] is unsure whether she should connect the mirror and reading analogies, but I think it is clear that they are two parts of a single explanation.

10. 24 ***τὸν ἀναγινώσκοντα*** *the reader*: Plotinus is most likely thinking of someone reading out loud. This was normal practice in his day.

10. 28–33 ***ὥστε τὰς παρακολουθήσεις κινδυνεύειν ἀμυδροτέρας αὐτὰς τὰς ἐνεργείας . . . ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ συνηγμένον*** *so that consciousness threatens to make dimmer these very activites . . . but gathered together in the same thing in itself*: An interesting point is to be made about this final passage. Plotinus says that conscious awareness will detract from the activity itself. To be aware that one is reading, as one is reading, inhibits the very act of reading. Is Plotinus then saying that we should encourage such unconscious activity? I think not. Although we do perform thousands of unconscious acts, in some cases, it would be impossible to play a part in the sensory world without being aware of what one is doing. The *spoudaios* is capable of being conscious on two ontological levels, or in Smith's terms, he is capable of both vertical and horizontal consciousness.[46] He emphasizes habitual actions here because they provide some sort of parallel to what can occur in *Nous*.[47] Linguiti notes *Ennead* IV. 4 [28] 4. 10 and IV. 4 [28] 25. 5, where Plotinus also states that concentration, at times, can preclude conscious awareness.

10. 28 ***τὰς παρακολουθήσεις*** *consciousness*: Note the use of the plural here. Wijsenbeek suggests that it may indicate two kinds of consciousness,[48] which is correct up to a point, but I think the plural is used here in a reference to the dual faculty of imagination.

10. 28–9 ***ἀμυδροτέρας*** *dimmer*: One might see here a technical use of this word, especially in view of the presence of *καθαρὰς* in line 30.

[45] Wijsenbeek, 'Man as a Double Being', 183.

[46] Smith, 'Unconsciousness and Quasiconsciousness', 293. Note *VP* 8. 20 where Porphyry notes Plotinus' ability to be conscious on two ontological levels at the same time.

[47] Smith, 'Unconsciousness and Quasiconsciousness', 295.

[48] Wijsenbeek, 'Man as a Double Being', 184.

Normally these two terms are set in opposition, ἀμυδροτέρας referring to the dimness of the sensory world (see comm. on ch. 3. 21–2), while καθαρὰς is associated with the purity of *Nous*. Seeing through *phantasmata*, represents a diminution in ontological terms.

CHAPTER 11

This is the first of three small chapters according to the division of the text by Marsilio Ficino. The arrangement of the text by Ficino here seems quite sensible as ch. 11 clearly marks the end of the sustained discussion concerning *eudaimonia* and consciousness presented in chs. 9 and 10. The chapter begins with an objection that Plotinus considers his opponents would make, that is, that the man who is unconscious can hardly be said even to be alive. Plotinus counters this by arguing that his opponents' objections are misguided, in the main, because they do not fully appreciate the ontological status of the *spoudaios*. Some commentators have thought that Plotinus is arguing here only against the views of the Stoics. I will show, however, that this view is based largely on a remark by Bréhier, which is not at all supported by the references Bréhier gives. Both the context and the content here make it much more plausible to suggest that Plotinus is still referring to both Aristotle and the Stoics.

11. 1–3 Εἰ δέ τινες μηδὲ ζῆν λέγοιεν τὸν τοιοῦτον ... ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ζῆν *But if some were to say that such a person is not living ... as also does his life*: An objection is raised to the thesis set out in chs. 9 and 10. Some commentators, B/T and Llorens, for example, take τινες here to be a reference to the Stoics (see also line 8 below). I do not believe that Plotinus is referring exclusively to the Stoics in this chapter. Those who would say that a man who is unconscious can hardly even be spoken about as living, never mind living well, are surely Aristotelians. The thrust of the *EN*, and the *EE*, is that *eudaimonia* is an activity that can never be at rest. For the concept of *eudaimonia* as inherently active, see the many references to Aristotle in the comm. on ch. 1.1. The Stoics, on the other hand, would have

been much closer to accepting the Plotinian thesis laid out in chs. 9 and 10, although it is difficult to know how they would have ruled on the unconscious person. It was, after all, the internal disposition of the sage that was of greatest importance to them. See Epictetus, *Disc.* 2. 10. 1 and *Disc.* 4. 12. 19. In Stoic parlance, it is one's moral purpose which is the key to *eudaimonia*, and a state of unconsciousness in no way destroys that. Plotinus, it seems to me, raises here an objection that is much more likely to be of Peripatetic origin.

11. 2–3 λανθάνειν δ' αὐτοὺς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τοῦ τοιούτου, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ζῆν *but that the* eudaimonia *of such a person escapes them, as also does his life*: What Plotinus means here is that the life of the *spoudaios* exists separately from the body in the timelessness of *Nous*, wherein lies his *eudaimonia*. In general see *Ennead* 1. 5 [36]. Since Aristotle considered activity to be a *sine qua non* for *eudaimonia*, Plotinus can say that in the unconscious man Aristotle fails to see not only his *eudaimonia*, but also his life. See *EN* $1102^{b}6$–7 and *EE* $1216^{a}3$–10 where such a situation is envisaged; 'sleep' in both these passages clearly means a lack of consciousness. For St Ambrose's use of this passage see Appendix 1.

11. 3–10 εἰ δὲ μὴ πείθοιντο, ἀξιώσομεν αὐτοὺς . . . τὸ βουλητὸν αὐτοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἔξω: *If they are not persuaded, we will ask them . . . the object of his will in external things*: Plotinus presents, in the light of his own metaphysical structures, a series of objections to the way others have undertaken an examination of *eudaimonia*. The objections that follow only make sense if we understand fully what Plotinus is indicating here. We must take into account all that has been said in earlier chapters, especially ch. 3 and 4, where the ontological status of the *spoudaios* was explained. The Plotinian *spoudaios* is not limited to a material body, but is part of *Nous*. The life of the *spoudaios* is a life of non-discursive noetic activity. As such he is one who lacks nothing (ch. 4. 21). It seems to me that both Aristotle and the Stoics are the objects of Plotinus' attentions here. Ch. 1 showed Plotinus' ability to change rapidly from school to school in delivering criticism.

11. 5–6 μηδὲ τὸ ζῆν αὐτοῦ ἐλαττώσαντας τὸ εὖ ζῆν ζητεῖν εἰ πάρεστι *not having diminished his life look to see if living well is present [to him]*: What Plotinus is objecting to here was fully explained in ch. 3. There it was noted that *eudaimonia* belonged to ὅτῳ ἄγαν ὑπάρχει τὸ

ζῆν 'to whatever has a superabundance of life' (24). Aristotle saw τὸ εὖ ζῆν as equal to τὸ εὖ πράττειν, *EN* $1098^{b}21$. Indeed for the greater part of the *EN* Aristotle links practical activity to *eudaimonia*. Aristotle, the Stoics, and Epicureans minimize the life of the *spoudaios*, in Plotinus' view, by connecting him to a material body. In linking *eudaimonia* to good actions (*EN* $1099^{a}1$ff.; *EN* $1099^{b}31$–32; *EE* $1219^{b}1$ff.), Aristotle is, in Plotinus' view, diminishing the ontological status of the life of the *spoudaios*.

11. 7–9 μηδὲ τὸν σπουδαῖον . . . ζητεῖν *nor to concede . . . in external activities*: Many commentators have followed the lead of Bréhier here, considering this to be an obvious reference to the Stoics. Bréhier sees Epictetus as the object of Plotinus' critique here, citing *Disc.* 3. 22. 38; 1. 4. 18; 3. 3; 3. 20 as evidence. I think that this has unfortunately narrowed the focus somewhat. Bréhier's references are, in fact, much too general to support what he says here. Although it is not difficult to attach the formula εἰς τὸ εἴσω ἐπεστράφθαι to the Stoics, it is more difficult to affix ἐν ταῖς ἔξωθεν ἐνεργείαις αὐτὸν ζητεῖν, which I suggest Bréhier fails to do, especially with the references to *Disc.* 3. 3 and 3. 20. In fact in *Disc.* 3. 3. 8–9, we find: ἐὰν δ' ἐν ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει θῶμεν, αὐτὸ τὸ τηρεῖν τὰς σχέσεις ἀγαθὸν γίνεται καὶ λοιπὸν ὁ τῶν ἐκτός τινων ἐκχωρῶν, οὗτος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τυγχάνει 'If, however, we define the good as consisting in a right moral purpose, then the mere preservation of the relationships of life becomes a good; and furthermore, he *who gives up* some of the externals achieves the good' (my italics). H/S[2] also refer to Epictetus, *Disc.* 1. 4. 8, on the strength of Bréhier's comment. B/T, too, also follow Bréhier and refer to Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 7. 68. 3 and Seneca, *De Vita Beata* 21. 4. Again the references here to Marcus Aurelius and Seneca are slightly misleading, because they admit only that the wise man will enjoy natural benefits not that *he will seek them*.[1]

I do not necessarily exclude the Stoics from this criticism but again I think it reasonable to suggest that Aristotle ought to be considered

[1] Nec enim se sapiens indignum ullis muneribus fortuitis putat. Non amat divitias, sed mavult; non in animum illas, sed in domum recipit, nec respuit possessas 'For indeed the wise man does not deem himself undeserving of any of the gifts of Fortune. He does not love riches, but he would rather have them; he does not admit them to this heart, but to his house, and he does not reject the riches he has' (*De Vita Beata* 21. 4, Basore trans.).

here. Indeed Plotinus' highlighting of the apparent contradiction in agreeing that the good for man is within, and then seeking it in externals, may throw some light on how the ancients viewed Aristotle's *EN* and *EE*. Perhaps this is the very contradiction that some modern readers find in Aristotle's ethical writings. In the *EN*, in particular, this dichotomy seems apparent. We seem to have a difficulty in reconciling book 10 with the books that have gone before. In *EN* 1123^{b}16ff., we are told that ὁ μεγαλόψυχος (who is equated with the *spoudaios* in *EN* 1123^{b}29) seeks the greatest of external goods (τὰ ἐκτός), which is honour. In *EN* 1123^{a}6 ff., we are told that ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής furnishes his house in a manner suitable to his wealth. In general throughout the first four books of the *EN* the Aristotelian σπουδαῖος seeks external goods, albeit in a moderate amount. Yet Aristotle in the final chapter of the *EN* appears to equate *eudaimonia* with contemplation (1177^{a}17–18). In doing this he urges the aspiring *spoudaios* to be content with a small quantity of external goods (1179^{a}3 ff.), only those necessary to carry on life as a human being (1178^{b}3–4), and to live in accordance with the highest thing *in him* (ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ) (1177^{b}35) (adapted). See also *EE* 1249^{b}12 where the *spoudaios* is instructed to live with reference to the ruling principle within him (πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχὴν ζῆν).

The Stoics, by contrast, did not encourage us to seek external goods. In fact, their view is much closer to what Plotinus himself recommends. At the beginning of ch. 7, Plotinus himself admitted that the *spoudaios* does not reject the necessities of life when they are presented to him, and thus it would be difficult for him to criticize the Stoics who said much the same thing of their wise man. The Stoic sage seeks no external goods, but merely uses what is presented to him, being aware all the time that these things are ultimately indifferent and make no addition to his *eudaimonia*; see Cicero, *De Finibus* 4. 30. Plotinus agrees that such externals make no contribution to the *eudaimonia* of the *spoudaios*. Aristotle, however, did say that such externals made up part of the aim of the *spoudaios*, even if he did reduce them to a minimum (*EN* 1178^{b}3–4). He is thus a more appropriate object of this criticism.

11. 9 τὸ βουλητὸν αὐτοῦ *the object of his will*: This is the One. Note Plotinus' use of the term 'will' here when referring to this ontological

ascent; when referring to the pursuit of externals he uses the verb 'wish or want' (ἐθέλω). See ch. 7.1.

11. 10–12 ***οὕτω γὰρ ... βούλεσθαι ταῦτα*** *For thus... willed these things*: Plotinus emphasizes that the *eudaimonia* of the *spoudaios* is to be found in *Nous*, real Being; to suggest that it is to be found in externals, is to locate it in the sensory world, and to place it in the ontological category of image.

11. 12–14 ***ἐθέλοι γὰρ ἂν ... ὅμως εὐδαίμων*** *For he would want ... he is nevertheless* eudaimōn: Why the Plotinian *spoudaios* would like all men to prosper is not made clear in the *Enneads*. It can be assumed though that since we all come from the same origin, the return of all souls to their true home is to be encouraged.[2] The claim that the *spoudaios* will maintain his *eudaimonia* regardless of what happens to others was examined in chs. 7. 33 ff. and 8. 12-18 (see comm.). See also 15. 21 ff.

11. 14–17 ***εἰ δέ τις ... ἐπιστρέφουσιν αὑτοῦ τὴν βούλησιν εἰς τὸ εἴσω*** *And if someone ... his will inwards*: A central tenet of Neoplatonic philosophy is that the person aspiring to the One must seek within himself. See comm. on ch. 4. 18–19 (αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὅπερ ἔχει), where the matter is discussed in some detail, including the influence of this thinking on Augustine. Also see Atkinson,[3] who notes that turning inwards characterizes the *spoudaios*. To the references given there one can add *Ennead* v. 1 [10] 12. 14 where we are told: τὸ ἀντιλαμβανόμενον εἰς τὸ εἴσω ἐπιστρέφειν 'that we must turn our power of apprehension inwards'. See also *Ennead* v. 8 [31] 11. 17.

11. 15–16 ***μὴ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὰ κακὰ μὴ εἶναι*** *for it is impossible for evils not to exist*: As B/T and H/S[2] note, this is a cardinal Neoplatonic text, the source of which is Plato's *Theaetetus* 176[a]5. It is to be found again at *Ennead* I. 8 [51] 6. 1-2; I. 8 [51] 7. 11-12; III. 2 [47] 5. 29; III. 2 [47] 15. 10-11.

[2] On this see Rist, *Road to Reality*, (1967), 163–4. See also Dillon, J., 'An ethic for the Late Antique Sage', (1996), 315–35; Smith, 'Significance of Practical Ethics', 234–5; McGroarty, 'The Ethics of Plotinus', 28–33; and, most recently, Schniewind, *L'Éthique du Sage*, 171–97.

[3] Atkinson, Ennead *V.1*, 248.

CHAPTER 12

In ch. 12 Plotinus returns to the part pleasure has to play in the *eudaimōn* life, first touched on in ch. 2. 7.[1] There Plotinus accepted that to be in one's natural and proper state was necessarily pleasant. Here he confirms that the life of the *spoudaios* lived in *Nous* is indeed pleasant in some way. However, the brevity of this chapter is not surprising. Plotinus has serious difficulties in placing pleasure in the life of *Nous*. He is forced to do so because Plato's *Philebus* considered the good to be a mixed life of intellect and pleasure.[2] But what kind of pleasure is to be found in *Nous*? He makes clear the sorts of pleasures that must be excluded, essentially those associated with movement, but the kind of pleasure permitted to the *spoudaios* is never fully clarified. Indeed it is never cogently argued, here, or elsewhere in the *Enneads*,[3] that pleasure, of any kind, can exist at the level of *Nous*.

In general Plato considered pleasure to be a replenishment of something lacking, a movement towards a natural condition.[4] As a Platonist, Plotinus struggles to accommodate the views of the *Philebus* within his own metaphysic. There is no room in *Nous* for pleasure as replenishment of a lack, because *Nous* has no movement and lacks nothing.[5] Plotinus is ultimately forced into a theory of pleasure for the good life that owes more to Aristotle than it does to Plato. Aristotle's theory of pleasure as something that accompanies perfect activity is more easily adapted to *Nous* than Plato's replenishment model. Superficially it also comes quite close to Epicurus' katastematic pleasure. This may be the reason for the brevity of this chapter and the somewhat exasperated

[1] In what follows I am indebted to the excellent analysis of Plotinus' concept of pleasure in Van Riel, *Pleasure and the Good Life*, 94–120. In general, see also J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor, *The Greeks on Pleasure*, (1982).

[2] *Philebus* 20b–23b and 61b–6. Plotinus is clearly unhappy about this. See *Ennead* VI. 7 [38] 25. 1–3.

[3] This chapter is also brief because most of the argument on which it bases its conclusions is to be found in *Ennead* VI. 7 [38] 24–30.

[4] As with most topics, Plato's views on pleasure are scattered throughout a number of dialogues. The *Philebus* does appear to present his most developed thought on the topic.

[5] Note the earlier general statement on pleasure and the *spoudaios* in *Ennead* I. 5 [36] 10. 19–20. ἀλλ' ἡ ἕξις καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ εἴ τι ἡδὺ δι' αὐτὴν ποιεῖ 'it is one's inner state which produces *eudaimonia* and any pleasure that results from it' (adapted).

tone here, where Plotinus, although unwilling, seems to be forced, both by what he finds in the *Philebus*, and by his opponents, to concede that *eudaimonia* contains some element of pleasure.

12. 1 τὸ δὲ ἡδὺ τῷ βίῳ τῷ τοιούτῳ ὅταν ἀπαιτῶσιν *Whenever they demand to know where pleasure is to be found in such a life*: It seems to me that Plotinus shows a certain reluctance in returning to this topic, but it was not something that he could avoid given that most schools considered that the good life brought with it some form of pleasure. Note Plotinus' use of τὸ ἡδύ here, as opposed to ἡ ἡδονή, which he normally employs with regard to bodily pleasure. Naturally enough, physical pleasure is impossible at the level of *Nous*, as is noted in *Ennead* VI. 7 [38] 30. 15-16.

12. 1 τῷ βίῳ τῷ τοιούτῳ *in such a life*: This does not seem to me to refer still to the *spoudaios* in an unconscious state, but simply to the life of the *spoudaios* lived at the level of the higher soul in *Nous.*

12. 1–3 οὐ τὰς τῶν ἀκολάστων οὐδὲ τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἡδονὰς ἀξιώσουσι παρεῖναι *they will not value the presence of the pleasures of the licentious nor [any] bodily pleasures*: This excludes the Hedonists from any serious consideration as one of Plotinus' opponents here. It is likely that Plotinus also has Epicurus in mind, given that the Epicurean hierarchy of kinetic and katastematic pleasures follows shortly. Epicurus was often deliberately misunderstood by his critics.[6] His philosophy was far from hedonistic in any general sense, but some of his teachings gave his enemies much scope to imply that he was.[7] A more balanced view of his philosophy shows that gluttony and incontinence do not constitute the good life

[6] See Van Riel, *Pleasure and the Good Life*, 79–87.

[7] Nec equidem habeo quod intelligam bonum illud, detrahens eas voluptates, quae sapore percipiuntur, detrahens eas, quae auditu et cantibus, detrahens eas etiam, quae ex formis percipiuntur oculis, suaves motiones, sive quae aliae voluptates in toto homine gignuntur quolibet sensu. 'For my part I find no meaning which I can attach to what is termed good, if I take away from it the pleasures obtained by taste, if I take away the pleasures which come from listening to music, if I take away too the charm derived by the eyes from the sight of figures in movement, or other pleasures produced by any of the senses in the whole man' (Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 3. 41, King trans.). And, καὶ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος δέ φησιν 'ἀρχὴ καὶ ῥίζα παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἡ τῆς γαστρὸς ἡδονή' 'Epicurus says: the pleasure of the stomach is the beginning and root of all good' (Usener 409, 70; L/S 21M).

(*Vatican Sayings* 33 and 59 = L/S 21G). Plotinus, like other contemporaries, seldom saw the need to be fair in his appraisal of Epicurus. See comm. on ch. 1. 28.

12. 3–4 αὗται γὰρ ἀδύνατοι παρεῖναι καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀφανιοῦσιν *for it is impossible for these to be present and they will destroy* eudaimonia: Somatic pleasures cannot exist in *Nous*; *eudaimonia* is the preserve of the immaterial higher soul. See ch. 14. 1-5. Presumably Plotinus means by καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀφανιοῦσιν that if *eudaimonia* was lived on the level of body, the resultant instability would continually jeopardize it.

12. 4 οὐδὲ μὴν τὰς περιχαρίας *nor certainly are there excessive joys*: A similar comment is made at *Ennead* I. 5 [36] 8. 7. See also VI. 7 [38] 30. 17-18, where irrational joys of the lower soul are also denied to *Nous* (χαραὶ ψυχῆς ἂν ἄλογοι γένοιντο). Just as there will not be any bodily pleasures, neither will there be excessive emotional pleasures. The use of ἡ χαρά here brings to mind both Epicurus, and the Stoics. The Stoics made a distinction between ἡ ἡδονή and ἡ χαρά. They claimed that although the sage does not experience bodily pleasure (ἡ ἡδονή) as part of the good life, he does experience joy (ἡ χαρά). But Plotinus must reject this too since it also involves movement (*SVF* iii. 111), and therefore has no place in *Nous*. The term can be also associated with Epicurus, and must be rejected on the same basis, since, as a kinetic pleasure, it consists in motion and activity (DL 10. 136).

12. 5–6 ἀλλὰ τὰς συνούσας . . . οὐδὲ γινομένας τοίνυν *but the [pleasures] accompanying ... nor in processes, moreover*: The position most obviously being rejected here is Epicurus' view that kinetic pleasure has a part in the good life. But, ultimately, Plotinus is also rejecting a central view of Plato's concerning pleasure within the good life. Pleasure defined as the replenishment of a lack, the movement towards a natural condition, must also be rejected as a candidate for the pleasure in *Nous*.[8] *Nous* lacks nothing, therefore, there can be

[8] πάλιν δὲ ἁρμοττομένης τε καὶ εἰς τὴν αὑτῆς φύσιν ἀπιούσης ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι λεκτέον 'Conversely, when the harmony is being restored and a return is made to its natural condition, we may say that pleasure is generated' (*Philebus* 31d8–9, adapted). Again at 53c4–7: ἆρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν ὡς ἀεὶ γένεσίς ἐστιν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς; κομψοὶ γὰρ δή τινες αὖ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι μηνύειν ἡμῖν, οἷς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν. 'Are we not told that pleasure is always something that comes to be, that there is no such thing as a pleasure that

no element of this kind of pleasure there (*Ennead* VI. 7 [38] 26). Aristotle had already written against Plato on this point in the *EN* at 1153^a9-15.[9]

12. 6–7 ***ἤδη γὰρ τὰ ἀγαθὰ πάρεστι, καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ πάρεστι*** *for already the goods are present, and he is present to himself*: This is referring to the established state of *eudaimonia.* Note again the ontological use of *ἤδη*. That all goods are present to the *spoudaios* was made clear as early as ch. 4. 20–23 (see comm.). This is so because as a member of *Nous*, the higher soul, in which the *spoudaios* lives, is a one-many. It is both itself, and all other really existing things; see *Ennead* I. 1 [53] 2. 22; IV. 7 [2] 10. 30–35; and VI. 7 [38] 15. 27–8.

12. 7–10 ***καὶ ἕστηκε τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἵλεων τοῦτο ... εἴπερ σπουδαῖος*** *and this pleasure and contentment are stable ... if [he is] a* spoudaios: This is the crux of the chapter. What kind of pleasure is Plotinus referring to here? The genuine pleasures, that is, the bodily pleasures of the *Philebus* have been rejected, as have been the irrational joys of the soul (*Ennead* VI. 7 [38] 30. 15–18). But having excluded them, Plotinus has great difficulty in establishing exactly what kind of pleasure, if any, there is to be found in *Nous*, if he is to remain true to Plato's general view of pleasure as replenishment of a lack. The fundamental problem for Plotinus in accommodating Plato is that *Nous* permits no lack or movement of any kind. Plotinus, therefore, finds Aristotle's view of pleasure as that which supervenes on the completion of the activity of our natural state to be much more acceptable (see *EN*

is? There again you have a theory which certain subtle thinkers endeavour to expound to us, and we should be grateful to them.' See also 54c4 ff. Pleasure and pain are also *κινήσεις* in *Republic* 583e9.

[9] *οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γινομένων συμβαίνουσιν ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον* 'For not all pleasures are comings to be, or accompanied by a coming to be, but rather they are activities, and an end, nor do they occur because a coming to be is in train but because capacities are being put to use; and not all pleasures have something as end, but only those involved in the bringing to completion of one's nature. Hence it is not right to say that pleasure is a perceived process of coming to be; rather one should say that it is an activity of a natural disposition, and replace perceived with unimpeded' (1153^a9–15). See also *EN* 1174^a29 ff.

1153a14–15). This contented and stable condition is actually nearer in kind to the concept of pleasure identified by Epicurus as katastematic,[10] but rejected by Plato because of the perennial want experienced by the human condition. Good lives lived on various ontological levels yield various degrees of pleasure,[11] but, unlike Plato, at the level of *Nous*, Plotinus is reluctant to call this pleasure (*Ennead* VI. 7 [38] 30). He claims in that treatise that Plato only referred to this as pleasure, when referring to the good life, because he could not find an appropriate way of speaking about it. Plotinus, himself, for this very reason, is forced to discuss it through metaphor (lines 24–9).[12]

Apart from the passage in this chapter, the clearest statement he makes with regard to pleasure and *Nous* is to be found at *Ennead* VI. 7 [38] 30. 29–31: *ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἄσμενον ὄντως ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητότατον καὶ τὸ ποθεινότατον, οὐ γινόμενον οὐδ' ἐν κινήσει* 'For there in [*Nous*] is true delight and the greatest satisfaction, and the most loved and longed for, which is not in the process of becoming nor in movement' (adapted). Plotinus, it seems to me, in adopting what is essentially an Aristotelian model, never successfully develops a coherent theory of pleasure for the life in *Nous*. In the main, this is because Aristotle's model for pleasure used at the level of *Nous*, is made to operate in an ontological framework which does not support it because the perfect activity of *Nous* cannot actually yield pleasure. As Van Riel notes: 'In the end, Plotinus' analysis of the good life is developed separately from his theory of pleasure.'[13]

12. 8 ἵλεως *contentment*: B/T note parallels in the idea of the wise man being contented in Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 8. 47. 5 and Seneca, *De Beata Vita* 4. 4. The parallel in Seneca is closer to what we have here than the one in the *Meditations*. Of course the underlying ontology differs significantly.

12. 9–10 τῶν λεγομένων κακῶν of what are said to be evils: Aristotle's accidents of fortune belong to this category in Plotinus' view. Such things are not evil and are completely irrelevant to the man who

[10] Later Platonists also adopted this Epicurean theory and terminology; see Damascius, *In Philebum* 154, 155, and 190.

[11] See ch. 3 of this treatise and its discussion of the hierarchy of life.

[12] Van Riel, *Pleasure and the Good Life*, 113. See also *Ennead* VI. 7 [38] 30. 25.

[13] Van Riel, *Pleasure and the Good Life*, 120.

is *eudaimōn*. Evil is a failure to separate oneself from the body and to choose to live among images and not realities, see *Ennead* I. 8 [51] 14. 44–9.

12. 10 εἴπερ σπουδαῖος *if [he is] a* spoudaios: See comm. on chs. 8. 21 and 9. 24–5. Against Rist,[14] I emphasize here again that *eudaimonia* is something that requires an actual ascent to a higher ontological level through purification. Although we all have a higher soul, which does not come down (*Ennead* IV. 8 [6] 8. 3), *eudaimonia* occurs only when we reintegrate ourselves with this soul through excellence. See *Ennead* I. 2 [19] for what is required. *οὐδ' ἀπαιτητέον τούτοις τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχειν, οἷς μὴ εἴργασται εὐδαιμονίας ἄξια.* 'People must not demand to be *eudaimōn* who have not done what deserves *eudaimonia*' (*Ennead* III. 2 [47] 4. 45–7 adapted). *εἴπερ σπουδαῖος*, therefore, is not added as an afterthought, but as the all-important rider.

12. 10–12 εἰ δέ τις ἄλλο εἶδος ἡδονῆς περὶ τὸν [σπουδαῖον] βίον ζητεῖ, οὐ τὸν σπουδαῖον βίον ζητεῖ *But if someone is looking for another form of pleasure concerning this life, it is not the life of the* spoudaios *he seeks*: H/S^2 in the *addenda ad textum* delete the first *spoudaios* in this sentence. There appears to be no MS evidence in favour of deleting it. I can only assume that H/S^2 felt that the scribe simply duplicated the *spoudaios* in the later part of the sentence.

CHAPTER 13

This chapter, perhaps more than all the others, brings out most clearly Plotinus' fundamental Platonism. Nowhere is the clear-cut dualism of body and soul so effectively presented as in this short chapter. Although it begins not unlike a Stoic diatribe, it quickly brings to light a major failing in Stoicism and Epicureanism. Their material-bound metaphysics do not permit them to follow a route they nevertheless take. In the example of the bull of Phalaris, their claims for the undiminished *eudaimonia* of the incarcerated sage are not logically justifiable in terms of the one-level ontology of their own philosophies. If anyone can claim to possess *eudaimonia* while

[14] Rist, *Road to Reality*, 148.

in the bull it is surely the Plotinian *spoudaios*, whose body may suffer the horrors inflicted, while his higher soul is elsewhere feasting on the vision of the One.

13. 1–3 *Οὐδ' αἱ ἐνέργειαι . . . ὅσῳ περιστατικαί* *The activities . . . inasmuch as they are due to random circumstances*: Plotinus, as he does so often in the *Enneads*, begins ch. 13 by returning to a point already made, demonstrating his sometimes unsystematic approach to the presentation of his philosophy. He often returns to an original point only to depart from it in a completely new direction. On this technique in general see Armstrong,[1] who is most likely speaking about treatises in general, but the same holds true within treatises, as we see here.

13. 1 *Οὐδ' αἱ ἐνέργειαι δὲ διὰ τὰς τύχας ἐμποδίζοιντο ἄν* *The activities [of the* spoudaios*] will not be impeded through chance*: In ch. 4 the more general point was made that the *eudaimonia* of the *spoudaios* will not be lessened by accidents of fortune. Chs. 5 and 6 were devoted, almost exclusively, to explaining why this is so. Plotinus, in those chapters, was defending what had been essentially a Stoic position, that fortune could not disturb the disposition of the sage (Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 5.40–1, *SVF* iii. 585), against an attack from Aristotelians who claimed that the *spoudaios* would be affected by misfortunes, if they were grave enough (see *EN* 1100^a5–9). Plotinus now returns to the same theme, this time placing the emphasis on the *activities* of the *spoudaios* and fortune's inability to curb the important ones, which occur in *Nous*. Kalligas in his comments on this section refers to the 'Middle-Platonic' *Didaskalikos*, where in ch. 2 there is an assessment of the practical and theoretical life.[2]

13. 1 *ἐμποδίζοιντο* *impeded*: For the use of this verb in this particular context B/T refer to Marcus Aurelius' *Meditations* 8. 41. 5; 5. 34. 2; and 5. 20. 2 where we find: *ὑπὸ τούτων δὲ ἐνέργεια μέν τις ἐμποδισθείη ἄν, ὁρμῆς δὲ καὶ διαθέσεως οὐ γίνεται ἐμπόδια διὰ τὴν ὑπεξαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν περιτροπήν*. 'By these some action might be hindered, but they are not hindrances to my impulse and disposition because of my power of reservation and adaptation'. This verb was also used in the opening chapter of this treatise, in line 3; see comm. on 1.3. See also ch. 5. 21.

[1] Armstrong, 'Plotinus' in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, 218.

[2] See J. Dillon, *Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism*, (1993), 3–4, 53–7.

13. 2 ἀλλὰ ἄλλαι ἂν κατ᾽ ἄλλας γίγνοιντο τύχας *and other [activities] will take place through other fortune*: Since the passage which follows deals with *αἱ κατὰ τὰς θεωρίας ἐνέργειαι* we must assume that the activities indicated here are principally of a physical nature. Essentially this is a Stoic position. See Seneca, *De Vita Beata* 4. 2; 4. 5; 5. 3; 6. 2.

13. 2–3 πᾶσαι δὲ ὅμως καλαὶ καὶ καλλίους ἴσως ὅσῳ περιστατικαί *but nevertheless all [his activities] are fine, perhaps finer, inasmuch as they are due to random circumstances*: This particular point is a development of the view first expressed in ch. 5 and examined in detail in ch. 7. *πᾶσαι δὲ ὅμως καλαί* is explained when we view matters from the vantage point of *Nous*, and *καλλίους ἴσως* added because the body still attached to the *spoudaios* will occasionally oppose him. The similarity of Plotinian and Stoic sentiments has already been noted: *λέγουσι δὲ καὶ πάντ᾽ εὖ ποιεῖν τὸν σοφόν . . . πάντ᾽ εὖ ποιεῖν τὸν φρόνιμον, καθ᾽ ὅσα ποιεῖ καὶ οὐ μὰ Δία καὶ ἃ μὴ ποιεῖ* 'They [the Stoics] also say that the wise man does everything well . . . the prudent man does everything well, so far as concerns what he does, and not of course also what he does not do' (*SVF* iii. 560, L/S 61G).

περιστατικαί *due to random circumstances*: B/T note the use of this word again in *Ennead* I. 2 [19] 7. 21.[3] The Stoic connection is further strengthened through H/S[2] reference to *SVF* iii. 496 (= DL 7. 109), where the word is used in the account of Zeno's philosophy. The only other use of this word noted in the *Lexicon Plot.* is the one already cited in *Ennead* I. 2 [19] 7. 21.

13. 3–5 αἱ δὲ κατὰ τὰς θεωρίας ἐνέργειαι . . . σκεψάμενος προφέροι *The activities concerning contemplation . . . examination*: We are, presumably, to think here of physical impediments which hinder the *spoudaios*' search for the desired objects of meditation. Plotinus may in general be thinking about his own ill-fated journey with the emperor Gordian (*VP* 3). But, more likely, he is thinking about the physical difficulties associated with his illness.[4] We should also remember that 'dialectic' was the mainstay of the school, and he

[3] There is a misprint in the B/T commentary here, which has I. 2 [19] 17. 21.

[4] See P. Gillet, *Plotin au point de vue médical et psychologique*, (1934) who suggests that Plotinus was suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis. See more recently M. D. Grmek, 'Les Maladies et La Mort de Plotin' in L. Brisson, *et al* (eds.), *Porphyre, La Vie de Plotin*, ii (1992), 335–53.

may have in mind here people who were physically incapable, for whatever reasons, of taking part in such discourses. What is of particular interest here is that although Plotinus now goes on to say that the greatest learning is always at hand, i.e. within, there does seem to be necessary, or at least desired, some investigation or research regarding externals. An indication perhaps that the *spoudaios* will only turn inwards after assessing the external world. This ties in with *Ennead* I. 2 [19] and my earlier point that the *spoudaios* does pay attention to his particular circumstances, i.e. requires moral excellence before purification. See comm. on ch. 8. 21 and the references given there in support of this view. Against this view, see Henry.[5]

13. 5–6 *τὸ δὲ μέγιστον μάθημα πρόχειρον ἀεὶ καὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ* *but 'the greatest learning' is always at hand and with him*: *τὸ μέγιστον μάθημα* is for Plotinus, as it was for Plato, the vision of the Good. The phrase is borrowed directly from Plato's *Republic* 505a2. As in Plotinus, in Plato the greatest form of knowledge is the knowledge acquired after civic excellence; it is a knowledge that transcends the material world. It is at hand since the hypostatic realms are within us, and thus our path to them, and ultimately the path to the vision of the One, cannot be blocked by externals. *ὅτι δὲ οὕτω χρὴ νομίζειν ἔχειν, ὡς ἔστι μὲν τὸ ἐπέκεινα ὄντος τὸ ἕν . . . ἔστι δὲ ἐφεξῆς τὸ ὂν καὶ νοῦς, τρίτη δὲ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς φύσις, ἤδη δέδεικται. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν τῇ φύσει τριττὰ ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ εἰρημένα, οὕτω χρὴ νομίζειν καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτα εἶναι.* 'It has been shown that we ought to think that this is how things are, that there is the One beyond Being ... and next in order there is Being and *Nous*, and the nature of Soul in the third place. And just as in nature there are these three of which we have spoken, so we ought to think that they are present also in ourselves' (*Ennead* V. 1 [10] 10. 1–6, adapted). See also *Ennead* VI. 7 [38] 36. 4 ff.; VI. 9 [9] 3. 15–22; VI. 9 [9] 11. 17–20, 38–9 and comm. on ch. 4. 18–19 for the possible origin of the idea.

13. 7 *κἂν ἐν τῷ Φαλάριδος ταύρῳ λεγομένῳ* *even in the so-called bull of Phalaris*: Phalaris, tyrant of Acragas (Agrigento), flourished *c.*570/65–554/49 BC. It is said that Phalaris gained control of Acragas a decade after the city's foundation. He gained a reputation for his cruelty in the shape of a bull with a hollow interior, in which he roasted his victims alive. Cicero records that the whole population of

[5] Henry, 'The Place of Plotinus', p. xlvi.

Acragas finally rose up in revolt and killed him. See *De Officiis* 2. 26; *Tusc. Disp.* 2. 17; *In Verrens* 4. 73; Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheke* 9. 19. 1; and Usener, *Epicurea* 601.

13. 7–8 ὃ μάτην λέγεται ἡδὺ δὶς ἢ καὶ πολλάκις λεγόμενον *which in vain is said to be pleasant, whether it is said twice or indeed many times*: The text here is quite contorted Most translators (Armstrong, MacKenna, and Bréhier) do no justice to the Greek. Müller deleted the line in its entirety. There is however no MS evidence to suggest corruption. The text as it stands in H/S^2 is indeed somewhat awkward. I supply a comma after ἡδύ, which seems to me to help the sense here.

Almost certainly Plotinus is referring here only to the Epicureans and not the Stoics.[6] As is often the case, however, Epicurus is suffering from some distortion at the hands of his opponents. What Epicurus actually says is that a man can still be *eudaimōn*, while he is in pain; he does not deny that torture is painful (DL 10. 118). The version of Epicurus' doctrine, wherein the actual torture is pleasant, goes back at least as far as Cicero, and Plotinus shows little hesitancy in accepting it. It was a commonplace paradox among Stoics and Epicureans that the wise man would still retain his *eudaimonia* while

[6] Epicurus vero ea dicit, ut mihi quidem risus captare videatur. Adfirmat enim quodam loco, si uratur sapiens, si crucietur, exspectas fortasse dum dicat, 'patietur, perferet, non succumbet': magna mehercule laus et eo ipso, per quem iuravi, Hercule digna, sed Epicuro, homini aspero et duro, non est hoc satis: in Phalaridias tauro si erit, dicet: 'Quam suave est, quam hoc non curo!' Suave etiam? An parum est, si non amarum? At id quidem illi ipsi, qui dolorem malum esse negant, non solent dicere, cuiquam suave esse cruciari: asperum, difficile, odiosum, contra naturam dicunt, nec tamen malum: hic, qui solum hoc malum dicit et malorum omnium extremum, sapientem censet id suave dicturum. 'As for Epicurus, however, he speaks in a way that makes him seem to my mind to be provoking laughter. For in one passage he asserts that if the wise man be burnt, if he be tortured—you are waiting perhaps for him to say, 'he will submit, will endure, will not yield': high praise by Hercules and worthy of the great god Hercules whose name I invoked; but this is not enough for Epicurus, that hard stern spirit; if the wise man finds himself inside Phalaris' bull, he will say: 'How sweet; how indifferent I am to this!' Actually sweet? Or is 'not bitter' a bit inadequate? And yet those very philosophers who deny that pain is an evil do not generally go so far to say that it is sweet to be tortured; they say that it is unpleasing, difficult, hateful, contrary to nature, and yet that it is not an evil: Epicurus who says that pain is the only evil and the worst of all evils, thinks that the wise man will pronounce it sweet (*Tusc. Disp.* 2. 17, King trans.).

being roasted in the brazen bull. We also find mention of the bull in Aristotle's *EN* 1148^{b}24 and 1149^{a}14. See also Cicero, *Republic* 1. 44.[7]

13. 8–12 ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ τὸ φθεγξάμενον ... τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅλου θέας *For there [according to them] what cries out ... the vision of the total Good*:[8] This is the crux of the matter. The Epicurean and Stoic claim for the invulnerability of the sage is not supported by their metaphysics. It does, however, make sense for Plotinus to make this claim since the *spoudaios* lives on two different levels: there is the lower soul that suffers in the bull, but there is also the higher soul (the real self of the *spoudaios*), which remains unaffected. The man who has regained his place in *Nous* has before him the vision of the One. Although compelled to look to the needs of the body, he is other than body, and free from its affections. The dual nature of the *eudaimōn* enables Plotinus to claim as logically verifiable the old paradox of the brazen bull.[9] See *Ennead* 1. 2 [19] 5. 5 ff.

13. 10–11 ἐνταῦθα δὲ ... ἕως ἂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνῇ *but [according to us] ... while it is compelled to accompany it*: The higher soul is the real man. However, it is the projection of this higher soul that animates body and gives it life. It is therefore ours, and we are responsible for it. This lower soul is what mixes with body, and it is this that feels the pain in the bull of Phalaris. The higher soul is forced to accompany it only in the sense that it is the source of its life. The higher soul itself never comes down to body. The *spoudaios* existing at this level does not suffer, but only the combination of lower soul and body. The *spoudaios* in the bull therefore may indeed be aware of pain, but all the while still retain his *eudaimonia*. As Smith notes: 'There is nothing in Plotinus' theory to prevent there being two areas of consciousness which may operate independently of each other.'[10]

[7] See also P. Mitsis, *Epicurus' Ethical Theory*, (1988), 120–2 for a discussion of Epicurean *eudaimonia* in the face of torture.

[8] Plotinus' exposition here is poor. What we expect is an argument that says that what is pleasant cannot at the same time suffer pain. In fact, Armstrong translates along those lines: 'for according to their philosophy that which says that its state is pleasant is the very same thing which is in pain.' However, that is not what the Greek text actually says.

[9] Plotinus is sympathetic to the ethical pronouncements of the Stoics, but, in his view, their metaphysics do not support their assertions. See Murray, 'The Ascent of Plotinus to God', 233 and Plass, 'Plotinus' Ethical Theory', 249.

[10] Smith, 'Unconsciousness and Quasiconsciousness', 294. See in general comm. on chs. 9 and 10.

CHAPTER 14

As he did in ch. 13, in ch. 14 Plotinus again returns to points that he has made earlier in the treatise. There is little justification for assigning this material to a separate chapter; the topic examined in the previous one continues to be discussed here. This chapter can be divided into two parts; the first part might be seen as a continuation and development of the main theme of ch. 4, as Plotinus explains in detail why *eudaimonia* is not to be associated with body. The vegetative soul, and its activities, are clearly separated from the activities of the higher soul, which is where *eudaimonia* is to be found. The second part of the chapter focuses on the correct relationship that the *spoudaios* ought to have with the body that has attached itself. Much of what he says here regarding the proper relationship between soul and body has already been discussed in earlier chapters in this treatise, pain (ch. 8), pleasure (ch. 12), and fortune (ch. 7). There is little doubt that the present treatise suffers somewhat from Plotinus' normal practice regarding revision,[1] but it is also possible that his own ill health at the time of writing has contributed to some of the repetition concerning the body and our need to ignore its pains and pleasures.

14. 1–4 *τὸ δὲ μὴ συναμφότερον... τοῦ σώματος καταφρόνησις* *The combination ... of the body is evidence of this*: The *spoudaios* is not a combination of body and soul. Schniewind[2] suggests that this is exaggeration in an attempt to explain to the ordinary man what it is like to be a *spoudaios*, conscious at the level of *Nous*. It is exaggeration in that Plotinus has already said that the body-soul combination belongs to the *spoudaios*, but even there, he did make it clear that the life of the body-soul combination is not the life of the *spoudaios*, see ch. 4. 25-36.

The separation of the body and the higher soul expounded in the latter part of ch. 13, is presented even more forcefully at the beginning of 14. This is the core of Plotinus' ethical theory and demonstrates his fundamental Platonism. Yet we know that Plotinus absorbed

[1] He rarely read over what he had written due to poor eyesight (*VP* 8. 1–2).

[2] See Schniewind, 'The Social Concern of the Plotinian sage', 56–7.

Aristotelianism and Stoicism into his philosophy (*VP* 14. 85-7), and aided by these additions he was able to develop a metaphysic beyond what is to be found in Plato. His debt to Aristotle, especially, becomes clear in what follows.

14. 1 τὸ συναμφότερον *The combination [of body and soul]*: Plotinus is referring here to the combination of the body and lower soul only, the lower soul being only a reflection of the higher soul, which is the real man who never mixes with body.[3] This combination is sometimes referred to as τὸ κοινόν (see *Lexicon Plot.* 569–70), or τὸ σύνθετον (see *Lexicon Plot.* 973–74).[4] For Plato's use of this term see *Alcibiades* 130c1-2 and *Timaeus* 87e5.

14. 1 τὸν ἄνθρωπον *the man*: Blumenthal[5] remarks that ὁ ἄνθρωπος is sometimes used in a technical sense meaning ἡμεῖς and suggests that this is a case in point. Blumenthal is correct in this instance. See also *Ennead* IV. 7 [2] 1. 22–3. By ἡμεῖς Plotinus means conscious operation at the level of the higher soul. For a detailed discussion of the metaphysical implications of ἡμεῖς, see Himmerich[6] and O'Daly.[7] However, it is not the case that this equation can always be made, and in many cases ὁ ἄνθρωπος is not equal to ἡμεῖς. See below lines 11, 13.

14. 2–4 ὁ χωρισμὸς ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἡ τῶν λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν τοῦ σώματος καταφρόνησις *separation from the body and contempt for the so-called goods of the body*: This point was made earlier in the latter part of ch. 6. There, Plotinus argued that bodily requirements might be called necessities, but not goods, hence he states here ἡ τῶν

[3] διττὸς γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὁ μὲν τὸ συναμφότρόν τι, ὁ δὲ αὐτός 'For every man is double, one of him is a sort of compound being and the other one of him is himself' (*Ennead* II. 3 [52] 9. 30–1, adapted). See also *Enneads* II. 1 [40] 5. 18 ff. and VI. 4 [22] 14. 16–26, 29–31.

[4] See P. Merlan, 'Greek Philosophy from Plato to Plotinus', (1967), 56 n. 9, who suggests that Plotinus' description of τὸ συναμφότερον as the combination of the body and lower soul only may well have been a direct response to the Platonist Antiochus of Ascalon whose ethical theory suggested that man was a combination of body and soul, and that self-preservation meant preservation of both parts. See also Kalligas, 'Living Body, Soul, and Virtue in the Philosophy of Plotinus', 34–6.

[5] Blumenthal, *Plotinus' Psychology*, 111 n. 29.

[6] Himmerich, Eudaimonia, 92–100.

[7] O'Daly, *Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self*, 21 ff.

λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν τοῦ σώματος. On *ὁ χωρισμὸς ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος*, Bouillet refers to *Ennead* I. 1 [53] 3. 21-6, where Plotinus describes the position before *ὁ σπουδαῖος* separates himself from body and what, in fact, is necessary for separation. See also *Enneads* I. 1 [53] 12. 14-20; I. 6 [1] 5. 39 ff. and I. 8 [51] 7. 12 ff. The idea of a separation from body is of course central to Platonism; see *Republic* 611d7-612a5 and *Phaedo* 80d–81a.

14. 4–8 *τὸ δὲ καθόσον . . . ἵν' ἂν καὶ ἐφήψατο σώματος* *It is ridiculous . . . which would connect it with the body*: This is the core of Plotinus' ethical teaching. It explains his particular conception of *eudaimonia*. As I explained earlier, *eudaimonia* for Plotinus consists of the return of the 'ego' (the level of consciousness on which we operate) from the empirical self to *Nous*, a reintegration with the higher soul that does not come down (see comm. on ch. 9. 1–2; see also *Enneads* IV. 8 [6] 4. 1–2 and II. 9 [33] 2. 1 ff.). This occurs outside of time and place in the eternity of *Nous* (see I. 5 [36] 7. 20-30). It is, therefore, absurd for anyone to contend that *eudaimonia* extends to the *συναμφότερον*, which contains only the lowest level of soul, a mere image of the higher soul.

14. 4 *τὸ ζῷον* *the living body*: Blumenthal[8] sees that 'since *ζῷον* also means "animal" it usefully indicates the combination of body and those faculties of soul which are not specifically human, i.e. those below reason. All four terms are equivalent: *ζῷον* = *συναμφότερον* and *κοινόν* *Ennead* IV. 3 [27] 26. 1-3; *ζῷον* = *σύνθετον*, *Ennead* VI. 8 [6] 2. 13'. See also Vogel[9] and the references given there.

14. 5–7 *ἢ περὶ ψυχὴν συνίσταται, ἐνεργείας ταύτης οὔσης καὶ ψυχῆς οὐ πάσης* *which is concerned with soul, being an activity of this [soul], but not all of it*: *Eudaimonia* is the preserve of the higher soul, a higher soul which humanity alone possesses. *διὸ καὶ ὡς αἰσθητικοί· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ὄργανα αἰσθήσεως· καὶ πολλὰ ὡς φυτά· ἔστι γὰρ σῶμα αὐξόμενον καὶ γεννῶν· ὥστε πάντα συνεργεῖ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ κρεῖττον τὸ ὅλον εἶδος ἄνθρωπος* 'Therefore we also live like beings characterized by sense-perception, for we, too, have sense-organs; and in many ways we live like plants, for we have a body which grows and produces; so that all things work together, but the whole form is man in virtue of

8 Blumenthal, *Plotinus' Psychology*, 20.

9 C. J. de Vogel, *Rethinking Plato and Plotinus*, (1988), 214 n. 10.

its better part' (*Ennead* III. 4 [15] 2. 8-11).[10] See also II. 1 [40] 5. 18 ff. The activity of this higher soul is described in *Ennead* V. 3 [49] 4. 10–15 and VI. 9 [9] 9. 11–16. For how this works in practice, see Porphyry, *VP* 8. 19–23 where he describes Plotinus' ability to engage with others and at the same time remain conscious in his higher soul in *Nous*. See also *Ennead* I. 1 [53] 13. 5 ff.[11]

14. 7–8 ***οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῆς φυτικῆς ἵν' ἂν καὶ ἐφήψατο σώματος*** *for it is not [an activity] of the vegetative soul, which would connect it with the body*: The higher soul is present to body but it itself never comes down (see *Ennead* II. 9 [33] 2. 9 and IV. 8 [6] 3. 3). The vegetative soul is illuminated by the higher soul: the higher soul directs the animation of the body even if the lower soul is the animator: *ἤδη γὰρ αἰσθητικοῦ ὄντος τοῦ γενομένου ἐπηκολούθησεν αὕτη τρανοτέραν ζωὴν διδοῦσα· μᾶλλον δ' οὐδ' ἐπηκολούθησεν, ἀλλὰ οἷον προσέθηκεν αὑτήν· οὐ γὰρ ἐξίσταται τοῦ νοητοῦ, ἀλλὰ συναψαμένη οἷον ἐκκρεμαμένην ἔχει τὴν κάτω συμμίξασα ἑαυτὴν λόγῳ πρὸς λόγον. ὅθεν καὶ ἀμυδρὸς οὗτος ὢν ἐγένετο φανερὸς τῇ ἐλλάμψει.* 'For when the man who came to be already had sense-perception, this soul [viz. the higher soul] followed on and gave a brighter life; or rather it did not follow, but in a way attached itself; for it does not go out of the noetic, but united to it has the lower soul in a way hanging from it, mixing itself in forming principle to forming principle. And so this man, who is dim, becomes clearly visible by the illumination' (*Ennead* VI. 7 [38] 5. 26-31, adapted). For an account of the activities of the lower soul in body, and Plotinus' tendency to use different terms to describe the lower soul, see Blumenthal.[12]

14. 8–11 ***οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τοῦτο … πρὸς αὐτὰς φέρειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον*** *For certainly this* eudaimonia*…bringing the man to them*: Having established that *eudaimonia* is not to be found in

[10] Armstrong notes: 'it must be remembered that for Plotinus man is a "bridge-being", intermediate between the two worlds. He alone is present in the Intelligible personally in his own right, the other creatures only by their archetypes', *Architecture of the Intelligible Universe*, 101.

[11] For an interesting parallel between a separate higher and lower soul, see Svetasvatara *Upanishad*, part I, 'Shall we think of time, or of the own nature of things … not a union of these, for above them is a soul who thinks. But our soul is under the power of pleasure and pain' (J. Mascaró, The Upanishads (1965), 85).

[12] Blumenthal, *Plotinus' Psychology*, 26 ff.

body, Plotinus explains why this is so. Again these are points that were touched on earlier, see ch. 6. 1–4. Having returned to an original point, Plotinus now characteristically expands on it, teasing out its implications. This danger, the danger of bodily advantages, is a danger only to the one who is not yet a *spoudaios*. One of the difficulties of this treatise is that Plotinus switches from a consideration of *ὁ σπουδαῖος* to the ordinary man at random and we must always be sure which of these he is discussing. The two are compared again in the following chapter and it is clear there that *ὁ σπουδαῖος*, *by virtue of his wisdom*, will not be concerned with his body, whether it is good or bad (see ch. 15. 1 ff.). The ordinary man, then, if he has too many bodily advantages, is in danger of preferring the life in body and of never turning his gaze inwards to *Nous*. See *Ennead* I. 8 [51] 14. 24 and II. 9 [33] 2. 10-13. The complete fall of the soul is described in I. 8 [51] 13. 21-4.

14. 10 *τούτων* *these things*: Clearly this word relates to both the *φυτικόν* and the *αἰσθητικόν*.

14. 11 *τὸν ἄνθρωπον* *the man*: He is simply the ordinary man who has not yet ascended to his higher self. Blumenthal's suggestion that *ὁ ἄνθρωπος* = *ἡμεῖς* although correct in the first line does not stand here. See below, line 13.

14. 11–14 *ἀντισηκώσεως δὲ οἷον ... τὰ ἔξω* *A sort of counterbalancing... his external circumstances*: This is basic Platonic teaching. In the *Phaedo*, in particular, this doctrine is spelled out: the difficulty of caring for soul while being in a body and the demands of the body conflicting with the soul (66a–d); the purification necessary to free the body from soul (67a–c), and the punishment of the body and the reduction of its influence on soul (94c–d). See also *Republic* 441b6 where Plato traces this idea to Homer, quoting the *Odyssey* book 20. 17–20, where Odysseus strikes his chest and calls his heart to order: *στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ· τέτλαθι δή, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ᾽ ἔτλης, ἤματι τῷ ὅτε μοι μένος ἄσχετος ἤσθιε Κύκλωψ ἰφθίμους ἑτάρους* 'But striking his chest, he called his heart to order and said: 'Patience, my heart! You had something far more ignominious than this to endure when the invincible Cyclops devoured your brave comrades'.

14. 12 *τὰ ἄριστα ... χείρω* *the best things... worse*: These terms were found in opposition earlier in ch. 4. 21-3: *τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ ζητήσειε;*

τῶν μὲν γὰρ χειρόνων οὐδέν, τῷ δὲ ἀρίστῳ σύνεστιν 'For what indeed would he look for? Nothing from the worse things, and the best is in him'. *τὰ ἄριστα* are located in the life of the higher soul, which we can live in only after we have chosen to raise ourselves above the body/soul combination. See also ch. 3. 27 where we were told that *τὸ ἄριστον* was equal to *ἡ ἄγαν ζωή* and *ἡ τέλειος ζωή*.

14. 14 τὰ ἔξω *his external circumstances*: Some of these are listed in the next two lines. See also *Ennead* II. 3 [52] 15. 6–8, where they are also described: *ὅτε εἰσῄεσαν εἰς τὸ σῶμα, γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τόδε τὸ σῶμα καὶ τῶνδε γονέων καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις τόποις γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὅλως, ὡς εἴπομεν, τὰ ἔξω* 'when they came into the body, and coming into this particular body and being born of these particular parents, and in such and such a place, and in general what we call external circumstances'. See also *Ennead* III. 2 [47] 15. 51 and VI. 9 [9] 7. 17 ff., where the soul is ordered to let go of all externals and to turn to what is within.

14. 14–17 ὁ δὲ τῶν τῇδε ἄνθρωπος ... ἠπατημένῳ *Let the man concerned with these ... by which he is led astray*: Wundt[13] saw this as a reference to the emperor Gallienus, who was joint emperor with Valerian between AD 253 and 260, and sole emperor in AD 260–8. Gallienus is mentioned in Porphyry's *Life* as someone who greatly honoured and venerated Plotinus (*VP* 12. 1–2). B/T dismiss Wundt's suggestion, but do not argue the point. It is hardly possible to determine whether or not Plotinus had someone in particular in mind here. The idea that beauty and riches make no addition to *eudaimonia* is something Plotinus took up again in the treatise directly following *Ennead* I. 4 [46] chronologically, (see III. 2 [47] 6. 1–9).

14. 16 τοῦδε τοῦ τόπου *of this place*: As B/T, and H/S[2] indicate, this phrase is borrowed directly from Plato's *Theaetetus* 176a7–8. In that passage Plato is explaining that in this material universe, evils necessarily exist: *ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὦ Θεόδωρε—ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη—οὔτ' ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἱδρῦσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης* 'Evils, Theodorus, can never be done away with, for the good must always have its contrary; nor have they any place in the divine world, but they must needs haunt this region of our mortal nature'.

[13] M. Wundt, *Plotin*, (1919), 49.

Undoubtedly Plotinus knew this passage well. He repeats this idea throughout the *Enneads*. See I. 8 [51] 6. 1 ff. and I. 2 [19] 1. 1, where *τόνδε τὸν τόπον* is used again), and I. 8 [51] 7. 12; III. 2 [47] 5. 29; III. 2[47] 15. 10–11.

14. 16–17 ***τῶν τοιούτων ἠπατημένῳ*** *[possession] of such things by which he is led astray*: The beguilement of the individual soul is twofold, see *Ennead* IV. 8 [6] 5. 16. At first in its descent it forgets its true home and sees itself as isolated, as Plotinus describes in *Ennead* V. 1 [10] 1. 4–5. Secondly, as he emphasizes here, it errs in pursuing the things of this world, considering them to be valuable. It is no longer able to distinguish reality from image. See *Ennead* IV. 8 [6] 4. 12–21 and VI. 9 [9] 3. 4 ff., where the individual soul descends to the sensory world thinking it to be more real than *Nous*.

14. 17–20 ***περὶ δὲ σοφὸν ταῦτα ἴσως . . . ἀποθήσεται*** *Perhaps the wise man . . . positions of authority*: Plotinus now sets forth the true activities of the wise man and explains how he will best care for body, so that his real self remains detached. Here B/T refer to Plato's *Republic* 542b4 which is a misprint. However at 540d5–e1 we have the following: *τῶν μὲν νῦν τιμῶν καταφρονήσωσιν, ἡγησάμενοι ἀνελευθέρους εἶναι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίας, τὸ δὲ ὀρθὸν περὶ πλείστου ποιησάμενοι καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου τιμάς* '[philosopher/kings] would scorn the present honours, regarding them as illiberal and worthless, but prize the right and the honours that come from that above all things'. This seems to be in keeping with what Plotinus says here. Both B/T, and Bréhier, suggest that this may be a direct reference to the senator Rogatianus, who attended Plotinus' lectures, and is said as a result, to have given away all his property and rejected public life (*VP* 7. 33–5). Kalligas notes also *VP* 7. 20–1 where Porphyry mentions Zethus, an Arab, whom Plotinus tried to divert from affairs of state to philosophy.

14. 17 ***σοφὸν*** *the wise man*: Plotinus switches to the more recognized term for the sage in Stoic parlance. In the main, throughout this treatise he prefers *spoudaios*, but he uses *sophos* here, and in the next chapter. The *Lexicon Plot.* shows that Plotinus uses the terms interchangeably throughout the treatises, and therefore the switch to *sophos* here has no significance.

14. 20 ***ἀρχὰς δὲ ἀποθήσεται*** *and he will put aside positions of authority*: One should note that this goes directly against Plato's

view in the *Republic* that the philosopher/king should rule (see 473c ff.).[14] Plotinus' mysticism would seem to create a tension between the isolated sage and his part as a member of a community. See comm. on ch. 4. 24, where I explain that Plotinus felt the need to stress civic excellence, displayed in the community, alongside the higher excellence of purification where the latter might seem to negate the former.

14. 21–6 ***σώματος δὲ ὑγίειαν φυλάττων . . . ἵνα μὴ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα βλέπῃ*** *While being mindful of his bodily health . . . in order that he may not have to look to the body*: This passage suggests that even the *spoudaios* has to work to keep the demands of the body from interfering with his *eudaimonia.* Presumably Plotinus simply means that even in the case of the *spoudaios* the body may disturb what Smith[15] calls 'vertical' consciousness of this *eudaimonia* on the level of the body/soul combination, but not *eudaimonia per se.*

14. 21 ***σώματος δὲ ὑγίειαν φυλάττων*** *While being mindful of his bodily health*: What is meant here is that the *spoudaios* will guard against letting his body fall into ill-health since then he may have to consider it, not that he will want his body to be healthy *per se.* Health contributes nothing to *eudaimonia* (see ch. 6.28). Plotinus himself seemed quite unconcerned about caring for his own body (see *VP* 2 . 1-9).

14. 21–3 ***οὐκ ἄπειρος νόσων . . . ἀλγηδόνων*** *he will not want . . . without experience of pain*: This must be something akin to character building. When we overcome difficulties we are stronger people for that very reason. We must learn to master what is 'ours' even if it is not 'us'. This is necessary since in general: *πολλῆς δὲ καὶ ὀχλώδους προνοίας δεομένων, ἅτε πολλῶν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων αὐτοῖς προσπιπτόντων ἀεί τε ἐνδείᾳ συνεχομένων καὶ πάσης βοηθείας ὡς ἐν πολλῇ δυσχερείᾳ δεομένων* 'bodies need a great deal of troublesome thought, since many alien forces assail them and they are continually in the grip of poverty, and require every sort of help as being in great trouble' (*Ennead* IV. 8 [6] 2. 11-14).

[14] See *Ennead* IV. 4 [28] 44. 7–12 where the pursuit of office is noted as something capable of causing enchantment. In general, as Rist notes, Plotinus had little time for a return to the Cave. See J. Rist, *Eros and Psyche: Studies in Plato, Plotinus and Origen*, (1964), 170.

[15] Smith, 'Unconsciousness and Quasiconsciousness', 293.

14. 23–6 **ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ γινομένων . . . πρὸς τὸ σῶμα βλέπῃ** *but even if these do not come about … to look to the body*: Bodily sufferings can be instructive, especially in youth. This is elaborated on in the treatise that follows *Ennead* I. 4 [46] chronologically; see *Ennead* III. 2 [47] 5. 15-20. Bodéüs[16] suggests that this passage reflects Plotinus' own advanced years at the time of writing this treatise. This is quite plausible, but what should be noted, in addition to his age, is his state of health at this time,[17] his sentiments here may well mirror his own particular circumstances of poor health at the time of writing.

14. 26–7 **γινόμενος δ' ἐν ἀλγηδόσι . . . ἀντιτάξει** *When he finds himself in pain … against these things*: How the *spoudaios* deals with pain was examined in detail in ch. 8. The main point made there was that pain belongs to body and does not penetrate to the σπουδαῖον, who is other than body. In addition we are advised there that if the pain becomes too severe there is always the option of suicide.

14. 27–31 **οὔτε προσθήκην ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς . . . πῶς ἂν τὸ ἐναντίον ἀφαιροῖ;** *neither in pleasures … how could the opposite take anything away from it?*: A recapitulation of what was stated earlier. Ch. 12 examined the role of pleasure in the good life. There we saw that a very particular kind of pleasure accompanies conscious life in the higher soul. It is simply the 'unhindered activity' of this life, see *Ennead* I. 5 [36] 4. 2-3 and I. 5 [36] 10. 19 ff. Bodily pleasures, too, have no place in the *eudaimōn* life.[18] Health and freedom from pain were excluded from the *eudaimōn* life as early as ch. 6. 25 ff. Plotinus argued there that even when we have them they do not make us *eudaimōn*, and more importantly, we seek them only in their absence. Thus we may call them necessities, but not goods. If these add nothing to *eudaimonia*, how can their opposites take anything away from it?

[16] Bodéüs, 'L'Autre Homme de Plotin', 256 and n. 6.

[17] See Grmek, 'Les Maladies et La Mort de Plotin', 335–53, who examines the various theories put forward over the years concerning Plotinus' illnesses and the disease that finally killed him. With regard to his final illness, Grmek's conclusion is that the symptoms manifested by Plotinus do not lead to certainty in the diagnosis of any one disease.

[18] Desires connected with bodily pleasures penetrate only as far as the imagination (*Ennead* I. 2 [19] 5. 19–20).

CHAPTER 15

Marsilio Ficino's placing of this material into another chapter is not justified; ch. 15 continues in the same vein as ch. 14: bodily goods or their opposites make no difference to the *eudaimōn*. Ch. 15 shows how the *spoudaios* is a very different person from the man who is living mainly the life of the combination of body and soul (see ch. 14.1). Plotinus begins this chapter with a topic touched on earlier. Natural advantages mean nothing to the man who is *eudaimōn*, just as their opposites are equally unimportant. We can be two different people, Plotinus emphasizes, and we must not consider things that ordinary nature finds terrible when we focus on the *spoudaios;* he is of a different ontological order and nothing appears terrible to him, if he is truly wise. Ch. 15 presents the Plotinian *spoudaios* as someone who serves not only his own best interests, but also, the best interests of all other men. The *spoudaios* is presented as a social being, an active community member, who has concern for others in the community. He is not, Plotinus insists, an isolated mystic, but a friendly and sympathetic neighbour, a man who is the best of friends.

15. 1–3 *Ἀλλ' εἰ δύο εἶεν σοφοί . . . εἴπερ ἐπίσης σοφοί* *But if there were two wise men... We will say that, if they are equally wise*: As it was in ch. 9 16 ff., *eudaimonia* here is equated with wisdom. There, wisdom was said to be a substance 'not destroyed in someone sleeping, or, in general, in what is called not conscious to oneself' (19-20). What was affirmed there is enlarged upon here: wisdom produces *eudaimonia*, which is a state, as wisdom is a substance. Once *eudaimonia* is established it cannot in itself be affected by anything bodily, in terms of the presence or absence of anything according to nature. A wise man will continue to be *eudaimōn* regardless of circumstances.[1] Understandably, this theme had a central place in Plotinus' thinking, given his own circumstances of serious ill-health at the time of writing. It is repeated again, albeit

[1] Remember that chs. 9 and 10 showed that the *spoudaios* will be *eudaimōn* even if the man on the level of the body/soul combination is unconscious.

in a different context, in the treatise directly following this one chronologically, *Ennead* III. 2 [47] 6. 1-8.

B/T note that there is a Stoic parallel, in external terms at least. Although the Stoics pursued the things according to nature, such things did not make up part of the end, which was excellence. Excellence consisted in the correct disposition of the sage, which enabled him to select the things according to nature; but excellence was the only good, the sole constituent of *eudaimonia*. See Seneca, *Ep.* 92. 11–13, and Alexander, *On Soul* 2. 164. 3–9. Strictly speaking, the Stoic sage maintains an attitude of equanimity when confronted with things according to, or contrary to, nature. See Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 5. 41–2. This is the position of the Plotinian *spoudaios* here. Note however the comm. on ch. 13. 8 on the passage concerning the bull of Phalaris. Plotinus explains why, metaphysically, he can claim that the Plotinian *spoudaios* is indifferent to natural things, and why, conversely, the Stoics cannot. Nevertheless Stoic influence here is obvious. See DL 7. 104–7.

15. 2 κατὰ φύσιν λέγεται *is said to be according to nature*: τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν was a well-known phrase in Stoicism. See Plutarch, *Comm. Not.* 1069e–f, where Zeno is reported as affirming that achieving what is in conformity with nature was a basic requirement of *eudaimonia*. See also Cicero, *De Finibus* 3. 31, 61, and Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 11. 16. Plotinus, himself, ch. 1. 29, used the phrase τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν to identify and dismiss the Stoics and their linking of this phrase to *eudaimonia*. See the more detailed commentary there. It seems to me that Armstrong has been careless with his translation of this phrase. He translates thus: 'are called natural goods'. Neither for Plotinus, nor indeed for the Stoics, were things κατὰ φύσιν ever considered goods.[2] Plotinus refers to them only as τῶν λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν 'so-called goods', and this expression is principally directed against Aristotle,[3] who did believe that such external things could be called good (*EN* 1179^{a}2-4).

15. 3 εἴπερ ἐπίσης σοφοί *if they are equally wise*: What Plotinus means by wisdom here was already touched on in ch. 9. 17-20. His concept of wisdom takes us to the very core of his philosophy. σοφία

[2] See Seneca, *Ep.* 92. 11–13.
[3] See ch. 14. 3.

μὲν καὶ φρόνησις ἐν θεωρίᾳ ὧν νοῦς ἔχει· νοῦς δὲ τῇ ἐπαφῇ. διττὴ δὲ ἑκατέρα, ἡ μὲν ἐν νῷ οὖσα, ἡ δὲ ἐν ψυχῇ· κἀκεῖ μὲν οὐκ ἀρετή, ἐν δὲ ψυχῇ ἀρετή. 'Wisdom, theoretical and practical, consists in the contemplation of that which *Nous* contains; but *Nous* has it by immediate contact. There are two kinds of wisdom, one in *Nous*, one in soul. That which is there [in *Nous*] is not excellence, that in the soul is excellence' (*Ennead* I. 2 [19] 6. 13-15, adapted). What that appears to mean is that the excellence of wisdom belongs to the soul, which is not on the level of *Nous*. Practical wisdom first, followed by theoretical wisdom (contemplation), brings us to the level of *Nous*, but we still contemplate from outside: subject/object. The *spoudaios* is one who has passed over into *Nous* and his wisdom there is of a different kind. There is no longer a subject/object relationship in his contemplation; he can now contemplate the Forms directly. Being conscious at his highest level of soul, he is real being, and his wisdom is substance. This equation was made in ch. 9. 18-19. In *Ennead* v. 8 [31] 4. 39 we are told that: *ἡ οὐσία αὐτὴ σοφία* 'the very being of *Nous* is wisdom', and at V. 8 [31] 4. 48 still referring to *Nous: καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἡ ἐκεῖ σοφία* 'and reality is wisdom there'. This wisdom is beyond the wisdom of the higher excellences. In v. 8 [31] 5. 15-16 it is given the additional title of true wisdom: *ἡ ἄρα ἀληθινὴ σοφία οὐσία, καὶ ἀληθινὴ οὐσία σοφία* 'The true wisdom, then, is substance, and the true substance is wisdom'. This thinking is ultimately based on passages in Plato, as in *Phaedo* 79d1–8. See also *Republic* 486a4–7.

15. 4–6 εἰ δὲ καλὸς τὸ σῶμα ὁ ἕτερος καὶ πάντα . . . τί τοῦτο ἂν εἴη; *And if one has beauty of body and all the other things . . . why would this matter?*: Again all the advantages that might accrue to the body/soul combination are dismissed as being in no way beneficial to the attainment of *eudaimonia*. Much of what is said here, and in what follows, has already been stated, and one might suggest that Plotinus in earlier years would have been more succinct.[4]

15. 4 καλὸς τὸ σῶμα *beauty of body*: B/T note that this phrase reappears in *Ennead* III. 2 [47] 6. 8. See also I. 6 [1] 8. 1 ff., where the aspirant to *eudaimonia* is encouraged not to pursue bodily beauty (*ἐν σώματι καλά*).

[4] Porphyry notes that in his later years Plotinus' powers waned, *VP* 6. 35.

15. 5 μηδὲ ὅλως πρὸς ἀρετὴν *nor to excellence in total*: It seems to me that previous commentators have missed the importance of ὅλως here.[5] I suggest that ὅλως can be taken with ἀρετὴν to give the meaning of 'excellence in total'. Plotinus, when discussing ἀρετή, makes an important division between civic excellences and the higher excellences, which he equates with purifications (*Ennead* I. 2 [19] 3. 1 ff.). The aspirant to *eudaimonia* must have both sets of excellences (*Ennead* I. 3 [20] 6. 15–17). The point made here then may well be that bodily advantages are not an aid to obtaining either kind of excellence and so ὅλως, I suggest, ought to be taken with πρὸς ἀρετὴν rather than with μηδὲ. See lines 15–16 of this chapter.
15. 5 τοῦ ἀρίστου θέαν *the vision of the best*: See *Ennead* I. 6 [1] 7. 33, where this phrase is used again. At I. 6 [1] 7. 33–4 we are told that ὁ μὲν τυχὼν μακάριος ὄψιν μακαρίαν τεθεαμένος, ἀτυχὴς δὲ [οὗτος] ὁ μὴ τυχών 'the man who attains this is blessed in seeing that blessed sight, and he who fails to attain it has failed utterly'. In other places Plotinus calls it τῆς θέας τοῦ θεοῦ 'the vision of the god' (*Ennead* V. 5 [32] 11. 15), and warns us that we must reverse our way of thinking since this is not a vision to be seen with mortal eyes. See also ch. 13. 11–12 where it was called τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅλου θέας, and *Ennead* VI. 9 [9] 11. 34, where it is simply called τῆς θέας. This is of course the vision of the One, which Porphyry tells us Plotinus experienced four times in his lifetime.[6]
15. 6 καὶ τὸ ἄριστον εἶναι *or to being the best*: Plotinus has moved progressively up the ontological ladder that leads to *eudaimonia* to finish with τὸ ἄριστον εἶναι. The higher excellences result in the purification of the soul, which now settles itself in *Nous*. We have now gone beyond excellence (*Ennead* I. 2 [19] 6. 16–19). See also I. 2 [19] 1. 50–1 and I. 2 [19] 3. 31. To have a vision of the best one must recover real Being. The *spoudaios* must become fully conscious on the level of the higher soul. Armstrong misses the importance of εἶναι[7] here: we must *become* real Being. This was made clear earlier in ch. 4. 12–15: τὸν μὲν ἄλλον ἄνθρωπον μέρος τι τοῦτο ἔχειν δυνάμει ἔχοντα, τὸν δὲ εὐδαίμονα ἤδη, ὃς δὴ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστὶ τοῦτο καὶ μεταβέβηκε

[5] Armstrong translates thus: 'nothing to do in any way with virtue'; MacKenna: 'still less towards virtue'; Bréhier: 'ni à la vertu'; and B/T: 'überhaupt für die Tugend'.
[6] *VP* 23. 16.
[7] Armstrong simply translates 'or *with* the best itself'.

πρὸς τὸ αὐτό, εἶναι τοῦτο 'the other man who has this as a part has it potentially, but the man who is already [in possession of] *eudaimonia*, who is this in actuality has passed over into it, is this'. As Smith[8] observes with regard to an earlier passage, *Ennead* v. 3 12: 'he is now confident that the higher stage of ascent, unity and identity with *nous*, can be reached and goes on to claim that one becomes[9] *nous* when one abandons all other phases of oneself and gazes on *nous* by means of *nous*'.

15. 6–9 ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ... συμβάλλοιτο *Since the one... even a flute-player*: This general point was made already in ch. 7. 15-21. Once again one suspects that this treatise in its diffuseness suffers from Plotinus diminished powers.

15. 8–9 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν πρὸς αὐλητικὸν τέλος ἡ τούτων πλεονεξία συμβάλλοιτο *for an excess of these things would not contribute to making him even a flute-player*: The comparison between a technical excellence, such as flute-playing, and *eudaimonia* was common since Plato and Aristotle. B/T refer to Plato's *Gorgias* 501e, where Plato dismisses flute-playing as an art that produces only pleasure and nothing else.[10] It seems that the reputation of the flute-player had not improved by Plotinus' time.

15. 9–11 ἀλλὰ γὰρ θεωροῦμεν ... ἃ μὴ ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων νομίσειεν *For indeed we consider... that which the* eudaimōn *does not*: In ch. 8. 13

[8] Smith, *Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition*, 45.

[9] Smith observes that Merlan, *Monopsychism*, 79 has also noted the use of *γίγνομαι* here. 'The repeated use of the word *γίγνεσθαι* permits no doubt ... Plotinus here discusses (and admits) the possibility of some kind of transformation (*γένεσις*) of "us" into the *Νοῦς χωριστός*'.

[10] E. R. Dodds has a note on this which is worth quoting in full: 'it [flute-playing] was especially associated (a) with the wilder sort of evening parties (*Theaet.* 173d5 *σὺν αὐλητρίσι κῶμοι*) and (b) with the ecstatic dancing practised in the Dionysiac and similar cults (cf. Ar. *Pol.* 1342^{b}1 ff., Proclus in *Alc.* 198.5 ff.). It was no doubt on these grounds that the Pythagoreans condemned it as "hybristic" and vulgar (Iamb. *Vit. Pyth.* III); Pythagoras is even said to have advised his followers to wash their ears after hearing (Aristides Quintilianus, *de musica*, ii, p. 66 Jahn). Aristotle tells us (*Pol.* 1341^{a}18 ff.) that in the fifth century it was fashionable for a time to learn to play the aulos, but it was later discarded from the educational programme—rightly, he thinks, since this instrument is *οὐκ ἠθικὸν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικόν*. Plato excluded it altogether from his ideal State, ostensibly on the more technical ground that it was *πολυχορδότατον* and therefore "unscientific" (*Rep.* 399d, cf. *Phil* 56a)' (*Plato: Gorgias* (1959), 322–3).

we were told that no pain penetrates to the *spoudaios*, and that to sympathize with other people in pain is a weakness of our soul. Later in line 27 it is added that the *spoudaios* does not see misfortune as terrible but merely a childish fear. The general point made there, then, is simply repeated here.

15. 11–14 *ἢ οὔπω οὔτε σοφὸς οὔτε εὐδαίμων εἴη . . . ὅτι μηδέν ποτε κακὸν ἕξει* *or he would not yet be either wise or* eudaimōn . . . *that evil will never ever take hold of him*: One should note the technical vocabulary in this passage. *Eudaimonia* is the result of a process of purification (see above 15. 3). Purification is required in order that the *spoudaios* rid himself of all distracting *phantasmata*. The working of the process of imagination is central to Plotinus' psychology (see comm. on ch. 10. 19). Images come from above and below (*Ennead* IV. 4 [28] 13. 13). The images from below arrive *via* the sense faculty and represent only a trace of reality, and it is these that Plotinus tells us to get rid of here. They may appear frightening at times to the ordinary man, but not to the *spoudaios*, who keeps his attention fixed on the real images from *Nous*.

15. 13 *οἷον ἄλλος παντάπασι γενόμενος* *and becoming, as it were, another person entirely*: This ascent to a higher ontological level is required if the ordinary man is to become a *spoudaios*. This small phrase encapsulates Plotinian metaphysics. In making this ascent the *spoudaios* becomes conscious at the level of *Nous*, and removes his real self from disturbances in the temporal and sensory world. Bodéüs uses this phrase as the starting point for his article 'L'Autre Homme de Plotin'. He goes on to point out the great difference between the anthropologies of Plotinus and St Paul, mainly from an analysis of this treatise.

15. 14–15 *οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἀδεὴς ἔσται περὶ πάντα* *For in this way, certainly, he will be fearless concerning all things*: Regaining possession of his true self in *Nous* the *spoudaios* still operates in the sensory world, but he does so without fear of what happens to his body/soul combination. See *VP* 8. 19, where Porphyry says of Plotinus that he was at once present to himself, and to others. Having the higher realities in view, so to speak, he will not fear any image from the sensory world since his judgements are founded on the truth of *Nous*.

15. 15–16 *οὐ τέλεος πρὸς ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ ἥμισύς τις ἔσται* *not complete with regard to excellence, and will be a half-man*: Excellence is

achieved in two stages (*Ennead* I. 3 [20] 6. 17). The half-man is one who has acquired the civic excellences but not the higher excellences, which are equivalent to purification. Thus this man has not separated himself from body and is made afraid by some images from the world of sense. We are told in *Ennead* I. 3 [20] 6. 24 that the natural or civic excellences are not complete (ἀτελές) in vision and character. This is the state of the half-man. This half-man is referred to in ch. 16. 4 as ἐπιεικής; see the commentary there.

15. 16–21 ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἀπροαίρετον ... ἐκπλαγείη *And when an involuntary fear... a single severe glance*: This passage brings to mind Plato's *Phaedo* 77e3-7: *καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἐπιγελάσας, ὡς δεδιότων, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πειρῶ ἀναπείθειν· μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἔνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται. τοῦτον οὖν πειρῶ μεταπείθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον ὥσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια.* 'Cebes laughed. Suppose that we are afraid, Socrates, he said, and try to convince us. Or rather don't suppose that it is we that are afraid. Probably even in us there is a little boy who has these childish terrors. Try to persuade him not to be afraid of death as though it were a bogey'. This is noted by H/S², and by B/T, who also note the use of this image by Porphyry.[11] See also Wyttenbach's note on this image in his edition of the *Phaedo* where he refers to its use by Porphyry, Themistius, and Simplicius.[12] Surprisingly Wyttenbach does not refer to this passage in Plotinus.

15. 16–18 ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἀπροαίρετον ... γένηται *And when an involuntary fear... on other things*: This is evidence that the *spoudaios* engages in ordinary everyday activity as a member of a community. This is borne out in Plotinus' own life.[13] In concerning himself with these activities he may be overcome momentarily by some kind of fear. Although the *spoudaios* never relaxes his attention to the noetic world (see *VP* 8 . 20; 9. 18), this passage indicates that there could be times when he would not be perfectly in control. The involuntary impulse by its very nature could not be mastered: *ἀλλ' ἄλλου εἶναι τὸ ἀπροαίρετον, τὸ δὲ ἀπροαίρετον ὀλίγον εἶναι καὶ ἀσθενές· τὸν δὲ*

[11] Porphyry, *On Abstinence from Killing Animals*, 119, 44N. B/T mistakenly refer to 24 instead of 44.

[12] As cited in J. Burnet, *Plato: Phaedo*, (1984), 63.

[13] In *VP* 9 Porphyry gives a picture of the bustle of Plotinus' house and his arbitration in everyday disputes.

φόβον πάντῃ· περὶ οὐδενὸς γὰρ φοβήσεται—τὸ δὲ ἀπροαίρετον καὶ ἐνταῦθα 'the involuntary impulse belongs to something else, and is small and weak as well. It [viz. the soul] does away with fear altogether, for it has nothing to be afraid of—though involuntary impulse comes in here too' (*Ennead* I. 2 [19] 5. 13-16). It is this involuntary impulse which marks us as temporal creatures who have care for body, see *Ennead* I. 2 [19] 5. 3 ff.[14]

15. 20–1 *παῖδα καταπαύσει . . . ἐκπλαγείη* *and will check the child . . . a single severe glance*: A very striking image of how the *spoudaios* will control the combination of body and soul. The threatening will be unemotional, *ἀπειλῇ δὲ ἀπαθεῖ*, since the *spoudaios* does not operate on the level of emotion, see *Ennead* I. 2 19] 5. 12-15. The image suggests a picture of someone who controls by example. The correctness of his own behaviour inspires lesser people to copy it.[15] The image here of the sage correcting his lesser self can be writ large for society in general: the sage will instruct other people through example.

15. 21–5 *οὐ μὴν διὰ ταῦτα . . . μετὰ τοῦ νοῦν ἔχειν* *For such a person . . . because of his union with* Nous: The image of the *spoudaios* unemotionally instructing his lesser self in the previous lines prefigures the picture of the *spoudaios* presented in the final lines of ch. 15. This is a very important passage, which some writers have failed to take into account. The *spoudaios* has been dismissed as someone who is unconcerned, for the most part, with other human beings.[16] Westra here confuses lack of emotion with lack of concern. Plass[17] too sees irony in the combination of 'Such a person is not . . . unfriendly or hardhearted' and 'rendering to his friends as much as he renders to himself'. Both Plass and Westra have missed an essential point in Plotinus' ethical teaching. They fail to understand what Plotinus

[14] See O'Daly, *Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self*, 30.

[15] At *Ennead* IV. 3 [27] 32. 8–9 we are told *γένοιτο γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀμείνων καὶ τῇ παιδεύσει τῇ παρὰ τῆς κρείττονος* 'for a lower soul can be comparatively good from the beginning and can become so as a result of education by the higher soul'.

[16] Westra, *Plotinus and Freedom*, 127.

[17] Plass, 'Plotinus' Ethical Theory', 253. See also Henry, 'The Place of Plotinus in the History of Thought', p. xlvi, who believes that: 'In the pursuit of happiness, in the search for God, society has no place.'

means by excellence as demonstrated by the *spoudaios*. First we are told that civic excellence is a necessity for the *spoudaios* (see *Ennead* 1. 3 [20] 6. 14–18). Civic excellence in Plotinus (1. 2 [19] 1. 16–21) appears initially to be of the same kind that Plato presents in the *Republic*.[18] But there is another form of excellence that must be practised if one is to be a *spoudaios*. The wisdom gained by the *spoudaios* 'comes after the natural excellence, and then perfects the character' (*Ennead* 1. 3 [20] 6. 20–1). The *spoudaios* is guided by higher principles in *Nous* and his excellence, *as practised in society*, must be guided by those principles (*Ennead* 1. 2 [19] 3. 14-19).[19] Plato's civic excellence is subsumed in the excellence of purification that is required of the *spoudaios*.[20] This, ultimately, is the substance of civic excellence (τῆς πολιτικῆς ἡ οὐσία), the unemotional instruction of one's fellow human beings. By demonstrating the 'upward path' one is being the best of friends and showing the only concern that is worthwhile. To show pity, or to be emotionally guided, would be a disservice to one's friends. Practice of this kind of excellence does not make one an automaton. Porphyry provides us with examples of the *spoudaios*' concerned activity within his community; see *VP* 9. 16–17.[21] Yet, there is a problem here. It is difficult to see how this sort of instruction will benefit the masses, many of whom will not possess the philosophical bent required.[22] Smith[23] sees a similar difficulty in Porphyry's philosophy.

15. 22 ἀγνώμων *hardhearted*: It is clear from Porphyry's account of Plotinus' life that he was not hardhearted. Presumably Plotinus felt

[18] See 427e–434d.

[19] The doctrine of the benevolence of the *spoudaios* probably has its origins in Plato's *Symposium* where the production of true virtue in the family and state is based on a vision of the Good. See most recently the article by Smith, 'Action and contemplation in Plotinus' 65–72, which promotes a positive view of the relationship between contemplation and action in Plotinus.

[20] See the commentary on excellence in Plotinus in ch. 8. 21.

[21] See also Rist, *Road to Reality*, 168.

[22] See the references given at 103 n. 248 for a discussion of the difficulty of reconciling the ethical instruction of the *Enneads* with the behaviour of Plotinus depicted in Porphyry's *Life*. For a more positive view, see Schniewind, 'The Social Concern of the Plotinian Sage', 51–64.

[23] Smith, *Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition*, 71, 139.

emotion like everyone else, but did not allow this to direct his activities, which were guided by his higher soul in *Nous*.

15. 23–4 ἀποδιδοὺς οὖν ὅσα αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς φίλοις *Therefore rendering to his friends as much as he renders to himself*: Bréhier notes that this was a trait common to the Stoic and Epicurean sage; he refers to Epictetus, *Disc.* 1. 19. 11-15 and Epicurus (Usener, no. 581 = Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones* 3. 17. 39).

CHAPTER 16

The final chapter takes up again a fundamental Platonic theme that underlies this treatise, stated with particular clarity at the beginning of ch. 14: 'The combination [of body and soul] is not man, and especially not the *spoudaios*' (lines 1–2). Plotinus reinforces his argument with the authority of Plato, who is named for the first time in this treatise, although he has been quoted in ch. 13. 5–6, and indirectly alluded to throughout; see e.g. ch. 12. 1–4 and ch. 14. 1–2. The topic of suicide is touched on again, and although some commentators disagree, it seems quite clear to me that Plotinus is in favour of it. Plotinus closes the treatise by acknowledging that the body is attached to us, and although it plays no part in the *eudaimōn* life, he recognizes that we must cater for it as long as it is ours, and that in the scheme of things it has played its part.

16. 1–6 Εἰ δέ τις μὴ ἐνταῦθα ... καὶ οὐ ῥᾳδιον γενέσθαι *But if one will not set ... and this cannot easily occur*: These opening lines would seem to be a reference to Aristotle's position on the *spoudaios*. Although Aristotle stated that the *spoudaios* would not be shaken easily from his *eudaimonia*, he did concede that major disturbances would disrupt his *eudaimonia: πολλαὶ γὰρ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ παντοῖαι τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστ' εὐθηνοῦντα μεγάλαις συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γήρως, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τρωικοῖς περὶ Πριάμου μυθεύεται· τὸν δὲ τοιαύταις χρησάμενον τύχαις καὶ τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει.* 'For many changes occur in life, and all sorts of things happen: it is possible for a person who

flourishes to the highest degree to encounter great disasters in old age, as happened to Priam in the story of the events at Troy; and no one who has a fate like that, and died miserably, is counted *eudaimōn* by anyone' (*EN* 1100^{a}5–9, adapted). See also *EN* 1100^{b}22–30 and *Magna Moralia* 1206^{b}30–5. In Aristotle's view, the *spoudaios* may have a life that contains a mixture of good and bad. This is not the case with Plotinian *eudaimonia;* the *spoudaios* living in *Nous* has no share in any evil.

16. 1–2 *θήσει* *will set*: Armstrong, and H/S^2, in their first editions both read *ἄρας θήσειε*. However, H/S^2 replaced this with Kirchhoff's suggestion of *ἄρας θήσει*, which had been accepted by Müller, Volkmann, and then B/T. But the H/S^2 change from the optative *θήσειε*, to the future *θήσει*, was not noted in their *addenda ad textum*, which seems to have been a simple oversight. Armstrong was following these corrections with the result that in his second Loeb edition he read the optative *θήσειε*, not with a view to argument, but simply because he didn't realize that H/S^2 had emended the text. Against all this Bréhier prints the optative *θήσειε*.

16. 2–3 *κατάγοι δὲ πρὸς τύχας καὶ ταύτας φοβήσεται περὶ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι* *but would bring him down to chance and will fear that these things can concern him*: The idea that the one who lives in *Nous* is without fear is repeated in *Ennead* I. 1 [54] 2. 13–14.

16. 3–4 *οὔτε σπουδαῖον τηρήσει . . . ἀλλ' ἐπιεικῆ ἄνθρωπον* *he will not be observing the* spoudaios . . . *but the reasonable man*: The juxtaposition of the *spoudaios* and all other men is frequent in the *Enneads* (see II. 9 [33] 9. 6–8). But as is clear from the context here, the *ἐπιεικής* does not refer to the general population which is unlearned in philosophy, but to a man who has made some progress in terms of separation from body and yet is still capable of being disturbed by elements in the world of sense. He is not a *spoudaios*, but neither is he to be grouped with the ordinary man who lives only the body and soul combination.[1] For its use in Plato in this manner,

[1] The reasonable man is described in *Ennead* VI. 4 [22] 15. 36–37 *μικτός τις ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κακοῦ ἑτέρου γεγενημένος* 'mixed from the good self and the evil other'. See also II. 9 [33] 9. 8–11, where the *ἐπιεικής* is separated from the common crowd because he has some share in excellence and good. See Schniewind, *L'Éthique du Sage*, 108–13, who gives an excellent assessment of the categories of man as found in the *Enneads*.

see *Symposium* 210b8, and by contrast, compare its non-philosophical use in Aristotle's *Politics* 1308^{b}27.

16. 4–6 καὶ μικτὸν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ διδοὺς, μικτὸν βίον ἔκ τινος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ ἀποδώσει τῷ τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιον γενέσθαι *giving him a mixture of good and bad; he will assign to such a one [the* spoudaios*] a life which is also a mixture of some good and bad, and this cannot easily occur*: Understandably commentators and translators have found difficulty with the text here. B/T observe that Müller wished to omit the phrase *καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιον γενέσθαι*. Bréhier, too, brackets this in his text. MacKenna does not translate *καὶ μικτὸν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ διδοὺς* at all. It is difficult to see the grammatical relationship between *μικτὸν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ διδοὺς* and *μικτὸν βίον ἔκ τινος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ ἀποδώσει*.

The problem has emerged, I think, because of confusion about the object of the sentence. Plotinus has said that anyone who accepts a mixture of good and bad in the *eudaimōn* life is not thinking of the Plotinian *spoudaios*, but of a reasonable man. *ἀποδώσει τῷ τοιούτῳ*, which follows, is no longer referring to the reasonable man who was the object of the sentence, but to the Plotinian *spoudaios* who has now become the object. I supply a comma after *διδοὺς*, which helps with clarity. *μικτὸν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ διδοὺς* is referring to the reasonable man. However, *μικτὸν βίον ἔκ τινος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ ἀποδώσει* (lines 5–6) is referring to the Plotinian *spoudaios*. Existing on a higher ontological level, he cannot be touched by evil, which is the force of *οὐ ῥᾴδιον γενέσθαι*.

16. 5 μικτὸν βίον *mixed life*: H/S^2 in the *fontes addendi* refer to Plato's *Philebus* 22d6. There we find: *ἐν τῷ μεικτῷ τούτῳ βίῳ* 'in this mixed life'. See also *Ennead* VI. 4 [22] 15. 38–40 where we are told: *ἄλλος δέ τις ὁτὲ μὲν οὕτως, ὁτὲ δὲ ἄλλως ζῇ, μικτός τις ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κακοῦ ἑτέρου γεγενημένος* 'but someone else lives now this way now the other; he has become a person mixed from the good self and the evil other'. See also *Ennead* III. 2 [47] 7. 1 ff.

16. 6 καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιον γενέσθαι *and this cannot easily occur*: This is litotes. Such a situation cannot occur for a *spoudaios*.

16. 7 οὐκ ἂν ὀνομάζεσθαι εὐδαίμων *he would not merit being called* eudaimōn: Plotinus is saying, in effect, that such a person cannot exist. Outwardly, once again, Plotinus and the Stoics appear to agree. Man in Stoic theory either is good or bad, wise or foolish. So too, the

Plotinian *spoudaios*, who has become his real self again in *Nous*, can contain no mixture of bad. He will give the body only as much attention as is necessary, and if the body proves to be too troublesome, he has the option to leave it. Therefore, if someone does have a mixture of good and evil, he does not possess *eudaimonia*. *Eudaimonia* for humanity is an absolute, either you possess it or you do not, there are no half measures.

16. 8–9 οὐκ ἔχων τὸ μέγα οὔτε ἐν ἀξίᾳ σοφίας οὔτε ἐν καθαρότητι ἀγαθοῦ *not having greatness, either in worth of wisdom, or in clarity of good*: These are the hallmarks of Plotinian *eudaimonia*. We saw earlier that wisdom for the *spoudaios* was in fact the substance of *Nous*, real being. The *spoudaios* is the substance of wisdom. See comm. on chs. 9. 20 ff. and 15. 13. For ἐν καθαρότητι ἀγαθοῦ see comm. on 3. 36 where καθαρῶς is considered in some detail. Clarity is a feature of *Nous*; it characterizes separation from body.

16. 10–13 ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ... καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνο ζῆν *For indeed Plato correctly ... and live according to that*: As so often in the *Enneads*,[2] Plotinus directs us now, as Kalligas notes, in a synoptic way to Plato's philosophy. What Plotinus refers to here is best found in an amalgamation of Platonic passages. Armstrong suggests that the Platonic passages referred to are *Symposium* 212a1 and *Theaetetus* 176b1. To this H/S[2] add *Republic* 427d5-6 and 613b1. Harder also notes *Republic* 365b1. I quote the *Theaetetus* passage since it is closest in direct meaning to what we have here: διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι 'That is why we should make all speed to take flight from this world to the other, and that means becoming like the divine so far as we can, and that again is to become righteous with the help of wisdom' (176a8–b2). *Republic* 427d5-6 and 365b1 contain only linguistic similarities. This above passage summarizes well the necessary steps for the acquisition of *eudaimonia*. Plotinus can refer directly to Plato since this passage is, outwardly at least, straightforward Platonism. Although the metaphysical structure of the world is much more detailed in Plotinus, Plato's general statements on metaphysics may still be used by Plotinus as a blueprint for his own philosophy of ascent.

[2] See *Ennead* I. 2 [19] 3. 5; II. 1 [40] 7. 1; III. 6 [26] 11. 1; IV. 3 [15] 1. 23.

16. 13–17 ***τοῦτο οὖν δεῖ . . . κατακείσεται ἢ ὡδί*** *So it is necessary . . . if he lodges here or there*: B/T refer to *Ep.* 104. 8 and 28. 1 where Seneca expresses similar sentiments. *De Tranquillitate Animi* 2. 15 is also noted. The closeness of Plotinian and Stoic ethics is again apparent.

16. 17–20 ***διδοὺς μὲν τούτῳ . . . κύριος δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὢν τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τούτου*** *giving to this . . . he himself is in control concerning this decision*: This passage in the final chapter of *Ennead* I. 4 [46] makes it clear, to me at least, that Plotinus, in his final years, was in favour of suicide. See comm. on ch. 8. 5-9, and Appendix 2 for a fuller discussion of Plotinus' attitude to suicide.

16. 19 ***ἐν καιρῷ φύσεως*** *in nature's appropriate time*: Suicide is not to be thought of as common practice. For most people nature will decide on the life span of the body.

16. 19 ***κύριος δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς*** *he himself is in control*: See comm. on ch. 8. 8-9.

16. 20–3 ***ὥστε . . . ἕως δυνατόν*** *So that . . . while he is able*: Suicide is permissible, but only to be carried out when rational calculation demands it. Here we are told that the *spoudaios* will care for body as long as he is able to, and as long as he can make progress to consciousness of this *eudaimonia* on the level of the body and soul combination. Why the *spoudaios* does not simply jettison the body when *eudaimonia* is established is never discussed in the *Enneads*. The most obvious reason is that as a Platonist, Plotinus would simply have accepted the Platonic teaching in the *Phaedo* 62a1 ff. that we are given a post and should not desert it, although as Gallop[3] notes, Plato is not vetoing suicide *in toto*. Thus the man who is *eudaimōn*, and knows that the body is of no value, will still care for it, only departing when no further progress towards *eudaimonia* can be made. See Appendix 2.

16. 22 ***καὶ ὅλως οὐκ αὐτοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ προσεζευγμένου*** *and not really for him* [*the* spoudaios] *but for what is attached to him*: *Ennead* VI. 4 [22] 15. 38 tells us that the *spoudaios* gives what he gives to the body *ὡς ἑτέρῳ ὄντι ἑαυτοῦ* 'as something other than himself'.

16. 23–9 ***οἱονεὶ μουσικὸς λύρας . . . ἐχρήσατο γὰρ αὐτῷ ἤδη πολλάκις*** *like a musician with a lyre . . . he has used it many times already*: The imagery of a musician using a harp for soul using body

[3] D. Gallop, *Plato's Phaedo*, (1975), 85.

is found before and after Plotinus. B/T refer to Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Anima* 113. 1, and to Seneca, *Ep.* 87. 14.[4]

16. 27 ἄνευ ὀργάνων *without the instrument*: The image of the musician and lyre found already in Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Anima* 113. 1 is likely to have been in Plotinus' mind at this point.[5]

16. 27–9 καὶ οὐ μάτην . . . ἐχρήσατο γὰρ αὐτῷ ἤδη πολλάκις *But the instrument*. . . *for he has used it many times already*: Plotinus may well mean by this that the *spoudaios* used the body while training his higher soul to control its wants and needs. This would explain the presence of πολλάκις.

[4] McHugh notes that the same imagery is to be found in Plato's *Phaedo* 85e–86d. *Saint Ambrose: Seven Exegetical Works*, 145. See also Appendix 1 where it is shown that this image was also borrowed by St Ambrose.

[5] 'The two images seem to be closely related, though Plotinus, as we should expect, is more sharply visualised and poetic; the idea which they convey is the same, the activity always going on, always essentially the same, but sometimes using instruments, sometimes laying them aside. But what makes me almost certain that Plotinus had the Alexander passage in mind when he wrote is the odd plural ἄνευ ὀργάνων, which does not fit very well in its Plotinian context and looks to me like a verbal reminiscence of Alexander's ἄνευ ὀργάνων ἐνεργοῦντα', A. H. Armstrong, 'The Background of the Doctrine that the Intelligibles are not Outside the Intellect' (1960), 408.

APPENDIX 1

St Ambrose, *Jacob and the Happy Life*

St Ambrose used *Ennead* I. 4 [46], *Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας* quite extensively in writing the sermon *Jacob and the Happy Life*.[1] The general themes of *Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας* can be found in book one of *Jacob and the Happy Life* (*JHL*) from ch. 6. 24 through to ch. 8. 39. Ambrose is able to employ pagan philosophy in the service of Christianity principally to demonstrate the importance of reason in the realization of perfection. Obviously Ambrose borrows only sections that can be accommodated within Christian philosophy. Below I have juxtaposed passages where Ambrose's use of *Ennead* I. 4 [46] is most obvious.

1. *Ennead* I. 4 [46] 2. 21-6: Then living well will not belong to those who feel pleasure, but to the one able to grasp that pleasure is the good. The cause of living well then will not be pleasure, but the ability to judge that pleasure is the good. For [the ability] to judge is superior to [experiencing] an affection; for it is reason or intellect; whereas pleasure is [merely an] affection, and that which doesn't have reason is in no way superior to reason

   JHL 1. 7. 28: For the happiness of life does not lie in bodily pleasure... and in the mind of the man who knows that the good is also the pleasurable... Therefore, the motive for living well is not bodily pleasure, but the mind's sagacity. For it is not the flesh, which is subject to passion, that judges, but the mind, because nothing gives more pleasure than honourable counsels and noble deeds; that is why the mind is the interpreter of what constitutes the happy life. Now sagacity, or reason that has control over passion, is better than passion, and what judges is more excellent than what is subject to judgement. Nor is it possible that the non-rational be better than reason.

2. *Ennead* I. 4 [46] 4. 1–22: If, then, a human being is able to have the perfect life, a man who has this life is *eudaimōn*. If not, one would have to set *eudaimonia* among the gods, [if] such a life [belongs] to them alone. Yet

[1] This has been noted by McHugh in *St. Ambrose: Seven Exegetical Works*, 117 n. 5. The translation of *Jacob and the Happy Life* used in this Appendix is by McHugh.

since we say that this *eudaimonia* exists also among human beings, we must consider how this is so. I mean this: it is clear from other considerations that man has perfect life through having not only sense-perception, but also reasoning, and true noetic [activity]. But does he have this as something other than himself? No, he is not really a man if he does not have this either potentially or in actuality, which we say constitutes *eudaimonia*. But will we say that he has this species of life, this perfect life, in him as a part of him? The other man who has this as a part, has it [*eudaimonia*] potentially, but the man who is now in [possession of] *eudaimonia*, who is this in actuality, has passed into it, and is this. The other things now [merely] clothe him; one would say that they are not part of him because he does not want them to surround him. They would be his if they were connected to him through an act of will. What then is the good for this man? He himself [is the good] for himself by virtue of what he has. The transcendent cause [the Good] is [the cause] of the good in him and is in another way good, present to him in another way. There is evidence for this in that the one who has [the good] in this way does not seek to be anything else. For what indeed would he look for?

JHL 1.7.29-30: The happy life, then, does exist among men, but I mean only in those in whom life has been made perfect. Now the perfect life is not that of the senses, but the life of reason, lived according to management exercised by the reason and natural vigour possessed by the mind. In this there is found, not a part of man, but his completion, which appears not so much in his status as in his actions, and these, after all, make a man happy. To such a man, what is good but he himself? This good he possesses, this good is with him, and it will be the source of future goods for him ... And so the man who has been made perfect seeks nothing else but the only and admirable good.

3. *Ennead* I. 4 [46] 5.1-2: But what about pains and illness, and in general that which impedes activity?

   JHL 1.8.37: But perhaps someone may suppose that illness and bodily weakness are a hindrance to fulfilling the work of perfection, in that the works and accomplishments of one's hands cannot continue.

4. *Ennead* I. 4 [46] 6.1-7: But if our account taught that *eudaimonia* [depended on] not being in pain or ill or unfortunate or falling into great disasters, *eudaimonia* would not be [possible], whenever any of these contraries were present. But if this [*eudaimonia*] lies in possession of the true good, why is it necessary to put it aside, and looking towards it, to seek other things by which to judge *eudaimonia*, [other things] which do not count towards *eudaimonia*?

JHL 1.7.32: For if the definition were such that the happy life was the one that could be found free and clear of unfortunate occurrences, surely someone could not be termed happy if such occurrences came to pass. And so such matters have been put aside, and in judging of the happy life only this is demanded, that the definition of it should consist in nothing else but the possession of the true and the good. For the man who has this despises all other things and has no need of them.

5. *Ennead* I. 4 [46] 7. 1–8: Why, therefore, does the *eudaimōn* wish these things to be present and reject their opposites? We will say that it is not because they bring any addition to *eudaimonia*, but rather to his existence. [He avoids] the opposite of these [necessities] either because [they contribute] towards non-existence or because being present they disturb the end, not through taking it away, but because the one who has the best, wants to have this alone, not something else with it, which, whenever present, doesn't take it away, but nevertheless also exists beside it.

   JHL 1. 8. 34–5: Although the presence or absence of external advantages and bodily joys usually does not take anything from virtue or add anything to it ... For accidentals, which cannot increase happiness, do not lessen it, because the only good remains full and inviolable; Virtue that has been perfected remains always amid adversities and pleasures, adversities do not take anything away from its perfection, nor do pleasures add anything.

6. *Ennead* I. 4 [46] 7. 28–34: And if he should be unburied, his body will rot anyway both under and above the ground. And if [it is a concern] that he is buried inexpensively and without name, not being thought worthy of a lofty memorial, how trivial! And if he should be led off as a captive, the exit is there for him, if he cannot achieve *eudaimonia*. And if his own relations should be enslaved, for example, if daughters-in-law and daughters were to be dragged off—what, then, would we say, if he had died not having seen such a thing?

   JHL 1. 8. 36: He will not consider himself wretched either if he or his children fall into captivity, something that is reckoned a grave misfortune by most men ... He is not weak in regard to wrongs done to his own, nor anxious about the burial of his body.

7. *Ennead* I. 4 [46] 8. 2–5: But he will not be pitied even in his pain, since there is splendour inside him, like the light in a lamp when a terrific gale blows outside in a great tumult of wind and storm.

   JHL 1. 8. 36: Although he fights with the most severe pain, he does not show himself wretched but reveals a strength of spirit that shines like a

light in a lantern even amid rough storms and winds of the greatest severity, a strength that cannot be quenched.

8. *Ennead* I. 4 [46] 8. 24–5: For one must not [live] in an untrained manner, but like a great combatant be in a state to ward off fortune's blows.

   JHL 1. 8. 36: Rather, like a strong athlete, he matches blow for blow the man lashing him.

9. *Ennead* I. 4 [46] 9. 18–23: If thinking and wisdom were imported [from outside *Nous*], this argument would perhaps make sense; but if the essential nature of wisdom is in a substance, or rather in the substance, and this substance is not destroyed in someone sleeping, or, in general, in what is called not conscious to oneself; this activity of the substance is in him and such an activity is sleepless, then the *spoudaios*, in that he is a *spoudaios*, would be active even then.

   JHL 1. 8. 39: What indeed is lacking to the man who possesses the good and has virtue always as his companion and ally? . . . In what quiet of sleep not active? Even when he is asleep, his own virtue does not forsake him . . . He is no less happy . . . when he sleeps than when he is awake, because he is no less safe and sound when sleeping than when he is awake.

10. *Ennead* I. 4 [46] 16. 20–7: So that some of his activities will contribute to *eudaimonia*, but others will not be for the sake of the end, and not really for him [the *spoudaios*] but for what is attached to him, which he will care for and put up with, while he is able, like a musician with a lyre, while he is able to use it, but if he is not able to use it he will exchange it for another, or he will abandon using the lyre and he will give up the activity directed to it, having another task now not requiring a lyre and he will ignore it lying nearby singing now without an instrument.

    JHL 1. 8. 39: If a man who has been accustomed to sing to the accompaniment of a harp should find the harp shattered and broken and its strings undone and the use of it interrupted, he would put it aside and not call for its measures but would delight himself with his own voice. Just so will such a man as we have here allow the harp that is his body to lie unused.

APPENDIX 2

Plotinus on Suicide

We find within the framework of the *Enneads*, I suggest, if not a development, at least a switch of emphasis in Plotinus' attitude to suicide. In *Ennead* I. 9, number 16 in Porphyry's chronological order, we find an early Plotinian view of suicide which wished to curtail the Stoic teaching on suicide which advocated fairly free exit from the body.[1] Thus Porphyry is advised not to commit suicide because he is suffering *ἐκ μελαγχολικῆς* and thus his decision does not have a rational basis (*VP* 11). By the time we reach *Ennead* I. 4 [46], *Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας*, however, I think a change is discernible in Plotinus' outlook. This was written when he himself was suffering from a painful illness, which was eventually to kill him. And even taking into account that in this treatise, for the most part, it is the *spoudaios* who is now under discussion, it should be noted that we are directed to suicide as a viable option no less than *five* times. In contrast to *Ennead* I. 9 [16] where we are warned that we must remain for the time allotted us (16), now we are told: *διδοὺς μὲν τούτῳ ὅσα πρὸς τὴν χρείαν καὶ δύναται, αὐτὸς δὲ ὢν ἄλλος οὐ κωλυόμενος καὶ τοῦτον ἀφεῖναι, καὶ ἀφήσων δὲ ἐν καιρῷ φύσεως, κύριος δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὢν βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τούτου* 'giving to this [combination of body and soul] as much as it needs, and he is able, but he himself is other and is not prevented from abandoning this, and he will abandon it in nature's appropriate time, and he himself is in control concerning this decision' (ch. 16. 17-20). More important still are the passages in ch. 7. 31-2 where we are encouraged to do away with ourselves if taken as war-slaves. Why the *spoudaios* cannot sustain his *eudaimonia* as a war-slave is not clear, particularly in view of all that

[1] Thus the treatise begins with the emphatic: *Οὐκ ἐξάξεις, ἵνα μὴ ἐξίῃ· ἐξελεύσεται γὰρ ἔχουσά τι, ἵνα καὶ ἐξέλθῃ, τό τε ἐξελθεῖν ἐστι μεταβῆναι εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. ἀλλὰ μένει τὸ σῶμα ἀποστῆναι πᾶν αὐτῆς* 'You shall not take out your soul so that it may not go; for if it goes thus it will go taking something with it so that it can manage to get out; and going out is moving to another place. But the soul waits for the body to depart from it' (*Ennead* I. 9 [16] 1–3). In lines 7–11 the potential suicide is admonished again, before we get a final warning: *καὶ εἰ εἱμαρμένος χρόνος ὁ δοθεὶς ἑκάστῳ, πρὸ τούτου οὐκ εὐτυχές, εἰ μή, ὥσπερ φαμέν, ἀναγκαῖον ... εἰς τὸ προκόπτειν οὔσης ἐπιδόσεως οὐκ ἐξακτέον* 'and if each man has a destined time allotted to him, it is not a good thing to go out before it, unless as we maintain, it is necessary ... one must not take out the soul as long as there is any possibility of progress' (*Ennead* I. 9 [16] 15–19).

Plotinus says about his ability to undergo hardship. The crucial passage is to be found in ch. 7. 43-5 where Plotinus says: *καὶ πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ ἄμεινον αἰχμάλωται γενόμενοι πράξουσι. καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς δὲ βαρυνομένοις ἀπελθεῖν·... ἢ μένοντες δέον μή, αὑτοῖς αἴτιοι* 'Anyhow, many people will do better by becoming war-slaves; and it is in their own power to depart if they find the burden heavy. If they stay... when they ought not to, it is their own fault'. Now we are discussing 'many people' (*οἱ πολλοί*), not specifically the *spoudaios*, and suicide is still casually advocated. I suggest, therefore, that the change in Plotinus' attitude to suicide between *Ennead* I. 9 [16] and I. 4 [46] cannot be explained by a change in subject matter, from the ordinary man to the *spoudaios*, but rather the change is due to his own particular circumstances at the time of writing *Ennead* I. 4 [46]: he was ill. So in I. 4 [46] he has relaxed his restrictions on suicide so that it is permissible simply if the burden is heavy (*βαρυνομένοις* ch. 7. 43), and although *Ennead* I. 9 [16] may have represented his wish to curtail Stoic views about the legitimacy of suicide, I. 4 [46], I think, shows a return to what is tantamount to the Stoic *dictum* 'the door is open'.[2]

I suggest therefore that in his later years Plotinus thought suicide legitimate, and at times even necessary, for the *spoudaios*. Rist thinks this impossible because Plotinus says that we should stay in body if any improvement towards *eudaimonia* is possible and it seems unlikely that anyone is beyond the possibility of improvement.[3] Rist's mistake is to see *eudaimonia* in relative terms: it is an absolute. Once established, it remains inviolable in *Nous*. What is subject to change is the *spoudaios*' consciousness of his *eudaimonia*. Constant bodily pain will detract from the *spoudaios*' consciousness of his *eudaimonia* on the level of the body and soul combination, as Plotinus explained in ch. 7. 4 ff. Therefore improvement can be made *per se* by leaving the body behind. It is therefore logical even for the *spoudaios* to depart the body, the only criterion being that a decision is rationally based.

Plotinus in these last writings came to focus on moral concerns and as Hadot[4] has noted, these writings were essentially for Plotinus himself. Here we have a man waiting to die, a man whose body may have served him well up until this point, but now it serves only to bring pain. Plotinus had made all the progress he could at this stage and it is not surprising therefore

[2] See Dillon, 'Singing without an Instrument', 231–8 who is broadly in agreement with what I say here. However Rist, *Road to Reality*, 175–7, disagrees, arguing that Plotinus never endorsed suicide.

[3] Rist, *Road to Reality*, 176.

[4] P. Hadot, *Plotinus or the Simplicity of Vision*, (1993), 101.

to find a clear acceptance of suicide here. De Keyser[5] agrees that *Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας* is indeed a case of Plotinus changing his mind on suicide. Merlan[6] too agrees that Plotinus thought suicide to be permissible, as does Whittaker.[7]

[5] E. De Keyser, *La Signification de l'Art dans les Ennéades de Plotin*, (1955), 21.

[6] Merlan, 'Greek Philosophy from Plato to Plotinus', 130 n. 2. This was the view of Dean Inge who cites this passage as evidence of Plotinus' endorsement of suicide (W. R. Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus* (1918), i. 173).

[7] T. Whittaker, *The Neoplatonists*, (1928), 91.

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See also the List of Abbreviations, pp. xi–xii.

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